JUDGMENT 1. By this petition, original complainant - Smt.Sunita impugns Judgment rendered by learned Extra Joint Sessions Judge, Latur in Sessions Case No.66 of 1998 whereby and whereunder respondent Nos.2 and 3 have been acquitted for offences punishable under Section 376 (g) and 504 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 were prosecuted in Sessions Case No.66 of 1998, for offence of committing gang rape on the petitioner and use of obscenities in relation to her with intention to provoke her to commit breach of peace or knowing that she would be provoked to commit breach of public peace. Both of them were tried together. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted them of the charges. 3. The prosecution case, stated briefly, is that the petitioner was residing with her mother at village Karajgaon at the relevant time due to strained matrimonial relations with her husband. She claimed separate maintenance allowance from her husband, by name Mahesh Suryawanshi. She had also filed a civil suit against respondent No.2 - Mukund Jadhav, for recovery of loan amount advanced to him by her. The litigations were pending in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) and Judicial Magistrate (F.C.) at Ausa (District Latur). On May 12th, 1998 she went to Ausa to consult her advocate. By about 7.30 p.m., she boarded in a S.T. Bus to return to village Karajgaon. The S.T.Bus was bound for Sastur via interjection (Pati) of Karajgaon approach road. Some other co-villagers and she alighted from the S.T. Bus and started proceeding towards the village. She trailed behind the co-villagers, who were proceeding a bit ahead. She noticed that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 were following her from behind. After walking distance of about a mile, the respondent No.2 - Mukund called her. She stopped for a while. Both of them, i.e. the respondent Nos.2 and 3 reached near her. Then, respondent No.2 - Mukund asked her as to why she had filed recovery suit against him. She replied that if he would pay the money borrowed by him, then she would withdraw the suit. He told her that he would not pay the money and further added "you may uproot my pubic hair". She told him that let the suit be decided by the Court and immediately started proceeding towards the village. He caught her right hand and pulled her towards him. He told her that he would not pay the money and further added "you may uproot my pubic hair". She told him that let the suit be decided by the Court and immediately started proceeding towards the village. He caught her right hand and pulled her towards him. She turned around and asked him to release her hand. He forcibly pulled her by side of the road and then respondent No.3 - Pandit caught hold of her arms. Though she tried to resist, both of them dragged her upto distance of about 25 feet. They made her to lie down on ground in a ditch. The respondent No.2 allegedly lifted her petticoat and pulled apart her legs. He abused her in filthy language and thereafter committed forcible intercourse with her. Thereafter, respondent No.3 - Pandit committed forcible intercourse with her while respondent No.2 - Mukund held her hands. In the course of scuffle, her bangles were broken and hair pin had fallen at the place in the ditch. They left her alone only after their lust was satisfied. She returned to house of her mother at about 9.00 p.m. On next day morning, she went to Latur and narrated the incident to Superintendent of Police. Her report was registered as Crime No.0/1998 and she was referred to concerned Police Station where the offence was registered vide Crime No.83/1998. Certain investigation was carried out by the Police. Consequent upon material gathered during course of the investigation, the respondent Nos.2 and 3 were charge-sheeted for offences punishable under Section 376(g) and 504 read with 34 of the I.P.C. The petitioner alleged that she was ravished by the respondent Nos.2 and 3 with a view to avenge upon her because she had filed a civil suit for recovery of loan amount of Rs.20,000/- advanced to respondent No.2 - Mukund in lieu of the land mortgaged by him with her. 4. Both the respondents/accused denied truth into the charge (Exh.3). The defence version was that the petitioner wanted that the respondent No.2 - Mukund shall keep her as his mistress. There were sexual relations between them. He declined to keep her as his mistress. His marriage was scheduled after about one week and hence, he alongwith his friend have been framed in a concocted case at her behest. 5. The defence version was that the petitioner wanted that the respondent No.2 - Mukund shall keep her as his mistress. There were sexual relations between them. He declined to keep her as his mistress. His marriage was scheduled after about one week and hence, he alongwith his friend have been framed in a concocted case at her behest. 5. At trial, the prosecution examined 7 (seven) witnesses and produced certain documents in support of its case. