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2008 DIGILAW 1210 (JHR)

Raj Kumar Gupta v. Birendra Prasad Gupta

2008-10-21

M.Y.EQBAL

body2008
Judgment M. Y. Eqbal. J.- In these two revision applications since common question of law and facts are involved, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. In C.R. No. 40 of 2006, petitioners, who are tenants, have challenged the order dated 27.2.2006 passed by Munsif, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 7 of 2002 whereby he has terminated the lease in purported exercise of power under Section 18(2) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. 3. In C.R. No. 56 of 2007 the petitioner has challenged the consequential order dated 30.5.2007 passed by the same Court in the aforementioned miscellaneous case whereby he has ordered for eviction of the petitioner from the building premises under Section 18(3) of the said Act. 4. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass:- Petitioners were inducted as tenants in the shop premises for a fixed period of ten years commencing from 1.5.1992 to 30.4.2002 on a monthly rent of Rs. 900/-. A registered deed of lease was executed by three p8rsons as co-sharers/landlords including respondents Birendra Prasad Gupta. It appears that before the expiry of period of lease petitioners sent two notices dated 28.2.2002 followed by 20.4.2002 informing the landlords about their willingness for the renewal of lease as per clause (8) of the lease deed. However, on 18.3.2002 the respondent being one of the co-sharer/landlord filed an application purported to be under Section 18(2) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (in short the said Act) in the Court of Munsif, Ranchi for an order terminating the lease on the ground inter alia that the respondents required the suit premises for their own use and occupation and also for engaging his son in business. The said application was registered as Misc. Case No. 7/2002. On being noticed the petitioners appeared and filed their show cause stating inter alia that the application under Section 18(2) of the said Act is not maintainable inasmuch as petitioners-tenants have not exercised their option for extension of lease under Section 18(1) of the Act. Petitioners case is that as per clause (8) of the lease agreement respondents/landlords are bound to renew their lease for further period of ten years and for that a suit for specific performance being Title Suit No. 63/2003 has already been filed. Petitioners case is that as per clause (8) of the lease agreement respondents/landlords are bound to renew their lease for further period of ten years and for that a suit for specific performance being Title Suit No. 63/2003 has already been filed. Petitioners' specific case is that notice for renewal of the lease as per clause (8) of the lease agreement was served upon the landlord and not for extension of lease under Section 18(1) of the Act. Learned Munsif, after hearing the parties, passed the impugned order dated 27.2.2006 terminating the lease. The Court treated the notice sent by the petitioners/tenants as under Section 18(1) of the Act and further recorded a finding that respondent/landlords require the suit premises for his personal use and occupation. The Court below thereafter passed the consequential order dated 30.5.2007 purported to be under Section 18(3) of the Act and directed eviction of the petitioners from the shop premises. 5. Mr. P.K. Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners/tenants, assailed the impugned order as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel firstly submitted that admittedly the lease deed was executed in respect of the shop premises for a fixed period of ten years ending with 30.4.2002 and as per clause (8) of the said lease deed the lessor had agreed for renewal of the lease for a further period of ten years. Learned counsel submitted that exercising their right of renewal petitioners served notice before the expiry of the lease informing the landlord of their intention and willingness for the renewal of the lease and requested them for renewal of the lease deed. Instead of refuting the right of the petitioners respondents/landlords filed an application under Section 18(2) of the Act which itself was not at all maintainable. Learned counsel submitted that since petitioners/tenants did not exercise their option for extension of lease as contemplated under Section 18(1) of the Act, the question of entertaining the application under Section 18(2) of the Act and the order passed therein are wholly without jurisdiction. 6. Mr. B.B. Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents/landlords, on the other hand, submitted that Section 18 of the said Act does not contemplate of giving any notice by the landlord refusing to renew lease rather Section 18 contemplates of giving notice by the tenant for extension of lease. 6. Mr. B.B. Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents/landlords, on the other hand, submitted that Section 18 of the said Act does not contemplate of giving any notice by the landlord refusing to renew lease rather Section 18 contemplates of giving notice by the tenant for extension of lease. Learned counsel submitted that the Court below has rightly treated the notice sent by the petitioners under Section 18(1) of the said Act and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the Court below is perfectly legal and valid. 7. Before appreciating the rival contention made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I would first like to refer the relevant provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. In the year 1947 the Bihar Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Act was enacted which was extended upto March 1976 by successive notification. In 1977, Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 was enacted after repealing 1947 Act. In 1982, Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 was passed. 