JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastava, J.—Heard Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Mohd. Waris, Counsel for the appellants and Sri K. Ajit, learned Counsel for the ceveator/respondents. 2. These two appeals arise from the judgment and decree dated 24.3.2006 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Rampur, in civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 arising out of original suit No. 114 of 1982 and civil appeal No. 149 of 1991 arising out of original suit No. 60 of 1980 allowing civil appeal No. 10 of 1992. 3. Facts giving rise to the dispute are that Radhey Raman Agarwal, predecessor in interest of the respondent Viresh Agarwal and others instituted an original suit No. 114 of 1982 in the Court of Civil Judge, Rampur, which stood transferred to the Court of Additional Civil Judge, Rampur, claiming relief for declaration that the plaintiff is the sole owner of the land in dispute, which was depicted at the foot of the plaint and also relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the land. Relief for a decree of mandatory injunction for removal of Khokha erected by the defendants was also claimed. 4. The plaintiff Radhey Raman Agarwal died after institution of the suit and the plaintiff/respondents were substituted in original suit No. 114 of 1982. The father of the appellant Irshad Ali was arrayed as defendant No. 2. Irshad Ali Khan had also instituted an original suit No. 60 of 1980, in which Pooran and Mahboob Khan were arrayed as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and Radhey Raman Agarwal, father of the present plaintiff/respondents was arrayed as defendant No. 3. After his death, the respondent Nos. 3 to 9 as shown in the array of the respondents in second appeal No. 606 of 2006, were substituted. Original suit No. 60 of 1980 was filed for declaration that Irshad Ali Khan be declared as owner of non-Z.A. Khasra No. 49 the defendant No. 2 be restrained from interfering in his possession. 5. The plaintiff had set up his claim in original suit No. 114 of 1982 that he had purchased the land in dispute in the year 1949 measuring 160 by 68 area and started business in the name of Bharat Metal Works in partnership of Abdul Salam Khan and Chhotey Lai Jauhari, arrayed as defendant Nos. 5. The plaintiff had set up his claim in original suit No. 114 of 1982 that he had purchased the land in dispute in the year 1949 measuring 160 by 68 area and started business in the name of Bharat Metal Works in partnership of Abdul Salam Khan and Chhotey Lai Jauhari, arrayed as defendant Nos. 6 and 7 respectively in the said suit. Claim of the plaintiff was that he was managing director and had 1/2 share. Subsequently, partition had taken place but Pooran and Irshad Ali Khan (defendant Nos. 2 and 3) were trying to interfere in plaintiffs possession. 6. On perusal of the record, it also transpires that previously Irshad Ali Khan had instituted suit No. 40 of 1975 against Shiya Central Waqf Board and erected Khokhas. Now, the State Government is managing the property. Consequently, notice under Section 80, C.P.C. as well as under Section 326 of U.P. Municipalities Act, 1960, was sent. Irshad Ali Khan defendant No. 2 died and the appellants were substituted in his place, who filed their written statement. There were two other suits instituted regarding the property in question, original suit No. 6 of 1980. Khursheed Ali Khan v. Nabbu Khan, and original suit No. 16 of 1982, Abdul Salam Khan v. Sadik Ali Khan. All the suits were dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 30.9.1991. 7. Only three appeals were preferred against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 arising out of original suit No. 114 of 1982, civil appeal No. 149 of 1991 arising out of original suit No. 60 of 1980 and civil appeal No. 148 of 1991 arising out of original suit No. 6 of 1980. The lower appellate Court dismissed civil appeal No. 148 of 1991 filed by Khursheed Ali Khan civil appeal No. 149 of 1991 filed by Irshad Ali Khan and allowed civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 filed by Viresh Agarwal, the present plaintiff/respondents by means of a common judgment and decree dated 24.3.2006. The instant second appeal No. 575 of 2006 arises out of civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 and second appeal No. 606 of 2006 arises out of civil appeal No. 149 of 1991. The instant second appeal No. 575 of 2006 arises out of civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 and second appeal No. 606 of 2006 arises out of civil appeal No. 149 of 1991. Cross-objections were preferred in civil appeal No. 10 of 1992, which stood dismissed by means of the same judgment, which are challenged in the instant two appeals. 