JUDGMENT A.K. Sikri, J.-On 26.12.1972, the petitioner was appointed as a peon in the services of the respondent No.2 bank. In November 1992, he was still working as a peon when Smt. Raj Kali lodged her complaint on 22.11.1992 alleging that she had given Rs. 600/- to the petitioner for depositing in her savings bank account, but he did not deposit the same and made fictitious entry in her pass-book. Exact allegations in this behalf are contained in the charge-sheet dated 17.6.1980, which was served upon the petitioner, alleging as under: "On 22.11.1982, Smt. Raj Kali, Account holder of No. 18771 of B.O. Modi Nagar (who is your neighbour and whose account was opened with your introduction) gave you Rs. 600/- to deposit the same in her account along with her pass book. You did not deposit the said money in her account but made a fictitious entry of Rs. 600/- with the bank and put your initials in the pass book. You have, thus, cheated a customer of the bank, and have misused your official position and defrauded the bank. This Act on your part tentamount to gross misconduct in terms of para 19.5(J) of the Bipartite settlement dated 19.10.1966 making your liable for disciplinary action." 2. The petitioner denied the charges by submitting his reply; departmental enquiry was ordered and the enquiry commenced on 21.11.1983. While this inquiry was in progress, Smt. Raj Kali addressed a letter dated 15.12.1983 to the Manager of the respondent Bank in which it was stated that she had not made any complaint on the basis of which inquiry was started and in fact, she had not given Rs. 600/- to the petitioner for depositing in her account. The Bank still decided to proceed with the enquiry. Inquiry proceedings were concluded on 22.3.1984 on the basis of which the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 19.5.1984 holding that the charges stood proved against the petitioner. Show cause Notice dated 30/31.7.1984 was served upon the petitioner. Personal hearing was also accorded. Thereafter, punishment of dismissal was imposed upon the petitioner vide orders dated 21.9.1984. The petitioner preferred departmental appeal before the appellate authority, which was also dismissed on 6.5.1985. Thereafter, the petitioner raised industrial dispute. Show cause Notice dated 30/31.7.1984 was served upon the petitioner. Personal hearing was also accorded. Thereafter, punishment of dismissal was imposed upon the petitioner vide orders dated 21.9.1984. The petitioner preferred departmental appeal before the appellate authority, which was also dismissed on 6.5.1985. Thereafter, the petitioner raised industrial dispute. Dispute was referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (in short the CGIT) with the following terms of reference: "Whether the action of the Management of Punjab National Bank in dismissing Shri Suresh Chand, peon from service w.e.f 21.9.1984 is justified If not, to what relief the workman is entitled." 3. Parties appeared before the CGIT. The petitioner filed his statement of claim to which written statement was filed by the respondent followed by rejoinder of the petitioner. Evidence was recorded. The learned Presiding Officer, CGIT, has given his award dated 28.12.1989 in the said ID No. 91/87 holding that inquiry was conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in para 19.12(a) of the Bipartite Settlement Agreement and also that principles of natural justice were fully observed. He has, thus, held that the order of dismissal passed by the respondent Bank is legal and valid and fully justified. Challenging this a ward, present writ petition is filed by the petitioner. 4. The Division Bench issued Rule in this petition on 18.2.1992 and directed the petitioner to pay Rs. 600/- along with interest in the savings bank account of Smt. Raj Kali. In compliance to that order, the petitioner deposited demand draft dated 4.3.1992 in the sum of Rs. 935.80. in the account of Smt. Raj Kali. 5. Perusal of the award of the CGIT would show that the petitioner had challenged the fairness and justness of the enquiry on the following grounds: "1. That there was no legally admission or substantive evidence in as much as the complainant namely Smt. Raj Kali has not been produced as a witness; 2. That opinion of the handwriting expert could not have been relied upon; 3. That the inquiry was bad for the reason that the presenting officer examined himself as a witness; 4. That the Inquiry Officer prevented the workman to produce the documents on the record during the cross-examination of the Management witness; 5. That the inquiry was bad for the reason of non-production of the ledger keeper; 6. That the non-production of original pass book was bad, and 7. That the Inquiry Officer prevented the workman to produce the documents on the record during the cross-examination of the Management witness; 5. That the inquiry was bad for the reason of non-production of the ledger keeper; 6. That the non-production of original pass book was bad, and 7. That the documents ~ere improperly exhibited by the Inquiry Officer." 