ORDER: In this application, filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (Act No. 26 of 2006), the applicant seeks appointment of an arbitrator to pass an award in respect of disputes and differences which arose out of the agreement dated 1.9.1999 relating to the construction of bridge No.4 at K.M. 178/6-8 Chennai-Kumbakonam-Thanjavur Road for Highways and rural works department, Government of Tamilnadu. 2. The applicant, a partnership firm having its office at Hyderabad, entered into an agreement with the 1st respondent on 1.9.1999, for construction of the aforesaid work, pursuant to a letter of acceptance dated 9.6.1999 received from the 2nd respondent at Hyderabad. The work was completed on 30.4.2001 and was opened to road traffic. The maintenance period was also completed on 25.6.2003. During execution of the work, certain additional items were executed under the orders of the respondents. The applicant submitted a final bill for Rs.99,30,945.95. According to them, the total quantity executed, and the various amounts due to them against the existing as well as the additional items, worked out to Rs.3,86,45,642.61 and that the final bill, for this amount less the billed and paid amount of Rs.2,95,08,209.88 and the security deposit recovered from RA bills amounting Rs.7,76,513.22/-, was submitted on 25.7.2003. 3. After the applicant submitted their final bill to the 2nd respondent on 25.7.2003 a rider agreement dated 27.10.2004 was entered into between the 2nd respondent and the applicant whereby Rs.21,44,065/- was agreed to be released towards final payment leaving the amount towards additional quantities executed towards road items, additional amounts involved in adopting DMC method and the price variation payment with interest on delayed payments, unpaid. On 26.7.2005, the applicant submitted their claims aggregating to Rs.72,48,650.99 for extra quantities executed in respect of 13 existing items of the original agreement, and 3 new additional items, plus interest at 18% per annum from the date of completion i.e., 30.4.2001 till the date of actual payment. The applicant issued a reminder on 31.10.2006. On the respondents informing the applicant, vide letter dated 15.12.2006, that they would not appoint an arbitrator, the applicant again addressed letter dated 27.1.2007 seeking appointment of an arbitrator. It is only thereafter that the present application was filed seeking appointment of an arbitrator. 4. The applicant issued a reminder on 31.10.2006. On the respondents informing the applicant, vide letter dated 15.12.2006, that they would not appoint an arbitrator, the applicant again addressed letter dated 27.1.2007 seeking appointment of an arbitrator. It is only thereafter that the present application was filed seeking appointment of an arbitrator. 4. Sri A. Ramalingeswara Rao, learned counsel for the Applicant, would place reliance on Section 4 of the Contract Act to contend that communication of the letter of acceptance was complete only when it was received by the applicant at Hyderabad. Learned counsel would submit that, even if a part of the cause of action arose at Hyderabad, this Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application for appointment of an arbitrator. Learned counsel would submit that the applicant had its registered office at Hyderabad, it was carrying on business at Hyderabad, it was corresponding with the respondent from Hyderabad, it had received the letter of acceptance of the agreement from the respondent at Hyderabad and that it had issued bank guarantees from Hyderabad. According to the Learned Counsel, the aforesaid, material facts, coupled with the fact that the respondent also had its branch office at Hyderabad, would suffice to confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the application since a part of the "cause of action" had arisen within its territorial limits. Learned counsel would submit that the very fact that payments were made, only after the rider agreement dated 27.10.2004 was entered into, was sufficient to hold that the applicant's claims were not barred by limitation, that, in any event, the question of limitation, the scope of the rider agreement, whether it has a bearing on the claims etc, were all matters which are better examined by the arbitrator to be appointed by this Court. Learned Counsel would submit that, notwithstanding the pendency of the application filed by the respondent herein, against its Principal i.e, Government of Tamilnadu before the Madras High Court, seeking appointment of an arbitrator, the arbitration application filed by the applicant ought to be entertained as this Court has jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator and a sole arbitrator should be appointed for adjudication of all claims/disputes between the parties. Learned counsel would rely on Shree Ram Mills Ltd. Vs. Utility Premises (Petitioner) Ltd, 2007(4) SCC 599 , Ambica Industries Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2007(6) SCC 769 , Adhunik Steels Ltd. Vs. Learned counsel would rely on Shree Ram Mills Ltd. Vs. Utility Premises (Petitioner) Ltd, 2007(4) SCC 599 , Ambica Industries Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2007(6) SCC 769 , Adhunik Steels Ltd. Vs. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (Petitioner) Ltd, 2007(7) SCC 125 , DHV BV Vs. Tahal Consulting Engineers Ltd (ISRAEL)4 and Vijai Electricals Ltd., Hyderabad Vs. Mohan Exports (India) Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2007(3) ALD 583 5. Sri S. Rajan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, would contend that mere delivery of the letter of acceptance at Hyderabad would not amount to a part of cause action arising at Hyderabad, that mere correspondence did not constitute cause of action, that the action must include some act done by the respondent and that mere execution of the bank guarantee at Hyderabad did not constitute "cause of action" either in whole or in part. Learned counsel would rely on National Textile Corpn. Ltd Vs. M/s Haribox Swalram, 2004(5) ALD 120(SC) South East Asia Shipping Company Ltd Vs. Nav Bharat Enterprises Private Ltd, 1996(3) SCC 443 , The Iron and Steel Company Ltd Vs. M/s Tiwari Road Lines8, American Pipe Company Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1983 CAL. 186 and M/s Progressive Constructions Ltd. Vs. Bharat Hydro Power Corporation Ltd, AIR 1996 Del. 92 According to the learned counsel, the dispute raised in the present application relates to settlement of claims other than those for which final payment was made and, as the work was completed as early as on 30.4.2001, the claims as raised by the applicant were barred by limitation. Learned counsel would contend that the rider agreement dated 27.10.2004 specifically provided that the claims as raised by the applicant would be referred by the respondent to its principal i.e., the Government of Tamil Nadu, that in case the said amounts were not paid they would seek reference of this dispute to arbitration and, if payments were made pursuant to the award of the arbitrator, the applicant shall then be entitled for payment of the amount. Learned counsel would submit that the applicant, having entered into a rider