JUDGMENT:- Rule. By consent, made returnable forthwith. Heard Mr. Shivan Dessai, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. 2. This petition by legal representatives of deceased partner of tenant firm takes exception to dismissal of their appeal by the Administrative Tribunal. Original landlord too has expired and the respondents are his children. 3. There is no dispute that premises in question had been let out by original landlord Zoivanta to M/s. Heble's Pest Control Services for residential purposes by an agreement dated 30.7.71 @ Rs.3001- p.m., which was enhanced to Rs.5001- p.m. by mutual consent. By eviction application no.61 89 filed on 23.6.89, the landlord sought possession of the premises for personal occupation. At that time, landlord claimed to have been 77 years old and his wife was 72 years old. Landlord claimed possession of the premises since he wanted to shift to Panaji for treatment of his wife. 4. On 21.5.2004 landlord's wife expired. Two of the three partners of the tenant firm too died in 1991. However, according to the Rent Controller, the third partner Anil Heble, being alive, the suit did not abate. On 19.1.2004, the landlord had applied for impleadment of L.Rs. of one the deceased partners, Parag. This application was allowed by the Rent Controller on 17.9.2004 whereby the present petitioners came to be arrayed as respondents in the eviction proceedings. The Rent Controller allowed application for ejectment by his judgment dated 30.09.2004. As already recounted petitioner's appeal to Administrative Tribunal failed and this is how the petitioners are before this Court. This judgment was delivered on 6.11.2006. In May, 2007 the petitioners claimed to have learnt that even the landlord had died. (para 15 of the petition) In fact he died on 17.1.2007 as can be seen from death certificate filed by the respondent. The petition was, therefore, filed against son of the deceased landlord, and his daughter too was subsequently joined as respondent, though it is stated that she has no interest in the property. Landlord's son is stated to be 66 years old, and claimed by affidavit in reply dated 8.2.2008 that now he now needs the premises for his own occupation. There is no rejoinder to this. 5. Landlord's son is stated to be 66 years old, and claimed by affidavit in reply dated 8.2.2008 that now he now needs the premises for his own occupation. There is no rejoinder to this. 5. Both the learned Counsel for the parties addressed me on the merits of the factual findings recorded by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Administrative Tribunal. 6. The finding of fact that landlord indeed needed the premises when he filed the eviction application so as to shift to Panaji for better facilities for treatment of his wife cannot be faulted. Equally unassailable is the need pleaded by the landlord to occupy the premises himself, given his advanced age at that time. Thus, had the original landlord been contesting these proceedings, the petitioner tenants would not have had even an arguable case. 7. In the backdrop of these facts, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that need for which possession of the premises was sought ceased to exist upon the demise of landlords wife, even before the eviction application was allowed by the Rent Controller. Even the need of landlord himself abated upon his demise before the petition was filed. Relying on a string of judgments of the Apex Court, he submitted that for the purpose of seeking possession on the ground of bonafide need, it must be shown that the need existed on the day of making application and must continue till the final determination of the case. 8. His learned adversary, on the other hand submitted that it would be unjust to subject the fortunes of a landlord to vicissitudes of a lis. He submitted that ordinarily a lis must be decided on the basis of situation as it existed on the date of filing of proceeding. In any case, when a decree is passed in favour of a landlord, his subsequent death cannot lead to reopening of the matter and his L.Rs. could prosecute/contest further proceedings, which may have to be decided with reference to situation obtaining at the time of passage of decree. He too placed reliance on a number of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in support of his contentions, and particularly latest judgment of the Apex Court in Usha Kuvelkar Vs. Ravindra, (2008)1 SCC 330 : 2008 SAR (Civil) 38 : [2008(2) ALL MR 345 (S.C.)]. 9. He too placed reliance on a number of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in support of his contentions, and particularly latest judgment of the Apex Court in Usha Kuvelkar Vs. Ravindra, (2008)1 SCC 330 : 2008 SAR (Civil) 38 : [2008(2) ALL MR 345 (S.C.)]. 9. Rather than dealing with judgments relied on by both the parties separately, it may be useful to discuss them chronologically so as to elicit the thread of binding precedent emerging there from. 10. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders reported at (1975)1 SCC 770 on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied,. a three judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering an appeal by a landlord whose claim for ejectment of tenant for starting his own business was negatived because he had come to possess one shop during the pendency of the litigation. It was argued that it was illegal for the High Court to have taken cognizance of subsequent events. Rejecting this contention, the Apex Court observed in para 4 as under: "It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." (emphasis supplied) 11.1 In Shantilal Vs. Chimanlal reported at (1976)4 SCC 417 a three Judge bench of the Apex Court was considering the effect of death of a plaintiff landlord during the pendency of proceedings to recover under the Bombay Rent Act possession of premises let out. The necessity pleaded was that plaintiff required the premises for the use of partnership firm of which he was a partner. The High Court set aside decree for ejectment and remanded the case for trying out issue of comparative hardship and the question whether heirs of the original plaintiff required the premises reasonably and bonafide for their occupation. Upon remand, again a partial decree for eviction was passed, which was questioned by both the parties by preferring revision applications. Relying on judgment of Supreme Court in Phul Rani Vs. Naubat Rai, (1973)1 SCC 688 , the High Court allowed tenant's revision, rejected that of landlord's and dismissed the suit for eviction in toto. 11.2. It was contended before the Supreme Court that Phul Rani's case was not correctly decided by a two Judge bench of the Supreme Court. In Phul Rani's case, the Court had taken the view that requirement pleaded in ejectment application was landlord's personal requirement of residence for himself and members of his family. That members of his family must reside with him was his requirement, not theirs, and, therefore, the bench concluded that such a personal cause of action must perish on demise of plaintiff. That members of his family must reside with him was his requirement, not theirs, and, therefore, the bench concluded that such a personal cause of action must perish on demise of plaintiff. Disapproving these observations, three judge bench in Shantilal V s. Chimanlal held that if the law permitted eviction for residence of members of family, the requirement was not personal to landlord, but was of members of family as well. However, after considering facts of the matter Apex Court did not disturb dismissal of suit for ejectment. 12.1. In Hasmat Rai & Another Vs. Raghunath Prasad reported at (1981)3 see 103, which too was cited by learned Counsel for petitioners, a three judge bench of the Apex Court was considering tenant's appeal against his ejectment on account of landlord's need of premises to set up a shop. When the matter had reached the High Court, the tenant applied for amendment to written statement to contend that landlord had secured possession of some other premises, which satisfied landlord's need. High Court rejected this application and despite judgment in Pasupuleti Venkateshwaralu, "felt considerable hesitation in taking note of the subsequent event". The Apex Court granted the application for amendment. Two of the three Hon'ble Judges constituting the bench held in para 14 of the judgment as under : "If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Registration Act." "Therefore it is indisputable that the decree or order for eviction referred to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit the landlord's need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit the landlord's need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the court including the appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage. An illustration would clarify what we want to convey. A landlord was in a position to show that he needed possession of demised premises on the date of the suit as well as on the date of the decree of the trial Court. When the matter was pending in appeal at the instance of the tenant, the landlord built a house or bungalow which would fully satisfy his requirement. If this subsequent event is taken into consideration, the landlord would have to be non-suited. Can the court shut its eyes and evict the tenant? Such is neither the spirit nor intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re-entry. Therefore, when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff, the court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly." (emphasis supplied) 12.2. In his separate, but concurring judgment, third Hon'b1e Judge held in para 29 as under : "The High Court was bound to take the fact into consideration because, as is well settled now, in a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the statute prescribes to the contrary, the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of, either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority. That position, to my mind is indisputable." 13.1. In Amarjit Singh Vs. That position, to my mind is indisputable." 13.1. In Amarjit Singh Vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamasain reported at (1986)4 see 736, the landlady had secured possession of some other premises let out by her to New Zealand embassy after the proceedings for eviction were started against the appellant tenant. She inducted another tenant at higher rent, rather than occupying the premises herself, and pressed for eviction of appellant for her own occupation. Trial Court and the High Court held in favour of the landlord. 13.2. Referring to judgments in Pasupuleti and Hasmatrai, the Court observed in paras. 