JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. In the present application for condonation of delay of 2141 days in preferring the review petition, the Applicants/state had seriously blamed the concerned Govt. Advocate/Advocates who had been entrusted to appear on behalf of the Applicants/state in WA No. 90/2000 for not conducting the appeal with due diligence. But it goes without saying that if appeals filed by the government are lost for default of the concerned Govt. employee or the Govt. Advocate, no person is individually affected but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is the public interest. 2. Mr. H.N.K. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the Applicants/state contended that the consequence of the dismissal of the W.A. No. 90/2000 filed by the Applicants/state on withdrawal would be the loss of money amounting to around Rs. 4 (four) crores from the public exchequer. The Govt. Advocate or the officer concerned responsible for withdrawal of the WA. No. 90/2000 shall not be left scot free we also heard Mr. Roshni Piba, learned Counsel for the respondents. 3. By an order of this Court, WA No. 90/2000 filed by the Applicants/state was tagged with WA No. 98/2000 and WA No. 94/2000. In the cause list, WA No. 90/2000 had been shown listed along with WA No. 98/2000 and WA No. 94/2000. On 29.8.2001, the WA No. 90/2000 along with WA No. 98/2000 and WA No. 94/2000 was shown at item No. 3 of the admission before the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble Mr. justice J.N. Sarma and Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. Lamare. 4. The learned Advocate General, Mr. S. Nepolean, Mr. B.P. Sahu and Mr. N. Kotiswar, Govt. Advocate were shown in the cause list as the counsel appearing for the Appellants/State. For easy reference, the relevant portion of the cause list for 29.8.2001 before the Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.N. Sarma and Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. Lamare is quoted hereunder: IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram & Arunachal Pradesh) IMPHAL BENCH COURT – I CAUSE LIST FOR WEDNESDAY THE 29TH, AUGUST, 2001 (COURTSITFROM 10.30 A.M. TO 1.15P.M.) ALL MENTIONED BE MADE AT 10.30 A.M. LIST OF CITATION TO BE RELIED UPON BY SUPPLIED TO THE BENCH ASSISTANT IN ADVANCE BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.N. SANMA THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE B. LAMARE PART-1 : FOR MOTION 1. JUSTICE J.N. SANMA THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE B. LAMARE PART-1 : FOR MOTION 1. W.P. (Cril) No. Smt. Y. Mr. H.N.K.GA/PP 15/2001 Shanti Singh Devi V. State of Manipur FOR ADMISSION 2. W.P.(PIL) Kh. Mr. S. Jayenta GA No.2/2001 Ibochouba Singh V. State of Manipur 3. W.A./ No. State of Mr. A.G.B.P. 98/2000 Manipur Nepolean Sahu v. M/s Indrajit Agency With M.C. No. 199/2000 W.A. No. 94/2000 B.P. Sahu x C. Misc. No. 374/2000 Mr. N. Kotiswor x W.A. No.90/2000 -do- x W.P. © No. 909/99 D/C GA x W.A. No. 292/2000 D/C 4. W.A. No. National Mr. B. Dutta x 41/2000 Hydro v. State of Manipur 5. W.A. No. Th. Madam Mr. H.N.K. x Mohan Singh 5. W.A. No. 90/2000 was disposed of on 29.8.2001 as the learned Advocate for the Appellants/State did not press the Writ Appeal. The Applicants/State preferred the accompanying review petition against the said judgment and order of the Division Bench dated 29.8.2001 along with the present Misc. application for condonation of delay. 6. One of the grounds for condonation of delay is that as per the record of the Government, no instruction whatsoever had been given to any Govt. Advocate or Additional Govt. Advocate either to withdraw the Writ Appeal No. 90/2000 or for not pressing the appeal. Although the Govt. Advocate was shown as the counsel appearing for the Applicants/State in WA No. 90/2000 in the cause list dated 29.8.2001 it cannot be fully ascertained as to who actually amongst the Govt. Advocates/Advocate General did submit for not pressing the appeal before the court. The Govt. Advocate took sometime to decide the course of action to be adopted in the nature of the case by consulting the concerned authority of the Government. 7. It is also stated that the concerned Govt. Advocate did not know that the W. A. No. 90/2000 had been closed as not pressed. Since no information was given by anyone to the Forest Department who had filed the W. A. No. 90/2000, the Applicants/State had presumed that W. A. No. 90/2000 was pending before the High Court. 8. Only on 6.2.07 when the W.A. No. 94/2000 was listed for hearing Additional Govt. Advocate Mr. Th. Ibohal was informed by the counsel of the petitioner that the WA No. 90/2000 filed by the State Respondents had already been closed as not pressed on 29.8.2001. 9. 8. Only on 6.2.07 when the W.A. No. 94/2000 was listed for hearing Additional Govt. Advocate Mr. Th. Ibohal was informed by the counsel of the petitioner that the WA No. 90/2000 filed by the State Respondents had already been closed as not pressed on 29.8.2001. 