JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned senior Counsel assisted by Sri Anurag Khanna, Advocate for the revisionist, Sri Ravi Kant; learned senior Counsel assisted by Sri Nikhil Agarwal, Sri Rahul Agarwal and Sri Vishnu Gupta, learned Counsels appearing for the respondents. 2. With the consent of learned Counsel for the parties this revision has been heard and is being decided finally today itself. 3. This revision has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 26.10.2006 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 13, Allahabad in Suit No. 12 of 1997, Sri Hari Mohan Das Tandon and others v. M/s U.P. Export Corporation Ltd., whereby the Court below has decreed the suit for arrears of rent and water tax as also for possession in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. 4. Learned Senior Counsel for the revisionist has submitted that the findings of the trial Court on the issue of applicability of Act No. 13 of 1972 by virtue of the insertion of Section 2(1)(g) in the Act w.e.f 26.9.1994 is illegal and is liable to be set aside. According to him, the landlord had earlier filed a suit No. 701 of 1977. However, the same was compromised between the parties on 5.6.1986 wherein it was agreed that the rent of the premises in question shall be @ Rs. 1500/- p.m. The landlord had made an application under Section 21(8) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on 28.6.1991 claiming enhancement of rent. However, the matter was again settled between the parties and w.e.f. 1991, the agreed rent was fixed at Rs. 3500/- p.m. According to him, the parties again negotiated with respect to the enhancement of rent and on the basis of negotiations, the landlord had written his consent letter to the corporation stating that he has given his consent to accept Rs. 6000/- p.m. as rent w.e.f. 1.8.1996 for a period of five years. According to him, once, the aforesaid consent was granted by the landlord, it was in the nature of a binding agreement by the landlord to accept Rs. 6000/- p.m. as rent w.e.f. 1.8.1996 for a period of five years. According to him, once, the aforesaid consent was granted by the landlord, it was in the nature of a binding agreement by the landlord to accept Rs. 6000/- p.m. w.e.f. 1.8.1996 for a period of five years and therefore it cannot be a tenancy which could have been terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by giving only one month notice prior to the expiry of the aforesaid period and it would also be a waiver of the benefits of exemption made by the landlord of Section 2(1)(g) of the Act which provided that buildings having a monthly rent of more than Rs. 2000/- p.m. would be exempted from the operation of the Act. His submission therefore is that upon the aforesaid waiver as is quite apparent from the letter dated 14.12.1996, the landlord could evict the revisionist only under the provisions available under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and not by the present suit. He has also submitted that by virtue of the aforesaid consent, the tenancy of the revisionist would continue upto the year 2001 and this suit having been filed in the year 1997 cannot be decreed in favour of the landlord. He further states that the notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act which was given by the landlord has not been proved by him since he never deposed as a witness to prove the same. As such, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 5. In support of his contention, learned senior Counsel for the revisionist has placed reliance on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Lachoo Mal v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1971 SC 2213 and states that when the tenancy was governed by the Rent Control Act and the landlord entered into an agreement by which the tenant was to vacate the premises for reconstruction and the landlord was to re-deliver the same after reconstruction, no question of policy, much less public policy could arise. According to him, the landlord can waive the exemption benefit available for constructions made after the relevant date and such an agreement is neither illegal nor unlawful nor it defeats the provisions of any law within the meaning of Section 23 of the Contract Act. 6. According to him, the landlord can waive the exemption benefit available for constructions made after the relevant date and such an agreement is neither illegal nor unlawful nor it defeats the provisions of any law within the meaning of Section 23 of the Contract Act. 6. Learned senior Counsel for the revisionist has also placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of Satish Chandra Kakkar and four others v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 2006 (1) ARC 739 and contends that the benefit of the exemption clause can be legally waived by the parties and in case the Court comes to a conclusion that the increase of rent above Rs. 2000/- p.m. was with the agreement of the parties and the tenancy was to continue, they had in effect waived the benefit of the exemption clause. He states that it is quite apparent from the letter dated 14.12.1996 that the landlord had impliedly waived the benefit of the exemption under Section 2(1)(g) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 7. He has also referred to a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and another v. Indusind Bank Ltd. and others, AIR 2005 SC 439 to state that a power of attorney holder cannot appear as a witness and depose in place and instead of the principal. According to him, in the present case, since the landlord did not appear as a witness, but sent his power of attorney to depose on his behalf, it cannot be said that the notice to quit was duly proved. 