8. Records of the lower Court were summoned on the request of the Counsel for the appellants, which is now available. Learned Counsels for the respective parties are in agreement that the two appeals may be decided finally at the stage of admission itself, but before proceeding to decide the appeals, learned Counsel for the appellants made his submission as to what substantial error of law arises in the instant appeals in respect of which he proposes to advance his argument and the Counsel for the caveator/respondent has a right to make his objection and oppose the arguments. A number of substantial questions of law are shown in the memo of the appeal but the learned Counsel for the appellants is making his submission on following substantial questions of law : “(1) Whether, the lower appellate Court being last Court of facts has failed to discharge its duty inasmuch as it has neither formulated any points for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31, C.P.C. nor has considered the evidence on record nor recorded its own independent findings? (2) Whether, the findings of lower appellate Court are highly cursory and cryptic and are perverse for having been based without consideration of evidence on record? (3) Whether, the Courts below have adopted double standard in accepting and discarding the evidence especially the sale deed dated 17.4.1949 Ext. E-1? (4) Whether, the sale deed 56-C being public document is admissible in evidence inasmuch as the same having been filed in suit No. 114 of 1982, which has wrongly been ignored? (5) Whether, there is sufficient evidence to the effect that alternative case of the appellant of adverse possession having been proved, the Courts below have erred in law in not properly considering the same? (6) Whether, the lower appellate Court has erred in law in allowing civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 arising out of suit No. 114 of 1982 without specifically setting aside the findings of the trial Court? (6) Whether, the lower appellate Court has erred in law in allowing civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 arising out of suit No. 114 of 1982 without specifically setting aside the findings of the trial Court? (7) Whether, the plaintiff has failed to prove that he has any right of easement by prescription as provided under Section 15 of the Easement Act?” 9. Sri M.A. Qadeer, Senior Advocate, has tried to emphasize that the lower appellate Court has grossly erred in law while allowing civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 arising out of original suit No. 114 of 1982, without specifically setting aside findings of the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court has adopted double standard in appreciating evidence of the plaintiff/respondents and discarding the evidence of the appellants especially the sale deed dated 17.3.1928 paper No. 69-C and that it was a public document and admissible in evidence as it was filed in original suit No. 114 of 1982. Approach of the lower appellate Court while discarding and mis-appraising the relevant evidence and also that the appeals were decided without formulating any points for determination as required under Order 41 Rule 31, C.P.C. is unjustified. It is submitted that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31, C.P.C. is mandatory. 10. Thus, first argument advanced on behalf of the appellants revolves around the question that the decision of the lower appellate Court is in violation of the settled procedural law as well as wrong appraisal of evidence. Next argument is regarding easementary right claimed by the plaintiff and his failure to substantiate his claim by means of cogent evidence. Counsel for the appellants has also stressed the alternative plea of adverse possession, which is wrongly not accepted by the lower appellate Court. The trial Court decided all the five suits simultaneously and dismissed them by a common judgment including the claim of the plaintiff/respondent. 11. Counsel for the appellants submits that the lower appellate Court has made a mess of exercise of jurisdiction and proceeded to decide the appeals on altogether a wrong premise, which caused great prejudice to the appellants and this has resulted in grave mis-carriage of justice. Since the lower appellate Court was the last Court of fact, it was under legal obligation to examine the respective cases of the parties in the light of the evidence. Since the lower appellate Court was the last Court of fact, it was under legal obligation to examine the respective cases of the parties in the light of the evidence. Counsel for the appellants has placed both the judgments before me in support of his contention that the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court are perverse and based on a complete ignorance of evidence on record, which have been decided cursorily and in a cryptic manner without giving due weightage to the evidence on record in a pragmatic manner. 12. Counsel for the appellants has stressed that the trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs original suit No. 114 of 1982 because he had miserably failed to establish ownership on plot No. 49. The basis of ownership was the sale deed Ext. E-1 dated 17.4.1949. Relief granted by the lower appellate Court is in respect of the land, which is not identifiable and since the plaintiff/respondents did not make any effort to get a survey commission issued for its demarcation, findings are liable to be set aside. 