8. Sections 11 and 18 in 1982 Act were existed in 1947 Act. In 1947 initially the Controller had the jurisdiction to entertain application for eviction but the same was amended by Bihar Act of 1955. Now the jurisdiction has been vested in the Civil Court for passing orders of eviction under the said Act. Section 11 of the Act lays down the grounds for filing suit for eviction against the tenant. Section 11 reads as under:- "11. Now the jurisdiction has been vested in the Civil Court for passing orders of eviction under the said Act. Section 11 of the Act lays down the grounds for filing suit for eviction against the tenant. Section 11 reads as under:- "11. Eviction of tenants.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of the Section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liale to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the following grounds:- (a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for sub-letting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment; (b) where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or negligence or default of the tenant or of any person residing with the tenant or for whose behaviour the tenant is responsible: (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall hence forth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair relit fixed under Section 5; Explanation I.--In this clause the word 'landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of Section 2. Explanation /I.-Where there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference. Explanation /I.-Where there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference. (d) where the amount of (two months rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 16; (e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of the tenancy; and (f) the landlord requires the premises in [order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Municipality or Municipal Corporation or the N. Area Committee or the Regional Development Authority or any other Authority within whose jurisdiction the building lies and such building work cannot be properly and fully carried out without the premises being vacated. (2) (a) Where a servant of the Government in possession of any building as a tenant intends to vacate such building he shall give fifteen day's previous notice in writing of his intention to do so to the landlord and to the District Magistrate who shall under intimation to the landlord within a week of the receipt of the notice, either allot the building to any other servant of the Government whom the District Magistrate thinks suitable subject to the payment of rent, and the observance of the conditions of the tenancy by such servant of the Government or direct that the landlord shall be put in possession of the building: Provided that when no such order is passed by the District Magistrate, the landlord shall be deemed to have been put in possession of the building. (b) Where a building is vacated by a servant of the Government any person occupying such building other than the person referred to in clause (a) shall be liable to be evicted by the District Magistrate in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that after a landlord has been or is deemed to have been put in possession of such building, he may let it to any person." 9. Section 12 of the 1947 Act and Section 15 of 1977 Act laid down the provisions for extension of period limited by the lease. The said Section corresponds to Section 18 of 1982 Act with some changes. Section 18 reads as under:- "18. Extension of period limited by lease.-(1) If a tenant in possession of any building, held on a lease for a specified, period, intends to extend the period limited by such lease, he may give the landlord, at least one month before the expiry of the period limited by the lease, a written notice of his intention to do so, and upon the delivery of such notice the said time shall subject to the provision of Section 11 be deemed to have been extended by double the period covered by the original lease subject to a maximum of one year only. (2) Where the landlord to whom notice has been given under sub-section (1) wishes to object to the extension demanded by the tenant on one or more of the grounds mentioned in subsection (1) of Section 11 or on tile ground that the landlord has any other good and sufficient cause for terminating the lease on the expiry of period limited thereby, he may within fifteen days of the delivery of such notice apply to the Court in that behalf and the Court after hearing the parties may terminate the lease or extend the same for such period as it deems proper in the circumstances: Provided that the tenant shall not in any case be allowed to remain in possession of the building beyond the period permissible under sub-section (1). (3) If the tenant fails to vacate the building on the termination of lease or as the case may be on the expiry of the period fixed by the Court under sub-section (2), the Court shall on an application by the landlord pass an order for ejectment, which shall be executed as a decree and may further order that the tenant shall pay to the landlord such amount as may be determined by it as daily compensation." 10. At this stage, I would like to quote Section 14 which was for the first time introduced in 1982 Act. Section 14 reads as under:- "14. Special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bona fide requirement.