8. Sri Nikhil Agarwal, learned Counsel who has argued on behaff of the respondents has submitted that the document dated 14.12.1996 cannot be read to be an agreement between the parties in view of the provisions of Section 17(d) of the Indian Registration Act and hence it not being a lease deed, no interpretation or benefit can be obtained therefrom by the revisionist. He has submitted that in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Bhatia and others v. U.O.I., and another, 1995(1) SCC 104 when Section 2(l)(g) was introduced in the Act w.e.f. 26.9.1994, the ceiling of Rs. 2000/- p.m. was made for the purpose of applicability of the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972 to a building. 2000/- p.m. was made for the purpose of applicability of the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972 to a building. According to him, even if there was a tenancy subsisting even prior to the aforesaid insertion of Section 2(l)(g) in the Act, the exemption would apply in case the rent of the building was more than Rs. 2000/- p.m. after the provision came to be. He therefore states that in the present case, when admittedly in the year 1991 in proceedings under Section 21(8) of the Act, the parties had agreed to a rent of Rs. 3500/- p.m. then when the provisions of Section 2(1)(g) were introduced in the year 1994, the building would cease to be governed by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. He also states that the subsequent agreement in the year 1996 enhancing the rent to Rs. 6000/- p.m. would in effect have no effect on the status of the building which was even prior to such agreement exempted from the provisions of the Act by virtue of Section 2(1)(g) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. For the very same proposition, with respect to the applicability of similar provisions, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Saraswat Bank Ltd. and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2006(8) SCC 520 . He has argued that once the provisions of Section 2(1)(g) were incorporated in the Act No. 13 of 1972 by the Amendment Act No. 5 of 1995, those buildings whose rent were more than Rs. 2000/- p.m. are taken away from the applicability and protective provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972. He states that provision has become applicable on its being inserted in the Act and therefore, the trial Court has rightly recorded a finding that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable in the instant case. It has also been submitted that the provisions of the Act have given protective rights in the case of the tenants and it is at the wisdom of the legislature to withdraw such protective rights and once withdrawn, the rights would not give any further protection under the said legislation. Therefore, he submits that when the provisions of the Act became exempted in the case of certain buildings having rent of more than Rs. Therefore, he submits that when the provisions of the Act became exempted in the case of certain buildings having rent of more than Rs. 2000/- p.m. the revisionist could not resist claim of eviction in a month-to-month tenancy on a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 9. Sri Ravi Kant, learned senior Counsel who has also appeared on behalf of respondents has submitted that the case of Lachoo Mal (supra) was considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Murlidhar Aggarwal and another v. State of U.P. and others, (1974) 2 SCC 472 and it was held that Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Bar against suit for eviction of a tenant) is based on public policy. It is intended to protect the weaker section of the community with the view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general creating equality of bargaining power. He states that the Hon’ble Apex Court held that although the Section is primarily intended for the protection of tenants only, that protection is based on public policy and hence, a party could not have waived the benefit of the provision. According to him, the Hon’ble Apex Court reversed the decree passed in view of Clause 20 of the lease deed which provided that the parties were not entitled to claim the privileges under the U.P. Act of 1947. According to Sri Ravi Kant, learned senior Counsel, the ratio of the judgment in the case of Lachoo Mal (supra) would not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case wherein Section 2(1)(g) of the Act was inserted in Act No. 13 of 1972 providing that buildings having monthly rent of more than Rs. 2000/- would be exempted from the operation of the Act. According to him, like the jurisdiction of the Courts to try a proceeding under the Act would flow from the provisions itself and in case the Act is not applicable to a building, the Courts would lack inherent jurisdiction and no act of the parties could confer such jurisdiction on a Court having inherent lack of jurisdiction, hence when the Act is not applicable to a building, the benefit of its provisions are also not available. 10. 10. He has referred to a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma and others, (1988) 1 SCC 70 to demonstrate that in a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Hon’ble Apex Court was “considering the question of waiver by the landlord of Section 14(1) proviso (b) and it was held that it was necessary for the tenant to obtain consent of the landlord in writing to the specific sub-letting. He submits that mere permission or acquiescence is not enough and there can be no implied permission whereby the very provisions of the Act would be defeated and hence, it was impermissible. 