12 & 20 of the judgment as under: "12. This Court upheld that finding. This Court affirmed the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legal and factual in accord with the current realities, the Court could and in many cases must take cautious cognizance of events• and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings, provided rules of fairness to both the sides were scrupulously obeyed. In the instant case there is no question of violation of any principles ormles of natural justice. If cognizance is taken of events and developments, subsequent to the initiation of proceedings, it must be held that the landlady had the opportunity of occupying a floor in the house which fell vacant not once but twice subsequent to arising of her need for reasonable accommodation. She chose not to occupy the said premises. The landlady asserts that she must have means to live before she can utilise her living space to live. The landlady asserts that in order to have her means to live, she must let one floor on rent. According to her, that is the only source of her income. But it is not clear from the learned Rent Controller's findings or the High Court adjudication whether the huge bank balances alleged to belong to the landlady yield any income or not or is insufficient income for her to live. Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal we must proceed on the assumption that the landlady needed money to live and the income from her house letting was a source of her income. But the question is. is it a sufficient ground which will bring her out from the second limb of the conditions imposed by Section 14(1 )(e) of the Act? But the question is. is it a sufficient ground which will bring her out from the second limb of the conditions imposed by Section 14(1 )(e) of the Act? There is no dispute that administration of justice demands that any changes either in fact or in law must be taken cognizance of by the court but that must be done in a cautious manner of relevant facts." "20. The rent restricting Acts are beneficial legislations for the protection of the weaker I party in the bargains of letting very often. These must be so read that these balance harmoniously the rights of the landlords and the obligations of the tenants. The Rent Restriction Acts deal with the problem of rack renting and shortage of accommodation. It is in consonance with the recognition of the right of both the landlord and the tenant that a harmony is sought to be struck whereby the bona fide requirements of the landlords and the tenants in the expanding explosion of need and population and shortage of accommodation are sought to be harmonised and the conditions imposed to evict to tenant are that the landlord must have bona fide need." (emphasis supplied) 14. In Gulabbai Vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra and Others reported at (1991)3 SCC 483 a two judge bench was considering the case of a landlady who had constructed a bungalow during pendency of appeal. High Court held that this subsequent development could be considered to have satisfied landlady's needs. The Court held that the High Court was justified in doing so and quoted from judgment in Pasupuleti, Hasmat Rai and Amarjit Singh. 15.1. In P.V. Papanna Vs. K. Padmanabhaiah reported at (1994) 2 see 316 decided by a two judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a landlord, for whose bonafide need possession was sought died after even the Supreme Court held in favour of landlord, during the time which had been granted to the tenant to vacate. Tenant objected to execution contending that order of eviction in favour of landlord was personal and so his L.Rs. could not seek eviction. The executing court rejected tenant's objection. The High Court reversed the executing court upholding tenant's objections. Landlord's L.Rs. took the matter to Supreme Court. 15.2. Tenant objected to execution contending that order of eviction in favour of landlord was personal and so his L.Rs. could not seek eviction. The executing court rejected tenant's objection. The High Court reversed the executing court upholding tenant's objections. Landlord's L.Rs. took the matter to Supreme Court. 15.2. The Court reiterated that for claiming possession on the ground of bona fide need, such need must exist even when higher courts deal with the order of eviction in appeal or revision, following the principles enunciated in Hasmat Rai and Pasupuleti Venkateswaralu. But it added in para 13 and 18 as under: "From the various observations made in the cases referred to above, it is patently clear that this Court, while laying down that in a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of premises by landlord the subsequent events ought to be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord still required the premises in possession of the tenant, has also laid down that such an enquiry can be made so long as the decree for eviction does not become final. In other words, once the matter has become final in the sense that the order of eviction has been upheld by the Highest Court in which it was sought to be challenged, it would not be open to further challenge, which necessarily can be in the execution stage. This conclusion inevitably follows from the well-settled principle that a court executing the decree cannot go behind the decree for