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the absence of injuries on the prosecutrix/petitioner and her conduct alongwith attending circumstances would disprove the charge. The learned Sessions Judge found that version of the prosecutrix/petitioner was not worthy of credence. He observed that defence of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 is probable. He observed that litigations between the respondent No.2 - Mukund and prosecutrix/petitioner would show that their relations were strained. The learned Sessions Judge observed : " It is amply brought on record that accused Pandit is a close friend and relative of accused Mukund. In such circumstances, I find substance in the defence about false implication in this case with intent to give set back to the marriage of accused Mukund which was to be performed just within 8 days and thereby to teach him a lesson in revengeful attitude on the part of complainant". So, by disbelieving the prosecution evidence and believing the defence, the respondent Nos.2 and 3 came to be acquitted. 6. Heard learned Advocate Mr.Pawar holding for Mr.Dharashive, appearing for the petitioner and learned A.P.P. Mr.Sonawane. Unfortunately, though opportunity was given and the matter was adjourned from time to time, yet none appeared for the respondent Nos.2 and 3. This being a revision petition, the same can be disposed of even though advocate of one party or another is absent at the hearing, particularly, in view of specific provision contained in Section 403 of the Cr.P.C. Since none appeared at the hearing on consecutive two dates and even no request was made in spite of the fact that the judgment was reserved, I am at a loss to hear the arguments of the respondent Nos.2 and 3. 7. There cannot be duality of opinion that ordinarily exercise of revisional jurisdiction is limited and, therefore, reappreciation of evidence is impermissible. 7. There cannot be duality of opinion that ordinarily exercise of revisional jurisdiction is limited and, therefore, reappreciation of evidence is impermissible. This Court, in its revisional jurisdiction can exercise any of the power conferred on a Court of appeal and that under Section 386 (A). The High Court, as an appellate Court, is entitled to render conviction by reversing the order of acquittal, yet the express provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 401 clearly puts an embargo on the exercise of such powers to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The revisional jurisdiction operates within narrow limits and may be exercised only in exceptional cases where correction of a gross miscarriage of justice is required. The revisional jurisdiction may be exercised, however, in case where there is flagrant miscarriage of justice or perverse appreciation of evidence or that material evidence is overlooked by the trial Court. 8. Keeping at the back of mind the above referred legal position, I shall proceed to examine whether the impugned Judgment deserves interference being an exceptional case wherein miscarriage of justice seems to have occasioned or because findings of the learned Sessions Judge are apparently perverse. The principle that normally such findings are not to be interfered with is alright. Simultaneously, this Court cannot hoodwink the patently erroneous findings, which are based on rather misconception of the legal provisions. The ultimate aim is to see that the justice must prevail. 9. In the fact situation of the present case, bare perusal of the impugned Judgment reveals that the learned Sessions Judge did not take cognizance of presumption available under Section 114-A of the Evidence Act. The impugned Judgment does not show that the effect of such presumption available as regards absence of consent in prosecution for rape under clause (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the I.P.C. is considered by the learned Sessions Judge. There is no whisper in the impugned Judgment as regards the material reasons, which were considered in order to surmount availability of the presumption as to absence of the consent in the prosecution case when the petitioner, who was examined as PW-2, specifically alleged that she was subjected to forcible intercourse by both the accused persons, one after another, in succession. The Apex Court, in "State of U.P. vs. Pappu alias Yunus and another" (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 594, [2005 ALL MR (Cri.) 236 (S.C.)], held that the acquittal of the accused based inter alia on the absence of injury on the prosecutrix could not be approved. The Apex Court observed : "10. There appears to be some misreading of the evidence of PW 2, the mother of the prosecutrix. The trial court had noticed as to how even in the absence of any external injury an offence could have been committed after analysing the doctor’s evidence. The evidence of PW 2 has been read out of context by the High Court. As noticed by the trial court, she had categorically denied that the character of her daughter was not good and had also denied suggestion that her character being not good, they have been forcibly extricated from the mohalla. But at another place, she has accepted that character of her daughter was not good. Even if that be so, that does not dilute the offence. 