11. Learned senior Counsels for the parties however do not dispute the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Bhatia and others v. U.O.I, and another (supra). The argument is that the benefit of exemption provided under the Act w.e.f. 26.9.1994 was waived by the landlord when he gave his consent letter dated 14.12.1996. The letter dated 14.12.1996 finds place as Annexure 4 to the affidavit supporting the said application in the revision which states that the landlord had given a notice for enhancement of rent of the premises in question being 142/32, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad and upon negotiation with the General Manager of the revisionist, he agreed for a monthly rent of Rs. 6000/-w.e.f. 1.8.1996 for a period of five years. It is this consent given by the landlord which is interpreted by the revisionist to mean that the rent was enhanced to Rs. 6000/- p.m. for a period of five years and hence the landlord had waived the benefit of exemption under Section 2(1)(g) of the Act. The Trial Court while interpreting this evidence in the form of consent dated 14.12.1996 has recorded that the landlord has not stated that he would not evict the tenant for a period of five years or that the tenancy would come to an end automatically after a period of five years. The Trial Court has stated that in the absence of any such stipulation regarding the continuance of tenancy, the consent of the landlord cannot be read as if the tenancy was extended and the landlord could not terminate the tenancy before expiry of period of five years by virtue of letter dated 14.12.1996. The Trial Court has stated that in the absence of any such stipulation regarding the continuance of tenancy, the consent of the landlord cannot be read as if the tenancy was extended and the landlord could not terminate the tenancy before expiry of period of five years by virtue of letter dated 14.12.1996. It has recorded its finding that the consent clearly states that it has accepted the rent of Rs. 6000/- p.m. as a consequence of the notice given by the landlord for enhancement of rent. The view of the Trial Court is that by the consent letter dated 14.12.1996, the landlord had agreed that the rate of rent for a period of five years is to be Rs. 6000/- p.m. The Trial Court’s finding is that there was no consent with respect to the term of tenancy, particularly, when the agreement of tenancy initially entered into between the parties had already expired and after the expiry of the fixed term tenancy, the same would become a tenancy month-to-month. 12. The legislature enacted U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and prior to enactment of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1995 w.e.f. 26.9.1994, there was no provision for exemption of buildings from operation of the principal Act for the reason of amount of monthly rent. This was a special Act and the legislature in its wisdom introduced a ceiling on monthly rent of buildings to remain within the ambit of the various provisions of the Acts. This insertion of Section 2(1)(g) in the Act was a matter of policy relating to rights and restrictions of tenants and protection to landlords from the provisions of the special Act. In Lachoo Mal (supra), it was a case of re-construction of a building under an old tenancy which was continued under an agreement even though the re­construction was done after the relevant date providing exemption to such buildings. In Murlidhar Agarwal (supra) it was found that there was a bar to a suit for eviction of a tenant under the Act of 1947 but by an agreement, the parties provided that they were not entitled to the privileges under the Act of 1947. The Hon’ble Apex Court found the provision to be based on public policy and reversed the decree. The Hon’ble Apex Court found the provision to be based on public policy and reversed the decree. Therefore, the waiver claimed to have been made by a document has to be seen and the application of the law as settled has to be applied. As rightly submitted on behalf of the revisionist-tenant, the letter dated 14.12.1996 is to be read either as a waiver of Section 2(1)(g) of the Act or otherwise. 13. It is settled law as held in the case of P. Chandrashekhar Rao and Sons v. Alapati Jalaiah, (1995) 3 SCC 709 , that the landlord’s normal rights vested in him by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special legislation and in the case of a tenant the protective shield extended to him survives only so long as and to the extent the special legislation operates. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 held that with the issue of a notification granting exemption from the provisions of the Act to buildings whose monthly rent exceeded Rs. 1000/- the tenant lost the protection of the Act the moment the protection was taken away. Therefore even if the application of the tenant for fixation of fair rent is made prior to the notification of exemption and its date of enforcement he lost his rights and remedies under the Act the moment such protection was taken away since the rights and remedies were not vested ones. 14. In the case of Vishwant Kumar v. Madan Lal Sharma, AIR 2004 SC 1887 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held the right of a tenant to get the standard rent fixed under the Act are protective rights and not vested rights. It was held that although the application made by the tenant was prior to the coming into force of the amended provision exempting buildings having a monthly rent exceeding Rs. 3,500/- the same was lost since the protection was taken away. 15. The rights of a landlord recognized under the Law of Contract and Transfer of Property Act are vested rights which would be suspended with the enforcement of the Special Act and as soon as the Special Act is withdrawn the suspended rights of the landlord would revive. 