Judgment :- This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking to challenge the Award of the first respondent/Labour Court in I.D.No.233 of 1994 dated 18. 1998, in and by which, the Labour Court declined to grant any relief to the petitioner. 2. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute before the Government Labour Officer and thereafter moved the Labour Court. His dispute was taken on file as I.D.No.233 of 1994. The petitioner examined himself as W.W.1 and on the side of the management, two witnesses were examined as M.Ws.1 and 2. On the side of the petitioner/workman, 17 documents were filed and they were marked as Exs.W.1 to W.17. On the side of Management 16 documents were filed and they were marked as Exs.M.1 to M.16. 3. The Labour Court on an analysis of the evidence, (both oral and documentary) came to the conclusion that the retrenchment of the petitioner was bona-fide and there was no infraction of the condition precedent prescribed under Sec.25F(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (For short I.D.Act). It was also held that the question of seniority principle in terms of 25F did not arise. With reference to the retrenchment, the Labour Court had not found fault with the decision taken by the Management to terminate the service of the petitioner on the ground of his post being not required for the purpose of the employers business. 4. Mr. J. Saravanavel, learned counsel for the petitioner attacked the order of the Labour Court mainly on three grounds: Firstly, when the petitioner was retrenched, he was not offered compensation on the same day and subsequently only through post a cheque dated 1. 94 was enclosed and therefore this would not amount to compensation being offered in terms of the mandatory condition precedent found under Sec.25F(a) and (b) or the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court had held that on 1. 94 when the workman was served with the letter of retrenchment along with cheque, he refused to receive the same and thereafter, the said cheque was sent to him. However, the learned counsel submits that though the letter came to the workman by post, that cover did not contain the cheque dated 1. 94 and only after his request, cheque was later sent to him. On this ground, the learned counsel wanted the award to be set aside. 5. However, the learned counsel submits that though the letter came to the workman by post, that cover did not contain the cheque dated 1. 94 and only after his request, cheque was later sent to him. On this ground, the learned counsel wanted the award to be set aside. 5. When the Labour Court recorded the finding that the petitioner was offered the cheque on 1. 94 and as he had refused to receive the same, that would satisfy the condition precedents found under Sec.25F(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Similar question has been dealt with by a Division Bench in Industrial Chemicals Ltd vs Labour Court, Madras and Others reported in (1977(2)LLJ 137. The passages found in paragraphs 30 and 32 may be usefully extracted below: 30. Mr. Ramachandran, however, urged that whatever might be the position of the law merchant and whatever might be the implied terms of contracts between the creditors and debtors in the field of commerce, the payment contemplated by S.25F must be held to denote only payment in the current coin of the realm. No other mode of payment, according to learned counsel, could be held to fulfill the requirements of the section. He represented that not all workmen might be having banking accounts of their own, and in such a situation cheque payments could not be regarded as payments properly so called, where the payees happen to belong to the working classes. We feel that the argument based on working class monetary habits is far too general a generalization for us to accept, without any support therefor in statistics or other evidence. It is must be within the experience of many of us that there are people in several sectors of even business and commerce who abhor cheque payments, for reasons best known to themselves. On that account, the legal position of payment by cheque would not become any different. The question before us, as we conceive it, is one of law, and it is to be determined as a matter of construction of the provisions of S.25F(b). The expression used by the section is "paid" cognate to such expression as "payment", "payable" etc. When the statue employs such an expression as this, which is part of common speech, it must be held to have been employed by the Legislature in the popular acceptation of the term. The expression used by the section is "paid" cognate to such expression as "payment", "payable" etc. When the statue employs such an expression as this, which is part of common speech, it must be held to have been employed by the Legislature in the popular acceptation of the term. Learned counsel urged that payment can only relate to payment in cash or in current coin. We are not satisfied that any such restriction can be placed on the expression. There is nothing in S.25F to show that the word "paid" to be understood in any special or limited sense. It follows, therefore, that whatever meaning the expression has under the common law or general law must also be intended to be connoted when employed in the section. If under the general law a cheque were regarded as payment of money, upon no principle could a similar position be denied for payment by cheque under S.25F(b)." 31. ....................... 32. We have already observed that the expression "paid" occurring in S.25F of the Industrial Disputes At must be given its natural meaning as understood under the common law relating to discharge of debts by debtors and creditors. This is because the Industrial Disputes Act itself does not provide for any special definition of the expression "payment" and also because the expression itself is a term of common usage under the general law. If there were some special definition of the term "payment" either in S.25F or elsewhere in the Industrial Disputes Act then we are bound to apply that definition to payment of retrenchment compensation. In the absence of any such special provision, it would be reasonable to construe the section in the way we find it that is to say, to draw upon the connotation of the expression "payment" as it obtains in general usage and in legal writings". 6. Thereafter, the learned counsel submitted that no reason was given for the retrenchment. However, it is only under Rule 61 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules r/w Form "R" prescribed under Sec.25-F (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the employer is required to furnish the reasons with a copy marked to the appropriate Government. 6. Thereafter, the learned counsel submitted that no reason was given for the retrenchment. However, it is only under Rule 61 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules r/w Form "R" prescribed under Sec.25-F (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the employer is required to furnish the reasons with a copy marked to the appropriate Government. When the question as to whether the requirement to follow Sec.25(F)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act came up for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in AIR 1964 (1) LLJ 351 (Bombay Union of Journalists vs State of Bombay), the Supreme Court held that such a condition is not a condition precedent so as to nullify the retrenchment itself. In the foregoing case, the Labour Court has satisfied with the reasons adduced by the Management. 7. The last submission made by the learned counsel is that one Palanisami, who was senior to the petitioner, was also sent out earlier was a new plea raised by the management, when the petitioner himself had not raised any issue regarding violation of seniority, principle found under Sec.25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, the said question has become redundant to be dealt with by the Labour Court. 8. Under these circumstances, the writ petition is misconceived and the same is dismissed. No costs. 9. It is now stated by the learned counsel that the workman did not receive the cheque sent by post and it was returned to the employer. Now that the award of Labour Court has been confirmed, the second respondent is directed to return the cheque to the petitioner, which was already sent to him, with necessary validation or shall issue a fresh cheque for the same amount. This exercise shall be undertaken by the second respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.