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2008 DIGILAW 1215 (PAT)

Jaiswal Soap Factory v. State Of Bihar

2008-08-22

KISHORE K.MANDAL, R.M.LODHA

body2008
Judgment 1. These three writ petitions are by one assessee, namely, Jaiswal Soap Factory. Save and except that the assessment orders refer to a different period, the issues in all these three writ petitions are identical and, therefore, these three writ petitions have been taken up together for consideration. 2. At the outset, we wanted to know from the Counsel for the petitioner as to whether the statutory remedy against the impugned assessment orders is available to the petitioner under the Bihar Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (for short, "the Act, 2005") or not, and if it is so, why should not the petitioner be relegated to the statutory remedy. 3. The Counsel for the petitioner would submit that remedy of appeal provided in the Act, 2005, is onerous inasmuch as the petitioner is required to deposit 25 per cent of the tax assessed or full amount of admitted tax, whichever is higher. 4. According to him, by the impugned orders unwarranted tax liability has been fastened on the petitioner coupled with imposition of penalty and the petitioner is not in position to deposit 25 per cent of the assessed tax liability and the penalty amount. Counsel relied upon A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay V/s. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 , M.G. Abrol, Additional Collector of Customs, Bombay V/s. Shantilal Chhotelal & Co., AIR 1966 SC 197 and Filterco V/s. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., [1986] 61 STC 318 (SC) : AIR 1986 SC 626 . 5. Although the petitioners product is not having registered trade mark and the soap made by the petitioner is indigenous hand-made soap whose brand or trade mark is not registered under any law in force, Counsel would contend, the petitioners product (hand-made soap) has been taxed at 12.5 per cent and, thus, an error of law has been committed affecting the very authority of the assessing authority in passing the assessment orders. Based on this, Counsel contends that the impugned orders suffer from lack of jurisdiction. In support of this contention, the Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. V/s. Union of India, [1998] 111 STC 467 : [1997] 5 SCC 536. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Based on this, Counsel contends that the impugned orders suffer from lack of jurisdiction. In support of this contention, the Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. V/s. Union of India, [1998] 111 STC 467 : [1997] 5 SCC 536. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Lalit Kishore, Additional Advocate-General-Ill would contend that Chapter XII of the Act, 2005, provides adequate and efficient remedy to the petitioner for redressal of his grievance. He would submit that merely because 25 per cent of the tax liability is required to be deposited for maintaining the statutory remedy of appeal, the said remedy is not rendered onerous. In this regard, he referred to a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thansingh Nathmal V/s. Superintendent of Taxes, [1964] 15 STC 468 : AIR 1964 SC 1419 . He would submit that all contentions challenging the assessment orders must be raised in statutory appeal. 7. We reflected over the matter and gave a thoughtful consideration to rival contentions. 8. The petitioner is a manufacturer of hand-made soap. It sells them under the brand names of "Chasma Gola", "Teer Gola" and "Jaso Super Soap". According to the petitioner, it had applied for registration of "Chasma Gola Sabun" for registration as a trade mark before the Registrar of Trade Mark, Trade Marks Registry, Bombay in the year 1984; the registration was granted and that was renewed and kept alive up to March, 1996. As on April 7, 2007, the petitioners case is that "Chasma Gola Brand" did not have any trade mark registration. The other two brands had never ever any registration. 9. In writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 12457 of 2008, the order of assessment is for the period of third quarter of the assessment year 2006-07 and in the writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 12518 of 2008, the order of assessment relates to the period fourth quarter of assessment year 2006-07. In the third writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 12334 of 2008, the order of assessment is of the first quarter of the assessment year 2007-08. For all these three quarters, in the assessment orders, the assessing officer has not accepted the version of the petitioner. In the third writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 12334 of 2008, the order of assessment is of the first quarter of the assessment year 2007-08. For all these three quarters, in the assessment orders, the assessing officer has not accepted the version of the petitioner. The assessing officer referred to few documents including the advertisements of the petitioner and held that the petitioners own documents show that tax was leviable at 12.5 per cent on the subject-product and he held accordingly. The assessing officer also levied penalty under Section 32(1)(b) of the Act, 2005. 10. Chapter XII of the Act, 2005 makes provisions for appeal, revision and review. 