Judgment : This petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside the award passed by the arbitrator in Arbitration Case No. SK/LGF/1 of 2000 dated 24. 2003. 2. The brief facts are as follows: (a) The petitioner herein is the guarantor under the lease agreement/Exhibit A-3 dated 28. 1955 entered into between the first respondent and the second respondent/the borrower for purchase of a TATA Truck. It is stated that the petitioner herein joined as guarantor by executing separate guarantee letter guaranteeing the due fulfillment of obligation of the borrower, the second respondent. The total lease amount was to the tune of Rs.8,69,760/-. The first of the installments commenced on 28. 1995 and the last installment to end on 28. 1999, thus spanning to a period of 48 monthly installments. Invoice for the vehicle was raised in the name of the leasing company as owners. According to the first respondent, the lessee committed default in payment of the monthly installment due from 8th month onwards. The notice sent did not result in any positive response in clearing the arrears. Hence, the first respondent called upon the second respondent to surrender the vehicle. Accordingly, the same was surrendered on 19. 1996. Since the second respondent did not send necessary forms and the original R.C. Book for selling the vehicle, the first respondent sent a notice on 19. 1996 to the second respondent to settle the contract amount, failing which, it was intimated that the vehicle would be sold. Three afterwards, the first respondent sold the vehicle for a sum of Rs. 2,08,330/-on 16. 1998. The first respondent issued a notice on 27. 1998 informing of the sale and called upon the petitioner and the borrower/the second respondent to pay the shortfall amount. It is stated that, even to that, there was no response. This was followed by yet another letter on 11. 1999. Ultimately, the arbitration clause in the lease agreement was invoked to settle the dispute. (b) The first respondent filed the claim statement before the, arbitrator appointed In terms of the agreement clause, wherein it was stated that the petitioner, herein had joined as a guarantor in the said lease agreement to guarantee the due performance of the obligations of the principal lessee/the second respondent herein. (b) The first respondent filed the claim statement before the, arbitrator appointed In terms of the agreement clause, wherein it was stated that the petitioner, herein had joined as a guarantor in the said lease agreement to guarantee the due performance of the obligations of the principal lessee/the second respondent herein. As the liability of the petitioner was joint and several with that of the second respondent, the first respondent prayed for the award to be passed in terms of the claim made directing the petitioner as a guarantor and the second respondent as a lessee to pay the amount of Rs.7,41,415/- jointly and severally with interest at the rate of 24% p.a. from the date of the claim petition till the date of realization. (c) On notice, the petitioner and the second respondent raised preliminary objection as to the arbitrability of the dispute. Under order dated 17. 2000, the arbitrator overruled the preliminary objection. Thereafter, the lessee and the petitioner herein filed separate counters. In the counter filed by the lessee, the second respondent herein contended that once the vehicle was surrendered, the contract was revoked; as such, the first respondents could not claim future rentals, compensation charges or any other charges from him, including traveling expenses and legal expenses. He also questioned the claim of interest at 24% p.a., as the second respondent lessee was governed by the Debt Relief Act. (d) The second respondent made a counter claim for a sum of Rs.5,47,692/-. He submitted that the lease agreement was entered on 28. 1995. The vehicle was surrendered on 19. 1996 and hence the claim made on 21. 2000 was barred by limitation. The petitioner herein filed a separate counter. Apart from contending that the claim was barred by limitation, he took the stand that he had not executed any document guaranteeing the payment of amount under the lease agreement. (e) Upon hearing both sides the arbitrator passed an award directing the second respondent herein and the petitioner jointly and severally to pay to the first respondent herein a sum of Rs.6,94,450/- with interest at 18% p.a. from 21. 2000 till the date of realization with costs. 3. Aggrieved by the said award, the guarantor has preferred this petition contending that the arbitrator had not considered the contention of the petitioner that he had not guaranteed the loan transaction under the lease agreement. 2000 till the date of realization with costs. 3. Aggrieved by the said award, the guarantor has preferred this petition contending that the arbitrator had not considered the contention of the petitioner that he had not guaranteed the loan transaction under the lease agreement. He further pointed out that neither the signature of the petitioner nor his name found place in the lease agreement marked as Exhibit A-2. He further pointed out that no notice was issued prior to the arbitration proceedings; consequently, he could not be made liable to pay any amount. The petitioner further pointed out that Exhibit A-24, the guarantee letter, was a fabricated document, which could not be considered as binding as per law. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the guarantee agreement was an independently executed document and that it contained no arbitration clause to refer the dispute to arbitrator and that all that the guarantor guaranteed was that the terms and conditions of the lease shall be strictly observed and fulfilled by the the lessee. He submitted that the claim statement did not make out any liability or obligation on the part of the petitioner herein to make any payment as stated therein. 5. In support of his contention as to lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to bind the petitioner, learned counsel placed reliance of the decisions in sukaluram Gond v. State of M.P. and Others (1994) 5 SCC 570 and Dharma Pratishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 214 : (2005) 9 SCC 686: (2005) 1 MLJ 70 . He also referred to Hind. Paper Corpn. Ltd., v. Keneilhouseangami 68 company cases 361 and ITC Classic Finance Ltd. V. Grapco Mining and Co. Ltd. AIR 1997 Calcutta 397 to impress on the fact that when the guarantee agreement is an independent agreement, in the absence of a specific clause for referring to arbitration, the award passed as against this petitioner as a guarantor is totally unjustifiable. He pointed cut that the acquiescence to the proceedings before the arbitrator does not confer jurisdiction to pass an award on the petitioner. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent company submitted that going by the terms of the guarantee agreement, impliedly, the petitioner is a party to the lease agreement whereby, the petitioner had undertaken the co-obligation to discharge the lease amount. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent company submitted that going by the terms of the guarantee agreement, impliedly, the petitioner is a party to the lease agreement whereby, the petitioner had undertaken the co-obligation to discharge the lease amount. Consequently, it is not open to the petitioner herein to dispute the arbitration proceedings or the liability under the agreement. He also pointed out that the petition did not raise any issue as to the arbitrability of the dispute before the Arbitrator and hence, he is not entitled to raise the question of jurisdiction in the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 7. Heard the learned counsel on either side. 8. A reading of the award show that the arbitrator considered the issues as regards the rights of the first respondent to enforce its rights under the hire purchase agreement after the sale of the vehicle. Dealing with the question that the claim was barred by limitation, the learned arbitrator found that the claim was made within three years from the date when the vehicle was sold i.e., 16. 1998 and hence the claim was within the period of limitation Dealing with the contention that as per Section 11 of the Act 1996, an arbitrator could be appointed only by mutual consent and in the event of the failure, the arbitrator could be appointed only by mutual consent and in the event of the failure, the Chief Justice of the High Court alone could appoint the arbitrator, the learned arbitrator pointed out that the petitioner and the second respondent had already agreed that the first respondent’s Managing Director could nominate an arbitrator. Hence, there was no force in the contention of the petitioner and the second respondent that the arbitrator was not properly appointed. Learned Arbitrator however rejected the contention that the guarantor had not executed any document guaranteeing to pay the amount on the loan taken by the second respondent. Ultimately, as against the claim of 24% interest per annum, the learned arbitrator awarded future interest at 18% per annum from 21. 2000 till the realization was made. 9. Learned Arbitrator however rejected the contention that the guarantor had not executed any document guaranteeing to pay the amount on the loan taken by the second respondent. Ultimately, as against the claim of 24% interest per annum, the learned arbitrator awarded future interest at 18% per annum from 21. 2000 till the realization was made. 9. Before considering the rival contentions, we need to advert to Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which defines an “arbitration agreement.” Section 7(1) defines, an “arbitration agreement” to mean “an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.” Section 7(2) states that an arbitration may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. 10. Section 7(3) of the Act requires that the agreement shall be in writing. Section 7 further states that an agreement shall be deemed to be in writing if it is contained in a document signed by the parties, in exchange of letter, telex, telegrams or by means of telecommunication, which provide a record of the agreement or exchange of statement of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party not denied by the other. Courts have taken the view that all that is necessary in the agreement is that the agreement must indicate an intention of both, the parties to settle the dispute through arbitration. In the decisions in Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. V. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 3688 : 7 SCC 418, the Apex Court held that the arbitration agreement is not required to be in any particular form. What is to be ascertained is whether the parties have agreed that if the dispute arises between the parties in respect of subject matter of contract, such dispute shall be referred to arbitration. 11. An arbitration clause forming part of the contract is treated as an agreement independent of the parts of the contract. What is to be ascertained is whether the parties have agreed that if the dispute arises between the parties in respect of subject matter of contract, such dispute shall be referred to arbitration. 