11. Even assuming that the victim was previously accustomed to sexual intercourse, that is not a determinative question. On the contrary, the question which was required to be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on the victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is hypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and cannot in law give licence to any person to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the victim. Even if the victim in a given case has been promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. 12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of accomplice, would do." 13. Above being the position, the High Court’s view that the girl being of loose morals and easy virtue the accused were entitled to acquittal is indefensible. Without indicating reasons or basis the appellate court should not interfere with the findings recorded by the trial court. It is incumbent upon the appellate court, if it takes a contrary view, to analyse the evidence and to record its own conclusions. That has not been done in the instant case. This is a fit case where the matter needs to be reheard by the High Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh hearing. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case except indicating as to how the character of the victim is really of no consequence while adjudicating the question as to whether any rape was committed on her or not. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that since the respondents were acquitted by the High Court, the bail which was originally granted to them should be continued. It shall be open to the respondents to move the High Court for bail which shall be considered on its own perspective." 10. A bare perusal of the impugned Judgment would show that the learned Sessions Judge did not consider well settled legal principles, which are enunciated in "Bharwada Bhoganbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat" 753 AIR 1983 (SC) 753 . The Apex Court, time and again, observed that refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. The Apex Court, time and again, observed that refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. On principle the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with an injured witness. This Court, in "Ahmad Shaikh Hussain Ibrahim Versus State of 455 Goa 1993 (1) Bom. C.R. 455, held that the corroboration is not the sine-qua-non reliable and convincing evidence of prosecutrix could be made basis for conviction in a rape case. The evidence of victim, when does not suffer from basic infirmity, then as a general rule there is no reason to insist on corroboration. 11. The prosecutrix could not be treated as accomplice in order to seek substantial corroboration to her version. It would have been enough if some corroboration, which assures that her testimony bears ring of truth could be sufficient. True, no injuries were found on person of the prosecutrix. The learned Sessions Judge observed : "It means, PW-2 claims that both accused pressed her mouth one after another for more than ten minutes. If it is so, then naturally there could have been some injuries on her lips or face. So also, she claims that she was trying to resist during the whole incident. If it is so, then there would have been some injuries on her legs, other organs of the body including breast and private parts. But medical report clearly shows absence of any violence or injuries on the person of prosecutrix. This fact indicates that the complainant is definitely telling something which must not have occurred". 12. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the prosecutrix is young married woman, aged about 17 years and was caught hold of by the duo at the secluded place. The prosecutrix had already invited wrath of respondent No.2 - Mukund due to filing of suit for recovery of the amount. So, when subjected to use of criminal force, much resistance could not be expected from such a scared woman. There is nothing on record to show that the surface in the ditch was rough or stony. Consequently, mere absence of marks of violence on the person of the prosecutrix could not have been blown out of proportion. 13. So, when subjected to use of criminal force, much resistance could not be expected from such a scared woman. There is nothing on record to show that the surface in the ditch was rough or stony. Consequently, mere absence of marks of violence on the person of the prosecutrix could not have been blown out of proportion. 13. So far as the evaluation of the evidence by the learned Sessions Judge is concerned, it emerges that dispassionate approach is not reflected from the impugned Judgment. He observed that PW-3 - Smt.Rukminibai, who is mother of the prosecutrix, is definitely interested in prosecution. This observation is not based on any particular ground nor is substantiated by valid reasons. It is well settled that mere relation of a witness is not sufficient to infer his/her interest in the prosecution. The version of PW-Rukminibai reveals that when the prosecutrix returned home in the relevant night at about 9/9.30 p.m., her appearance was disturbed. Her bangles were broken, hair were dishevelled and scattered, buttons of the blouse were detached and she was sobbing. She narrated the horrendous act of gang rape committed by the respondent Nos.2 and 3 to the mother. This conduct of the prosecutrix could not have been brushed aside. 