11. Section 72 provides for an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner and Joint Commissioner, which reads, thus: 72. Appeal to Deputy Commissioner and Joint commissioner. - (1) Subject to such Rules as may be made by State Government under this Act, any dealer objecting to an order of assessment or an order levying interest or penalty passed by the prescribed authority against him, or an order under Section 25, or a person, objecting to an order of penalty passed against him or an order under Section 47 may appeal to the Joint Commissioner, or, the Deputy Commissioner specially authorized in this behalf. (2) No appeal under Sub-section (1) shall be admitted unless the dealer objecting to an order of assessment has paid twenty-five per cent, of the tax assessed or full amount of admitted tax whichever is higher. (3) Every appeal under this Section shall be filed, in such form and the manner, as may be prescribed, within forty-five days of the receipt of the notice of demand but where the appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient reason for not preferring the appeal within time, it may condone the delay. (4) The appellate authority while disposing of an appeal against an order, other than an order under Section 47, may- (a)(i) confirm, annul, reduce, enhance or otherwise modify such order; or (ii) set aside the order directing the authority below to make fresh order after further enquiry on specific points as directed; and (b) in other cases, pass such order as it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, deem fit. (5) No order under this Section shall be passed without giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant as also the authority whose order has been appealed against. (5) No order under this Section shall be passed without giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant as also the authority whose order has been appealed against. 12. Further appeal is provided to the Tribunal under Section 73, that reads, thus: 73. Appeal to Tribunal. - (1) Subject to such Rules as may be made by the State Government, any of the authorities mentioned in Section 10 or any person aggrieved by an order made by the Deputy Commissioner or Joint Commissioner under Section 72 or the Commissioner under Section 74 or Section 77, may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. (2) Where an appeal is preferred by a dealer, such appeal shall not be entertained by the Tribunal unless such dealer has deposited with the Tribunal in the manner specified by it, twenty-five per cent, of the amount in dispute: Provided that the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount required to be deposited under this section. (3) Every application for appeal under this Section shall be filed within ninety days of the communication of the order which is sought to be appealed, but were the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient cause for not applying within time, it may condone the delay. (4) No order under this Section shall be passed without giving the applicant as also the authority whose order is sought to be appealed or their representative, a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (5) On receipt of an appeal under Sub-section (1), the Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such order thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or setting aside the order appealed against. (6) The Tribunal shall sent the copy of every order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the concerned authority against whose order the appeal had been preferred. (7) The appeal filed before the Tribunal under Sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six month from the date of receipt of the appeal. 13. From the order of the Tribunal, an appeal would lie to the High Court under Section 79 on substantial question of law. Section 79 which provides thus: 79. Appeal before High Court. 13. From the order of the Tribunal, an appeal would lie to the High Court under Section 79 on substantial question of law. Section 79 which provides thus: 79. Appeal before High Court. - (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed by the Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) The Commissioner or a dealer aggrieved by any order passed by the Tribunal- (i) under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, (Bihar Act 5 of 1981), as it stood before its repeal by Section 94, on or after the date of commencement of this Act; or (ii) under this Act, may file an appeal to the High Court, and such appeal under this Section shall be filed within ninety days from the date of the communication to the dealer or the Commissioner on any question of law arising out of such order. (3) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate the question. (4) The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated and the respondents shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this Sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. (5)(a) The High Court shall decide the substantial question of law so formulated or involved and deliver such judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and may award such costs as it deems fit. (b) The High Court may determine any issue which- (1) has not been determined by the Tribunal, or (2) has been wrongly determined by the Tribunal, by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Sub-section (1). (6) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) relating to appeals to High Court, shall as far as may, be apply in the case of appeals under this section. 14. (6) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) relating to appeals to High Court, shall as far as may, be apply in the case of appeals under this section. 14. Besides the aforesaid remedy of two tier-appeal as noticed above, an aggrieved person has remedy by way of miscellaneous revision and revision under Sections 73A and 74. Sections 73A and 74 read, thus: 73A. Miscellaneous revision. - Subject to the provisions of Section 73, any order, other than an order passed by the Commissioner or orders against which an appeal has been provided under Section 72, passed under this Act or the Rules made thereunder may, on application, be revised: (1) by the Joint Commissioner (Administration), if the said order has been passed by an authority not above the rank of Deputy Commissioner; (2) by the Commissioner, if the said order has been passed by an authority not above the rank of Joint Commissioner; (3) by the Tribunal, if the said order has been passed by the Commissioner. 