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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 1216 (MP)

Ajay Singh v. State of M. P.

2008-10-14

PRAKASH SHRIVASTAVA

body2008
ORDER 1. This writ petition has been filed against the order dated 14.11.2005 passed by the Collector in suo motu exercise of the revisiona1 power under section 50 (1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. 2. The facts as narrated in the writ petition are that the land ad measuring 0.405 hectares situated at Khasra No.1 06/ka-3 was settled in the name of the respondent No.3 by order dated 7.11.1988 under the provisions of M.P. Krishi Prayojan Ke Liye Upayog Ki Ja Rahi Dakhal Rahit Bhoomi Par Bhumiswami Adhikaron Ka Pradan Kiya Jana (Vishesh Upabandh) Adhiniyam, 1984 (here in after referred to as 'the Act of 1984). The petitioner by way of a registered sale deed dated 9.12.1998 purchased an area of one acre out of the aforesaid land From the respondent No.3. The petitioner started construction activity on the purchased land and he was issued show cause notice dated 9.3.2005 stating that the land has been sold to the petitioner in violation of the provision of the Act of 1984 and requiring him to appear in the proceedings taken up by the Collector. 3. The petitioner appeared before the Collector and raised preliminary objection on 17.11.2005 vide annexure P/3 as regards the maintainability of the suo motu revision proceedings taken up by the Collector under section 50 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code on the ground that such proceedings cannot be taken up after a lapse of a reasonable time. 4. The Collector by the impugned order dated 14.11.2005 rejected the petitioner's preliminary objection and passed a final order setting aside the order of settlement dated 7.11.1988 which was made in favour of respondent No.3 Dharmendra Kumar. A further direction was issued to lodge an FIR with the police against the respondent No.3 since he had fraudulently sold the land to the petitioner. Aggrieved with this order present writ petition has been filed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Collector could not have exercised the suo motu revisional power against the settlement order dated 7.11.1988 after a lapse of about more than 16 years. Such a power under section 50 of the Code is required to be exercised within a reasonable time. 6. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Collector could not have exercised the suo motu revisional power against the settlement order dated 7.11.1988 after a lapse of about more than 16 years. Such a power under section 50 of the Code is required to be exercised within a reasonable time. 6. He further submitted that the petitioner had raised a preliminary objection about limitation but while deciding the preliminary objection the Collector passed the final order on the same date without giving any further opportunity to the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the, Collector initiated the proceedings under section 50 of the Code immediately after getting the knowledge of the settlement order dated 7.11.1988, therefore, there was no delay from the date of knowledge. He further submitted that the order of the Collector is right since the initial settlement order dated 7.11.1988 in favour of the respondent No.3 Dharmendra Kumar itself was bad and also after settlement of the land the respondent No.3 in violation of sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1984 sold the land to the petitioner. Therefore, by a composite order the revisional authority has rightly set aside the order of the settlement dated 7.11.1988. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. In the present case the suo motu revisional power has been exercised by the Collector under section 50 of the Code. Under section 50 revisional power can be exercised by the Collector either on his own motion or on the application made by any party. Section 50 (1) (ii) prescribes the limitation of 60 days for ma1ring the application for revision by a party. For exercising suo motu revisional power by the Collector no limitation has been prescribed and sub-section (1) of section 50 provides that such a power can be exercised by the Collector at any time. 10. The words "at any time" occurring in sub-section (1) of section 50 would not mean the time in infinity but it has been settled that such a power of suo motu exercise of revision under section 59 is to be exercised within a reasonable time. 10. The words "at any time" occurring in sub-section (1) of section 50 would not mean the time in infinity but it has been settled that such a power of suo motu exercise of revision under section 59 is to be exercised within a reasonable time. The Full Bench of this Court while considering the similar provisions contained in section 42 of the Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, (MP) has examined this aspect of the matter of Usha Devi (Smt.) and others v. State of M. P. and others, 1990 RN 77, and has held as under: 17. We have, however, no hesitation in accepting the submission of Shri Bhargava that power of revision suo motu contemplated under section 42 of the Act can be, and has to be, exercised within a reasonable time and that is the meaning to be attributed to the term "at any time" used therein. Counsel's reliance on State of Gujrat v. P. Raghav ( AIR 1969 SC 1297 ) in support of that contention is indeed well merited. There can be no dispute with that proposition because of the Constitutional imperative requiring statutory authorities to act reasonably and not arbitrarily. However, what should be the reasonable time for exercise of the power, as held in P. Raghav (supra), must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. 