-(1) Every suit by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form in every suit referred in sub-section (1) without delay. (3) (i) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants, also direct the summons to be served by registered post with acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require also direct the publication of the summons in the official gazette or in newspapers circulating in the locality, in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. (ii) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the registered article, the court may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (ii) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the registered article, the court may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided; and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in clauses (c) and (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 11. (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite Court fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the 'written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this section: Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the Section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. (9) Where no application has been made to the High Court in revision as laid down in sub-section (8) above, the Court, which passed the order for eviction may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provision of Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908): Provided that no such review shall be made unless an application is field for the same within ninety days of the date of order of eviction." 11. The non obstante clause contained in the said Section makes it clear that a tenant shall not be evicted from the building premises unless a landlord obtained a decree for eviction from a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction by filing a suit only on the grounds mentioned in the said Section. Section 11 (1)(e) is one of the grounds of eviction i.e. expiry of the period of lease. however, Section 18 of the Act gives a right to the landlord to approach the Court for the termination of fixed term lease on the expiry of the period in the event tenant in possession of building premises for a fixed period exercises his right for extension of the period of lease. however, Section 18 of the Act gives a right to the landlord to approach the Court for the termination of fixed term lease on the expiry of the period in the event tenant in possession of building premises for a fixed period exercises his right for extension of the period of lease. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 provides that a tenant may give the landlord a written notice of his intention to extend the period of lease and upon delivery of notice, the tenant may agree to the extension of lease by double of the period covered under the original lease subject to a maximum of one year only. However, if the landlord objects to the extension of lease, so demanded by the tenant by giving notice in sub-section (1), he may apply to the Court under sub-section (2) for termination of the lease on the grounds mentioned in' sub-section (1) of Section 11 or on any other good and sufficient causes. 12. On a plain reading of Section 18 of the Act, it is evidently clear that in cases where a tenant in possession of a building for a fixed term lease exercises his right under sub-section (1) for extension of the period limited by such lease by giving one month's notice before the expiry of the period of lease and the landlord refuses or object to the extension, then he may invoke the provision of subsection (2) of Section 18 of the Act by approaching the Court for termination of lease on the grounds mentioned in Section 11 (1) of the Act. 13. In the case of Zaffar Hussain vs. Mahabir Prasad and Others [ AIR 1957 Pat. 206 ], a Division Bench of Patna High Court considered the two provisions i.e. Section 11 and Section 12 of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. The fact of the case was that the petitioner-landlord let out the premises on lease for a fixed period of five years under a registered document on certain terms and conditions. On the expiry of the period of lease, the opposite party-tenant did not seek any extension of time limited by the lease under Section 12 of the Act. The petitioner-landlord, therefore, served a notice to quit to the opposite party stating that the rent for November and December, 1954 has not been paid. On the expiry of the period of lease, the opposite party-tenant did not seek any extension of time limited by the lease under Section 12 of the Act. The petitioner-landlord, therefore, served a notice to quit to the opposite party stating that the rent for November and December, 1954 has not been paid. In reply to the aforesaid notice, the tenant stated that he was advised by his lawyer to remit the rent to the petitioner by money order. The tenant further stated that the petitioner had executed three hand-notes on different dates and therefore, the amount of these hand-notes would be adjusted towards rent. The petitioner-landlord then made an application under Section 11 (1) of the Act before the Controller for eviction of opposite party on the leasehold premises on the ground that the tenant had defaulted to pay the rent of the house and that he had sublet the building premises. Another ground was that the opposite party-tenant not having got extension of lease as required under Section 12(1) of the Act was liable to be ejected on expiry of period of tenancy. The Controller passed order of eviction on the ground that the tenant sublet the premises. In appeal by the tenant, the Collector allowed the tenant's appeal on the ground that the allegation of subletting had not been proved. The petitioner then moved the Commissioner in revision who upheld the order of the Collector and found that neither non-payment of rent nor any subletting has been established. The petitioner then moved the High Court. While deciding the case, the Division Bench referred Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. The Division Bench observed:- 17. From Ss. 11 and 12 of the Act, we find that the scheme of the Act is as follows:- Sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of S.11 of the Act applies to a case of a month to month tenant, and it provides the various grounds on which such a tenant is liable to be evicted from the building in his possession. Sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of