it is binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit. Therefore, the executing court is required to execute the decree as it finds; save in exceptional cases where the decree on the face of it maybe found to be without jurisdiction. To put it differently, the executing court cannot enquire as to why the decree was passed but for the purpose of finding out whether the decree is a valid one or a nullity it can go into the question as to whether the court which passed the decree was competent to do so. To put it differently, the executing court cannot enquire as to why the decree was passed but for the purpose of finding out whether the decree is a valid one or a nullity it can go into the question as to whether the court which passed the decree was competent to do so. Besides, the executing court may if need be, look into the pleadings of the parties and the proceedings of the trial, for the limited purpose of construing the decree or the meaning of the words used therein," "For the foregoing discussion, we must hold that events which take place subsequent to the filing of an eviction petition under any Rent Act can be taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication until a decree is made by the final court determining the rights of the parties but any event that takes place after the decree becomes final cannot be made a ground for reopening the decree. The finality to the dispute culminating in the decree cannot be reopened by the executing court for readjudication on the ground that some event or the other has altered the situation. As a corollary thereto it must also be held that once the decree became final it became a part of the estate of the landlord and therefore the appellants as legal representatives of the deceased landlord are entitled to execute the same.” "It allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. 16. In Laxmi Vs. C. Sitar am Nagarkar and others reported at 1995 Supp (4) SCC 143, a two judge bench of the Supreme Court was considering claim of a landlord for possession on account of need for mother's residence. Mother expired and the landlord then took the plea that he needed the premises for his own occupation. The District Court, as well as High Court held that this plea required investigation in facts and could not be entertained in a revision petition. The Supreme Court upheld this course. 17.1. Reliance was also placed on a judgment of a two judge bench in Kamleshwar Prasad Vs. Pradumanju reported at AIR 1997 se 2399. In that case landlord had sought possession of the premises on the ground that he bonafide needed the premises for carrying on his own business. Trial Court rejected landlord's application. Appellate authority held in favour of landlord. Reliance was also placed on a judgment of a two judge bench in Kamleshwar Prasad Vs. Pradumanju reported at AIR 1997 se 2399. In that case landlord had sought possession of the premises on the ground that he bonafide needed the premises for carrying on his own business. Trial Court rejected landlord's application. Appellate authority held in favour of landlord. Tenant challenged the said order by filing a writ petition. During the pendency of the petition, landlord died and his L.Rs. contested the petition. It was contended by tenant that upon death of landlord, bonafide need did not survive. High Court held that decree for eviction had become final and could not be disturbed on application under Article 226 of the Constitution by taking into account death of landlord during the pendency of the petition. In this context the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under in para 3 of judgment :- "Having given anxious consideration to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and under the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the considered opinion that this case does not warrant interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Under the Act the order of the appellate authority is final and the said order is a decree of the Civil Court and decree of a competent Court having become final cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by taking into 'account any subsequent event which might have happened. That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises in question for starting a business which fact has been found by the appellate authority, in the eye of law, it must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any elder son." (emphasis supplied) 17.2. This judgment has been followed by this court in Dinesh Vs. Somani Radio Corp., W.P. No.2588/1990 decided on 29.9.2004. 18.1. In Kedarnath Agrawal Vs. This judgment has been followed by this court in Dinesh Vs. Somani Radio Corp., W.P. No.2588/1990 decided on 29.9.2004. 