3,500/- the same was lost since the protection was taken away. 15. The rights of a landlord recognized under the Law of Contract and Transfer of Property Act are vested rights which would be suspended with the enforcement of the Special Act and as soon as the Special Act is withdrawn the suspended rights of the landlord would revive. Under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the landlord’s right to evict tenants of buildings mentioned in Section 21 (8) of the Act only for the reasons given in Section 21(1)(a) of the Act were suspended and he was given the right to apply for enhancement of rent. As soon as such restriction is withdrawn and the building goes outside the purview of the Act the vested rights of the landlord under the General Law would revive. Therefore when a building whose rent is more than Rs. 2000/- per month stood exempted from the applicability of the Act by virtue of Section 2(1)(g) then the rights of the landlord under the general law stood revived. 16. Jurisdiction of a Court is the authority possessed by a Court to decide matters that are litigated before it. The authority can be conferred by a statute and limits to such authority can also be imposed by statute under which it was conferred the authority or under which the Court was constituted. Such authority may be extended or restricted and if no restriction or limit is imposed the jurisdiction is unlimited. When a limitation has been provided as to the kind and nature of the subject matter for exercise of jurisdiction then the jurisdiction depends on the existence of particular facts which have to be inquired to decide whether the Court had jurisdiction, if exercised under the Act. 17. Proceedings under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 can be initiated before the authority only when the subject matter of the proceeding is within the jurisdiction of the authority and the provisions of the Act are applicable to the building. In such a proceeding the authority under the Act would exercise its jurisdiction. In case the Act does not at all apply to the building then the authority under the Act would lack jurisdiction. It is settled law that inherent lack of jurisdiction renders the decree by such a Court a nullity. In such a proceeding the authority under the Act would exercise its jurisdiction. In case the Act does not at all apply to the building then the authority under the Act would lack jurisdiction. It is settled law that inherent lack of jurisdiction renders the decree by such a Court a nullity. Where a Court exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess its decision amounts to nothing. It is only when there is irregularity in jurisdiction that the parties could waive the irregular exercise of jurisdiction or it could be ignored at the appellate or revisional stage when no objection was taken at the first opportune moment. Unless on the date of passing of a decree the Court is possessed of jurisdiction, it could not have passed the decree. Jurisdiction must be acquired before judgement is given. Where the Court is without jurisdiction to entertain any matter, neither acquiescence nor the express consent of parties can confer jurisdiction upon the Court. 18. On the aforesaid premises, this Court is of the view that when the rights under the Act, whether they were personal rights or statutory restrictions and rights, did not come into being or they existed but were withdrawn by the statute subsequently, then the question of waiving such non-existent rights could not arise. Conversely the protection under the Act to a tenant subsists only till the Act is applicable to the building. Even the submission to the jurisdiction of a Court under the Act where such submission or waiver would bring the issue within jurisdiction of the Court conferred by the Act is quite different from submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court or waiving the rights and even then the issue in suit would not come within the jurisdiction of such Court. Therefore, mere appearance of a party and answering to the claim cannot give jurisdiction to a Court having limited jurisdiction under the Act then the application of the Act to a building can only provide the protection otherwise not. The Act has provided limited jurisdiction to the Courts exercising jurisdiction under the Act to adjudicate only with respect to those buildings whose rent is less than Rs. 2000/- p.m. with the insertion of Section 2(1)(g) w.e.f. 29.9.1994. The Act has provided limited jurisdiction to the Courts exercising jurisdiction under the Act to adjudicate only with respect to those buildings whose rent is less than Rs. 2000/- p.m. with the insertion of Section 2(1)(g) w.e.f. 29.9.1994. There is no enabling provision in the Act to enable the parties to extend the jurisdiction by any consent or waive a provision based on legislative wisdom and public policy. 