13. It is submitted next that the lower appellate Court has misread and misconstrued the statement of Irshad Ali Khan and his witness Mohan Singh as well as documentary evidence established unequivocally ownership of Irshad Ali Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants. The plaintiff/respondents failed to reveal specific period of the alleged encroachment by Irshad Ali Khan whereas the defendant Irshad Ali Khan pleaded continuous possession. Therefore, submission of the Counsel for the appellant is that even assuming the title was not proved, he had perfected his right by adverse possession. The plaintiff has also not been able to establish fraud and forgery by Irshad Ali Khan, relating to the sale deed of the year 1928, therefore, findings arrived at by the lower appellate Court is erroneous inasmuch as it constitutes substantial error of law on the face of judgment itself. Issue No. 7 decided by the trial Court against the plaintiff could not have been reversed by the lower appellate Court granting easementary right to the plaintiff/respondents especially on the face of findings of the trial Court that the plaintiff has got no right of user. 14. Counsel for the appellants has cited a decision of this Court in support of first substantial question of law; Doodhnath and another v. Deonandan represented by Lrs. and another, 2005 (59) ALR 715. 14. Counsel for the appellants has cited a decision of this Court in support of first substantial question of law; Doodhnath and another v. Deonandan represented by Lrs. and another, 2005 (59) ALR 715. Counsel for the appellants has laid emphasis that the judgments of the lower appellate Court must clearly suggest that judicial mind has been applied in appreciation of evidence and the Court was duty bound to record a definite findings on the question involved as well as assign reason for reversing the decision of the trial Court? 15. Counsel for the plaintiff/respondents while replying the argument of Sri M.A. Qadeer, Senior Advocate, has placed the sale deed dated 17.4.1949, which was executed by Nutfe Ali in favour of Bharat Medical Store for an area 160 x 63 Square feet and there was specific assertion in the plaint itself that the right of passage was also given to the plaintiff and there was an oral assurance to the said effect. The plaintiff/respondents have used the passage since beginning without any objection and they cannot be stopped from the right of entrance and exit. 16. Counsel for the plaintiff/respondents has also placed judgments of the lower appellate Court where he has recorded specific conclusion in respect of civil appeal No. 149 of 1991, Irshad Ali Khan and others v. Pooran and others. A bare perusal of the judgment, it transpires that the lower appellate Court while recording his conclusion, he has specifically stated the questions/objection raised in the said appeal. Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the judgment of the trial Court dated 30.9.1991 was decided simultaneously though the lower appellate Court has agreed with the findings of the trial Court and recorded his agreement where the trial Court held the sale-deed adduced in evidence by Irshad Ali Khan not worthy on any credence. The lower appellate Court has also recorded specific reason for agreeing with the findings as to why the sale deeds were not accepted especially on the face of assertion by the witness that he had the original sale deed in his possession but he failed to produce the same in the Court as well as he accepted the fact that no entries were made in the department of registry despite the notification for the Rampur district. Reason has been assigned as to why the sale deeds adduced in evidence alleged to be in favour of Irshad Ali Khan were not acceptable. 17. Sri K. Ajit learned Counsel for the respondents has placed the entire judgment in civil appeal Nos. 149 of 1991 and 148 of 1991, which is the judgment of conformance. He has demonstrated by placing the entire judgment to establish that though the judgment of the lower appellate Court in respect of the two civil appeal Nos. 148 of 1991 and 149 of 1991 is judgment of conformance yet while agreeing with the findings of the trial Court, the lower appellate Court also recorded his own opinion and reason for agreeing with the findings of the trial Court. The lower appellate Court while deciding civil appeal No. 10 of 1992, has once again agreed with the findings of the trial Court. So far findings of Radhey Raman Agarwal, was held to be owner on the basis of the sale deed, declaration was given by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. So far title of the disputed plot is concerned, the trial Court though accepted claim of the plaintiff and declared him to be owner of the area in question but refused to grant injunction as well as right of frontage because there was no mention of such a right in the sale deed pertaining to the year 1949, in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. The trial Court recorded a clear finding that the sale deed, which was adduced in evidence, was a registered document and more than 30 years old. Besides, it has been proved by the witness who had entered the witness box. The appellants had not pleaded adverse possession but on the contrary they only stated that they have been in use of the land in question since a very long time. Merely pleadings “long user” will not be sufficient to establish adverse possession. Therefore, submission of the Counsel for the appellants that the lower appellate Court committed a grave error while refusing the benefit of adverse possession is far-fetched. 