11. An arbitration clause forming part of the contract is treated as an agreement independent of the parts of the contract. Section 16(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 states that an arbitration clause forming part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract and the arbitral Tribunal can decide the questions of its own jurisdiction and the objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. In the decision in Firm Ashok Traders and Another v. Gurumukh Das Saluja and Others AIR 2004 SC 1433 : (2004) 3 SCC 155 in paragraph 13, the Supreme Court held: “under the scheme of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the arbitration clause is separable from other clauses of partnership deed. The arbitration clause constitutes an agreement by itself.” Hence, as per Section 16(2), the plea that the arbitral Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction should be raised not later than the submission of the defence. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Hind Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. Keneilhouseangami (supra) and ITC Classic Chance Ltd. v. Grapco Mining and Co. (supra) to impress on his submission that the guarantee contract is separate from the original contract. He also referred to decision of the Apex Court in Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ld (supra) to highlight the proposition as held by the Apex Court that the Arbitrator derives his jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute only from the arbitration agreement and that the there cannot be an assumption of jurisdiction by the Arbitrator. He also pointed out that where there is no such agreement, there is initial want of jurisdiction which cannot be cured, even by acquiescence. 13. A perusal of the decision in Hind Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. Keneilhouseangami (supra) shows that the company therein stood as a guarantor for due performance of the contract. The Calcutta High Court pointed out therein that the bank guarantee was a contract separate from the original contract pursuant to which the bank guarantee was furnished. 13. A perusal of the decision in Hind Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. Keneilhouseangami (supra) shows that the company therein stood as a guarantor for due performance of the contract. The Calcutta High Court pointed out therein that the bank guarantee was a contract separate from the original contract pursuant to which the bank guarantee was furnished. The Court pointed out that the bank was not a party to the original agreement. So too, the party at whose instance the bank guarantee was given was not a party to the bank guarantee. 14. It may be seen that in the decision in Mahatma Gandhi Sahakra Sakkare Karkhane v. National Heavy Engg. Corp. Ltd. (2007) 6 SCC 470 : (2007) 5 MLJ 1280, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the scope of a guarantee given by a bank on behalf of the vendor to the purchaser. In terms of the agreement between the vendor and the purchaser, the bank was required to furnish a guarantee as regards the supply erection and commissioning of sugar plants. The purchasers invoked the bank guarantee furnished by the bank of behalf of the vendor on account of the inability of the vendor to commission the project. The vendor contended that the purchaser could not invoke the bank guarantee unless the conditions precedent were satisfied. While deciding the issue as to whether the bank guarantee given was a conditional one or not, the Supreme Court held that in the course of commercial dealing unconditional bank guarantee was given, the beneficiary was entitled to realize such a bank guarantee in terms thereof irrespective of any pending dispute. The Court pointed out that the terms of guarantee are very essential and material to consider the scope of the guarantee. Referring to the decision in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1999 SC 3710 : (1999) 8 SCC 436 , the Supreme Court that the bank guarantee represents an independent contract between the bank and the beneficiary and that both the parties to that agreement would be bound by the terms thereof. Referring to the decision in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1999 SC 3710 : (1999) 8 SCC 436 , the Supreme Court that the bank guarantee represents an independent contract between the bank and the beneficiary and that both the parties to that agreement would be bound by the terms thereof. In so holding the Supreme Court further pointed out that the mere fact the guarantee referred to the principal agreement without referring to any specific clause in the main agreement, the right of the purchaser to recover from the guarantor the guaranteed amount shall not be affected or suspended by reason of the fact that disputes have been raised by the vendors with regard to or in connection therewith, The said decision has been followed in decision in Vinitech Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Infosystems Ltd (2008) 1 SCC 544 . The Apex Court on analysis of the terms of the guarantee, held that mere reference of the principal agreement in the preamble of a deed of guarantee does not make it a conditional guarantee and that unless particular clauses of agreement is incorporated in the deed of guarantee, the guarantee so furnished has to be considered as an unconditional guarantee. The Apex Court held that bank