9. On receiving the legal notice communicating that WA No. 90/2000 had already been dismissed and also for communicating the order dated 6.2.07 passed in WA No. 94/2000. (Ref. WP(C) No. 909/99) for compliance of the directions of this Court given in the order dated 6.2.2000, the Applicants/State came to know that the WA No. 90/2000 filed by the State had been closed as not pressed. As they came to know the disposal of the WA No. 90/2000 as communicated by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner, the matter was processed with the relevant file to the higher authority by Deputy Secretary, Forest, Govt. of Manipur for necessary action. 10. As per Rule of business of the State Govt. for preferring review petition or appeal against the order of this Court a decision is required to be taken in consultation with the administrative department as well as the opinion of the Law Department. While moving the file from one table to another table some time had been consumed. As per advice of the learned Advocate General as well as opinion of the Law Department, the administrative department took a decision on 25.5.07 for preferring the review petition or SLP against the order dated 29.8.2001 passed in WA No. 90/2000 as well as against the order dated 6.2.07 passed in WA No. 94/2000 on the ground that the order dated 29.8.01 passed in WA No. 90/2000 as not pressed by the learned Govt. Advocate was without instruction from the Government or without the knowledge of the State Government 11. On 1-6-07 the Applicants/State applied for certified copy of the impugned order to the concerned authority of the High Court of this Bench and the same was obtained on 13.6.07. On perusal of the order dated 29.8.2000 passed in WA No. 90/2001 the Applicants/State came to know that name of the Advocate was not mentioned in the order. On 1-6-07 the Applicants/State applied for certified copy of the impugned order to the concerned authority of the High Court of this Bench and the same was obtained on 13.6.07. On perusal of the order dated 29.8.2000 passed in WA No. 90/2001 the Applicants/State came to know that name of the Advocate was not mentioned in the order. After taking decision by the administrative department to engage Shri L. Shyamkishore, Senior Advocate, for filing the Review Petition or SLP against the order dated 29.8.2001 passed in WA No. 90/2000, the Applicants/State requested Sri L. Shyamkishore, learned Senior Advocate to file the Review Petition. A Review Petition along with condonation petition being C.M. Application No. 10/2007 was filed on 1.8.07 but due to some communication gap or otherwise the Review Petition was found containing some legal advises and internal exercise made by the Government which were not supposed to be part of the review petition, as such the said Misc. application No. 10/07 along with the accompanying Review Petition had been withdrawn on 9.8.07 with liberty to file the fresh Review Petition along with condonation application. 12. On the above ground and reason the Applicants/State are praying for condonation of delay of 2141 days in preferring the accompanying Review Petition. 13. The respondents-writ petitioners had filed the affidavit in opposition to the present Misc. application. In their affidavit in opposition the respondents had categorically denied the fact that the learned Additional Govt. Advocate, Mr. Th. Ibohal, was informed by the counsel of the respondents/writ petitioners only on 6.2.07 that the WA No. 90/2000 filed by the State Govt. had already been closed as not pressed on 29.8.2001 and also the fact that neither the Govt. Advocate/the concerned Advocate nor the Applicants/State had the knowledge about the disposal of WA No. 90/2000 earlier to 6.2.07 or 30.03.2002) 14. The respondents/writ petitioners also stated in the affidavit that the WA No. 90/2000 all along had been shown as disposed case whenever the WA No. 94/2000 had been listed before the Division Bench for a couple of years. Advocate/the concerned Advocate nor the Applicants/State had the knowledge about the disposal of WA No. 90/2000 earlier to 6.2.07 or 30.03.2002) 14. The respondents/writ petitioners also stated in the affidavit that the WA No. 90/2000 all along had been shown as disposed case whenever the WA No. 94/2000 had been listed before the Division Bench for a couple of years. In support of this fact, the respondents/writ petitioners had annexed the copies of the cause lists for the months of December, 2004, July, 2005, September, 2005, December, 2005, January, 2006, February, 2006, September, 2006 and January, 2007 wherein the WA No. 90/2000 had shown as disposed case, while listing the WA No. 94/2000 for hearing before the Division Bench as Annexure D-1 to this affidavit in opposition. 15. We are of the considered view that Annexure D-1 shall belie the fact that neither the Govt. Advocate nor the Applicants/State had the knowledge about the disposal of WA No. 90/2000 before 06.02.2007 or 30.03.2007. 