18. I have perused the entire record and plaint of the suits and find that though claim of adverse possession was raised before the lower appellate Court but was neither pleaded nor any evidence to establish adverse possession was adduced. There is a difference between adverse possession and illegal possession. 18. I have perused the entire record and plaint of the suits and find that though claim of adverse possession was raised before the lower appellate Court but was neither pleaded nor any evidence to establish adverse possession was adduced. There is a difference between adverse possession and illegal possession. Any unauthorized possession would not automatically confer a right or title on the basis of adverse possession unless and until it is established that the possession was continuous without any title and within the knowledge of the actual claimant as well as actual claimant did not raise any objection for the said continuous period. This admittedly was neither pleaded nor established by evidence and, therefore, I am of the considered view that the lower appellate Court did not commit any illegality in refusing relief to the appellants on the ground of adverse possession. It is also noteworthy that the appellants claimed ownership and title on the basis of the sale deed pertaining to the year 1928 and there was only an alternative plea of adverse possession without any effort to establish the alternative plea. In the circumstances, I am not in agreement with the submission and argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the judgments impugned suffer from any substantial error of law as the Court failed to grant benefit of adverse possession to the appellants. It has also been brought to my notice that the sale deed pertaining to the year 1928 was not got registered despite a notification dated 28.8.1947 was made in the District of Rampur. Original notification in Urdu as well as its Hindi translation finds place on the record. Basis of claim of the appellants is the sale deed pertaining to the year 1928, which admittedly was not got registered despite the notification of the year 1947. 19. Besides other argument that the sale deed of the year 1928 was public document and, therefore, it ought to have been taken into consideration by the lower appellate Court, is not acceptable. 19. Besides other argument that the sale deed of the year 1928 was public document and, therefore, it ought to have been taken into consideration by the lower appellate Court, is not acceptable. In the case of Sri Prasad and another v. Special Manager, Court of Wards, Balrampur, A.l.R. 1937 Oudh 194, it was held while interpreting Section 90 of Evidence Act that : “No legal presumption can arise as to the genuineness of the document more than 30 years old, merely upon proof that it was produced from the records of a Court in which it has been filed at some time previous, but that it must be shown that the document had been so filed in order to the adjudication of some question of which that Court had cognizance, and which had come under the cognizance of such Court." 20. Another decision is of Patna High Court : Rajendra Prasad Bose v. Gopal Prasad Bose, AIR 1925 Pat 442. The Division Bench held that mere fact of a certain document having been produced from a Court where it had been filed, does not necessarily bring that document within the requirements of Section 90 of Evidence Act. 21. In the instant case, the sale deed, which was produced in the Court, was brought from another proceedings but this alone will not constitute and attract provisions of Section 90 of Evidence Act, which is quoted hereinbelow : "90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.—Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation.—Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. This Explanation applies also to Section 81. This Explanation applies also to Section 81. Illustrations (a) A has been in possession of landed property for a long time. He produces from his custody deeds relating to the land showing his titles to it. The custody is proper. (b) A produces deeds relating to landed property of which he is the mortgagee. The mortgagor is in possession. The custody is proper. (c) A, a connection of B, produces deeds relating to lands in B’s possession, which were deposited with him by B for safe custody. The custody is proper. State Amendment—[Uttar Pradesh].—In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, in Section 90,— (1) (a) The existing section shall be renumbered as Section 90 (1) thereof, and for the words “thirty years”, the words “twenty years” be substituted, and (b) add the following thereafter as a new sub-section (2) namely : “(2) Where any such document as is referred to in sub-section (1) was registered in accordance with the law relating to registration of documents and a duly certified copy thereof is produced, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, it is that person’s handwriting, and in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to have been executed or attested.” (2) After Section 90, insert the following section, namely— “90-A. (1) Where any registered document or a duly certified copy thereof or any certified copy of a document which is part of the record of a Court of justice, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the original was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed. (2) This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement. The Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 90 will also apply to this section" [Uttar Pradesh Act 24 of 1954, section 2 (w.e.f. 30.11.1954). 