6. Learned CGIT, however, did not accept any of these grounds. The learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that the findings and observations of the learned CGIT brushing aside the aforesaid arguments were clearly erroneous and the learned CGIT has not considered the matter in proper perspective. With respect to the observations of the learned CGIT on each ground, the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was as under: (i) In the award of the learned Industrial Tribunal, First ground is discussed about no legal admission evidence. The Tribunal found that the non-production of the complainant-Rajkali does not vitiate the inquiry and the deposition of the management witness is legally admissible and substantive evidence and it is not necessary that the complainant be examined in every case. According to the petitioner, the learned Industrial Tribunal failed to apply its mind that the charge was based on a complaint of Smt. Rajkali which was only thumb impression and it was typed in English and therefore it was mandatory and in all fairness complainant Rajkali was required to be examined. The petitioner placed reliance on the decision of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Chaturvedi and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1984(2) S.C.C. 350 . In this case, Supreme Court took the view that the examination of writer was necessary so that the opportunity could be given to the defence to cross examine the writer otherwise the reliance is totally misconceived. (ii) With regard to Second ground regarding the opinion of handwriting expert, the learned Tribunal took the view that the report of the handwirting expert dated 10.9.1983 was produced on the record on 12.12.1983 and at that time, no objection was taken by the defence representative and therefore the report of handwriting expert is logically probative and has been rightly relied upon. It is submitted that the report of the handwriting expert is merely an opinion and is inducted during the course of inquiry. It is submitted that the report of the handwriting expert is merely an opinion and is inducted during the course of inquiry. The non-examination of handwriting expert is fatal to the inquiry and it is well settled that the evidence given by the expert are not conclusive because it is after all evidence. Relieance is placed by the petitioner on (1) Para 26 of the decision in the case of Ishwari Prasad v. Md. Isha, reported in AIR 1963 5.C. 1728 (2) Para 21 of the decision in the case of Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar, reported in AIR 1964 5.C. 529. It is further submitted that the report of handwriting expert was not supplied with the charge-sheet which is clear from the dates and it shows that it was procured at a later stage as suitable to the bank and its credibility and authenticity is doubtful. It is submitted that in departmental inquiry the fairness and compliance of the principles of natural justice are the basic requirement even when not called upon from the defence. (iii) The Third ground of the petitioner that the presenting officer cannot appear as a witness has been found without force. According to the petitioner the conclusion is unfounded inasmuch as it is well settled law that a witness cannot be a presenting officer. Reliance is placed on Para 120 of Anil Kumar Ghosh v. Union of India, reported in 1990 H.C. Calcutta 299. It is submitted that 5h. A. L. Gulani who acted as disciplinary authority and issued the charge-sheet was the sole witness in the enquiry by the management and he was the presenting officer. (iv) On Fourth ground that inquiry is bad for not permitting the petitioner to use the document/withdrawal letter dated 15.12.1983 in cross-examination, it is submitted that at page 17 of the inquiry register the workman representative during cross-examination of the management witness enquired about the receipt of the letter dated 15.12.1983 from 5mt. Rajkali which was admitted but still it was not allowed to be used in cross-examination. It is submitted that the very basis of the inquiry is complaint and once it is withdrawn, the basis of the inquiry disappears and become non-existent. The effect of letter dated 15.12.1989 is necessary to be considered which has not been done by the industrial Tribunal. It is submitted that the very basis of the inquiry is complaint and once it is withdrawn, the basis of the inquiry disappears and become non-existent. The effect of letter dated 15.12.1989 is necessary to be considered which has not been done by the industrial Tribunal. (v) With regard to Fifth ground regarding non-production of the ledger keeper the learned Tribunal took the view that it is not vitiating the enquiry and it is for the management to decide what to produce and what not to produce. It is submitted that the entries of the ledger and the pass book could only be proved by the ledger keeper and his non-examination is fatal to the departmental inquiry. (vi) The Sixth ground was about non-production of the original pass book and the Learned Tribunal held that it had no force. The submission of the petitioners Counsel is that when the photocopy was stated to be fabricated and even the entry was doubted, it was required in all fairness to produce the original pass book. (vii) The Seventh ground regarding the contention that the documents were improperly exhibited by the Inquiry Officer was rejected having no force, which according to the learned Counsel was not a correct approach. 