11. In the matter of Hamir Singh v. State of M.P. and others, 1996 RN 80, this Court has held as under: 1. A show cause notice issued by respondent No.3 on 4th of April, 1977 calling upon petitioner to show cause as to why the order of settlement be not quashed in suo motu revisional jurisdiction in the subject matter of this writ petition. The show cause notice is Annexure-B. According to the petitioner, this is a cyclostyled notice. It further stated that no specific ground has been mentioned in the notice. The notice given after a lapse of more than six years from the date the premium was paid is being challenged. It is argued that lot of improvement has been made by the petitioners and they cannot be deprived of this property. There is merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The notice given after a lapse of more than six years from the date the premium was paid is being challenged. It is argued that lot of improvement has been made by the petitioners and they cannot be deprived of this property. There is merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. This Court in Mangilal Bohare and others v. State of M.P. and others, decided on 24th of September 1994, held in categozy tenns that suo motu jurisdiction cannot be invoked after a long delay. Reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported as Usha Devi v. State of M.P., 1990 RN 77. The Full Bench has placed reliance on a decision given by the Supreme Court in the case reported as State of Gujrat v. P. Raghav, 1969 SC 1297. 2. In view of the above legal situation, I am of the view that the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction in this case after a lapse of more than six years is belated. This reason alone is enough to interfere in this writ petition. 12. This Court again considered the same issue in the matter of Pratap Singh and another v. State of M.P., 1997 RN 219, and has held as under: "14. The powers of revision are provided in section 50 of M.P. Land Revenue Code. While considering the scope of section 50 in the case of Rammulal (supra), this Court held in para 5 of its judgment that the power of suo-motu revision must be exercised within a period of few months. The Divisional Bench in the case of Rammulal (supra), while considering the judgment in the case of State of Gujrat (supra), held that the powers of revision under sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code are pari materia' with Section 50 of M.P. Land Revenue Code and held that the powers must be exercised within a reasonable time and the length of reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. Here the land was settled in the name of plaintiff in the year 1972 and suo motu powers were exercised in the year 1979. Here the land was settled in the name of plaintiff in the year 1972 and suo motu powers were exercised in the year 1979. No reasons have been assigned nor any fact has been narrated in the written statement by the defendant to demonstrate that the facts and circumstances of the case were such that delay of7 years in exercising the powers suo motu revision was justified. 13. In the matter of Sitaram v. State of M.P. 1999 RN 82=1999 (1) MPLJ 179 this Court has held as under: 6. In this context I may refer to the decision rendered in the case of Usha Devi and others v. State of M.P. and others, 1990 MPLJ 353 , wherein this Court has held that there is no bar of limitation while exercising power under section 50 of the Code but the same has to be exercised within a reasonable time. I may quote with profit the following observations of their Lordships:- "We have, however, no hesitation in accepting the submissions of Shri Bhargava that powers of revision suo motu contemplated under Section 42 of the Act can be, and has to be, exercised within a reasonable time and that is the meaning to be attributed to the term "at any time" used therein. Counsel's reliance on State of Gujrat v. P. Raghav, AIR 1969 SC 1297 , in support of that contention is indeed well-merited. There can be dispute with that proposition because of the Constitutional imperative requiring statutory authorities reasonably and not arbitrarily. However, what should be reasonable time for exercise of the power, as held in P. Raghav (supra), must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised". 7. From the aforesaid, it is categorically clear that the suo motu power has to be exercised within a reasonable time and what would be reasonable time has to be determined in individual cases. Similar view was taken in case of Murarilal and others v. State of M.P. and others, 1994 RN 61 = 1994 MPLJ 378 ,1 may hasten to add here that in the aforesaid case, their Lordships did not interfere with the order as jurisdiction was invoked after six years on the ground that effect of the aforesaid matter came to light before a short period of such invocation. Thus, the effect of the aforesaid decision is that exercise of power has to be done within a reasonable period. Shri Agrawal has also drawn my attention to the decision in the case of Mohd. Kavi v. Fatma Bai Ibrahim, 1998 (I) MPWN 26, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealing with section 50 of the Code, held that suo motu powers of revision has to be exercised within a reasonable time and while so holding, their Lordships opined that even one year may be unreasonable. 