agreement with his eyes open, was bound by the terms and conditions thereof, and that it could not resile therefrom on the specious plea that the agreement was vague, against public policy or that it was based on a misunderstanding of facts. Learned counsel would submit that the applicant, having entered into a rider agreement with his eyes open, was bound by the terms and conditions thereof, and that it could not resile therefrom on the specious plea that the agreement was vague, against public policy or that it was based on a misunderstanding of facts. According to the learned counsel, the clauses in the rider agreement were clear, unambiguous and required the applicant to await the outcome of the arbitral proceedings between the Government of Tamilnadu and the respondent herein. Learned counsel would contend that, in any event, this Court lacked jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator since no part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial limits. Section 2(e) of Act No. 26 of 2006 defines 'Court' to mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit. Under Section 11(5) of Act 26 of 1996, a party may request the Chief Justice, or any person or institution designated by him, to appoint an arbitrator where the condition stipulated therein are satisfied. Similarly, under Section 11(6), a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary measure for securing appointment of the arbitrator where the ingredients of the said sub- section are satisfied. The "Chief Justice" referred to in Sections 11(5) and 11(6) would, in view of Section 11(12)(b), mean the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose local limits the principal civil court referred to in Section 2(1)(e) is situated. It is only if the principal civil court in a district, in the State of Andhra Pradesh, has the jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration, if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, would the Chief Justice of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, or his designate, have jurisdiction either to appoint an arbitrator or to take the necessary measure to secure appointment of an arbitrator. 7. Under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, every suit shall be instituted in a court within whose local limits the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 7. Under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, every suit shall be instituted in a court within whose local limits the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. The Explanation to Section 20 provides that a Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole and principal office in India or in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office at such place. 8. The Principal Office (i.e, the Head Office) of the respondent is, admittedly, not in Hyderabad. Even if the respondent is held to have a subordinate office, (i.e., branch office) at Hyderabad, it is only if the cause of action, either wholly or in part, has arisen at Hyderabad, would the Applicant be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, or his designate, for appointment of an arbitrator or to take the necessary measure to secure such appointment. "Cause of action" implies a right to sue. The material facts, which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove, constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted, inter alia, to mean every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be a part of the cause of action. (Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India11; Swamy Atmananda Vs. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, AIR 2005 SC 2392 . In the restricted sense "cause of action" means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including the alleged infraction. (Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association Vs. Union of India), 2001(2) SCC 294 10. "Cause of action" is the bundle of facts which, taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including the alleged infraction. (Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association Vs. Union of India), 2001(2) SCC 294 10. "Cause of action" is the bundle of facts which, taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. Each and every fact pleaded does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing on the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. (Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd, 2002(1) ALD 104(SC) = (2002)1 SCC 567 , National Taxtile Corpn. Ltd.6). The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000(2) ALD (Crl.) 675(SC) = 2000(7) SCC 640 ; Y. Abraham Ajith Vs. Inspector of Police, 2004(2) ALD (Crl.) 491(SC) = AIR 2004 SC 4286 ) 11. Osborne's Concise Law Dictionary defines "cause of action" as the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right of action. Black's Law Dictionary defines the expression "cause of action" to mean the fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial relief. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, a cause of action is stated to be the entire set of facts that give rise to an enforceable claim. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.), the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action", in common legal parlance, is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, a cause of action is stated to be the entire set of facts that give rise to an enforceable claim. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.), the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action", in common legal parlance, is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), the expression "cause of action" is explained as:- “Cause of action' has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that a particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action." "Cause of action" has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. In determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial. (Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, ILR (1989) 16 Cal 98, Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 ) "Cause of action" is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. (A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163 ). Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 ) "Cause of action" is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. (A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163 ). Cause of action must be revealed in the pleadings and the pleadings alone should be looked into to know whether cause of action, or a part of the cause of action, arose within the jurisdiction of a court. (Syed Saleema Bee Vs. Smt. Syed Noorjahan, 2006(2) ALD 721 = 2006(2) ALT 637 ). 13. For the purpose of deciding whether the facts averred by the petitioner would, or would not, constitute a part of the "cause of action", one has to consider whether such facts constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than that. (Alchemist Limited Vs. State Bank of Sikkim, 2007(4) ALD 61(SC) = 2007 AIR SCW3023). Cause of action must include some act done by the defendant since, in the absence of such an act, no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. (South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd.7; Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India, 2006(2) ALD (Crl.) 308 (SC) = (2006) 6 SCC 207 ). 