7. He additionally argued that in any case, even if it is presumed that the charge is proved, the punishment of dismissal could not be imposed on the basis of this charge and it does not fall in the category of gross misconduct but would only be a minor misconduct. Submission was that in Rule 19.5 gross misconduct is defined. None of the action of the petitioner, even if found to be proved, fall within the expression gross misconduct. At the most Clause (g) of Rule 19.7, the attempt to collect money without the permission could be a minor misconduct and for minor misconduct, the punishment could be as per 19.8 of the Rules which does not provide for dismissal. At the end, it was submitted that the fact that the petitioner was a peon and was not discharging the duties of a clerk or a cashier, etc. may also be considered and also that the petitioner was called upon by this Court to deposit the alleged amount of Rs. 600/- + interest total Rs. 935.80 which direction is complied by him without prejudice to his rights. 8. may also be considered and also that the petitioner was called upon by this Court to deposit the alleged amount of Rs. 600/- + interest total Rs. 935.80 which direction is complied by him without prejudice to his rights. 8. It was, thus, pleaded that the impugned award be set aside and the reference answered in favour of the petitioner. 9. Learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the scope of interference with the departmental inquiry in exercise of judicial power was very limited. Finding of facts recorded by the Inquiry Officer were accepted by the Disciplinary Authority on the basis of which punishment was imposed. The Tribunal had also gone into the matter and rendered its Award which again recorded the fact and this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not enter into these findings of facts. He further submitted that merely because complaint was withdrawn by the complainant was no ground not to proceed with the inquiry. His explanation was that the incident was of 26.11.1982; complaint was made on 20.1.1983 and charge sheet on the basis of said complaint was filed on 17.6.1983. Six months thereafter complaint was withdrawn i.e. on 15.12.1983 which could have been because of the influence exercised by the petitioner and, therefore, the bank was not obliged to close the proceedings after the service of charge sheet. Insofar as hand writing expert is concerned, it was submitted that Inquiry Officer had not relied upon the said report. In respect of Presenting Officer acting as witness, the learned Counsel argued that no prejudice was suffered by the petitioner thereby. The learned Counsel for the respondent thus beseeched that this Court should not interfere with the A ward and dismiss the writ petition relying upon the following judgments: (i) State Bank of India v. Tarun Kumar Banerjee, VI (2000) SLT 762= AIR 2000 SC 3028 . (ii) Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, II (1998) CLT 89 (Sq AIR 1998 SC 2311 . 10. I have considered the respective submissions of both the sides. The allegations in the complaint were that Smt. Raj Kali had given Rs. 600/- to the petitioner for depositing in her Savings Bank account but he did not deposit the same and made fictitious entry in her pass book. 10. I have considered the respective submissions of both the sides. The allegations in the complaint were that Smt. Raj Kali had given Rs. 600/- to the petitioner for depositing in her Savings Bank account but he did not deposit the same and made fictitious entry in her pass book. This is clearly a serious charge and I do not agree with the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner that it would amount to minor misconduct. Learned Counsel had referred to Para 19.7 of Chapter 19 which stipulates acts and omissions on the part of an employee constituting minor misconduct. He submitted that case would be covered by Clause (g) which reads as under: "19.7 By the expression minor misconduct shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee- xxx xxx xxx (g) attempt to collect or collecting moneys within the premises of the bank without the previous permission of the management or except as allowed by any rule of law for the time being in force" 11. The submission is misconceived. Attempt to collect or collecting moneys within the premises of the bank signifies lawful collection. However, it is made minor misconduct if it is done with the previous permission of the management. It would not deal with the situation where an employee collects money from a customer and does not deposit in his/her account, retains the same with him and makes fictitious entry into pass book of the customer. Such an act would be criminal breach of trust as well as tampering with the records. It would fall in Clause (j) of Para 19.5 which enlist gross misconduct Clause (j) reads as under: 19.5 By the expression "gross misconduct" shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee- xxx xxx xxx (j) doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. 