74. Revisionary powers of Commissioner. - The Commissioner may, suo motu, call for and examine the record of any proceeding recorded by any authority, officer or person subordinate to him under this Act and if he considers that any order passed therein is erroneous or it is prejudicial to the interest of revenue, pass such order as he deems fit after giving the dealer or the person concerned an opportunity of being heard. 15. There is also provision for review provided under Section 76, which reads, thus: 76. Review. - Subject to such Rules as may be made by the State Government under this Act, any authority appointed under Section 10 or the Tribunal may review any order passed by it, if such review is, in the opinion of the said authority or Tribunal, as the case may be, necessary on account of a mistake which is apparent from the record: Provided that no such review, if it has the effect of enhancing the tax, interest or penalty or of reducing a refund shall be made unless the said authority or the Tribunal, as the case may be, has given the dealer, or the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 16. Section 77 provides for determination of disputed questions for the purposes of the Act. 16. Section 77 provides for determination of disputed questions for the purposes of the Act. It reads, thus: 77. Determination of disputed questions. - (1) If any question arises, otherwise than in proceedings before a court, or before the prescribed authority has commenced assessment of a dealer under Section 27 or Section 28 or Section 29 or Section 30 or Section 31 or Section 32 or Section 33, whether, for the purposes of this Act- (a) any person, society, club or association or any firm or any branch or Department of any firm, is a dealer, or (b) any particular thing done to any goods amounts to or results in the manufacture of goods, within the meaning of that term, or (c) any transaction is a sale or a purchase, or where it is a sale or a purchase the sale price or the purchase price, as the case may be, thereof, or (d) any particular person or dealer is required to be registered, or (e) in the case of any person or dealer liable to pay tax, any tax is payable by such person or dealer in respect of any particular sale or purchase, or if tax is payable, the rate thereof, or (f) input tax credit can be claimed on any particular transaction of purchase and if it can be claimed, what are the conditions and restrictions subject to which such input tax credit can be claimed, or (g) the order passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 25 is just and proper, or (h) any other question involving interpretation of any provisions of the Act, the Commissioner shall, subject to such Rules as may be made, make an order determining such question. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, the prescribed authority shall be deemed to have commenced assessment of the dealer under Section 27 or Section 28 or Section 29 or Section 30 or Section 31 or Section 32 or Section 33, when the dealer is served with any notice by the prescribed authority under the said sections. (2) The Commissioner may direct that the determination shall not affect the liability of any person under this Act, as respect any sale or purchase effected prior to the determination or such date as he may specify. (2) The Commissioner may direct that the determination shall not affect the liability of any person under this Act, as respect any sale or purchase effected prior to the determination or such date as he may specify. (3) If any such question arises from any order already passed by any authority or court under this Act or Bihar Finance Act, 1981 (Bihar Act 5 of 1981), as it stood by its repeal by Section 94, no such question shall be entertained for determination under this section; but such question may be raised in appeal against such order. 17. The survey of aforesaid provisions leaves no manner of doubt that the Act, 2005, is a self-contained code and provides complete machinery for redressal of grievance to an aggrieved party. Merely because for maintaining an appeal, 25 per cent of tax liability is required to be deposited, the said remedy does not become unduly onerous. Moreso, looking to the large sale of the petitioners product, it cannot be inferred that the petitioner has no financial capacity to pay 25 per cent of the tax liability. 18. We may at this stage refer to the decisions cited by the Counsel for the petitioner. In the case of A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay V/s. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhivani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court expounded the legal position with regard to petitions under Article 226 vis-a-vis existence of alternative remedy, thus: 8. The only point, therefore, requiring to be considered is whether the High Court should have rejected the writ petition of the respondent in limine because he had not exhausted all the statutory remedies open to him for having his grievance redressed. The contention of the learned Solicitor-General was that the existence of an alternative remedy was a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned, or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treated as void or nonest. In all other cases, he submitted, courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners. In all other cases, he