18.1. In Kedarnath Agrawal Vs. Dhanraji Devi reported at (2004)8 SCC 76 decided by a two judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, landlord sought possession of a shop for their business. Trial Court and the District Judge held favour of the landlord. Before the High Court, it was pointed out that the original applicants (landlords) had died. High Court refused to take into account this fact. This is how the matter reached the Supreme Court. In this context, the court held in para 16 as under: "In our opinion, by not taking into account the subsequent event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. In our judgment, the law is well settled on the point and it is this: the basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and the suit/action should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suit/action. This, however, does not mean that events happening after institution of a suit/proceeding, cannot be considered at all. It is the power and duty of the court to consider changed circumstances. A court of law may take into account subsequent events inter alia in the following circumstances: i) the relief claimed originally has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate: or ii) it is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation: or iii) it is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties." (emphasis supplied) 18.2. The Court also referred to judgments in Pasupuleti Venkateswaralu, Gulabbai and Hasmat Rai, among others. The court found that the Uttar Pradesh Rent Act which was applicable, enabled legal representatives of deceased landlord to prosecute the application on the basis of their own need in substitution of the need of the deceased. The court then remitted the matter to High Court. 19. In Shakuntalabai Vs. Narayandas reported at AIR 2004 SC 3484 , a two judge bench of the Supreme Court was considering a lis that had originated 42 years back in 1962. Landlord sought possession of premises for carrying on his own business. The court then remitted the matter to High Court. 19. In Shakuntalabai Vs. Narayandas reported at AIR 2004 SC 3484 , a two judge bench of the Supreme Court was considering a lis that had originated 42 years back in 1962. Landlord sought possession of premises for carrying on his own business. Suit was decreed. During the pendency of appeal landlord died and his L.Rs. contested the appeal. They sought amendment to plead their bonafide need, while tenant sought an amendment to plead that the need had come to an end upon landlord's demise. Amendments were allowed and matter was remitted back for trial. Trial court dismissed the suit. Landlords appealed. During the pendency of appeal tenant died, and his L.Rs. were substituted. Appellate Court ordered eviction. High Court allowed tenant's appeal and dismissed the suit, which took landlord, to Apex Court. After considering several judgments, the Court concluded that where death of landlord occurs after a decree for possession has been passed in his favour, his L.Rs. would be entitled to defend further proceedings in appeal and the benefit accrued to them under the decree. The observations of the court in para 15 may be usefully reproduced below:- "As the preamble shows the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will be no end to litigation. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies. the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. The same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs and it may become an unending process. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to come." (emphasis supplied) 20.1. In Usha Kuvelkar Vs. Ravindra reported at (2008)1 SCC 330 : [2008(2) ALL MR 345 (S.C.)], a two judge bench of the Supreme Court was considering a similar case from Goa, governed by Goa Rent Control Act, 1968. Landlord filed application for eviction of tenant on 3.7.86, inter alia on the ground that premises were required by the landlord for his own personal occupation and also for members of his family. During the pendency of the proceedings, landlord pleaded subsequent development of his ill health, as also his retirement from employment of the State Govt. Rent Controller as well as Administrative Tribunal held in favour of the landlord. The High Court ordered remand to the Administrative Tribunal. This order was challenged before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of appeal before the Supreme Court, the landlord died and his L.Rs. were prosecuting the appeal. 20.2. After considering judgments in Shakuntalabai, P.V. Papanna, Shantilal Thakordas, the court rejected contention of the tenants that need for premises expired with the landlord, pointing out that landlord died after the eviction order, apart from the fact that possession had also been sought on the ground of need of the family. The appeal was allowed and judgments of Rent Controller and Administrative Tribunal were restored. 21. The learned Counsel for petitioners submitted that view consistently taken by three judge benches of the Supreme Court is that subsequent death of a landlord would adversely affect claim for possession on the ground of his bonafide need and his L.Rs. may not be able to reap the benefits of any decree in his favour if the litigation continued. He further submitted first, that decisions of two judge benches taking a contrary view were based on facts peculiar to those cases, and secondly could not be regarded as good law in face of judgments of three judge benches. may not be able to reap the benefits of any decree in his favour if the litigation continued. He further submitted first, that decisions of two judge benches taking a contrary view were based on facts peculiar to those cases, and secondly could not be regarded as good law in face of judgments of three judge benches. The proposition that in face of a decision of bench of higher strength, judgment by a bench of lesser strength cannot be followed, is unexceptionable and needs no authority. All the same, the learned Counsel referred to observations in Union of India Vs. Harjeet Singh reported at (2001)5 sec 593 and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Vs. State reported at (2005)2 see 673. 