14. As regards version of PW-5 - Bhalchandra, it is important to note that he is a totally independent witness. He is inhabitant of the same village. He had boarded in the same S.T.Bus in the evening of 12th May 1998 and alighted at the interjection of Karajgaon likewise the prosecutrix. He categorically states that the prosecutrix had travelled in the same S.T. Bus and alighted at Karajgaon Pati (interjection). His version reveals that likewise other passengers of the S.T.Bus, she proceeded towards village Karajgaon on foot from the place of interjection of the two roads. The learned Sessions Judge observed that PW-Bhalchandra did not state positively that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 alighted from the same S.T.Bus. It is observed : "He has just stated that accused Mukund and Pandit might have alighted from that bus". He is disbelieved for the reason that the prosecutrix did not name him amongst the persons, who were travelling in the S.T.bus as per recitals of the F.I.R. (Exh.15). It is well settled that the F.I.R. is not a catalogue of all the events. He is disbelieved for the reason that the prosecutrix did not name him amongst the persons, who were travelling in the S.T.bus as per recitals of the F.I.R. (Exh.15). It is well settled that the F.I.R. is not a catalogue of all the events. It is not required that all persons should be named, whosoever might have travelled in the S.T. bus in the relevant evening. 15. To trop it all what the learned Sessions Judge observed is that there is substance in the defence about false implication with intent to give set back to marriage of respondent No.2 - Mukund, which was to be performed just within eight days and thereby to teach him a lesson in revengeful attitude. The prosecutrix is an estranged woman. It is possible that she might have cordial relationship or some kind of intimacy with respondent No.2 - Mukund. Still, however, admittedly, their relations were soared in view of the pending litigation. She had previously lent Rs.20,000/- / Rs.22,000/- to him. He did not return the same and hence, she was required to approach the Court of law. If she desired to frame him in a false case, even without filing of the suit, she could have filed false F.I.R. in the past so as to pressurise him to shell out the money. She had no enmity, whatsoever, with respondent No.3 - Pandit. It does not stand to reason that merely because he is distinctly related to respondent No.2 - Mukund, he too came to be falsely implicated by her. The learned Sessions Judge appears to have expressed serious doubts about veracity of the prosecutrix (PW-2 Sunita) on the ground that she straightway approached Superintendent of Police, Latur with a written complaint. This is something strange. She may not have trusted the Police Officer at Ausa or she might have been advised by someone to approach the Superintendent of Police at Latur. That could not be a ground to dislodge her version. 16. I do not wish to dilate more on merits of the matter. The above observations are made only to show that there appears miscarriage of justice on account of patently erroneous approach of the learned Sessions Judge without adhering to the settled legal principles, which are referred to above. The restraint on exercise of revisional jurisdiction is alright; but justice is more preferred and must prevail. The above observations are made only to show that there appears miscarriage of justice on account of patently erroneous approach of the learned Sessions Judge without adhering to the settled legal principles, which are referred to above. The restraint on exercise of revisional jurisdiction is alright; but justice is more preferred and must prevail. This Court cannot abdicate its jurisdiction when there is a prima facie case to infer that the impugned decision reflects perverse approach towards the evidence on record. I do not wish to comment upon merits of the matter. Suffice it to say, the present matter requires afresh consideration by the Court of Sessions. Hence, it would be in the interest of justice to remand the sessions case to the trial Court for afresh consideration on merits thereof. 17. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned Judgment is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Sessions Court, Latur, with a direction that the Principal District Judge shall re-examine the relevant evidence and decide the same afresh, within a reasonable frame of time. He may secure attendance of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 without delay and decide the matter afresh. He shall not consider observations made hereinabove while taking afresh decision.