JUDGMENT:- Heard learned counsel Mr. N. D. Sonawane instructed by Advocate Shri. V. D. Hon, who appears for the appellant. This Second Appeal is filed by the defendant No.2 in Regular Civil Suit No.48/94.(The parties hereinafter are referred to their original status as plaintiff and defendants in Regular Civil Suit No.48/94). 2. The plaintiff had filed Regular Civil Suit No.4812004 on October 26, 1994 against the defendants for perpetual injunction. The suit, after hearing the parties, came to be dismissed by the Trial Court by its judgment and order passed on October 12, 2001. This judgment dismissing the suit, was challenged by the plaintiff in Regular Civil Appeal No.3/2002. This Regular Civil Appeal No.3/2002, after hearing the parties came to be allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kopargaon by its judgment and order dated October 18, 2004, and dismissal of the Regular Civil Suit No.48/ 1994 was quashed and set aside by the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court decreed the suit with costs. The defendants were directed to remove the construction of the road, passing through the land of plaintiff on/or before 30th November, 2004. This judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court on October 18, 2004 in Regular Civil Suit No.3/2002 is the subject matter of this Second Appeal. 3. The learned counsel for appellant has made available copy of the paper book supplied to the parties by the office of learned Additional District Judge, Kopargaon, District Judge, Ahmednagar. The pleading of the parties in civil suit is important. The pleading is defined under Order 6, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaint is pleading of the plaintiff and written statement is the pleading of the defendant. The parties are expected to plead material facts in their pleadings. The parties can lead their evidence in support of their pleadings. The pleading of the parties, thus is a foundation of stance taken by the parties in Civil Proceeding. Importance of the pleading is reiterated by the Supreme Court time and again. Reference can be made to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of "State Bank of India Vs. S. N. Goyal", reported in (2008 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4355: [2008 ALL SCR 2139]). The learned counsel has also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court regarding pleadings, in the matter of "Gulabrao Balwantrao Shinde Vs. Reference can be made to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of "State Bank of India Vs. S. N. Goyal", reported in (2008 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4355: [2008 ALL SCR 2139]). The learned counsel has also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court regarding pleadings, in the matter of "Gulabrao Balwantrao Shinde Vs. Chababai Balwantrao Shinde and others", reported in 2002 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4587: [2003(1) ALL MR 398 (S.C.)]. There, the Supreme Court has considered the provisions laid down under Order 6, Rule 1 and Order 7, Rule 7 of C.P.C. The Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot make out a new case which is not pleaded. In the matter of Gulabrao (supra) plaintiff had claimed only the half share in the property. 4. The learned counsel for appellant has invited my attention to the grounds Nos.(III), (IV), (VII), (X), (XI), (XII) raised in present appeal. These grounds are reproduced hereinbelow. (III) Whether the Court can grant a relief which is not asked by the plaintiff and more so when there is no pleadings to that effect in the plaint? (IV) Whether the relief of injunction can be granted in favour of a person who is not in possession of the suit land and it is settled principle of law? (VII) Whether the Courts have overlooked the main aspect of the case that in a suit for perpetual injunction the plaintiff has to prove her possession in the suit land and unless she proves her possession in the suit land, the suit for relief of injunction can not be decreed and injunction should not have been granted in her favour ? (X) Whether the Appellate Court has erred in holding that without filing cross objection or appeal the Appellant cannot agitate that the road was in existence since the year 1982, when it is now settled law that the party aggrieved by the lower court finding can agitate it in appeal filed by other party without preferring appeal or cross-objection and the Appellate Court has overlooked this legal aspect and if it would have consider it will have adverse inference and findings? (XI) Whether the Appellate Court while reversing the finding of the trial court has considered the ratio in Santosh Hazari's case reported in 2001(2) Mh.L.J. page 786 and therefore, the impugned Judgment and decree passed by the appellate court requires interference by this Han 'ble Court ? (XII)Whether the relief asked by the respondent No.1 is in respect of construction of rood an the Southern side of the Survey Na.94 i.e. the suit land and when from the evidence, it is proved and held by bath courts that the road is an the Northern side of the suit land, then is it legal and justifiable an the part of the Appellate Court to pass a relief of removal of the road and that too passing through the land of the respondent No.1 ? 