22. His learned adversary submitted that decision in Usha Kuvelkar's case is the latest pronouncement which considers several previous judgments and also arises out of same Goa Rent Act and would therefore, prevail. 23. The legal principles that emerge from a review of these judgments could be summarised as under: a) It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes legal proceedings. b) If the litigation pends power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course, for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally, factually in accord with the realities. The Court can take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. c) Death of a landlord or person in the family of landlord for whose need recovery of possession of premises is sought under concerned rent legislation pending litigation, is a relevant subsequent development, which ought to be taken into consideration. d) Landlord's securing possession of other premises which would satisfy his need, during the pendency of the proceedings, is also relevant subsequent development to be taken into consideration, since the requirement of the landlord must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of decree of the final Court, since appeal is continuation of suit. e) Rent restricting acts are beneficial legislation for the protection of the weaker party. These must be so read that they balance harmoniously to the rights oflandlords and obligations of tenants. e) Rent restricting acts are beneficial legislation for the protection of the weaker party. These must be so read that they balance harmoniously to the rights oflandlords and obligations of tenants. f) Events subsequent to the filing of eviction petition under any Rent Act, can be taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication until a decree is made by the final Court determining the rights of the parties. But any event that takes place after the decree become final, cannot be made a ground for reopening the decree. g) When pending litigation the need for which possession is sought, does not survive and separate need is set up, it could be examined in the same proceedings if the provisions of law so permit. h) A court may take notice of subsequent events if it is necessary in order to shorten litigation. 24. View thus, there is no conflict in the observations of the two Judge Bench and three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. Whatever deviations have been noticed, are on account of differences in facts. 25. In this case, deceased landlord had started the process way back in the year 1989. He wanted to secure possession of premises in order to ensure that his wife got proper treatment as also for his own occupation. His wife, however, expired on 21.5.2004. Without noticing this fact, however, the application for ejectment was allowed on 30.9.2004 by the Rent Controller. After tenant's appeal was rejected by the Administrative Tribunal on 6.11.2006, the landlord himself died on 17.1.2007. Landlord's son, who is 66 years old, has claimed by his affidavit-in-reply to the petition that he now needs the to occupy the premises. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submit that this is a separate and distinct need, which cannot be entertained in a petition, of this type, as held in Laxmi Vs. Sitaram Nagarkar, reported at 1995 Supplement 4 see 143 referred to above. In this context. the observations of two Judge Bench of Apex Court in Shakuntalabai Versus Narayandas in para 15 of judgment, may be recalled. The Court found that by the time a second appeal is decided by the High Court, long period lapses. Sitaram Nagarkar, reported at 1995 Supplement 4 see 143 referred to above. In this context. the observations of two Judge Bench of Apex Court in Shakuntalabai Versus Narayandas in para 15 of judgment, may be recalled. The Court found that by the time a second appeal is decided by the High Court, long period lapses. If during this period, upon death of landlord, suit was to be dismissed without going into merits, on principle of taking into consideration subsequent developments, even a fresh suit by landlord's heirs may meet the same fate and it may become an unending process. This possibility stares starkly in the present case, where the legal representatives of the landlord himself is 66 years old senior citizen. The object of Rent Legislation, was not to deprive of owners of their properties for all times to come. 26. The principles enunciated in the judgments referred to above, recognise the temporal dimension of life. Though a lis has to be decided with reference to the fact situation obtaining on the date the case is filed, it cannot be forgotten that life is not still. Therefore, subsequent developments, which would make the relief redundant or necessary, have to be taken into consideration, but with the riders "absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course" and "provided rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed". Therefore, it does not follow that subsequent developments, which accentuate the need to grant such relief, have