JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been preferred against the order dated 18.01.2008 (Annex.3) passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Suratgarh in Civil Suit No. 62/2007 refusing to take on record the written statement filed by the defendant-petitioner beyond the period of 90 days. The impugned order dated 18.01.2008 in its entirety reads as under - " odqyk, Qjhdsu mifLFkrA vf/koDrk ifjoknh dh vksj ls izLrqr izkFkZuk&i= vUrxZr vkns'k 8 fu;e 1 lifBr /kkjk 148 o 151 lh0ih0lh0 ij lquk x;k ftlesa izfroknh dh vksj ls 90 fnol ls vf/kd dh vof/k dks fMys dUMksu djrs gq, le; vof/k iznku dj tokc nkok fjdkMZ ij fy, tkus dk fuonsu fd;k gSA izkFkZuk&i= dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA ekuuh; jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; dk ,d ldwZyj bl dk;kZy; esa fnukad 8-12-07 dks izkIr gqvk gS ftlesa ekuuh; jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; }kjk vkns'k 8 fu;e 1 lhihlh ij l[rh ls lquokbZ djus ifjoknh }kjk tokc nkok tks fd fe;kn vof/k 90 fnol ds i'pkr~ izLrqr fd;k x;k gS] mldks fjdkMZ ij fy;k tkuk mfpr izrhr ugha gksrk gSA fygktk izfroknh dh vksj ls izLrqr izkFkZuk&i= vkns'k 8 fu;e 1 lifBr /kkjk 148 o 151 lh0ih0lh0 dk ,rn~}kjk [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA fely okLrs lk{; oknh fnukad 27-2-08 dks is'k gksA " 2. The order aforesaid is challenged in this writ petition on the submissions that the learned Trial Court has acted with material irregularity in not looking at the reasons stated by the petitioner for condonation of a short delay in filing the written statement; and has acted illegally in failing to consider that the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) are directory in nature as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a series of decisions. It is submitted that for not taking the written statement on record, the petitioner would suffer irreparable injury and would be deprived of the opportunity to defend the case. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent No.2 has, in all fairness, not attempted to justify the order impugned, and rightly so. 3. On 05.05.2008, after noticing that the learned Trial Court proceeded to reject the prayer for enlargement of time and for condonation of delay in filing the written statement only on the basis of a circular issued by the High Court, the Dy. 3. On 05.05.2008, after noticing that the learned Trial Court proceeded to reject the prayer for enlargement of time and for condonation of delay in filing the written statement only on the basis of a circular issued by the High Court, the Dy. Registrar (Judicial) was directed to make report in that regard and to place such circular on record. The Dy. Registrar (Judicial) has placed on record a copy of circular dated 17.11.2007 that seems to have been referred by the learned Trial Court in the order impugned. 4. By the said circular dated 17.11.2007, the subordinate Courts have been informed about the resolution adopted in the Chief Justices' Conference, 2007 for improvement in administration of Civil Justice System and it has been enjoined upon the subordinate Courts to comply with the directions in letter and spirit of the resolution. The said resolution requires that the time frame relating to filing of written statement under Order 8, Rule 1 CPC should be strictly adhered to but at the same time also states that `only in exceptional cases the Courts should permit filing of written statement beyond the upper time limit of 90 days.' It has further been required by the said circular that the provisions relating to examination of parties, discovery and inspection, issues and ex-pane injunctions should be strictly implemented. It has also been pointed out that the affidavits in evidence were filed reproducing entire of the pleadings instead of confining them to the facts to be proved by the witnesses and, therefore, it is required that the Court should carefully scrutinise the affidavits before serving copy on the opposite parties and wherever scope of affidavit is found unnecessary enlarged, such affidavit should be rejected with heavy costs. It is also required that 'frequent adjournments should be avoided.' 5. To curb against unnecessary delay at all the relevant stages of a civil suit, and to proceed with the matters expeditiously i.e., with promptitude and efficiency are the expectations every Trial Court is to come up to but then, the requirements of approach towards rules of procedure as explained by the binding decisions of the Courts cannot be ignored. 6. To curb against unnecessary delay at all the relevant stages of a civil suit, and to proceed with the matters expeditiously i.e., with promptitude and efficiency are the expectations every Trial Court is to come up to but then, the requirements of approach towards rules of procedure as explained by the binding decisions of the Courts cannot be ignored. 6. Profitable it shall be to recite the principles relating to the approach towards the rules of procedure as illuminated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr., AIR 1955 SC 425 followed and applied hitherto by the Courts that, - "16. Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure', something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should, therefore, be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to 'both' sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. 17. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle." 7. In relation to Rule 1ORDER8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kailash v. Nanhku & Ors., 2005 (4) SCC 480 has held, inter alia, that, - "45...... (iv) The purpose of providing the time schedule for filing the written statement under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is to expedite and not to scuttle the hearing, The provisions spells out a disability on the defendant. It does not impose an embargo on the power of the court to extend the time. (iv) The purpose of providing the time schedule for filing the written statement under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is to expedite and not to scuttle the hearing, The provisions spells out a disability on the defendant. It does not impose an embargo on the power of the court to extend the time. Though the language of the provisio to Rule 1 Order 8 CPC is couched in negative form, it does not specify any penal consequences flowing from the non-compliance. The provision being in the domain of the procedural law, it has to be held directory and not mandatory. The power of the court to extend time for filing the written statement beyond the time schedule provided by Order 8 Rule 1 is not completely taken away." (emphasis supplied) 8. It is also noteworthy that the Three-Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, 2005(2) WLC (SC) Civil 242 : (2005) 6 SCC 344 has also pointed out that the provision in Order 8, Rule 1 CPC is directory in nature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court said.- "21 .... Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time-limit of 90 days. The discretion of the court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order 8 Rule. (emphasis supplied) 9. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time-limit of 90 days. The discretion of the court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order 8 Rule. (emphasis supplied) 9. The approach of the learned Trial Court in making a cursory, and rather perfunctory, reference to a part of the said circular and not at all looking at the fundamental principles that the rules of procedure are not intended to punish a party, for every mistake made during the course of proceedings and that laws of procedure are designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; in not appreciating that the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 CPC have been held directory by the Hon'ble Supreme Court; and then, in not at all looking at the facts and circumstances of the case and totally ignoring the reasons as stated by the petitioner, is very difficult to be appreciated. 10. It is borne out that instant suit for mandatory and perpetual injunction has been filed on 03.10.2007 seeking the reliefs that the defendant-landlord (petitioner herein) should not attempt to dispossess the plaintiff-tenant (respondent No. 2 herein) without lawful process and should not attempt to disconnect the electricity supply connection at the suit premises. In this suit, the defendant-petitioner appeared on 06.10.2007 and moved an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC that was disallowed on 09.10.2007. It is noticed that on 11.10.2007 and 24.10.2007, the Trial Court of course granted adjournments for filing of written statement but a reply to the application for temporary injunction was indeed filed by the defendant-petitioner. It is further noticed that the suit proceedings were adjourned on 12.11.2007, 27.11.2007, 01.12.2007, and 20.12.2007 only on the ground that the Bar abstained from work. The Trial Court, thereafter, proceeded to close down the chance for filing the written statement on 03.01.2008 and adjourned the matter to 18.01.2008. 11. It is further noticed that the suit proceedings were adjourned on 12.11.2007, 27.11.2007, 01.12.2007, and 20.12.2007 only on the ground that the Bar abstained from work. The Trial Court, thereafter, proceeded to close down the chance for filing the written statement on 03.01.2008 and adjourned the matter to 18.01.2008. 11. However, the petitioner filed his written statement on 08.01.2008 with the application for enlargement of time and condonation of delay supported by affidavit (Annex.2) on the submissions, inter alia, that he had already filed reply to the application for temporary injunction that was posted for arguments; that he hails from a rural background and the lawyer had assured to send for him whenever required; that his lawyer had gone out during winter vacations and the written statement could not be filed on 03.01.2008; that his lawyer came on 05.01.2008 and sent him information that was received on 08.01.2008 and the written statement is being filed without further delay. 12. A comprehension of the principles governing the rules of procedure generally and the provision in Order 8, Rule 1 in particular coupled with a look at the record makes its clear that in this case, for the petitioner having assigned bonafide and adequate reasons, a few days' delay in filing the written statement, that was indeed filed on 08.01.2008, could have been condoned without causing any prejudice to the other side and taking the written statement on re ford would have served the cause of justice. 13. The learned Trial Court has obviously acted illegally in ignoring the relevant principles aforesaid; and has acted with material irregularity in not looking into the record of the case at all while rejecting the prayer for condonation of short delay in filing the written statement in a wholly cursory manner with abstract reference only to a part of the circular aforesaid. The impugned order, if allowed to stand, would manifest into serious injustice and is required to be set aside. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 has very rightly not attempted to justify the order impugned. 15. As a result of the aforesaid, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed; the impugned order dated 18.01.2008 is set aside and the written statement as already filed by the defendant-petitioner is ordered to be taken on record.No costs.Writ petition allowed. *******