JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shashi Kant Gupta, J.—The present writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 26-9-2002 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) passed by U.P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow (in short “Tribunal”) whereby it allowed the reference of Claim No. 403/1989 made by the respondent No. 1 (in short “Respondent”) arising out of the orders dated 4-5-1988 and 1.6.1989 passed by the disciplinary and the appellate authority respectively terminating the services of the respondent. 2. Background facts in a nutshell essentially are as follows : The respondent was initially appointed on the post of driver in the erstwhile U.P. Government Roadways and on creation of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (in short “Corporation”), he was sent on deputation with the Corporation. The respondent was deputed on Corporation bus No. URT 9834, plying on Agra-Bareilly route. However, on reaching Tundla Bus Station, the respondent allowed the cleaner of a bus, Kali Charan to drive the bus, even though he was not authorised to make any such delegation. While driving the bus, Sri Kali Charan lost control over the bus and the bus after hitting the tree fell into a ditch resulting in the death of three passengers on the spot and serious injuries to 39 passengers travelling in the bus. The Corporation suffered a loss of about rupees one lac as a result of damage caused to the bus. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid incident, the respondent was placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry and a charge-sheet dated 27-6-1986 was issued against him. A reply was submitted by the respondent which was not found satisfactory and after the completion of the departmental inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted its inquiry report to the disciplinary authority to the effect that the charges of serious misconduct stood fully proved against the respondent. Accordingly, a show cause notice dated 15-10-1987 along with a copy of the inquiry report was served on the respondent, requiring him to show cause as to why he may be not removed from service. The disciplinary authority after considering the reply submitted by the respondent and perusing the records of the inquiry was satisfied that it was not in the interest of the Corporation to retain the respondent in service and vide order dated 4-5-1988 respondent was terminated from service. 4. The respondent filed a departmental appeal. It was dismissed vide order dated 1.6.1989. The disciplinary authority after considering the reply submitted by the respondent and perusing the records of the inquiry was satisfied that it was not in the interest of the Corporation to retain the respondent in service and vide order dated 4-5-1988 respondent was terminated from service. 4. The respondent filed a departmental appeal. It was dismissed vide order dated 1.6.1989. Thereafter respondent filed a reference of Claim No. 403/4/1989 before the Tribunal challenging the aforesaid orders and the same was allowed on 26-9-2002 by the Tribunal holding that : (i) The balance salary and the allowances of the respondent No. 1 of the suspension period were forfeited without giving any opportunity of hearing. (ii) The inquiry has not been conducted in accordance with law and no reasonable opportunity was given to the respondent employee. 5. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order of the tribunal, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there was neither any illegality in conducting the disciplinary inquiry nor in the findings. It was further contended that reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the departmental witnesses and to produce evidence in his own defence was afforded to the respondent but the respondent himself stated before the Inquiry Officer that he did not want to cross-examine any witness or produce any evidence or defence witness and also refused to give any reason/justification for the accident and hence in such circumstances the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer was just and proper. 7. It was further contended that the work and conduct of the respondent had been utterly dissatisfactory as he had caused several accidents on earlier occasions as a driver. Adverse entries had been recorded in his character roll for several years. He was also given a warning and his two years increments were also stopped on 13-4-1967. On four other occasions recovery was directed to be made against the respondent for causing damage on account of the accident. 8. It has been further argued that the tribunal erroneously held that the departmental inquiry was not proper on the ground that no explanation was called before forfeiting the balance pay and allowances of the suspension period and reasonable opportunity was not given to the respondent. 8. It has been further argued that the tribunal erroneously held that the departmental inquiry was not proper on the ground that no explanation was called before forfeiting the balance pay and allowances of the suspension period and reasonable opportunity was not given to the respondent. It was further argued that the statements of all the relevant witnesses were recorded including the statement of conductor of the bus. 9. On the other hand counsel for the respondent has contended that no reasonable opportunity had been afforded to the respondent in the departmental inquiry and the inquiry was neither just and fair nor the explanation was called before forfeiting the balance salary and allowance of the suspension period. 10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 11. The following points arise for deciding the case : (i) Whether an order for forfeiting the balance salary and allowances of the suspension period can be passed without calling for an explanation by the disciplinary authority while passing the punishment order terminating the services of the respondent. (ii) Whether the inquiry resulting in the termination of the service of the respondent has been conducted in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the respondent. Point No. 1 : Forfeiting the Balance Salary and Allowances of the Suspension Period Without Calling for an Explanation 12. Respondent was placed under suspension and after the completion of the departmental inquiry, the inquiry report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer before the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and passed the order of termination and forfeited the balance salary and allowances of the suspension period. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Baldev Raj Guliani v. Punjab & Haryana High Court and others, AIR 1976 SC 2490 , has held as follows : “The character of the order of dismissal and that of the order of reinstatement in a departmental enquiry is absolutely different. Suspension is a step to dismissal and may culminate in dismissal. When an officer is suspended no work is taken from him but he does not cease to be in service. When he is dismissed the link with the service is snapped and naturally the order of suspension merges in dismissal. Nothing remains to be done about his suspension. Suspension is a step to dismissal and may culminate in dismissal. When an officer is suspended no work is taken from him but he does not cease to be in service. When he is dismissed the link with the service is snapped and naturally the order of suspension merges in dismissal. Nothing remains to be done about his suspension. When however, a suspended officer is reinstated an order which is different in content and quality from that of suspension takes effect. The suspended officer, on reinstatement, goes back to service. A further order may have to be passed by the authority as to in what manner the period of suspension will be treated. That will be, therefore, a distinct and separate proceedings apart from the earlier departmental proceeding in which the order of reinstatement was passed. If therefore, the order of reinstatement is set-aside, the officer is bound to revert to immediate anterior status of suspension.” 14. In the present case disciplinary authority found the respondent guilty and consequently terminated the service of the respondent. The suspension order passed earlier while initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent merged with the order of termination dated 4.5.1988 and the respondent ceased to be in service and nothing remained to be done about his suspension. Had the disciplinary authority exonerated the respondent then he would further have had to decide whether the order of suspension was valid and during the period it was in force the respondent could recover arrears of salary. In that eventuality the decision as to pay the allowance of the suspension period of the concerned employee and also whether the said period shall be treated spent on duty or not was required to be taken by the disciplinary authority after giving the notice to the concerned employee and calling for his explanation within a specified period. However, in the present case respondent has been dismissed and his link with the service is snapped and naturally the order of suspension merges in dismissal. That being so; the balance pay and allowance could be forfeited without calling any explanation or issuing any prior notice to the respondent. The order forfeiting the balance salary and allowance for the suspension period is a consequential order. That being so; the balance pay and allowance could be forfeited without calling any explanation or issuing any prior notice to the respondent. The order forfeiting the balance salary and allowance for the suspension period is a consequential order. Respondent has further failed to show that any prejudice has been caused to him due to non-issuance of notice for forfeiting the balance salary and allowances of the suspension period. Respondent has failed to place any service rules applicable at the relevant time requiring the issuance of any notice before forfeiting the balance salary of the employee while passing the order of termination. In view of the above, we do not find any illegality in the order of disciplinary authority forfeiting the balance salary and allowances of the suspension period of the respondent. Point NO. 2 : No Rreasonable Opportunity 15. The main plank of the argument of the counsel for the respondent is with regard to the alleged violation of principle of natural justice. It is an admitted fact that on 27-5-1986, the petitioner was deputed to ply bus No. URT-9834 on Agra-Bareillly route, however on reaching Tundla Bus Station the respondent No. 1 unauthorizedly allowed the cleaner Kali Charan to drive the bus and while Kali Charan was driving the bus he lost control over the bus and the bus after hitting the tree, fell into a ditch, resulting in death of three passengers on the spot and caused serious injuries to 39 passengers. In the said accident the bus was also badly damaged and corporation suffered a loss of Rs.1 lac. Since the respondent was a driver of the bus he cannot be permitted to delegate his duties to a third person who is not a driver. The basic and primary responsibility is of respondent in permitting Kali Charan cleaner of a bus to drive the bus. The duty of driving the bus was delegated by the respondent to Kalicharan, the cleaner of a bus, with the knowledge that Kalicharan was incapable and unauthorized to perform the duties of a driver. The basic and primary responsibility is of respondent in permitting Kali Charan cleaner of a bus to drive the bus. The duty of driving the bus was delegated by the respondent to Kalicharan, the cleaner of a bus, with the knowledge that Kalicharan was incapable and unauthorized to perform the duties of a driver. Delegating the responsibility to another with a knowledge that other person is incompetent, unskilled, unqualified and incapable to perform his duties properly, would amount to gross misconduct and in such a situation even the principles of Res ipsa loquitur can be applied as it has been held by Apex Court in Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjit Alhuwalia, (1998) 4 SCC 39 , wherein the Doctor delegated the task of injection to an unqualified nurse. 