1 may quote with profit :- "This Court in connection with other statutory provisions in the case of State of Gujrat v. Patil Raghavanatha, (1969) 2 SCC 187 , and in the case of Ramchand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 has impressed that where no time limit has prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute, it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time: such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under section 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time." 14. In the matter of Ravi Narayan v. State of M.P. and others, 2000 RN 161, this Court while considering the words "at any time" used in section 50 held that: 22. The words 'at any time' used either in section 50 or in section 51 for exercise of the suo motu powers would ordinarily mean that question of limitation would not arise. But the rule of prudence says that such power should be exercised within reasonable time. The principle of interpretation says that if the plain words are given their plain meaning and they lead to absurdity then such interpretation should be avoided. In all matters referred above, Supreme Court and this Court considering the totality of the circumstances and the facts before the said Courts, carne to the conclusion that the words' at any time' would not mean an indefinite period. In some of the cases period of months and in some of the cases period of one year was considered to be belated. 23. In some of the cases period of months and in some of the cases period of one year was considered to be belated. 23. When the Courts are required to consider whether particular period is a reasonable period for exercising the suo motu revisional powers or suo motu review powers then the Courts are guided not only by the provisions of law or rule of prudence but are also guided by the principles of equity, fair play and justice. The Courts cannot ignore the fact that public at large deposes confidence in the Judicial system and they wish to say that some end should be brought to the litigation. Though from the plain language of section 51 it does not appear that length of time would curtail or curb the powers of the authority to reviese its order but by the Judicial dictum it has been cricumscribed. The words' at any time' in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court, this Court and other Courts will have to mean 'within reasonable time'. The period in which powers can be exercised should be reasonable period. Aman is entitled to feel that after a final order in his favour he is free and is entitled to use and enjoy his property and chattel. If it enters in his mind that some authority on some day may exercise suo motu review or revisiona1 powers then it would be almost impossible for such person to enjoy the property which is in his possession. There must be some end to the litigation. If the things are kept in suspension and no finality is attached even to a final order it is going to shatter the public faith in the system. The law nowhere provides that the things may be kept in animated suspension so that someone or the other whenever wants transfusion of life into the suspended article may bring it back to life. The law is to be respected and justice is to be done by those who have authority to dispense justice. One cannot forget that interpretation of the law should be in accordance with equity, fair play and justice. At some point somebody is entitled to say that enough is enough. Somebody must permit the deads to remain burried in their graves. 15. One cannot forget that interpretation of the law should be in accordance with equity, fair play and justice. At some point somebody is entitled to say that enough is enough. Somebody must permit the deads to remain burried in their graves. 15. In the matter of Ram Bharosi Sharma v. State of M.P. and others, 2002 (3) MPLJ 189 , this Court held as under:-- 8. That being so there is some force in the arguments of learned Counsel for the petitioner it cannot be said that Commissioner, has exercised suo motu powers. He was directed to make some enquiry. The question of limitation was considered by this Court when powers of revision were exercised by the Commissioner, in the case of Sardar Singh (supra) and after considering the provision of section 50 it has been held that the suo motu powers of revision cannot be exercised after a lapse of a period of 7 years, placing reliance of judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujrat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others, AIR 1969 SC 1297 this Court in the said case has held that the power cannot be exercised after a lapse of7 years, powers has to be exercised within a reasonable time. The aforesaid legal position is further confirmed by this Court in the ' case of Pratap Singh and others v. State of M.P., 1997 Revenue Nimaya 219 wherein again considering the powers of suo motu revision under section 50 placing reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujrat (supra) it has been held that the powers of suo motu revision when not exercised within a reasonable time, the right which has accrued to a person cannot be withdrawn after such a belated stage. The Supreme Court also while considering power of suo motu revision in the matter of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 in the case of Mohammad Kavi (supra), has held that when no lime limit is prescribed under the statute it should be exercised within a reasonable limit. The Supreme Court also while considering power of suo motu revision in the matter of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 in the case of Mohammad Kavi (supra), has held that when no lime limit is prescribed under the statute it should be exercised within a reasonable limit. Considering the legal position in the light of the aforesaid judgment there cannot be any doubt that in the instant case also exercise of the powers of revision has been done after a lapse of 7 years, accordingly, the proceeding cannot be permitted to continue the show casue notice issued, proceedings instituted by the respondents vide Annexure-P/1 are unsustainable under the law in view of the well settled legal principle. 16. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Gujrat v. Patel Raghav Natha, AIR 1969 SC 1297 , while considering the similar provisions relating to the revisional power contained in section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code has held as under: 11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined of the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. 12. It seems to us that section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under section 211. Under section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the Legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. Reading sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purpose the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961 i.e., more than a year after the order, and it seems to us that this order was passed too late. 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of Mohammad Kavi v. Fatimbai Ibrahim, 1998 (1) MPWN 26, while considering the similar issue of reasonable time for exercise of suo motu power held that even one year time may be unreasonable. The view of the Supreme Court in that judgment has held as under: - "Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe anytime for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that whether a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in Sept. 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B. Majumdar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujrat) in State of Gujrat v. lethmal Bhagwandas Shah. (Spe. W.A.No. 2770 of 1979) disposed of on 1.3 .1990, where connection with section 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. (Spe. W.A.No. 2770 of 1979) disposed of on 1.3 .1990, where connection with section 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Co in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujra v. Patil Raghav Natha [ (1969) 2 SCC 187 ] and in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India [ (1994) 1 SCC 44 ] has impressed that where, no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it doe not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under section 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time." 18. Therefore, it is the settled law that when no period of limitation is prescribed the power is to be exercised within a reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time depends on the facts of each case. 19. Now, coming to the facts of the present case. The settlement order in favour of the respondent No. 3 under the Act of 1894 was passed on 7.11.1988. After the land was settled in the name of respondent No.3 he remained the owner of the land exercising all the rights as owner till 1998 when he sold a part of the settled land in favour of the petitioner by way of registered sale deed. The petitioner acted bonafidely and purchased the land since the land was settled in the name of the respondent No.3 almost 10 years prior to the purchase and there was no cloud on the title of the respondent No.3. After purchasing the land, the petitioner also raised the construction on the land. The Collector took up the matter against the order dated 7.11.1988 in suo motu exercise of the revisional powers by issuing the show cause notice dated 9.3.2005, which was after a lapse of more than 16 years. The exercise of the revisional power in aforesaid circumstances after a lapse of 16 years cannot be held to be the exercise of power within a reasonable time. The exercise of the revisional power in aforesaid circumstances after a lapse of 16 years cannot be held to be the exercise of power within a reasonable time. With the lapse of time the Collector had lost the jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings in suo motu exercise of powers under section 50 of the Act, therefore, the impugned order of the Collector so far as it relates to the exercise of suo motu reivisonal power against the order dated 7.11.1988 cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. 20. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the State that the settlement made in favour of the respondent No.3 is also liable to be cancelled since he has sold the land to the petitioner in violation of the provisions contained in sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1984. lf the respondents No.3 has violated any condition of the Act after initial settlement made in 1988 then that would furnish a ground for initiating separate proceeding against the respondents No.3 and the official respondent will be at liberty to initiate such proceedings against the respondent No.3 for alleged violation in accordance with law and take such action against the respondent No.3 as permissible in law. Such an action, if taken against the respondent No.3, would be without prejudice to any observations made in this order. 21. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.