COMMISSIONER, TRADE TAX, U. P. , LUCKNOW v. JAIN UDYOG.
2008-07-01
PRAKASH KRISHNA
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Prakash Krishna, J. - Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The present revision arises out of an order passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal on September 28, 1998 in Second Appeal No. 229 of 1998 relevant to the assessment year 1994-95. In the memo of revision the following question of law has been framed : "(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to annul the taxation order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), Bulandshahar under section 10B of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 in as much as, the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) was based on proven facts found on survey dated August 25, 1994, December 8, 1994 and December 9, 1994 ?" Relevant facts in brief are as follows : The dealer - opposite party is a manufacturer of M.S. round flat blades and seller thereof. It is also not in dispute that the dealer - opposite party has been granted eligibility certificate under section 4A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948. During the assessment year 1994-95, the assessment order was framed by the assessing officer declaring the dealer - opposite party as not assessable. The said order was sought to be revised by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), Trade Tax, in exercise of powers conferred on it under section 10B of the Act. After issuing the notice to the assessee the Deputy Commissioner found that the assessment order framed by the assessing officer is illegal and improper in as much as the fact as found in the survey dated August 25, 1994 was not taken into account. The assessment order dated June 25, 1997 was set aside and the matter was restored back to the assessing officer for framing the assessment order afresh. Feeling aggrieved against the said order, the assessee preferred a second appeal before the Tribunal which has been allowed by the order under revision. The sole contention of the learned standing counsel for the Department is that the Tribunal has committed a gross illegality in allowing the appeal only on the ground that the assessee being an eligible certificate holder its turnover is not assessable. He submits that a person having eligibility certificate may also indulge in trading of goods.
The sole contention of the learned standing counsel for the Department is that the Tribunal has committed a gross illegality in allowing the appeal only on the ground that the assessee being an eligible certificate holder its turnover is not assessable. He submits that a person having eligibility certificate may also indulge in trading of goods. In the survey dated August 25, 1994 it was found by the surveying officer that as a matter of fact no manufacturing activity is being carried on by the assessee - opposite party. Elaborating the argument it was submitted that the assessee is involved in trading of goods, the said transaction is liable to be taxed in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, submits that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are basically findings of fact. Elaborating the argument it was submitted that indisputably the assessee is holder of eligibility certificate, therefore, under section 4A of the Act the turnover of the dealer - opposite party is exempt. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. A bare perusal of the order of the Tribunal would show that it has proceeded to decide the appeal simply on the ground that the assessee had eligibility certificate for the relevant period as the same was effective for six years from April 24, 1990 to April 23, 1996. The assessment year involved herein is 1994-95 which is obviously covered by the said period. On this premises the appeal was allowed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has lost sight of the fact that exemption from trade tax is available to the manufacturer on such goods specified in the eligibility certificate. For the applicability of section 4A, a dealer has to be a manufacturer of goods. A person who is not a manufacturer is not entitled for eligibility certificate. The eligibility certificate granted in favour of the dealer - opposite party will grant exemption from trade tax only on such goods which were manufactured by the dealer - opposite party and not otherwise. A dealer may be a manufacturer and trader as well. Specified goods manufactured by a manufacturer holding eligibility certificate may not be liable to tax due to section 4A, but it does not mean that such person cannot be taxed for other business activities which are otherwise taxable under the Act.
A dealer may be a manufacturer and trader as well. Specified goods manufactured by a manufacturer holding eligibility certificate may not be liable to tax due to section 4A, but it does not mean that such person cannot be taxed for other business activities which are otherwise taxable under the Act. In other words grant of eligibility certificate grants exemption from trade tax liability in respect of the manufactured goods, mentioned therein only. The first appellate authority was perfectly justified to restore the matter to the assessing officer to re-frame the assessment order taking into consideration the facts as noted in the survey dated August 25, 1994 and the Tribunal was not justified to set the order of the first appellate authority aside. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal has committed a legal error in allowing the appeal and setting aside the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) in exercise of the powers under section 10B of the Act. In view of the above discussions, I find sufficient force in the revision. The question of law raised in the memo of revision is, therefore, decided in favour of the Department and against the assessee and it is held that the power was rightly exercised by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) under section 10B of the Act. The Tribunal was not correct in setting aside the said order. The revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) is restored. No order as to costs.