22. (2) This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement. The Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 90 will also apply to this section" [Uttar Pradesh Act 24 of 1954, section 2 (w.e.f. 30.11.1954). 22. Presumption is to be raised in favour of the document, which is 30 years old or proved to be 30 years old, if it is produced from any custody, which the Court in a particular case considers proper meaning thereby the custody should be proper custody. A copy of the sale deed brought on record by the appellants was only photostat copy, which was not even registered. Besides, the sale deed was obtained from the Court, which cannot be said to be a proper custody. Section 90 of Evidence Act gives a discretion to the Court to accept or not to accept authenticity of a document, which is 30 years old. The word used in Section 90 of Evidence Act is ‘may’ presume, therefore, if in case the Courts below do not agree to presume the sale deed to be a genuine document as it is 30 years old, it cannot be said that it amounts to substantial error of law. I cannot lose sight of the fact that these are second appeals and the Court cannot reappraise evidence even if two views are possible while interpreting the document. The word public document has been defined in Section 74 of Evidence Act. Section 76 of Evidence Act deals with certified copy of the public document. Provision of Section 76 of Evidence Act is as follows : “76. Certified copies of public documents.—Every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written, at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies. Explanation.—Any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty, is authorized to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section." 23. Thus, a conjoint reading of Sections 74, 76 and 90 of Evidence Act, besides notification of the year 1947, am not in agreement with the submission made by the Counsel for the appellants. The lower appellate Court was correct while refusing to place reliance on the sale deed pertaining to the year 1928 adduced in evidence on behalf of the appellants. Besides, the aforesaid reason, I have perused the said sale deed. Recital of the sale deed mentions plot Nos. 49 and 50 but the statement of witness shows that he states and refers only plot No. 49 and this has been noticed and specifically and categorically mentioned in the judgment of the lower appellate Court. 24. Learned Counsel has tried to place statement of P.W. 1 in support of his contention and I agree to the submission that the lower appellate Court was fully justified while ignoring the submission of the appellants and the findings do not call for interference under Section 100, C.P.C. 25. Submission of Sri M.A. Qadeer, Senior Advocate, regarding the question that the point of determination was not formulated by the lower appellate Court as required under Order 41 Rule 31, C.P.C., is also devoid of substance. 26. l have gone through the entire judgment of the lower appellate Court and on a careful consideration, it is clear that each and every question raised by the respective Counsels regarding issues framed by the trial Court, findings given by the trial Court have been taken into consideration while agreeing or disagreeing with the said conclusions. Interference in the second appeal on a technical approach has always been decried by the Apex Court. In the case of Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and others, (2006) I SCC 46. The Apex Court held that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The procedural law may be liberal and stringent but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance cause of justice unless compelled by the express and specific language of the statute. The Apex Court held that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The procedural law may be liberal and stringent but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance cause of justice unless compelled by the express and specific language of the statute. Similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Rani Kusum (Smt.) v. Kanchan Devi and others, (2005) 6 SCC 705 , no straitjacket formula can be laid down, the Court should only ensure that there should be no miscarriage of justice. The procedure of law is always subservient to, and is in aid to justice. In the circumstances, if provisions of Order 41 Rule 31, C.P.C. are to be interpreted in a hyper-technical manner, it will only elude and frustrate the intention of legislature while amending the scope of 100, C.P.C. In the instant case, though points for determination have not been formulated in a serial manner yet the lower appellate Court has recorded a categorical findings on each and every issue and error and reasons have been assigned while agreeing with the findings of the trial Court and confirming it or while disagreeing with the part of the decision while granting benefit to the plaintiff/respondents. 