guarantee is an independent contract between the bank and the beneficiary thereof. It held: “It is equally well settled in law that Bank guarantee is an independent contract between Bank and the beneficiary thereof. The bank is always obliged to honour its guarantee as long as it is an unconditional and and irrevocable one.” 15. Although the said Supreme Court decisions are with reference to the grant of injunction, yet, it lays down the law that a guarantee agreement is an independent agreement between the guarantor and the beneficiary that the mere reference in the guarantee agreement as to the principal agreement does not affect the right of the beneficiary to enforce his rights under the guarantee agreement. It stands on its own merit irrespective of any dispute between the guarantor and the party on whose behalf the guarantee had been furnished. It stands on its own merit irrespective of any dispute between the guarantor and the party on whose behalf the guarantee had been furnished. The law thus declared the Apex Court certainly favours the contention of the petitioner herein that the guarantee agreement is an independent agreement, and that the guarantor therein cannot be subjected to the arbitration proceedings solely on the availability of an arbitration clause in the original lease agreement. 16. A reading of the guarantee agreement dated 28. 1995 show that the second, respondent is not a party to the guarantee agreement. So too, the petitioner is not a party to the lease an independent guarantee agreement, the second respondent’s obligation under the lease agreement dated 28. 1995. It further states that the guarantor undertook and assured the company that the terms and conditions of the lease shall be strictly observed and fulfilled by the lessee. 17. The guarantee agreement further states that the company shall be entitled to enforce the guarantor’s contractual liability to reimburse and compensate all sums payable to the company in the event of default committed by the lessee. The guarantee agreement further states that the company granting time to the lessee or indulgence granted to the lessee shall not in any way affect the company’s position to proceed against the guarantor. 18. A perusal of this guarantee agreement dated 28. 1995 executed by the guarantor shows that there is no arbitration clause specific or a reference as to the arbitration clause in the lease agreement so as to bring the guarantor under the arbitration clause provided for under the main lease agreement. The sum and substance of the guarantee agreement is that the guarantor assures the payment fixed under the lease agreement, independent of the lease agreement, the guarantee agreement keeps alive the obligation of the guarantor to satisfy the lessee’s obligation under the lease agreement irrespective of what the lessor may give as a matter of concession to the lessee. Hence although in one sense the guarantor’s liability is interwined with that of the lessee, yet, at the same time,the terms of the agreement clearly show that it is an independent contract and hence any action contemplated by invoking an arbitration clause under the lease agreement would not ipso facto extend its application to the guarantee agreement. 19. Hence although in one sense the guarantor’s liability is interwined with that of the lessee, yet, at the same time,the terms of the agreement clearly show that it is an independent contract and hence any action contemplated by invoking an arbitration clause under the lease agreement would not ipso facto extend its application to the guarantee agreement. 19. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is in arbitration clause in the guarantee agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration. Going by the various clauses therein, the liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the lessee only to the extent specified under the lease agreement. The guarantee is a continuing one so as to remain in force until the obligation of the lessee as stated in the lease agreement are fully discharged. In the circumstances, I hold that in the absence of any specific agreement for referring a dispute to arbitration, provided for under the guarantee agreement, do not subscribe to the submission of the first respondent that the petitioner is bound by the terms of the lease agreement. Hence, the award is vitiated for want of jurisdiction insofar as the petitioner is concerned. 20. In the decision is Dharma Prathishthanam v. Matihok Construction (P) Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute is derived from the arbitration agreement and where there is no agreement, there is an initial want of jurisdiction which cannot be cured even by acquiescence. The Apex Court held that by using clear and unambiguous language, an arbitration agreement expresses the intention of the parties to have the dispute settled by arbitration. Where there is no such agreement, the award passed by the arbitral Tribunal suffers from want of jurisdiction. 