S. 11 applies to the case of every other tenant who is not covered by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of S.11 of the Act. Sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of S. 11 applies to the case of every other tenant who is not covered by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of S.11 of the Act. Section 11, clause (1), sub-clause (b) provides that, in the case of any other tenant, that is a tenant who is not covered by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of S. 11 of the Act, he is liable to be evicted from the building in his possession on three grounds: (a) on the expiry of the period of tenancy, or (2) for non-payment of rent or (3) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy. 18. Section 11, clause (1) of the Act, however, provides that the provisions of that Section are subject to the provisions of S. 12 of the Act. Section 12 provides for extension of time limited by lease. If a tenant, who is in possession of any building held on a lease for a limited time, intends to extend the time limited by such lease but not less than six and not more than twelve months, he may give the landlord, at least one month before the expiry of the time limited by the lease, a written notice of his intention to do so; and upon the delivery of such notice, the said time shall, subject to the provisions of S. 11, be deemed to have been extended for the period specified in the notice." The Division Bench finally observed:- "28. The legal position, therefore, is that the effect of non-compliance by opposite party No. 1 of the mandatory provisions of S. 12(1) of the Act was that he made himself liable to be evicted under S.11 (1)(b) of the Act. In view of this legal position, it was incumbent on the Collector and the Additional Commission to do what S.11 (1)(b) of the Act enjoined and to make an order for ejectment of opposite party No. 1 as was done by the House Controller. In effect, they declined to do what was by S.11 (1)(b) incumbent on them to do, and, thereby, they refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by law. It is, therefore, a case which calls for interference by this Court under its power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227." 14. In effect, they declined to do what was by S.11 (1)(b) incumbent on them to do, and, thereby, they refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by law. It is, therefore, a case which calls for interference by this Court under its power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227." 14. The aforesaid Sections 11 and 12 of 1957 Act were again considered by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Digambar Narain Chaudhary vs. Commissioner of Trihut Division and Others reported in [AIR 1959 Patna 1]. In the Full Bench, the fact was that on 13th January, 1954 the opposite party-landlord let out a portion to the petitioner for seven months and on the expiry of the period, a notice was served through a lawyer to vacate the house on the expiry of the term of lease. The petitioner did not vacate the house and held over even after expiration of seven months. The landlord then filed application under Section 11 of the Act on the ground that the tenant had committed a breach of condition of tenancy by making certain additions and alterations of the building and further that on the expiry of the period of lease, he was liable to vacate the premises on the ground of non-payment of rent. The Controller allowed the application and directed the tenant to vacate the house on various grounds including that the tenant did not obtain extension of period of lease as provided under Section 12 of the Act. The tenant preferred appeal which was allowed by the Collector holding that acceptance of rent after the expiration of the term of the tenancy amounted to the landlord's assent to the continuance of the possession of the building by the tenant. However, the Commission in appeal filed by the landlord disagreed with the Collector. The matter ultimately came to the High Court. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court after considering Sections 11 and 12 of the Act observed as under:- "This Section requires that when a building has been leased out for a limited time and the tenant wants to extend the time limited by such lease, he should give the landlord notice of his intention at least one month before the expiry of the time, and upon the delivery of such notice the landlord is entitled to prefer objection within fifteen days. If the Collector is satisfied that the landlord has made out a case, for determining the lease, the extension will be refused. Unless the extension is refused by the Collector, there will be an automatic extension of the time in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 12 upon the delivery of the notice to the landlord. The combined effect of Ss. 11 and 12 of the Act is that unless the period limited by the lease is extended in accordance with the provisions of S. 12, the tenant was liable to be evicted on the expiry of the period of tenancy under Cl. (b) of sub-so (1) of S.11 of the Act. Where, therefore, a tenant occupies a building by virtue of a lease for a fixed term and does not obtain extension of the time in accordance with the provisions of S.12 of the Act he cannot legally resist the application of the landlord for his eviction on the expiry of the term of the tenancy." 