submitted, courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners. In the present case, he urged, the High Court in appeal had expressly dissented from the reasoning of the learned single judge as regards the lack of jurisdiction of the Customs Officers to adjudicate regarding the item under which the Article imported fell and the duty leviable thereon. Nor was there any complaint in this case that the order had been passed without an opportunity to the importer to be heard, so as to be in violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned Solicitor-General questioned the correctness of the reasoning of the learned Chief Justice in condoning the conduct of the respondent in not moving the Government in revision by taking into account the time that had elapsed between the date of the impugned order and that on which the appeal was heard. The submission was that if this was a proper test, the Rule as to, a petitioner under Article 226 having to exhaust his remedies before he approached the court would be practically a dead letter because in most cases by the date the petition comes on for hearing, the time for appealing or for applying in revision to the Departmental authorities would have lapsed. 9. We see considerable force in the argument of the learned Solicitor-General. We must, however, point out that the Rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law, is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a Rule which courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion. The law on this matter has been enunciated in several decisions of this Court but it is sufficient to refer to two cases: In Union of India V/s. T.R. Varma, [1958] SCR 499 at pages 503-504 : (S) AIR 1957 SC 882 at page 884 Venkatarama Ayyar speaking for the court said: It is well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue a writ; but, as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed V/s. Municipal Board, Kairna, AIR 1950 SC 163 , "the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs". Vide also K.S. Rashid and Sons V/s. Income-tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 : [1954] 25 ITR 167 (SC). And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226, unless there are good grounds therefor. There is no difference between the above and the formulation by Das, C.J., in State of Uttar Pradesh V/s. Mohammad Nooh, [1958] SCR 595 at pp. 605-607 : AIR 1958 SC 86 at page 93, where he observed: ...It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at the conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this Rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a Rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a Rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. After referring to a few cases in which the existence of an alternative remedy had been held not to bar the issue of a prerogative writ, the learned Chief Justice added: It has also been held that a litigant who has lost his right of appeal or has failed to perfect an appeal by no fault of his own may in a proper case obtain a review by certiorari. In the result this Court held that the existence of other legal remedies was not per se a bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari and that the court was not bound to relegate the petitioner to the other legal remedies available to him. 19. The Supreme Court, thus, held that existence of an alternative remedy by itself does not operate as a bar to maintain a petition under Article 226 in two exceptional situation, namely; (i) where there is complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned; and (ii) where the impugned order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. The present case does not make out any of the two exceptions, which may justify bypassing the statutory remedy. That the assessing officer has competence to pass the order of assessment is not in question at all. The order has been passed after hearing the petitioner and there is not an iota of allegation that the order suffers from the vice of infraction of principles of natural justice. A.V. Venkateswaran, AIR 1961 SC 1506 does not help the case of the petitioner at all. 20. In the case of M.G. Abrol, AIR 1966 SC 197 , Supreme Court dealing with the provisions of Sea Customs Act, held in paragraph 15 of the Report, thus: 15. Lastly, it was argued that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, as the respondents had an effective remedy by way of appeal to higher customs authorities. But the High Court rightly pointed out that the respondents had no effective remedy, for they could not file an appeal without depositing as a condition precedent the large amount of penalty imposed on them. That apart the existence of an effective remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court, but it is only one of the circumstances that the court should take into consideration in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this case, the High Court thought fit to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not see any exceptional circumstances to interfere with its discretion. In the result, Civil Appeal Nos. 376 and 377 of 1963 are dismissed with costs. 21. In this case, the High Court thought fit to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not see any exceptional circumstances to interfere with its discretion. In the result, Civil Appeal Nos. 376 and 377 of 1963 are dismissed with costs. 21. In the backdrop of the provision that required deposit of entire penalty amount before maintaining the statutory appeal, it was held that the remedy of appeal was not an efficacious remedy. Section 72 of the Act, 2005, that provides for appeal, requires only 25 per cent of the tax liability to be deposited. Pre-deposit of 25 per cent for maintaining the appeal, in our opinion, does not render the remedy of appeal ineffective. 