5. From the papers, it appears that Regular Civil Suit Na.48/1994 was in respect of agricultural land Survey Na.94 (suit land). Area of this land is not given in description of the property. However, boundaries have been specifically given. In para 2 of the plaint, a statement is made that suit property is owned by the plaintiff and it is in actual physical possession of the plaintiff since about 60-70 years prior to the date of filing of this suit. The suit land earlier was in the name of father of plaintiff and after his demise, plaintiff succeeded to the suit property. To the southern side of the suit property, land survey Nas.95 and 90 are situated. The owner of the land survey Na.95, had committed an encroachment aver the suit property in the year 1990-91. Plaintiff had applied for measurement to the District Inspector of Land Records. To the Southern side, Survey Nos.95 and 90 are situated. However, there is no public road. Suit land was never acquired by the State Government or defendant No.2 .Municipal Council. Grievance is raised that defendant No. 1 with the aid of defendant Nos.1 and 3 was trying to construct road from the southern side of the suit property. The said road admitted by the defendants, runs in east west direction. On October 20, 1994, construction material had been brought by the defendants. Therefore, prayer far decree of perpetual injunction in para Na.6(A) was made. The said road admitted by the defendants, runs in east west direction. On October 20, 1994, construction material had been brought by the defendants. Therefore, prayer far decree of perpetual injunction in para Na.6(A) was made. Though reference in the body of the plaint is made regarding construction of road by the defendants from the southern side of the suit land, para 6(A) i.e. prayer clause specifically seeks a decree for perpetual injunction against• defendants Nos.1 to 3 in relation to possession of the plaintiff over the land Survey No.94 i.e. suit property and especially for construction work of the road from suit land and/or prayer clause 6(B) makes a prayer that in case defendants succeed in constructing the road from the suit land, the said construction of the road may be removed and plaintiff be permitted to enjoy the suit property peacefully. 6. Since grievance is raised regarding the pleading, I have considered the importance of the pleading and noted the pleading in the plaint made by the plaintiff right from the description of the property till the end of the prayers i.e. para 6(A)(B) of the plaint. Written statement is filed by the defendant No.2 at Exh.15. Description of property is denied. According to the defendant No.2, there was no cause of action, suit filed by the plaintiff was hit by the principle of non joinder of necessary parties to the suit. According to the defendant No.2, suit was also bad for mis-joinder of parties. Contentions of the plaintiff that there was no road near Survey Nos90 and 95, was denied. Statement of plaintiff that there was no acquisition of the suit land either by the State Government or Municipal Council was also denied. In para (8). it is pleaded that all buildings, open space. public streets, within the limits of Municipal Council are under the control of the Municipal Council. For the public convenience and in the interest of public. properties can be acquired by the Municipal Council. On April 6. 1996 town Shirdi was declared as holy place under special programme, by the State of Maharashtra. Construction work of the road in question which is pleaded, has been started under this programme. A specific statement is made in para 10 that construction work of the road is not from the suit land and plaintiff has no concern with the said construction of the road. Construction work of the road in question which is pleaded, has been started under this programme. A specific statement is made in para 10 that construction work of the road is not from the suit land and plaintiff has no concern with the said construction of the road. In para 11 of the written statement, it is pleaded that plaintiff has filed suit and obtained exparte temporary injunction unnecessarily and put the municipal council to inconvenience. This written statement seems to have been filed on December 16, 1995. 7. The Trial Court has framed as many as seven issues in the suit. The issue No.1 was in respect of apprehension of the plaintiff and/or grievance of the plaintiff regarding obstruction to the possession and enjoyment and the finding is in the affirmative i.e. in favour of plaintiff. Issue No.2 was in respect of grievance of the defendants that suit was bad for non joinder of necessary parties and finding is against the defendants and in favour of plaintiff. The description of property, according to the Trial Court, was the subject matter of the issue No.4 and finding is recorded in favour of plaintiff. Issue No.5 was in respect of maintainability of the suit and finding is against the plaintiff, holding that the suit is not maintainable. Issue No.6 was regarding entitlement of the plaintiff for injunction and finding is against the plaintiff. 8. I have considered the finding of the Trial Court on issue No.5, holding that suit is not maintainable. Discussion and/or observation of the Trial Court is in para 9 of the judgment. The Trial Court has referred to oral evidence of the plaintiffExh.60 and alleged admission given by the plaintiff that construction of the road is now completed and the road is prepared in the northern side of the land Survey No.94. The learned Trial Judge also observed that the plaintiff has lost possession over the road and therefore, it was necessary for her to seek the relief of removal of encroachment and to seek possession of the said portion. However, plaintiff did not amend the plaint and not prayed for such removal. Plaintiff also did not ask for mandatory injunction/direction in the suit. For these reasons learned Judge of the Trial Court recorded finding that present suit for simplicitor injunction is not maintainable. 9. However, plaintiff did not amend the plaint and not prayed for such removal. Plaintiff also did not ask for mandatory injunction/direction in the suit. For these reasons learned Judge of the Trial Court recorded finding that present suit for simplicitor injunction is not maintainable. 