19. Insofar as the contention of learned Counsel for the revisionist that the issue on the question of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been wrongly decided since the tenancy was a fixed term tenancy is concerned, it will be seen from the written statement of the revisionist filed before the Trial Court that it was his own case in paragraph 17 thereof that after enhancement of rent to Rs. 6000/- p.m. the monthly tenancy will continue as usual. The rent of Rs. 6000/- p.m. was fixed for the period of five years. The consent letter dated 14.12.1996 if is to be interpreted to be a monthly tenancy, it would not require registration under the Registration Act, in case such document is interpreted to mean a tenancy for the next five years, the same would require registration. Admittedly, the letter dated 14.12.1996 is not in the form of a lease deed for a fixed period tenancy nor the same is registered. Therefore, it is only the enhancement of monthly rent which is consented by the landlord. 20. The contention that the landlord did not come in the witness box to prove the averments made in his plaint and that the power of attorney holder who has no personal knowledge was examined and hence, neither the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act nor the letter dated 14.12.1996 were proved in accordance with law is concerned, the statement is available as Annexure 7 to the affidavit which indicates that Sri Satish Tandon is described as son of Sri Hari Mohan Das Tandon and he has stated that apart from being the son of the landlord, he is also power of attorney holder of his father. In the cross-examination, he has proved the notice and letter dated 14.12.1996 by saying that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was signed by the lawyer in front of him and that the signatures were made in his presence. The contention based on the decision in the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) that the power of attorney would not have personal knowledge about the facts pleaded by the landlord would not be applicable in the present case, firstly, because in the aforesaid case, the power of attorney holder had deposed about the independent source of income of the principal which according to the Hon’ble Apex Court could have only been disclosed by the principal himself. In the present case, the witness was the son of the landlord also holding his power of attorney and he was examined to prove the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the letter dated 14.12.1996 which according to him were signed in his presence and sent to the tenant. There was no element of any personal knowledge of the power of attorney holder or of the landlord involved in the preparation of the notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act by the lawyer and when the witness deposed that it was signed by the lawyer in front of him, it cannot be said that the witness was trying to prove a fact which was only in the personal knowledge of the landlord. Similarly, the letter dated 14.12.1996 was confronted to the witness who affirmed the contents thereof. Even the contents of the letter cannot be said to be only in the personal knowledge of the landlord and when the witness proves its contents in his deposition. The document could be proved by the said witness who was son and power of attorney holder of the signatory of the letter dated 14.12.1996. It was a document that was proved and not any fact which was in the personal knowledge of the landlord alone. Consequently, the law laid down in the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) cannot be applied on the facts and circumstances of the present case since the facts and circumstances and deposition by the power of attorney holder in the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) was of a totally different issue. 21. Consequently, the law laid down in the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) cannot be applied on the facts and circumstances of the present case since the facts and circumstances and deposition by the power of attorney holder in the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) was of a totally different issue. 21. Insofar as the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court are concerned, it is settled law that the Revisional Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 cannot reappraise or reassess the evidence. It is only when the findings of fact are based either on no evidence or inadmissible evidence or evidence has been ignored under a wrong assumption, then the Revisional Court would be within its jurisdiction to record its own findings by reassessing the evidence. In the present case, the Trial Court has recorded its findings on the evidence available before it and it cannot be said that this Court in its revisional jurisdiction would have jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act has to satisfy itself that the order of the Trial Court is in accordance with law. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is quite apparent that the impugned order of the Trial Court has been passed in accordance with law and it cannot be said that findings of fact recorded therein suffers from any error in facts. Since, this Court in exercise of its revisional power cannot re-examine or reassess the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court on the basis of evidence duly proved and in accordance with law no interference is required in the impugned order. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, this revision has no force and is accordingly rejected. No order is passed as to costs. ————