to be ignored. The mandate in the judgments referred to above, is not to selectively ignore developments, which would underline the necessity to promptly grant a relief and only to take into consideration those developments, which would enable the Court to throw out the suitor, who has approached the Court for a relief and patiently put up with Law's delays and inadequacies of the system to grant to him what was due years ago. 27. The landlord seeking possession of premises for starting his business or say to set up a son in business, may be required to acquire some other premises because he cannot allow life to stand still and do nothing for livelihood, or do nothing to expand his business. Does law expect him to forgo possession to his own property because he secured some premises to meet his growing needs? Does law expect him to forgo possession to his own property because he secured some premises to meet his growing needs? A landlord may construct residential premises by taking a loan and in order to repay the loan, may let out a portion of his house. In the course of time as loan is repaid and number of members of his family also diminished because of daughters' marriages or sons taking employment elsewhere. Does it follow that said landlord must put up with the tenant for the rest of his life though he can afford to live in comfort in his sunset years, simply because he once inducted a tenant? 28. Acquisition of accommodation during pendency of lis by landlord may satisfy his additional needs of growing family and merely because such needs have not been pleaded in the eviction proceedings initially started, they could not be ignored. A review of the authorities cited, requires that all subsequent events should be noted and not only those, which favour a tenant. Therefore, the need of landlord's son in this case, who is 66 years old, too would qualify for being considered as a subsequent event, just as the death of his parents. 29. Another temporal dimension of law too may be noticed. Rent Legislation meant to protect tenants arose when social reality was altogether different. In commercial and industrial centres, big landlords constructed hundreds of tenements in order to let them out and make income from property. Rules which emerged to respond to such landlords attempts to evict tenants cannot apply to landlords struggling to get possession of their sole property. Whenever possible, law need not always lag behind life, or be dragged by changing pace of life. If an anachronistic rule of law is a product 'of legislation, legislative corrective may be needed. But if Courts have by their judgments laid down some requirement, which with passage of time creates conflict judicial action to modify such requirements so as to bring them in tune with realities of life would be needed. 30. Fortunately, right from Pasupuleti to Kedarnath the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated that the basic principle is to decide the lis on the situation as existing on the date a suitor institutes legal proceedings. 30. Fortunately, right from Pasupuleti to Kedarnath the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated that the basic principle is to decide the lis on the situation as existing on the date a suitor institutes legal proceedings. Subsequent events may have to be taken into consideration "absent special circumstances" and "provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed", if and only if the relief originally claimed becomes inappropriate, or if it is necessary to shorten litigation and or in order to do complete justice. Thus the need to consider subsequent events, will have to be judged in the context of facts in each case. In this case, the present respondent would be on the verge of being pushed into unending loops of litigation, if only the death of his parents, but not his advanced age and needs are taken into consideration. As observed by the Apex Court in Shakuntalabai, such is not the intendment of the judicial dictum to consider subsequent events. Hence, as far as this case is concerned, the decree must be held to have attained finality upon the decision of Administrative Tribunal. Tenant's invocation of discretionary writ jurisdiction, does not reopen the lis, except to the extent of tenant's being permitted to show that the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal, was itself liable to be set aside on the basis of situation then obtaining. If the subsequent event of death of original landlord was to be noticed, rules of fair play would demand that need stated by respondent No.1 in his affidavit in reply (which is unrebutted) too may be considered here and now, without pushing him in another round of litigation, "in order to shorten litigation", as held in Kedarnath. 31. Further, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for respondent, if respondent does not occupy the premises himself upon eviction of petitioners, Section 27 of the Goa Rent Control Act entitles the tenant to apply for repossession. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to stifle the bonafide need of the landlord's aged son to occupy the premises in the evening of his life. 32. There is nothing to show that the Administrative Tribunal erred in holding in favour of the landlord. In view of this the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.