22. In the case of Filterco, [1986] 61 STC 318 (SC) : AIR 1986 SC 626 , the Madhya Pradesh High Court did not entertain the writ petition under Articles 226 and 227, as the statutory remedy was available. Dealing into this aspect, the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 of the Report (page 322 of STC) considered the matter, thus: We are of opinion that the High Court should have examined the merits of the case instead of dismissing the writ petition in limine in the manner it has done. The order passed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax was clearly binding on the assessing authority under Section 42B(2) and although technically it would have been open to the appellants to urge their contentions before the appellate authority, namely, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, that would be a mere exercise in futility when a superior officer, namely, the Commissioner, has already passed a well-considered order in the exercise of his statutory jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) of Section 42B of the Act holding that 21 varieties of the compressed woollen felt manufactured by the appellants are not eligible for exemption under entry 6 of Schedule I of the Act. Further Section 38(3) of the Act requires that a substantial portion of the tax has to be deposited before an appeal or revision can be filed. In such circumstances we consider that the High Court ought to have considered and pronounced upon the merits of the contentions raised by the parties and the summary dismissal of the writ petition was not justified. In such circumstances we consider that the High Court ought to have considered and pronounced upon the merits of the contentions raised by the parties and the summary dismissal of the writ petition was not justified. In such a situation, although we would have, ordinarily, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the case to that court for fresh disposal, we consider that in the present case it would be in the interests of both sides to have the matter finally decided by this Court at the present stage itself especially since we have had the benefit of elaborate and learned arguments addressed by the Counsel appearing on both sides. 23. It would be seen that, inter alia, the contention before the Supreme Court was that an appeal before appellate authority was a mere exercise in futility, as the superior officer had already taken a particular view of the matter. 24. In the case of Thansingh, [1964] 15 STC 468 : AIR 1964 SC 1419 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court made these weighty observations: (page 474 of STC) Against the order of the Commissioner an order for reference could have been claimed if the appellants satisfied the Commissioner or the High Court that a question of law arose out of the order. But the procedure provided by the Act to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed; the appellants moved the High Court challenging the competence of the Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and sought to reopen the decision of the taxing authorities on question of fact. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or Tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another Tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party apply to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. 25. Having already noticed that the alternative remedy provided in the statute is not unduly onerous and that neither the assessing officer lacked jurisdiction in passing the impugned assessment orders nor these orders have been passed in breach of principles of natural justice, we find no justification in invoking high prerogative jurisdiction under Article 226 bypassing the statutory remedy of appeal and revision. 26. We find ourselves unable to accept the submission of the Counsel for the petitioner that since error of law has been committed by the assessing officer in holding that the soaps sold by the petitioner are registered under the Trade Marks Act, the orders of assessment are rendered without jurisdiction. As to whether the view of the assessing officer is right or wrong has to be examined and considered by the statutory appellate authority or the revisional authority, as the case may be. Even if we assume that a wrong view has been taken by the assessing officer, that does not render the order without jurisdiction. As to whether the view of the assessing officer is right or wrong has to be examined and considered by the statutory appellate authority or the revisional authority, as the case may be. Even if we assume that a wrong view has been taken by the assessing officer, that does not render the order without jurisdiction. Unless a case falls under the exceptions highlighted by the Supreme Court in the case of A.V. Venkateswaran, AIR 1961 SC 1506 which the present case does not, we are afraid there may not be any justification in bypassing alternative remedy provided in statute. In this view of the matter, the decision relied upon by the Counsel for petitioner in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd., [1998] 111 STC 467 (SC) : [1997] 5 SCC 536 has no application to the present fact-situation. 27. We refrain from making any observation about the correctness of the view taken by the assessing officer in the matter and the dismissal of these writ petitions by us must not be taken as an expression of opinion by us on the merits of the assessment orders as in our view, the correctness of the orders has to be examined and considered in the statutory remedy provided under the Act, 2005. 28. All these three writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed in limine.