15. In the case of Mahendra Prasad Gupta & Others vs. Sitaram Singhania & Others [1984 PLJR 210], the fact was that in 1943, one Nirmal Chandra Guha leased out the premises for five years. Before the expiry of period of lease, N.C. Guha sold the holding to Paliram Singhania, who purchased it in the names of his two sons. In 1946, there was a fresh lease between the purchasers and petitioner No.1 and his two brothers for a period of eleven years with effect from 18.10.1957 to 14.11.1968. An application was filed by the lessor under Section 15(2) of the Act (now Section 18 of 1982 Ac,) before the Munsif praying that the lease be terminated after 30.11.1968. This gave rise to Misc. Case No. 206 of 1968. While the said Misc. Case was pending, a fresh lease was executed between the parties on 5.3.1969 for a period of 11 years. On 1.10.1979, the lessor gave notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. On 15.12.1979, a petition was filed before the Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur under Section 15(3) of the Act for eviction of the tenant. The petitioners opposed the application on the ground that the same was misconceived. Answering the question, the Division Bench held:- "4. On 1.10.1979, the lessor gave notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. On 15.12.1979, a petition was filed before the Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur under Section 15(3) of the Act for eviction of the tenant. The petitioners opposed the application on the ground that the same was misconceived. Answering the question, the Division Bench held:- "4. In the instant case, it is clear that the tenants had not given any written notice, as envisaged under Section 15(1), to the landlord for extension of the period of lease. A clear averment to that effect has been made in the writ application but it has been denied in the counter affidavit that has been filed in this Court. It would be proper to consider whether the contention raised by the petitioners on this aspect of the matter is correct. 5. Annexure 1 is the application that has been filed by the landlord before the learned Subordinate Judge. In that application we do not find any clear averment to the effect that any notice as contemplated under Section 15(1) of the Act has been given. It was, therefore, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of the absence of a clear averment to the effect aforesaid, it was not open to the respondent to contend that notice had in fact been given. There is substance in this connection. In any event, on the examination of the materials on the record, we find that the factual assertion made by petitioners is correct. Learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to Annexure 'C' a notice given by the petitioners to respondents 1 and 2. On the basis of this notice it was contended 'that there has been fulfillment of the requirement under Section 15(1) of the Act. A perusal of the notice would, however, make it clear that this notice was being given on the basis of the terms of the lease and not on the basis of the right as may be available to a tenant under Section 15(1) of the Act. This is clear from the reading of the notice itself. Reference at this stage may be made to the terms of the lease which is Annexure 'C' to the counter-affidavit. This is clear from the reading of the notice itself. Reference at this stage may be made to the terms of the lease which is Annexure 'C' to the counter-affidavit. Paragraph 11 of the lease is a stipulation in relation to the extension of the period of lease in the circumstances as mentioned in that paragraph. In view of the presence of this stipulation it is legitimate to infer that the notice (Annexure 'C') was in pursuance of the purported exercise of option as given in Clause 11 of the lease aforesaid. 6. learned counsel for the respondents contended that the application filed before the learned Subordinate Judge was maintainable in view of the order that has been passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 206 of 1968. That should be taken to be an order under Section 15(2) of the Act. Consequently an application under Section 15(3) of the Act was maintainable before the learned Subordinate Judge. A perusal of the compromise petition (Annexure-E) as also the order (Annexure-F) to which reference has already been made makes it clear that the Court was not exercising its power under Section 15(2) of the Act and extending the lease. In fact under the provisions of that section the maximum extension that was permissible was only one year. The recitals in the compromise petition and the order itself indicate that the case was being disposed of because of the compromise and the execution of a fresh lease for a period of eleven years. The contention of the respondents therefore cannot be accepted. 7. Lastly, it was contended that the Court should take notice of the intervening events and on that basis refused to interfere with the impugned order. Learned counsel contended that the lease executed in the year 1969 expired on 1.12.79 and therefore, before the filing of the application at best there could be extension for one year under Section 15(1). Even if it is taken in consideration, a tenant did not have right to continue in the suit premises after 1.12.1980. In the circumstances the Court should take note of these facts and refuse to interfere as the tenants had no right to continue in the premises in question. The main difficulty of the respondents, however is that the order of the Subordinate Judge has been passed under Section 15(3) of the Act. In the circumstances the Court should take note of these facts and refuse to interfere as the tenants had no right to continue in the premises in question. The main difficulty of the respondents, however is that the order of the Subordinate Judge has been passed under Section 15(3) of the Act. In view of our finding that there was no notice under Section 15(1) of the Act the power of the Court was not there to entertain any application under Section 15(3) of the Act. It is only where order of termination under Section 15(2) of the Act has been passed or the period of extension as granted by the Court has expired that Section 15(3) is attracted. Since neither of the two contingencies as mentioned above were present in this case, the Subordinate Judge did not have power to entertain the application and pass orders of eviction on the basis of the application made before it. In the absence of the power to entertain and adjudicate on the application filed before the learned Subordinate Judge, it is difficult to hold that this Court should not interfere even though an order has been passed by an authority which had no power to pass the impugned order." 