12. I also reject the contention of the petitioner that merely because Smt. Raj Kali had withdrawn the complaint, enquiry should not have been proceeded. As mentioned above, complaint was made on 20.1.1983 and after the charge sheet was served upon the petitioner she withdrew the complaint. 12. I also reject the contention of the petitioner that merely because Smt. Raj Kali had withdrawn the complaint, enquiry should not have been proceeded. As mentioned above, complaint was made on 20.1.1983 and after the charge sheet was served upon the petitioner she withdrew the complaint. As it is the concern of every employer to ensure that the conduct of its employees is without blemish and keeping in view that there was such a serious charge against the petitioner, if the bank decided to go with the enquiry, it had the right to do so (see State Bank of India v. Tarun Kumar Banerjee, AIR 2000 SC 3028 ). Vol. CLIX SURESH CHAND v. PRESIDING OFFICER, CGIT 487 13. There may be various reasons for Smt. Raj Kali to withdraw the complaint. That would also explain that non-production of Smt. Raj Kali as a witness. The learned Tribunal had dealt with this aspect in the following manner in the impugned A ward. "Firstly it has been submitted that there was no legal, admissible or substantive evidence as the complainant Smt. Raj Kali has not been produced as a witness. The Management witness at page 4 of the inquiry Register had deposed that Smt. Raj Kali approached the bank on 18.1.1983 with her Pass Book and further that she submitted a written complaint on 20.1.1983 duly typed and put her thumb impression before him. During the cross-examination at page 8 of the Inquiry Register, the Management witness categorically stated that he was basing allegation on the basis of the complaint and the personal talk with the complainant. The learned representative for the workman has argued that the witness did not elaborate as to what personal talk was between him and the complainant. The learned representative for the management has rightly submitted that there was no relationship between the witness and the complainant and as such the personal talk referred to in the deposition necessarily implied that the complainant personally talked about her complaint with the Manager and also gave him the typed complaint. Further it was for the representative of the workman to cross-examine the witness on this particular point. The very fact that there was no cross-examination on this point established the fact that the complainant made oral complaint as well during her personal talk with the witness and also gave him a written complaint. Further it was for the representative of the workman to cross-examine the witness on this particular point. The very fact that there was no cross-examination on this point established the fact that the complainant made oral complaint as well during her personal talk with the witness and also gave him a written complaint. The learned representative of the workman in support of his contention has relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case Central bank of India v. P.L. Jain, 1969 II LLJ 377; Khartha and Co. Ltd. v. Its Workman, 1963 IILLJ 452; and Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, 1972 Lab. IC-627. These authorities relate to the peculiar facts of these very cases and are distinguishable and are not relevant to the facts of the present case. The deposition of the Management witness is legally admissible and substantive evidence and the same carrot be ignored. It is not necessary that the complaint must always be examined in every case. In the authority State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (SC) Lab. Judgments Vol. V page 168, it was held by the Honble Supreme Court as under- It is well settled that in the domestic inquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility." 14. The Tribunal also relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of J.D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India, Supreme Court Lab. Judgments Vol. V Page I. That was also a case where the complainant was not examined and the Supreme Court held that inquiry will not be treated as vitiated on this ground. Insofar as non-production of handwriting expert is concerned, the Tribunal has dealt with in the following manner: "With regard to the second ground that opinion of the hand writing expert could not have been relied upon as hand writing expert had not been examined during the inquiry. It may be observed that the report of the handwriting expert was produced on the record on 12.12.1983 and at that time no objection whatsoever