21. Going by the statutory provisions and the law thus declared that arbitration is essentially a matter of agreement between the parties to have the resolution of their disputes by referring the same to an arbitrator, the respondents are duty bound to point out such an agreement between the petitioner and the first respondent for reference of the dispute before the arbitrator. A bare reading of the guarantee agreement reveals that there is no such agreement for arbitration so as to advance the case of the first respondent herein to fall within the ambit of an arbitration agreement. A bare reading of the guarantee agreement reveals that there is no such agreement for arbitration so as to advance the case of the first respondent herein to fall within the ambit of an arbitration agreement. As already held, in the decision in Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander and Others (2007) 5 SCC 719 : (2007) 6 MLJ 317 referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in paragraph and after referring to the decisions in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi AIR 1998 SC 1297 : (1998) 3 SCC 573 : (1998) Supp MLJ 91, Bharat Bhushan Bansal v. U.P. Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 899 : (1999) 2 SCC 166 , Bihar State Mineral Development Corpn. V. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. (supra) and State of Orissa v. Damodar Das AIR 1996 SC 942 : (1996) 2 SCC 216 , the Supreme Court held that “a clause in a contract can be construed as “an arbitration agreement” only if an agreement to refer disputes or differences to arbitration is expressly or impliedly spelt out from the clause.” 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in Sukaluram Gond v. State of M.P. and Others (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that there should be an agreement showing the consent to refer the dispute for settlement by the arbitrator. The Apex Court further held that: “Parties to the contract, by consent, refer their dispute for settlement to a Tribunal of their choosing, instead of to a Court. Therefore, there should exist an agreement showing consent to refer a dispute for settlement by the arbitrator. In cases where the arbitrator which are not referred to him or over which he has no jurisdiction to try, the question is not one of waiver or estoppel, but of authority. The question is whether a person, not a party to a reference, but who participated in the award proceeding with objection and continued to participate in the proceedings under protest, as was done in this case, whether is bound by the award? Our answer is no. He is not bound by the award, as being without authority, After taking objection to the authority of the arbitrator and making protest, unless a proper reference was made by this Court, the arbitrator does not get the authority and jurisdiction to make the award against a non-party to the contract. 23. Our answer is no. He is not bound by the award, as being without authority, After taking objection to the authority of the arbitrator and making protest, unless a proper reference was made by this Court, the arbitrator does not get the authority and jurisdiction to make the award against a non-party to the contract. 23. The situation herein is no different to take a different conclusion. In the absence of any agreement disclosed either in the guarantee agreement or in any further communication in writing, the award passed as against the petitioner cannot be sustained. 24. Learned counsel for the first respondent pointed out that the petitioner had not taken a specific stand as to the jurisdiction and hence, at this stage, the petitioner cannot claim that the arbitration proceedings would not bind him. He submitted that the petitioner had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, consequently, it is not open to him to question the jurisdiction of the arbitrator vis-à-vis, the petitioner guarantor herein. 25. A perusal of the claim statement shows that in paragraph 11 the first respondent alleged that the petitioner joined, as a guarantor in the lease agreement and guaranteed the performance of all the obligations of the lessee and that as per the terms of the lease agreement, parties had agreed to have the disputes settled by arbitration of sole Arbitrator appointed by the Managing Director of the claimant company. However, a reading of the lease agreement shows that the first respondent and lessee alone were parties to the agreement and a separate guarantee agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the first respondent. As already noted, it contained no clause on arbitration. 26. It is no doubt true that in the counter filed, there is no detailed reference as to the allegation as has now been projected by the petitioner herein. Yet a reading of the counter shows that the petitioner and the second respondent took the plea that the arbitrator, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. In the reply statement, the petitioner took a specific plea that he did not participate in the transaction alleged in the claim statement. He further pleaded that he did not guarantee the repayment due under the lease agreement. In the reply statement, the petitioner took a specific plea that he did not participate in the transaction alleged in the claim statement. He further pleaded that he did not guarantee the repayment due under the lease agreement. It was also contended that under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the arbitrator could be appointed by mutual consent, and in the event of failure, the Chief Justice of the High Court could alone appoint the arbitrator. The learned arbitrator viewed that the respondents and the claimant, as per the agreement, agreed that in the case of a dispute, the Managing Director of the lessor company is given power to nominate the arbitrator. In paragraph 36 of the award, the Arbitrator pointed out that the objection as to the appointment of the Arbitrator and the arbitration clause was already overruled as per the order passed on 17. 2000. Beyond this, the award does not touch anything on the present contentions. 