27. In the instant case, the trial Court was of the considered view that the plaintiff/respondents established his title on the basis of the sale deed pertaining to the year 1949. The trial Court has recorded its conclusion that the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff/respondents have proved the sale deed dated 17.4.1949, besides Irshad Ali Khan has himself admitted this fact in his previous suit No. 40 of 1975. The Court also refused to accept the sale deed adduced in evidence on behalf of Irshad Ali Khan. The suit of the plaintiff/respondents was dismissed only on the question of granting right of frontage. The lower appellate Court being the last Court of fact has given its detailed findings while deciding civil appeal No. 149 of 1991 on the issues and ground raised, similarly also while allowing civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 (internal page 52 of the typed copy of the judgment). The lower appellate Court being the last Court of fact has given its detailed findings while deciding civil appeal No. 149 of 1991 on the issues and ground raised, similarly also while allowing civil appeal No. 10 of 1992 (internal page 52 of the typed copy of the judgment). Conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court is on the basis of evidence to the effect that the plaintiff has been able to establish by cogent evidence that the appellant Viresh Agarwal was in occupation continuously and, therefore, though fact of user of frontage and use of road in question has not been mentioned in the sale deed yet the lower appellate Court has specifically expressed his disagreement with the findings of the trial Court and, therefore, specially when the plaintiffs title was confirmed and accepted, I do not consider it appropriate to interfere in the findings and appraisal of evidence by the lower appellate Court. The contention of the learned Counsel that the lower appellate Court has adopted double standard is without any basis. 28. The Apex Court depreciated the liberal construction and generous application of provisions of Section 100, C.P.C. Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that only because there is another view possible on appreciation of evidence that cannot be sufficient for interference under Section 100, C.P.C. For ready reference, extract of paragraph 7 of the case of Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, (2002) SCC, 134 is quoted below : “7. .....We have noticed with distress that despite amendment, the provisions of Section 100 of the Code have been liberally construed and generously applied by some Judges of the High Courts with the result that objective intended to be achieved by the amendment of Section 100 appears to have been frustrated. Even before the amendment of Section 100 of the Code, the concurrent finding of facts could not be disturbed in the second appeal. This Court in Paras Nath Thakur v. Mohani Dasi, held : (AIR p. 1205 para 3). It is well settled by a long series of decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and of this Court, that a High Court, on second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact, however, erroneous the findings of fact recorded by the Courts of fact may be. It is not necessary to cite those decisions. It is well settled by a long series of decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and of this Court, that a High Court, on second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact, however, erroneous the findings of fact recorded by the Courts of fact may be. It is not necessary to cite those decisions. Indeed, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents did not and could not contend that the High Court was competent to go behind the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two Courts of fact.” 29. Similar view has been expressed in a number of other decisions by the Apex Court in the cases of Thiagarajan and others v. Sri Venugopalaswamay B. Koil and others, JT 2004 (5) SC 54; Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, (2005) 7 SCC 60 , Gurdev Kaur and others v. Kaki and others, 2006 All.C.J. 1481 (SC) and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 . 30. The Apex Court in the recent case of Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , ruled that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be preposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of the each case whether a question of law is substantial one and involved in the case or not? The same view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Govinda Raju v. Mariamman, (2005) 2 SCC 500 . 31. The judgments under challenge cannot be interfered in this appeal in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. The two judgments do not suffer from any error and no substantial question of law arises. The instant second appeals lack merit and are, accordingly, dismissed. Costs on parties. ————