9. The plaintiff was appellant in Regular Civil Appeal No.312002 filed under section 96 read with Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Power, scope and jurisdiction of the First Appellate Court under section 96 has been considered by the Supreme Court, in the matter of "Madhukar and others Vs. Sangram and others", reported in 2001 A.I.R. S.C.W.1804. Supreme Court has observed that it is the duty of the First Appellate Court to deal with all issues and evidence led by the parties before recording the findings. It is also aposite to refer to another judgment of Supreme Court i.e. in the matter of "Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari", 2001 A.I.R. S.C.W.723. 10. From this view point let us now turn to the judgment of First Appellate Court in the hand. The First Appellate Court has framed two points for determination in the appeal. Point No.1 is in respect of the entitlement of the plaintiff to get the relief sought for and finding is in favour of the plaintiff. In para No.11, First Appellate Court has referred to two documents i.e. Exhs.69 and 70. It is not seriously in dispute that development plan was published in the year 1982. The case of the defendants is that road was shown in the Development plan. In para 12 of the judgment the First Appellate Court has referred to the findings of the Trial Court that defendant has carried out construction of the road during the pendency of the suit and in defiance of the temporary injunction order passed by the Trial Court against the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court opined that it is clear case that by flouting the order of the Court, the defendants have carried out construction of the road. The First Appellate Court, therefore, observed that it is open for the Court and it is in the inherent jurisdiction to bring back party to its position where it originally stood before the injunction order was passed. The First Appellate Court, therefore, observed that it is open for the Court and it is in the inherent jurisdiction to bring back party to its position where it originally stood before the injunction order was passed. It was submitted before the First Appellate Court that plaint para 6(B) was not considered by the Trial Court, wherein it has been mentioned that during the pendency of the suit, if the defendant carries out the construction work, then they be directed to remove the said construction. The First Appellate Court then observed in para 13 that "Thus, it appears that from the contents of the plaint that plaintiff has claimed relief of mandatory injunction. The First Appellate Court was of the opinion that even though it is not claimed, then also, the Court has authority and duty to restore the possession of the plaintiff which has been dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. The First Appellate Court further proceeded to hold that the Trial Court has committed error by dismissing the suit only on the ground that she has not claimed mandatory injunction, ultimately the First Appellate Court has allowed the appeal and quashed and set aside the judgment and decree. 11. The learned counsel for appellant has also placed his reliance on the judgment of learned Single Bench of this Court in the matter of "State of Goa & Ors. Vs. Shri. Gurudas Timblo & Ors.", reported in 2004(3) ALL MR 418. Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C. has been considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court while holding that filing of cross-objection in an appeal, is purely optional. Scope of Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C. now has been clarified by the Supreme Court also. In other words, in appeal filed by the plaintiff, defendants were permitted to support the judgment of the Trial Court. The Courts below have considered mainly three aspects of the matter i.e. the oral evidence, alleged admission given by the plaintiff in cross examination, development plan Exhs.69 and 70 as well as fact of issuing temporary injunction by the Court which remained in operation till the disposal of the suit and fact of construction of the road by the defendant No.2 during the pendency of the suit. The learned Counsel for appellant could not point out that temporary injunction order granted by the Trial Court was at any point of time challenged by filing legal proceeding and was quashed and set aside till the disposal of the suit. 12. The pleading of the party has to be considered and understood in its proper perspective. This Court and Supreme Court has held that mofussil pleading has to be construed liberally. Para 6(B) of the prayer Clause specifically makes a prayer that if defendants No.1 to 3 succeed in carrying out the construction of the road legally, in that circumstances said work (construction of the road) and said action should be removed and plaintiff be permitted to enjoy the property peacefully. This pleading is in vernacular. I read the plaint from para (1) till last prayer in para 6(C). If the plaint as a whole is read and appreciated, in my view, adequate and sufficient pleading is made by the plaintiff seeking mandatory injunction and/or direction. In the case in hand, both the Courts are concurrent on the point that temporary injunction was issued by the Court. The Courts have referred to various dates right from the date of filing of the suit and even couple of months before it. The Courts have referred the report of the Commissioner. The Courts have also appreciated the short span of time within which the defendant No.2 could complete the construction work of the road in defiance of the temporary injunction granted