16. The Apex Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami, AIR 1962 SC 1 , has held as follows : “An exception to the general rule that the burden of proof of the alleged negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff occurs wherever the facts already established are such that the proper and natural inference immediately arising from them is that the injury complained of was caused by the defendant’s negligence, or where the event charged as negligence ‘tells its own story’ of negligence on the part of the defendant, the story so told being clear and unambiguous. To these cases the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies. Where the doctrine applies, a presumption of fault is raised against the defendant, which, if he is to succeed in his defence, must be overcome by contrary evidence, the burden on the defendant being to show how the act complained of could reasonably happen without negligence on his part. Where, therefore, there is a duty on the defendant to exercise care, and the circumstances in which the injury complained of happened are such that with the exercise of the requisite care, no risk would, in the ordinary course of events ensue, the burden is in the first instance on the defendant to disprove his liability. In such a case, if the injurious agency itself and the surrounding circumstances are all entirely within the defendant’s control, the inference is that the defendant is liable.” 17. The circumstances established in this case speak for themselves and candidly point towards the respondent’s misconduct. In such a case, if the injurious agency itself and the surrounding circumstances are all entirely within the defendant’s control, the inference is that the defendant is liable.” 17. The circumstances established in this case speak for themselves and candidly point towards the respondent’s misconduct. The omission and misconduct on the part of the respondent to delegate the authority to an unskilled cleaner to drive the bus, is sufficient to hold him guilty and the act of the respondent is so grossly negligent that he could not have been retained as a driver. 18. Also, the past history of the respondent does not support his case as it has specifically been stated in paragraph 6 of the writ petition that even earlier the respondent caused several accidents on 25-7-1964, 4-7-1970, 20-12-1977 and 27-5-1986; an adverse entry had been recorded in his character roll for the years 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1971-72, besides a warning was also given to him on 11-12-1965 and his two annual increments were also stopped on 13-4-1967. Moreover on four occasions recovery was directed to be made against the respondent for causing damages to the Corporation for the accidents. It is worthwhile to state that the contents of paragraph 6 of the writ petition stating the past misconduct of the respondent have not been denied by the respondent in his counter affidavit. A bare perusal of the inquiry report clearly reveals that respondent himself stated before the Enquiry Officer that he did not want to cross-examine any witness or produce any defence witness and also refused to give any reason/justification for the accident and hence in such circumstances the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer and disciplinary authority was just and proper. It has also been stated in paragraph 12 of the petition that the entire record of the departmental proceeding was produced before the Tribunal. The factum of producing the entire record before the Tribunal is not denied by the respondent in his counter-affidavit, however, the tribunal without considering the entire record of departmental proceeding, chose to consider only few paragraphs of the reply given by the Corporation to the Claim Petition and skirted the relevant and central question arose for adjudication i.e. entrusting illegally the bus to cleaner Kalicharan for driving. The Tribunal while passing the impugned order applied superficial and casual approach in reaching to an abrupt conclusion while holding that proper opportunity was not afforded. 19. The disciplinary authority, after setting out the entire facts, agreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiry officer and affirmed the same. In case the appointing authority agrees with the finding of the Inquiry Officer while passing the order of punishment it is not necessary to give detailed reasons, particularly when nothing new is added in reply to show cause notice issued by the disciplinary authority. Disciplinary authority vide order dated 4-5-1988 has clearly stated that the respondent in reply to the show cause notice, has merely reiterated the averments which were made in reply to the charge-sheet and have added nothing new in reply to the show cause notice. 20. The appellate authority has also held that the respondent in allowing the bus to be driven by a cleaner Kalicharan which led to the death of three persons and causing injuries to 39 passengers would amount to a gross misconduct and have further held that the reasonable opportunity was given to respondent but he failed to prove his innocence. 21. The gross misconduct of the respondent in allowing an unauthorized person to drive the bus and putting the lives of a large number of innocent passengers in danger cannot be condoned and he could not have been permitted to continue in service, particularly when he had been found guilty of committing gross misconduct on earlier occasions as well. 22. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is based on complete misreading of the case and misconception of the legal position relevant to the matter. The Tribunal has not recorded any cogent, satisfactory and convincing reasons to set aside the order of termination. Bare perusal of the inquiry report and the order passed by the disciplinary and appellate authority clearly indicates that proper and reasonable opportunity was granted to the respondents. In view of the above, we do not find any illegality in conducting the inquiry nor in the findings. 23. No other point has been pressed. 24. In view of our conclusions the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 26.9.2002 passed by the Tribunal is accordingly quashed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. ———