16. The respondents/writ petitioners also in their affidavit categorically stated that in the application for condonation of delay, the Applicants/State did not even made a whisper as to when the Administrative Department actually had started to process the file for filing the accompanying Review Petition and also did not mention the month and year for processing the file for taking opinion of the Law Department. The respondents/writ petitioners also categorically stated that the Applicants/State did not even mention the lump sum numbers of days taken by the Administrative Department, the Law Department and the learned Advocate General in taking the decision for filing the accompanying Review Petition. 17. Mr. H.N.K. Singh, learned Senior "counsel appearing for the Applicants/State in order to substantiate the case of the Applicants/State relied on the decisions of the Apex Court, namely, (1) State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. 2002 (143) ELT 249 (SC) (2) Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750 (3) N. Balakrishan v. M. Krishnamurthy 2008 (228) ELT 162 (SC) (4) State of A.P. v. I. Chandrasekhara Reddy and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 3311 (5) State of Nagaland v. LipokAo and Ors. 2005(183) ELT 337 (SC) and (6) Devendra Swamy v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation AIR 2002 SC 2545 . 18. The learned Senior counsel by placing heavy reliance on State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 3311 (5) State of Nagaland v. LipokAo and Ors. 2005(183) ELT 337 (SC) and (6) Devendra Swamy v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation AIR 2002 SC 2545 . 18. The learned Senior counsel by placing heavy reliance on State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. (supra) contended that it is a common knowledge that there is delay in filing the appeal by the State Government in a number of cases on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos. Para 10 of the SC in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. (supra) read as follows: Para 10. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court be it by private party or the State are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-international or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism injustice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism injustice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The court shall decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cell to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorize the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of delay. 19. The learned Senior counsel for the Appellants/State contended that the ratio laid down in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. (supra) had been followed by the Apex Court in latter cases including the State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and Ors. (supra). 20. It is fairly well settled law that whether or not there is a sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case and also that if the refusal to condone the delay result in grave injustice it would be a ground to condone the delay. (Ref. : 1) In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) AIR 1984 SC 1744 In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe. 21. (Ref. : 1) In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) AIR 1984 SC 1744 In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe. 21. It is also equally settled that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid but justice should not be denied to the party because of gross mistakes and deliberate inaction of its counsel. In litigation to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for default of the concerned Govt. Advocate or concerned official the ultimate sufferer is public. In the case where there is loss of huge amount of money from the public exchequer because of default of the concerned Govt. Advocate or the concerned person, the expression 'sufficient cause' should be considered with pragmatism injustice-oriented approach rather than in technical detection of sufficient cause or explaining every day's delay. 22. The Apex Court in the State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and Ors. (supra) indicated that the Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorize the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Paras 16, 17 and 18 of AIR in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and Ors. (supra) read as follows: Para 16. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer [1988] 3 SCR 198 it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could not be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsible for the acts, omissions of its officials. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude, is therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have' a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning of course, within reasonable limits is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Government functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned. Para 17. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise is as routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of then making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of then making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State arc lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression sufficient cause' should therefore, be considered with pragmatism injustice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involves for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorize the officers to take a decision, or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Para 18. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. 2002 (143) ELT 249 (SC); and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750 . It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fail to protect public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal. 23. To the contra Mr. Roshni Piba, learned Counsel in support of the case of the respondents/writ petitioners relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in P. K. Ramchandran v. State of Kerala 1997 ECR 785 (SC) and also the decision of this Court in State of Mizoram and Anr. 23. To the contra Mr. Roshni Piba, learned Counsel in support of the case of the respondents/writ petitioners relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in P. K. Ramchandran v. State of Kerala 1997 ECR 785 (SC) and also the decision of this Court in State of Mizoram and Anr. v. V.S. Pillai and Anr. 2005 (4) GUT 188. We had also given our conscious application of mind to the cases cited by Mr. Roshni Piba. 24. The Apex Court in G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore [1988] 3 SCR 198 held that the fraud played by and unusual conduct of the concerned Govt. employee which would lose a crore of rupees from the public exchequer would amount to sufficient cause for the delay in preferring the appeal. Paras 15, 16,17 of the SCC in G Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (supra) read as follows: Para 15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decision of Government are collective and institutional decision and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. Para 16. The law of limitation is, no doubt the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omission of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Para 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow and encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow and encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognisation of these limitation on governmental functioning of course, within reasonable limit is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the Law Officers of the Government placed the government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the malafides of the officers should not be imputed to government. It relied upon an trusted its Law Officers. Lindiey, M. R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd., observed, though in a different context; Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them. In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time for the government to realize that the Law Officers failed that trust. 25. For the reasons discussed above, we are of the considered view that unusual slackness played by and unusual conduct of the Advocate appearing for the Applicants/State in WA No. 90/2000 which shall cause the loss of crore of rupees from the public exchequer would be the sufficient cause for condonation of delay in preferring the Review Petition. Further, we are also of the view that the Advocate who had committed the fraud by withdrawing the WA No. 90/2000 without instruction from the concerned authority of the Govt. of Manipur shall not be left Scot free in the interest of the Govt. of Manipur in particular and also the public in general. 26. Accordingly, in the interest of justice, the delay of 2141 days in preferring the accompanying Review Petition is condoned subject to the payment of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten thousand) to the respondents, which shall be paid within 30 days from today. of Manipur in particular and also the public in general. 26. Accordingly, in the interest of justice, the delay of 2141 days in preferring the accompanying Review Petition is condoned subject to the payment of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten thousand) to the respondents, which shall be paid within 30 days from today. Further, the Director of Vigilance, Govt. of Manipur is directed to hold an enquiry to find out the person/Advocate responsible for withdrawing the WA No. 90/2000 without instruction from the competent authority of the Govt. of Manipur and a criminal case, if necessary, may be registered against the person responsible. The Director of vigilance, Govt. of Manipur has to submit the report within 3 months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and order to the Registrar of this Bench for placing the same before this Court. 27. Registry of this Bench has to furnish photocopies of the present Misc. application as well as the accompanying Review Petition to the Director of Vigilance, Govt. of Manipur within 3 days from today.