14. If the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises at a place where the plaintiff resides, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant or defendants do not reside at the place where the plaintiff resides, a suit can be instituted at a place where the plaintiff resides. In such a situation, it is at the option of the plaintiff that a Court gets jurisdiction - be it the place of residence of the plaintiff or the defendant. (Syed Saleema Bee20). However, if no part of the "cause of action" has arisen within the territorial limits of a court then parties cannot, even by agreement, confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. (New Moga Transport Co. Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2004(3) ALD 143(SC) = (2004) 4 SCC 677 ). 15. However, if no part of the "cause of action" has arisen within the territorial limits of a court then parties cannot, even by agreement, confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. (New Moga Transport Co. Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2004(3) ALD 143(SC) = (2004) 4 SCC 677 ). 15. The material facts which, according to the applicant, constitute "cause of action" are (1) the applicant has its registered office and is carrying on its business at Hyderabad; (2) they entered into correspondence with the respondent from Hyderabad; (3) they received the letter of acceptance of the agreement from the respondent at Hyderabad; and (4) they issued bank guarantees from banks at Hyderabad. 16. It is necessary to note that the work executed by the applicant, which forms the subject matter of the agreement, was in the State of Tamilnadu. The assertion of the respondents that payments were also made to the applicant in the State of Tamilnadu has not been denied. Except for the aforesaid facts, no part of the cause of action has, admittedly, arisen within the State of Andhra Pradesh. 17. On the question, whether the fact of the respondent having their registered office and carrying on business at Hyderabad, and their having entered into correspondence with the respondent from Hyderabad, would constitute even a part of the "cause of action", it is useful to note that the Supreme Court, in Oil and Natural Gas Commission18, held that, merely because the petitioner submitted the tender, made representations from Calcutta in response to an advertisement inviting tenders which were to be considered at New Delhi, the work was to be performed in Hazira (Gujarat) and he had received replies to the fax messages at Calcutta, it would not constitute facts forming an integral part of the "cause of action" and that the Calcutta High Court could not assume jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner resided in or carried on business from it registered office in the State of West Bengal. Again in National Taxtile Corporation Ltd.6, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the petitioner carried on business at Calcutta, or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta, was not an integral part of the cause of action and that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. As such the aforesaid facts do not constitute a part of the "cause of action". 18. On the question whether receipt of the letter of acceptance at Hyderabad would constitute "cause of action", even in part, Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act stipulates that the communication of an acceptance is complete (1) as against the proposer when it is put in a course of transmission to him, so as to be out of the power of the acceptor; and (2) as against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. In the case on hand, the applicant is the proposer and the respondent the acceptor. Since the letter of acceptance was put in a course of transmission to the applicant from the State of Tamilnadu, and came to the knowledge of the respondent in the State of Tamilnadu, communication of the acceptance stood completed both against the applicant and the respondent in the State of Tamilnadu and not at Hyderabad. It is necessary to note that in State of Rajasthan Vs. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 , the question, whether service of notice at the head office of the company at Calcutta would give rise to a "cause of action" within the State of West Bengal to enable the Calcutta High Court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter where the challenge made was to the acquisition proceedings in Jaipur, arose for consideration. The Supreme Court held that the entire cause of action, culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 152 of the Rajasthan Act, arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court and it was not necessary for the company to plead service of notice upon them at Calcutta for grant of an appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the notice issued by the Rajasthan Government. The Supreme Court held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Supreme Court held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Afortiori, receipt of the letter of acceptance by the applicant at Hyderabad would not constitute "cause of action" conferring jurisdiction on the Chief Justice of the High Court of A.P, or his designate, to appoint an arbitrator or take the necessary measure to secure such appointment. 19. On the question whether furnishing of bank guarantees from banks at Hyderabad would constitute cause of action, it is useful to refer to South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd.7, wherein the Supreme Court observed that, where a contract was executed in Bombay, i.e., within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay and performance of the contract was also to be done within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court; merely because the bank guarantee was executed at Delhi and transmitted for performance to Bombay, it did not constitute "cause of action" enabling the respondent to lay the suit on the original side of the Delhi High Court. 20. None of the aforesaid facts, relied upon by the applicant, constitute the "cause of action", even in part, necessary to confer jurisdiction on the designate of the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to entertain an application seeking appointment of an arbitrator or to take the necessary measure to secure such appointment. It is, therefore, wholly unnecessary for this Court to examine the other contentions urged on behalf of the respondents. Suffice to hold that since this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application, under Section 11 of Act 26/1996, the application, as filed, is liable to be dismissed. Needless to state that the order now passed will not preclude the applicant from invoking the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of the High Court or his designate, within whose local limits the principal civil court, referred to in Section 2(1)(e) of Act 26/1996, is situated. 21. This application is, accordingly, dismissed.