Research › Search › Judgment

J&K High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 125 (JK)

State v. Ab. Rehman Dar

2008-04-11

MOHAMMAD YAQOOB MIR

body2008
1. Delay of 365 days in preferring Civil Second appeal is sought. `Sufficient cause for non filing the appeal in time required to be projected and explained as precondition for condonation is not satisfactory. It is no more res-integra that `sufficient cause has to be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice but for construing it so liberally power is fettered. If gross negligence/inaction are attributable to the seeker then other party can not be made to suffer. Gross and negligent attitude has to be discouraged; otherwise law of limitation will be rendered illusory and illogical. 2. Principles have been laid down for refusing or accepting the motion for condonation by the Apex Court in the judgment reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353. i. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. ii. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. iii. Every days delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. iv. When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. v. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala-fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. vi. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize in justice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." In Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao reported in AIR 2002 SC 1201 the Apex Court has observed as follows: "Acceptance of explanation furnished is the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona-fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. ........................ ........................ However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merits. The observation made by the Rajasthan High Court in Urban Improvement Trust v. Poonam Chand AIR 1997 Rajasthan 134 deserves mention in this regard. The relevant observation is a follows: - "Now it must be taken to be well settled principle of law that before rejecting applications under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and dismissing appeals as barred by lapse of time, the courts of law are required to put a glance as a condition precedent on the merits of the appeals and unless the appeals are found to be hopelessly devoid of merits ordinarily efforts should be made to decide the appeals on merit." 3. The present case has to be considered in the backgrounds of the principles as laid down. For appreciating the matter in it right prospective, it shall be quite relevant to precisely notice the factual aspect of the matter. 4. Respondent had been engaged as Chowkidar in the office of Executive Engineer, Irrigation and Flood Control Division, Sumbal by Petitioner no. 3. Respondent, an illiterate person, was engaged and had produced medical certificate showing his age as 30 years approximately in the year 1979, on the basis of which date of birth seem to have been recorded in the service book. Appellant seems to have changed the age of respondent from 30 years to 36 years as on 09.08.1980 without any basis that too at the back of the respondent which prompted the respondent to file the suit for declaration and injunction bearing file No. 263/numbri before the trial court. Petitioners/(defendants) seem to have shown negligent approach towards the proceedings i.e. after causing appearance they had absented so were proceeded in ex-parte. Then on appearance ex-parte proceedings were set aside. But again absented so again the case proceeded in ex-parte. Petitioners/(defendants) seem to have shown negligent approach towards the proceedings i.e. after causing appearance they had absented so were proceeded in ex-parte. Then on appearance ex-parte proceedings were set aside. But again absented so again the case proceeded in ex-parte. Resultantly, judgment came to passed in ex-parte on 16.12.2003 by the court of Sub Judge, Srinagar whereunder superannuation was declared null and void, the respondent was ordered to reach the age of superannuation on the basis of medical certificate dated 08.11.1979. Decree has been passed accordingly in favour of the respondent (Plaintiff). 5. Petitioners preferred the 1st. civil appeal bearing file No. 29/appeal which has been dismissed by 2nd Addl. District Judge, vide his detailed judgment dated 12.06.2004. From 12.06.2004 till 13.09.2005 petitioners have slept over the matter so have woke up after the lapse of one year and three months. Three months is the time prescribed for appeal, therefore,excess period of one year i.e. 365 days is sought to be condoned. 6. For condoning the delay, the sole ground projected is attributed to administrative reasons. In para-3 of the application it is stated that the judgment of the appellate court passed on 12.06.2004 was not communicated to the petitioners until filing of the execution proceedings somewhere in the middle of the year 2005. Thereafter steps were taken for obtaining copy of the decree. After seeking legal advice, then while following administrative and official procedure time is lost in the departmental communication, therefore, delay in filing the civil second appeal. 7. The cause projected is devoid of any substance and is casual. It is unheard that the petitioners can afford to state that the decision of the appellate court was not communicated to them when in presence of their engaged advocate judgment has been announced. To allege that the petitioner gained the knowledge somewhere in the middle of the year 2005 as recorded in para 3 of the application, further exposes their stand. Middle of the year 2005 has been vaguely averred. If taken June 2005 then the copy of the judgment should have been applied for and obtained in the month of June or July 2005 but as per certified copy available on file, application for obtaining the copy is shown to have been filed on 12.09.2005 and seems to have been obtained on 13.09.2005. On the same date, instant application alongwith civil second appeal has been presented. 8. On the same date, instant application alongwith civil second appeal has been presented. 8. The stand of the petitioners is belied, as in the para 3 of the application, it has been contended that after obtaining the copy of the judgment and the decree, then legal advice and approval for filing appeal has been sought. Same fact is also reflected in para 4 of the application. If it is taken correct then, the copy has been obtained on 13.09.2005 how on the same date appeal has been preferred. It is also one of the factors which exposes the stand of the petitioners and shows total negligence on the part of the petitioners. Such type of the negligence, if not taken serious note of, will render the limitation Act as illogical. 9. Negligence, slackness and indolence is totally attributable to the petitioners; same is compounded by aforementioned averments contained in the application which warrants application of limitation with all harshness. 10. To allow application on compensatory costs will not suffice in the peculiar facts of the case as the same will amount to rubbing salt on the wounds of the respondent who had suffered all along. 11. Cumulative effect is that the cause projected is neither plausible nor cogent. Therefore, application is dismissed. Resultantly, the civil second appeal preferred is also dismissed as barred by limitation. Decree be drawn up as such. 12. Disposed of accordingly.