Enchante Jewellery And Gems Limited v. Estate Officer-ii, Haryana Urban Development Authority (Huda)
2008-07-15
MAHESH GROVER, VIJENDER JAIN
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Vijender Jain, J. 1. The petitioner-M/s Enchante Jewellery & Gems Limited, earlier known as M/s Mehrasons Jewellery and Gems Limited, while invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, has made multifarious prayers, but the challenge is essentially hovering around order dated 18.9.2007 (Annexure P9) vide which resumption order dated 24.6.1998 has been upheld. The petitioner seeks the quashing of these two orders. 2. The petitioner was allotted an institutional plot by respondent No. 1 in the year 1993 after its representative was interviewed on 18.4.1995 and its eligibility, according to the norms, was found to be acceptable. Plot No. 24 situated in Sector 32, Gurgaon having a tentative area of 2035 square meters was allotted to the petitioner vide allotment letter dated 28.6.1995 at a tentative price of Rs. 46,80,500/-. 3. Shorn off other details, one of the primary requirements of the allotment letter was the schedule of payment which was contained in Clause 5 of the letter. However, the petitioner failed to conform to the same which ultimately led to the plot being resumed on 24.6.1998. 4. A spate of representations and proceedings were instituted by the petitioner trying to stall the resumption of the plot and as a consequence, it made endeavours to seek the possession of the plot, which was ultimately negatived by the respondent No. 2 vide order dated 18.9.2007. 5. The sole grievance of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was mat the petitioner was never associated with the proceedings. The petitioner when applied for the allotment of plot, gave its address as S-555, Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi and subsequently, the change of address was notified to the respondents, but they continued to correspond with it at the address which did not belong to the petitioner at all. The most of the correspondence of the respondents addressed to the petitioner is at S-55, Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi. This, according to the petitioner, resulted in non-communication of the letters/orders and, therefore, it could not meet the requirements as desired of the petitioner by the respondents and its representative as he was never associated with the proceedings. 6. Shri Kirti Uppal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, very strenuously highlighted the grievance of the petitioner as detailed above. Accordingly, this Court summoned the records of the respondents to understand the grievance of the petitioner. 7.
6. Shri Kirti Uppal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, very strenuously highlighted the grievance of the petitioner as detailed above. Accordingly, this Court summoned the records of the respondents to understand the grievance of the petitioner. 7. The records have been produced and we have perused the same with the assistance of Shri Ashok Aggarwal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents. 8. There is no dispute that the petitioner was associated with the proceedings as is noticed in the impugned order till February, 1997 when the communications were being addressed at the correct address given by the petitioner. Thereafter, the impugned order was silent on this aspect. The record, however, belies the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner totally. 9. For the first time, notice under Section 17(1) and (2) of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (for short, the Act) was issued to the petitioner on 16.1.1997 and a reply to it was filed by the petitioner on 6.2.1997. On 12.2.2007, the representative of the petitioner was heard and it was asked to pay the whole amount due up to 17.2.1997, which was not done and the respondents thereafter sent notice under Section 17(3) of the Act by registered post on 9.12.1997. The petitioner asked for the accounts statement vide its letter dated 28.1.1998 and the respondents communicated to it vide their letter dated 4.2.1998 that an amount of Rs. 72,09,853/- was due. On 10.2.1998, a notice under Section 17(4) of the Act was sent and the petitioner was asked to come present on 27.2.1998 for personal hearing. 10. The representative of the petitioner came present on 27.2.1998 with a demand draft of Rs. 10 lacs, which was not accepted by the respondents in view of the fact that the amount in question was Rs. 72,09,853/- and he was informed that the date of hearing would be 3.3.1998. 11. The representative of the petitioner again presented himself with a demand draft of Rs. 10 lacs on 3.3.1998 which was not accepted by the respondents, who demanded the entire amount due within a period of ten days, failing which resumption order shall be passed. Thereafter, from 1998 till 2006, the petitioner was facing recovery proceedings from its bankers and the company was also constrained to go to the BIFR. On 12.6.2006, the petitioner again approached the respondents for the plot and its request was declined.
Thereafter, from 1998 till 2006, the petitioner was facing recovery proceedings from its bankers and the company was also constrained to go to the BIFR. On 12.6.2006, the petitioner again approached the respondents for the plot and its request was declined. The petitioner filed an appeal on 4.7.2006 against the resumption order which was passed on 24.5.1998 and the same was dismissed on 18.9.2007. 12. A perusal of the record reveals that the communications were sent at an address which was alien to the petitioner, i.e., S-55, Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi, even though the petitioner had intimated its changed address as Plot Nos. 3 and 4, Udyog Vihar, Phase IV, Gurgaon, yet, it has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner, as its representative had associated himself with the proceedings till the time the resumption order was passed in the year 1998. The record further reveals that the Estate Officer had, for the first time, communicated to the petitioner that a sum of Rs. 72,09,853.55 vide letter dated 4.2.1998, which was sent at S-55, Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi. Despite this, the representative of the petitioner had presented himself on 27.2.1998 as desired by the respondents. This is borne out from the communication written by the petitioner to the Estate Officer on 3.3.1998 with reference to the meeting dated 27.2.1998. On 3.3.1998, the representative of the petitioner-presented himself with a demand draft of Rs. 10 lacs which was not accepted by the respondents and thereafter, notice under Section 17(4) of the Act was issued to the petitioner, which was also acknowledged by it. Thus, it is apparent from these communications exchanged inter se between the petitioner and the respondents that even though, in all these communications/orders written by the respondents the address of the petitioner is S-55, Greater Kailash, Part-II, New Delhi, yet, its representative was continuously responding to the same and he had presented himself for personal hearing. 13. It, therefore, does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner that a prejudice has been caused to it only because the orders/communications were being sent to an alien address. That apart, even if this argument were to be accepted, then also, the petitioner remained silent from 3.3.1998 till the year 2006 without any cogent explanation. The plot, in the meantime, had been allotted in December, 2005 to some one else.
That apart, even if this argument were to be accepted, then also, the petitioner remained silent from 3.3.1998 till the year 2006 without any cogent explanation. The plot, in the meantime, had been allotted in December, 2005 to some one else. The petitioner has not impleaded the subsequent allottee as a party to the writ petition, who was undoubtedly an essential party as any order passed qua the plot in question would have a fall-out on the rights of such allottee. 14. For the aforesaid reasons when the petitioner has failed to. show any prejudice caused to it on account of letters/orders sent at a different address than the one given by it; as its representative had associated himself with the proceedings, as also the fact that it has chosen to sleep over its rights since 1998 without any justifiable explanation and the fact that the subsequent allottee has not been impleaded as a party, we refrain from exercising our jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner. 15. The petition is accordingly dismissed.