16. In the case of Narayan Prasad Tulsian vs. Shital Prasad Saha and Another [(1975) BBCJ 750], the order passed under Section 12(3) of the B.B.C. Act was challenged under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before the Patna High Court. In that case application under Section 12(3) of the Act was filed by the respondents in the Court of Munsif, Bhagalpur for passing order of eviction against the petitioner-tenant. Petitioner was initially inducted on the land for 11 months and after expiry of the said period, petitioner continue remitting monthly rent to the landlord which were accepted all the time. Sometime later while the petitioner was still holding over, he filed an application under Section 5 of the Act before the Rent Controller for fixation of rent. As counter blast, respondent-landlord filed application in two cases under Section 12(3) of the Act before the Munsif praying for an order of eviction on the ground that the tenancy had terminated by afflux of time. As counter blast, respondent-landlord filed application in two cases under Section 12(3) of the Act before the Munsif praying for an order of eviction on the ground that the tenancy had terminated by afflux of time. Petitioner-tenant for some reason remained absent as a result of which application was heard ex parte and order of eviction was passed under Section 12(3) of the Act. The said order was challenged on the ground inter alia that proceeding under Section 12(3) was without jurisdiction as the application filed by the landlord was not maintainable. The Division Bench after discussing the provisions has quashed the impugned order of eviction passed under Section 12(3) of the Act and held as under:- "It will be noticed that a tenant in possession of any building, held on a lease for a specified period has been given option under sub sec. (1) of Section 12 to give a written notice his intention to extend the period limited by such lease at least one month before the expiry of the period. On such notice being delivered, the time fixed under the lease of a specified period shall be deemed to have been extended by double the period covered by the original lease but in no case exceeding a period of one year and that too subject to the provisions of Section 11. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 lays down that the landlord to whom notice has been given if he wishes to object to the extension demanded on one or more of the grounds contemplated by law may within 15 days of the delivery of such notice put forth his objection before the Court in that regard and the Court after hearing the parties may either terminate the lease or extend the same for an appropriate period, in no case exceeding the period as introduced by the legal fiction, under sub-section (1) of Section 2. Thereafter sub-section (3) of section 12 provides that if the tenant fails to vacate the building either on the termination of the lease or on the expiry of the period fixed by the Court, that is, either after the expiry of the deemed extension of time under sub-section (1) of Section 12 or after the expiry of the time fixed by the Court under sub-section (2), the landlord may resort to a summary proceeding under sub-section (3) of Section 12 and in such a summary proceeding on his mere application the Court may pass an order of eviction which in law has the force of a decree. In my considered view, therefore, the summary procedure prescribed in Section 12(3) of the Act can be resorted to only in cases where the tenant has exercised his option under Section 12(1) and/or where the Court has passed an appropriate order under sub-section (2) of Section 12. Where no notice has been given by the tenant to the landlord before the expiry of the fixed period under the lease certainly the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12 are not attracted and in that event it automatically follows that there can be no resort to any proceeding under Section of the Act. 4. I am fortified in my view by a number of decisions which, though not squarely covering the point, have indicated the principles and objects governing Section 12 of the Act. In the case of Odhavajee Muijee and Another vs. Ram Krishna Lal Shaw and Others a Bench of this Court held that the procedure of a suit contemplated by Section 11 (1)(c) of the Act only applies to a case where there is no statutory extension of the lease under Section 12(1), but once there is notice given by the tenants for an extension of the lease under Section 12(1) and there is by statutory fiction an extension of the lease under Section 12( 1) then the provisions of Section 12(3) come into operation and it is open to landlord to apply to the court for eviction of the tenant on the termination of the extended period of the lease. That is the procedure contemplated by Section 12(3) which governs cases falling both under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 12. In the case of Ramji Saran vs. Krishna Chandra Khanna, it was similarly ob. That is the procedure contemplated by Section 12(3) which governs cases falling both under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 12. In the case of Ramji Saran vs. Krishna Chandra Khanna, it was similarly ob. served by a Bench of this Court that after an order either terminating the lease or extending the same for such period as the Court may deem proper has been passed as is contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 12, the landlord has been afforded a rather summary remedy to get the premises vacated by the tenant under sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act. And, that summary remedy is by way of an application to the court which cannot take the place of a plaint. It was similarly held in the case