27. As already noted, the guarantee agreement is an independent agreement. All that is sought for in the agreement. All that is sought for in the guarantee agreement is to guarantee the payment as contemplated under the lease agreement and nothing beyond. As held in the decision in State of Orissa and Another v. Sri Damodar Das (supra) and reaffirmed the decision in Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander and Others (supra). “a contract can be construed as an “arbitration agreement” only if an agreement to refer disputes or differences to arbitration is expressly or impliedly spelt out from the clause.” The arbitration clause is to be gathered from the documents executed between the parties. In the decision in Maharshi Dayanand University and Another v. Anand Co¬op. L/C Society Ltd. And Another (2007) 2 ARB.LR 294 , the Apex Court, while allowing the parties to raise a plea before the Arbitrator, held that the existence of an arbitration clause was a sine quanon for reference of a dispute for arbitration in the absence of a clause or an uncertain or unmindful intention by the parties; The intent must be clear from the material on record. The view of the Tribunal that the petitioner herein was a party to the lease agreement is not borne out by any material. On the contrary, the petitioner is not a party at all to the lease agreement. 28. The view of the Tribunal that the petitioner herein was a party to the lease agreement is not borne out by any material. On the contrary, the petitioner is not a party at all to the lease agreement. 28. The decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above clearly state that where a separate agreement had been entered into by the guarantor, the terms of guarantee agreement alone will govern the issue. Consequently, the view of the arbitral Tribunal is vitiated by the error apparent on the face of the record. 29. In the context of the fact that the guarantee agreement is not part and parcel of the lease agreement to which the petitioner was a party and in the absence of any agreement in the guarantee agreement for referring the dispute between the guarantor and the first respondent to arbitration, I agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the award insofar as the petitioner is concerned, suffers for went of jurisdiction. A reading of award and the reply by the petitioner show that the petitioner did make an objection as to the proceedings on account of the absence of arbitration agreement in the guarantee agreement. There is no question of the petitioner hence acquiescing to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrators to pass an award so as to bind the petitioner herein. 30. It is no doubt true that under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the jurisdiction of this Court is supervisory only. 31. In the decision in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181 : (2006) 4 MLJ 458 the Apex Court pointed out that the party questioning the jurisdiction of the arbitrator has an obligation to raise this issue during the arbitration proceedings or soon after the initiation thereof. Reiterating the law declared in the case of ONCC v. Saw Pipes (2003) 5 SCC 705 , the Supreme Court further pointed out that the arbitral award could be set aside if it is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law or interest of India or justice and morality. It further pointed out that where the arbitrator had gone beyond or contrary to the express law of the contract or granted relief in the matter not in dispute, the same would come within the purview of Section 34 of the Act. It further pointed out that where the arbitrator had gone beyond or contrary to the express law of the contract or granted relief in the matter not in dispute, the same would come within the purview of Section 34 of the Act. The said decision has been followed consistently. 32. Referring to various decisions of the Apex Court, in the decision in Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. V. Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd (2007) 8 SCC 466 , the Supreme Court, pointed out: “It is correct that Courts shall not ordinarily substitute their interpretation for that of the arbitrator. It is also true that if the parties with their eyes wide open have consented to refer the matter to the arbitration, then normally the finding of the arbitrator should be accepted without demur. There is no quarrel with this legal proposition. But in a case where it is found that the arbitrator has acted without jurisdiction, and has put an interpretation on the clause to law then in that case there is no prohibition for the Courts to set things right.” Considering the fact that there is total lack of jurisdiction and that the petitioner did question the jurisdiction of the Arbitrators, in the absence of any arbitration agreement between the petitioner and the first respondent and further, going by the decisions of the Apex Court, interference by this Court is certainly called for in setting aside the award as against the petitioner/guarantor alone. 33. I agree with the contentions of the petitioner herein that in the absence of an arbitration agreement between the petitioner guarantor and the first respondent herein, the award passed suffers from want of jurisdiction. Hence, I have no hesitation in allowing this petition. 34. Accordingly, the award dated 24. 2003 (sic) made in Arbitration Case No. SK/LGF/1 of 2000 on the file of the third respondent is set aside in respect of guarantor alone and the original petition is allowed.