was taken by the defence representative, and in fact the defence representative had cross-examined the Management witness at length on the opinion of the handwriting expert. It may be observed that the report of the handwriting expert was produced on the record on 12.12.1983 and at that time no objection whatsoever was taken by the defence representative, and in fact the defence representative had cross-examined the Management witness at length on the opinion of the handwriting expert. The handwriting expert opinion was never disputed by the defence representative at any point of time during the course of inquiry, on the ground that it was inadmissible in the absence of the production of the handwriting expert himself. The very fact that the defence representative cross-examined the witness at length on the report of the handwriting expert goes to show that any objection regarding the admissibility of the report of the handwriting expert without actually producing the handwriting expert r3.d been given up. As has been stated hereinabove, the strict rules of Indian Evidence Act are not applicable to the domestic inquiry and all material which is logically probative for prudent mind is permissible and admissible. The report of the handwriting expert is logically probative and as such the same has been rightly relied upon by the Inquiry Officer in support of her conclusion." 15. For the proposition that Presenting Officer cannot be a "fitness, the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Anil Kr. Ghosh v. Union of India, 1990 I CLR 299. However, this judgment stands overruled by the Supreme Court in Director General, ICMR and Ors. v. Dr. Anil Kr. Ghosh and Anr., VI (1998) SLT 532=III (1998) CLT 112 (SC)=1999 (1) LLJ SC 1036. Therefore, there is no force in this ground either. 16. However, the petitioner has been able to make out a case of interference in view of his following two arguments, namely, (a) whether the Presenting Officer could prove the report of the handwriting expert or for proving the same the handwriting expert himself was to be produced as a witness; and (b) whether non-production of original pass-book to prove the charge is vital. 17. The Presenting Officer appeared and produced the report of the handwriting expert. For proving this report the handwriting expert was not produced. 17. The Presenting Officer appeared and produced the report of the handwriting expert. For proving this report the handwriting expert was not produced. There is a force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that evidence given by the expert is not conclusive and the veracity of the report is to be decided after the cross-examination of the expert. In the present case, as per the petitioner, even that report of the handwriting expert was not supplied with the charge-sheet. In the absence of the handwriting expert the petitioner was denied opportunity to cross-examine him and therefore, it would be violation of principles of natural justice. The Inquiry Officer has heavily relied upon the said report for indicting the petitioner in the inquiry. Therefore, the handwriting expert should have been produced to prove his report. The prejudice is writ large in not adhering to this course of action. 18. I also find merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that non-production of the original document, i.e. at least the ledger, which was in possession of the bank and from where entries could be proved, would be fatal to the departmental inquiry. 19. The learned Tribunal has taken the view that it was for the management to decide what to produce and what not to produce. However, having regard to the nature of the charge, the same could be proved from the ledger showing that there is no credit in the account of the complainant whereas the petitioner had shown that credit in the pass-book. Non-production of ledger is, therefore, fatal. 20. On these two grounds, therefore, inquiry is vitiated. 21. With this I come to the vital question of relief. The incident is of the year 1992. Eighteen years have gone by. The petitioner is 57 years of age. The age of superannuation is 60 years. Therefore, no useful purpose would be served at this stage to hold fresh inquiry. At the same time since the inquiry is vitiated on technical ground, the petitioner also should not be given full back wages. While setting aside the punishment and reinstating the petitioner, ends of justice would meet if the petitioner is granted 25% of the wages for the intervening period and no other financial benefits. 22. The impugned award is accordingly set aside and the writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. While setting aside the punishment and reinstating the petitioner, ends of justice would meet if the petitioner is granted 25% of the wages for the intervening period and no other financial benefits. 22. The impugned award is accordingly set aside and the writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. The petitioner shall also be entitled to costs quantified at Rs. 5,000/-. Petition allowed.