by the Civil Court. The conduct of the defendants carrying out and completing the construction work in defiance of temporary injunction granted by the Court, has been taken cognizance by the First Appellate Court referring to the pleading i.e. para 6(B) and has quashed and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. It is unfortunate that the Trial Court did not read the plaint especially para Nos.6 (A), (B) and (C) in its proper perspective. The parties cannot be permitted to flout the orders of the Civil Court, if such instances are brought to the notice of the Court and Court has restored the possession on the date of filing of the suit, said order cannot be said to be perverse. The parties cannot be permitted to flout the orders of the Civil Court, if such instances are brought to the notice of the Court and Court has restored the possession on the date of filing of the suit, said order cannot be said to be perverse. In my view, a party to the litigation, cannot be allowed to take an unfair advantage by committing breach of an interim order passed by the Civil Court and escape the consequences thereof. Wrong committed by the party disobeying the order of the Civil Court should not be allowed to continue or perpetuate such wrong as a precedent. Such disregard of the order of the Civil Court should not be permitted to hold good. Such disobedience, if brought to the notice of the Court, what is the duty of the Court? A party suffering breach of injunction order mayor may not resort to provision laid down under Order 39, Rule 2(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such party mayor may not file or take out contempt petition in accordance with the provisions of law. However, the Civil Court seized with hearing of such lis always can resort to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Imposition of punishment or consequences of order passed under Order 39, Rule 2(A) of Civil Procedure Code and/or order passed by the competent Court under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would be altogether different aspect of the matter. Citizens/litigants who approaches to the Civil Court for adjudication of alleged rights is/ are basically interested in seeking remedy/ decree/order from the competent Civil Court. Primarily he has concern with relief of Civil nature in his favour from the Civil Court upon adjudication of rights. The Civil Court, therefore, is duty bound, to exercise inherent powers under section 151 of the Code for setting wrong at naught. This is because it is of high importance that orders of the Court should be obeyed. Thus, in my view, on principle those who defy a prohibition imposed ought not to be able to get away with the fruits of their defiance. If act of the disobedience were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and prevalent public policy. Thus, in my view, on principle those who defy a prohibition imposed ought not to be able to get away with the fruits of their defiance. If act of the disobedience were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affair to exist while it is in seizin of lis, that state of affair is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the same Court orders otherwise or Superior Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances, has the duty and also right to treat such disobedient act as having not taken place at all for its purposes. In my view, these inherent powers u/s.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure are wide and are not subject to any limitation. To put it in other words, it can be stated that where in violation of stay order or injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it shall be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong, right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong. In my view, the inherent powers will not only be available in such case, but it is bound to be exercise in that manner in the interest of justice. Even apart from the Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, in my view, as a matter of judicial policy, the Courts should guard against itself being stultified. In the circumstances like this it cannot be held that Court is powerless to undoing a wrong done in disobedience of Court orders. However, in the case on hand the First Appellate Court has exercised such power under section 151 of the Code. This exercise, therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary, absurd or perverse. 13. In the case on hand, the learned counsel for appellant fairly conceded that there is no acquisition on behalf of council. The First Appellate Court with reasoned judgment has quashed and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, decreed the suit with costs and directed the defendants to remove the construction work of the road. which is passing through the land of plaintiff. The First Appellate Court with reasoned judgment has quashed and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, decreed the suit with costs and directed the defendants to remove the construction work of the road. which is passing through the land of plaintiff. In view of the order passed by the First Appellate Court, grounds No. III and IV stated in memo of appeal cannot be accepted to be grounds involving substantial questions of law. In my view, the grounds which according to the learned counsel for appellant involve substantial question of law in reality do not involve such substantial question/s within the meaning of Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. This appeal being devoid of substantial question of law, needs to be dismissed. In the result, Second Appeal stands dismissed being devoid substantial question of law. No order as to costs. Second appeal dismissed.