of Satya Charan Gosami vs. Shyam Ishaar Gangu Mal Bhujvani that the only purpose behind Section 12(3) appears to be that in the case of a tenant who gets advantage of Section (1) of the Act, the landlord may evict him under a summary proceeding instead of a suit. 5. Learned counsel for respondent no. 1 contended that since Section 11 has been made subject to the provisions of Section 12. Therefore, in any case in which either of the grounds enumerated in Section 11 (1) was attracted if a summary remedy had been provided in Section 12(3), there is no reason to hold why Section 12(3) will not have precedence over the provisions of Section 11 (1 )(e). In my view, this contention cannot be held to be tenable for the simple reason that if this submission were accepted as correct in law, the whole provision of Section 11 (1 )(e) would be rendered otiose. And in view of the language of section 13(3), as was contended by learned counsel for respondent no. 1, there will be no occasion for any landlord to get in decree in a duly constituted title suit on the ground mentioned in Section 11 (1 )(e). And in view of the language of section 13(3), as was contended by learned counsel for respondent no. 1, there will be no occasion for any landlord to get in decree in a duly constituted title suit on the ground mentioned in Section 11 (1 )(e). Learned counsel relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Digambar Narain Chaudhary vs. Commissioner of Tirhut and Others for the purpose of contending that the combined effect of sections 11 and 12 of the Act was that unless the period limited by the lease was extended in accordance with the provisions of Section 12, the tenant was liable to be evicted on the expiry of the period of tenancy under Section 11 (1)(b). Where, therefore, a tenant occupies a building by virtue of a lease for a fixed term and does not obtain extension of time under Section 12, he cannot legally resist the application of the landlord for his eviction on the expiry of the term of the tenancy. I am afraid, the decision in Digambar Narain Chaudhary's case is not applicable to the facts of the present case at all, for that was a case where the Full Bench of this Court was seized with the question as to the effect of holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. That was a case in which the notice to quit had been given by the landlord to the tenant during the period that the tenant was holding over and praying rent and it was held that merely because there was a statutory holding over and a statutory tenancy created under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, that could not amount to any unequivocal assent by the landlord to continue the tenancy from month to month. In that case the point for determination was not as to whether an application under Section 12(3) of the Act would be maintainable even if no option was exercised, and privilege enjoyed by a tenant under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 12." 17. The propositions of law decided in the decisions referred to hereinabove were either under the B.B.C. Act, 1947 or B.B.C. Act, 1977. The propositions of law decided in the decisions referred to hereinabove were either under the B.B.C. Act, 1947 or B.B.C. Act, 1977. In 1982 Act, which is under consideration, a new provision namely, Section 14 has been inserted as quoted herein above, which provides a special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement or expiry of the period of lease as mentioned in Section 11 (1)(c) or (e) of the Act. Therefore, Section 14 casts a duty upon the Court to try the suit for a decree of eviction under Section 11 (1)(c) and (e) of the Act in accordance with the special procedure. The conjoint reading of Section 11, Section 14 and Section 18 of the Act make it clear that if the landlord seeks a decree of eviction of the tenant in possession of the building on the expiry of fixed term lease, he shall have to file a suit for eviction and a special procedure as contemplated under Section 14 shall be followed for the disposal of such suit. This is, however, subject to a special remedy provided under Section 18 of the Act which will come into force only when a tenant in possession of a building for a specified period, invoke his right under sub-section (1) of Section 18 by giving notice for the extension of the period of lease, but such right for extension of fixed term lease is limited to a period of one year only in the event landlord does not object to such extension by applying to the Court for termination of lease. 18. In the instant case, admittedly the petitioners were inducted in the suit premises on the basis of lease deed dated 22.4.1992 for a fixed period of 10 years from 1.5.1992 to 30.4.2002. As per Clause (8) of the lease deed dated 22.4.1992, the parties had agreed for the renewal of lease for a further period on the same terms and conditions and on payment of 10% increment of monthly rent. Clause (8) of the lease deed reads as under:- "Clause (B).-On the expiry of every ten years, the lesser shall renew the lease in the name of the lessee on 10% increment of monthly rent." 19. Clause (8) of the lease deed reads as under:- "Clause (B).