Honble VYAS, J.–By this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 18.1.2005 (Annexure 7) passed by the Chief Manager, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Hanumangarh and order dated 29.1.2005 (Annexure 9) passed by the Executive Director (Traffic), Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, and further prayed that respondents may be directed to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Conductor upon which he was working prior to his termination. (2). According to the brief facts of the case, petitioners father late Shri Girdhari Lal was an employee of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called RSRTC) and while working on the post of driver he died. Therefore, petitioner was provided appointment on compassionate ground vide order dated 3.2.2004 on fixed salary of Rs. 2,500/- per month on probation for a period of two years on the post of Conductor. In pursuance of the said order the petitioner joined his duty and performed his duties sincerely. (3). In the writ petition it is stated by the petitioner that during his service tenure three charge-sheets were issued to the petitioner upon checking of the vehicle on different dates. The details of those charge-sheets are as follows: 1. Charge-sheet No. 1578 dated 23.7.2004 2. Charge-sheet No. 1579 dated 23.7.2004 3. Charge-sheet No. 6496 dated 11.11.2004 (4). The contention of the petitioner is that he was facing disciplinary enquiry in above three months, and he was placed under suspension vide order dated 9.7.2004. (5). It is further contended that the appellants, after issuing charge-sheet to the petitioner, were under obligation to conduct enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the Regulations of the Corporation, but it is very strange that all of sudden vide order dated 18.1.2005, while observing in the order that there are three charge-sheets pending against the petitioner and without completing enquiry against the petitioner, and while taking into account the fact that petitioner was appointed on probation, therefore, straight way termination order has been issued against the petitioner which is under challenge. (6). The order of termination was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing departmental appeal in which all grounds were raised by the petitioner with regard to the validity and illegality of the order of impugned termination, but vide order Annexure 9 dated 29.1.2005 the appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed without assigning any reason. (7). (6). The order of termination was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing departmental appeal in which all grounds were raised by the petitioner with regard to the validity and illegality of the order of impugned termination, but vide order Annexure 9 dated 29.1.2005 the appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed without assigning any reason. (7). While inviting attention towards above facts, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that termination order dated 18.1.2005 is totally illegal, baseless and unconstitutional, because no enquiry whatsoever has been conducted against the petitioner, so also no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that before passing order impugned dated 18.1.2005 terminating the services of the petitioner, no notice and no opportunity of hearing whatsoever has been given to the petitioner therefore, the order of termination is against the principles of natural justice. Although petitioner was appointed on probation, but order of termination speaks that it cast stigma upon him. Therefore, for the reason of termination enquiry was necessary but his services have been dispensed with without completing enquiry. According to the petitioner this order is penal in nature and in view of the law laid down by this Supreme Court even in case of probationer no such penal order can be passed by the respondents. (8). The petitioner has invited attention of this Court towards judgment reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60 - Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors. and judgment reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239 V.P. Ahuja vs. State of Punjab & Ors. In both these judgments it has been held by the Apex Court that probationer is like a temporary servant is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily or punitively without complying with the principles of natural justice. According to petitioners counsel petitioners services were terminated during probation period invoking terms and conditions of his appointment, but it is also obvious from the order of termination that three charge-sheets for alleged misconduct were pending upon which no enquiry was conducted were taken into account for terminating the services of the petitioner. Therefore, the order impugned is penal in nature and it casts stigma. Therefore, the order impugned is penal in nature and it casts stigma. Therefore, it is obvious that by stigmatic order without holding any enquiry against the petitioner even though three charge-sheets were pending against the petitioner, the petitioner has been thrown out of job which is totally against the principles of natural justice. Therefore, it is prayed that the order impugned is penal in nature and it has been passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice so also ignoring the procedure of law which is applicable for the employee of the RSRTC for taking disciplinary action. Therefore, without holding any enquiry disciplinary action has been taken which is not permissible under the law. Therefore, the order impugned deserves to be quashed. (9). Learned counsel for the petitioner also assailed the validity of the order passed by the appellate authority on the ground that no reason whatsoever has been assigned by the appellate authority. Therefore, it is abundantly clear from the order of the appellate authority (Annexure 9) that this order is totally without application of mind and suffers from the vice of speaking order. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention towards judgment of a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in (1990) 4 SCC 594 in which it has been held that recording of reasons are mandatory in disciplinary proceedings. (10). Per contra, it is argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner was appointed on probation which is evident from his appointment order itself, therefore, the order of termination impugned by the petitioner cannot be termed as penal in nature. Further, it is submitted that although it is observed in the order that three charge-sheets are pending against the petitioner and no enquiry has been conducted, but in the operative part of the order it is rightly observed that the petitioner was appointed on probation for two years and he has not successfully complete the said period and during this period his work was not found satisfactory, therefore, his services are terminated. (11). As per respondents counsel, there is no illegality committed by the respondents because the order is in consonance with the terms and conditions of the order of appointment. (11). As per respondents counsel, there is no illegality committed by the respondents because the order is in consonance with the terms and conditions of the order of appointment. Further, it is contended that the order of the appellate authority is also in consonance with the provisions of law because the Executive Director (Traffic) has rightly observed in the order that appeal is not acceptable on the grounds raised by the petitioner. (12). After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the entire record of the case and judgments cited by the parties, I am of the opinion that the impugned order dated 18.1.2005 (Annexure 7) has been passed on the ground that the petitioner was on probation and he has not completed the probation period successfully, but in this order assertion of pendency of departmental enquiries has also been made. Meaning thereby, at the time of passing of order dated 18.1.2005 (Anx. 7) three charge-sheets were pending and enquiry in those charge-sheets was not concluded but those charge-sheets were taken into account for the purpose of terminating the services of the petitioner and in reply to para 5 of the writ petition, it is specifically admitted by the respondents that "the repeated acts of the petitioner clearly defines the conduct of the petitioner to be bad and against the interest of the Respondent Corporation, which amounts to "misconduct" and for which the respondent Corporation has taken proper action by dispensing with the services of the petitioner." Meaning thereby, as per reply also, the order impugned has been passed on the basis of alleged misconduct committed by the petitioner for which admittedly no enquiry was conducted. Therefore, the order of termination cannot be termed as order simplicitor. Certainly, this order is punitive in nature. Therefore, such order cannot stand before eye of law. (13). Honble Supreme Court has observed in V.P. Ahunjas case (supra) that a probationer like a temporary servant is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily or punitively without complying with the principles of natural justice. In this case also, admittedly no enquiry whatsoever has been conducted in respect of the alleged charges which are mentioned in the impugned order, therefore, the order passed by the Chief Manager, Hanumangarh is totally illegal, unconstitutional and against the principles of law. (14). In this case also, admittedly no enquiry whatsoever has been conducted in respect of the alleged charges which are mentioned in the impugned order, therefore, the order passed by the Chief Manager, Hanumangarh is totally illegal, unconstitutional and against the principles of law. (14). In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), Honble the Apex Court has held that if order is punitive in nature and cast stigma, then enquiry is necessary before terminating the services of an employee. The relevant portions of the said judgment in paras 21, 26 and 31 are as follows: "21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstances, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. ...... ..... ..... 26. There is, however, considerable difficulty in finding out whether in a given case where the order of termination is not a simple order of termination, the words used in the order can be said to contain a "stigma". The other issue in the case before us is whether even if the words used in the order of termination are innocuous, the court can go into the words used or language employed in other orders or proceedings referred to by the employer in the order of termination. ...... ..... ..... Thus, it depends on the fact and circumstances of each case and the language or words employed in the order of termination of the probationer to judge whether the words employed amount to a stigma or not." (15). ...... ..... ..... Thus, it depends on the fact and circumstances of each case and the language or words employed in the order of termination of the probationer to judge whether the words employed amount to a stigma or not." (15). Upon perusal of order of the appellate authority also it is clear that the order passed by the appellate authority is totally non speaking order. Therefore, in view of the constitutional Bench judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 , I am of the opinion that this order is also contrary to the law laid down by the Honble Apex Court. (16). In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 18.1.2005 (Annexure 7) passed by the Disciplinary authority and the order dated 29.1.2005 (Annexure 9) passed by the appellate authority are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. However, it is made clear that the respondents are free to hold an enquiry for alleged charge-sheets issued against the petitioner, in accordance with law.