-On the expiry of every ten years, the lesser shall renew the lease in the name of the lessee on 10% increment of monthly rent." 19. At this stage, I will not enter into the question with regard to the effect of Clause (8) of the lease deed, but the fact remains that there is a renewal clause in the lease deed whereby it was agreed by the parties that on the expiry of the period of lease, the lesser shall renew the lease on 10% increment of monthly rent. 20. A notice dated 28.2.2002 was filed and proved in the Court below and was marked Ext. 2. This notice was sent by the tenants through their lawyer before the expiry of the period of lease whereby the tenants requested the landlord for the renewal of lease in pursuance of Clause (8) of the lease deed dated 22.4.1992. The tenants claimed in the said notice that they are entitled to renewal of the lease for a further period of ten years in terms of Clause (8) of the lease deed. The said notice was followed by another notice dated 20.4.2002 which was proved and marked Ext. 2/A. On receipt of the said notices, the respondent-landlord filed an application purported to be under Section 18(2) of the Act for an order terminating the fixed term lease on the ground inter alia that the respondent requires the suit premises for his use and occupation and also for engaging his son in business. On being noticed, the petitioners-tenants filed show cause stating inter alia that the application under Section 18(2) is not maintainable and further that the proceeding is bad for non-joinder of necessary party, inasmuch as the other cosharers-landlords were not made party. It was further stated in the show cause that they have sent two registered notices requesting the landlord to execute a registered deed of renewal of lease and on their failure, they have already filed a suit for specific performance of lease agreement being Title Suit No. 63 of 2002. The petitioners further stated that they have never exercised their option for extension of lease as provided under Section 18(1) of the Act and, therefore, the application under Section 18(2) of the Act is not maintainable. 21. The petitioners further stated that they have never exercised their option for extension of lease as provided under Section 18(1) of the Act and, therefore, the application under Section 18(2) of the Act is not maintainable. 21. The Court below after hearing the parties, allowed the application and passed order of termination of lease. The Court firstly held that the aforesaid notices dated 28.2.2002 and 20.4.2002 shall be treated as a notice under Section 18(1) of the Act. The Court further held that the respondent-landlord requires the premises in question for their own use and occupation. 22. As noticed above, sub-section (2) of Section 18 specifically provides that the landlord to whom notice has been served under sub-section (1) may object to the extension demanded by the tenant on one or more of grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 11 or any other good and sufficient causes. The Court below terminated the lease by passing the impugned order on the ground of personal requirement as contemplated under Section 11 (1)(c) of the Act. However, the Court below has overlooked the renewal clause contained with lease-deed and the first proviso to Section 11 (1)(c) which casts a duty upon the Court to comply the requirements mentioned therein. So far as the aforesaid notice dated 20.4.2002 is concerned, the Court below has committed serious error of law in treating the said notice as under Section 18(1) of the Act. As discussed above, Section 18(1) of the Act contemplates extension of fixed term lease double the period fixed therein but not more than one year. If a tenant in possession of a building for a fixed period specified in the lease whereby a right of renewal of the lease for a period more than a year and the tenant seeks renewal of the lease for a further period by giving notice to the landlord, then such lease deed cannot be renewed for a period more than a year by invoking the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Act. In the notices, Exts.2 and 2/A, the petitioners-tenants categorically made a request for the renewal of the lease for a period of ten years and not for the extension of the lease for a maximum period of one year under Section 18( 1) of the Act. In the notices, Exts.2 and 2/A, the petitioners-tenants categorically made a request for the renewal of the lease for a period of ten years and not for the extension of the lease for a maximum period of one year under Section 18( 1) of the Act. On the basis of such notices, Court cannot terminate the lease by entertaining an application under Section 18(2) of the Act. 23. After giving my anxious consideration on the relevant provisions of the B.B.C. Act, I come to the following conclusions:- (i) Section 18 of the Act applies in cases where there is a fixed term lease without there being any renewal clause whereby parties agreed for renewal of the lease. (ii) In cases, where there is a lease for a period more than one year, with a renewal clause as aforesaid and if the landlord refuses to renew the lease for a further period, he has to file a regular suit for eviction on the grounds mentioned in Section 11 (1) of the said Act. (iii) In cases where there is a fixed term lease with a renewal clause, a tenant before expiry of the period of lease, may approach the landlord by giving notice for the extension of the lease as contemplated under Section 18(1) of the Act. If such notice is given under Section 18(1) of the Act, then the landlord may proceed under Section 18(2) and Section 18(3) of the said Act. 24. In the instant case, as held herein-above, the notices dated 28.2.2002 and 20.4.2002 sent by the petitioners for renewal of lease deed in terms of Clause (8) cannot and shall not be treated as a notice under Section 18(1) of the Act, inasmuch as the petitioners have not exercised their right for extension of lease which is available to a tenant under Section 18 of the said Act. In that view of the matter, the Court below has committed serious error of law in entertaining the application of the landlord-respondent under Section 18(2) of the Act and passing the impugned order terminating the lease. Consequently, the impugned order passed under Section 18(2) and consequential order passed under Section 18(3) of the Act are wholly without jurisdiction. 25. These civil revision applications are, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. Consequently, the impugned order passed under Section 18(2) and consequential order passed under Section 18(3) of the Act are wholly without jurisdiction. 25. These civil revision applications are, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.