JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Sub Inspector on 12th January, 1974 and, in January, 1984, was promoted as a Sub Inspector. In December, 1990, the petitioner was promoted as an Inspector (Executive). By an order dated 3/4th June, 2002, the Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force, North Sector, New Delhi issued an order under Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules compulsorily retiring the petitioner from the service. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order, has filed the present writ petition. 2. Heard Shri Ashok Khare, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Siddharth Khare for the petitioner and Shri Ashok Singh, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order was arbitrary and that no reasonable person could form an opinion for compulsorily retirement on the basis of the material available on the service record of the petitioner. It was also alleged that the petitioner had been awarded a minor punishment, which was of a temporary nature and had lost its efficacy with the passage of time. Further, such penalties which was awarded, could not be taken into consideration while considering the matter under Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel placed reliance upon a catena of decisions, viz., M.S. Bindra v. Union of India, (1978) 7 SCC 310; Hans Raj v. State of Punjab, (1985) SCC 134; H.C. Gargi v. State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 158 ; Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299 ; B.D. Arora v. Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes, 1998 Supp. (2) SCC 98; High Court of Punjab, Haryana v. Ishwar Chand Jain, (1999) 4 SCC 579 ; Bhoop Narain Tiwari v. Uptron India Ltd., (2001) 4 AWC 2480 ; and Tritoki Nath Maim v. State of U.P., 2002 (5) ESC 307; and M.L. Binjolkar v. State of U.P., Madhya Pradesh, 2005 (5) ESC 164. 4. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit stating that the petitioner’s over all service record, including gradings of annual confidential report was taken into account for consideration of his suitability and the same was found unsatisfactory and was not found fit for further retention in service in public interest. 4. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit stating that the petitioner’s over all service record, including gradings of annual confidential report was taken into account for consideration of his suitability and the same was found unsatisfactory and was not found fit for further retention in service in public interest. Further, the respondents submitted that the order prematurely retiring the petitioner was based on the material found in the service record of the petitioner. The respondents contended that seven entries were found in his service record, viz., (1) Censure in the year 1979 for negligence of duty; (2) Censure in the year 1980 for misconduct, indiscipline and disobedience; (3) Censure in the year 1983 for gross indiscipline and misconduct; (4) Major penalty of reduction in pay for indiscipline, disobedience of lawful orders and absenting from duty, vide final order dated 3.9.1996; (5) Recorded warning for breaking lock of Guest House, vide order dated 20.7.1997; (6) Two days pay fine for overstay vide order dated 25.5.2000; and (7) Withholding of increment for a period of one year without cumulative effect for submission of a complaint directly to the DG/CISF making false allegation about general administration and CISF staff, vide final order dated 15.12.1999. Consequently, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that there was sufficient material available which was considered by the authorities and it was found that the petitioner was not fit for further retention in service in public interest. The order of premature retirement was passed after considering the over all service record of the petitioner. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder affidavit submitted that the censure entries made in the years 1979, 1980 and 1983 were never communicated to the petitioner, and that in any case, the censure entries lost its sting, more so, after the petitioner was promoted in the years 1984 and 1990. Further, the other penalties imposed in the years 1996, 1999 and 2000 was for a limited period, which came to an end upon the expiry of its period, and therefore, the adverse entries recorded in the service record could not be taken into consideration. Further, the other penalties imposed in the years 1996, 1999 and 2000 was for a limited period, which came to an end upon the expiry of its period, and therefore, the adverse entries recorded in the service record could not be taken into consideration. Assuming without admitting that the said entries could be taken into consideration, the learned Counsel submitted that the entries were such that no reasonable person could form an opinion holding that the petitioner was not fit for further retention in service in public interest, and therefore, the said order of premature retirement was arbitrary and was liable to be set aside. 6. In Baikuntha Nath Das (supra). the Supreme Court laid down the principles with regard to premature retirement of a Government employee. The Supreme Court in paragraph 34 held : “The following principles emerge from the above discussion : (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a Government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary—in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter—of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.” 7. The Supreme Court further held that it was permissible for the Court to interfere only on the grounds mentioned in clause (3) of the aforesaid principles, namely, that the order was mala fide or was based on no evidence or that the order was arbitrary. 8. In M.S. Bindra (supra), the Supreme Court held : “Therefore, judicial scrutiny of any order imposing premature/compulsory retirement is permissible if the order is either arbitrary or mala fide or if it is based on no evidence. The observation that principles of natural justice have no place in the context of compulsory retirement does not mean that if the version of the delinquent officer is necessary to reach the correct conclusion, the same can be obviated on the assumption that other materials alone need be looked into.” 9. A Division Bench of this Court in Bhoop Narain Tiwari (supra) held : “Until and unless an employee has lost his utility in service or there exists anything adverse against him, he cannot be compulsorily retired even if he is less meritorious in comparison to other employees. When such an employee is promoted, the defect, if any, stands diluted.” 10. Another Division Bench of this Court in Triloki Nath Maini (supra) held : “The compulsory retirement is to be made in public interest in case the Government servant has outlived his utility or has become dead wood. The conduct, performance and integrity of the Government servant is reflected from the character roll entry which do form the basis of consideration of public interest in the matter of compulsory retirement.” 11. The conduct, performance and integrity of the Government servant is reflected from the character roll entry which do form the basis of consideration of public interest in the matter of compulsory retirement.” 11. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Kumar Jain, (2002) 3 SCC 641 , the Supreme Court held : “The aforesaid decisions unmistakably lay down that the entire service record of a Government servant could be considered by the Government while exercising the power under F.R. 56 (c) of the Rules with emphasis on the later entries. FR 56 (c) of the Rules read with sub-rule (2), empowers the State Government with an absolute right to retire an employee on attaining the age of 50 years. It cannot be disputed that the dead woods need to be removed to maintain efficiency in the service. Integrity of a Government employee is foremost consideration in public service. If a conduct of a Government employee becomes unbecoming to the public interest or obstruct the efficiency in public services, the Government has an absolute right to compulsorily retire such an employee in public interest. The Government’s right to compulsorily retire an employee is a method to ensure efficiency in public service and while doing so the Government is entitled under Fundamental Rule 56 to take into account the entire service record, character roll or confidential report with emphasis on the later entries in the character roll of an employee. In fact, entire service record, character roll or confidential report furnishes the materials to Screening Committee or the State Government, as the case may be, to find out whether a Government servant has outlived his utility in service. It is on consideration of totality of the materials with emphasis on the later entries in the character roll, the Government is expected to form its opinion whether an employee is to be compulsorily retired or not.” 12. The Supreme Court further held : “Vigour or sting of an adverse entry is not wiped out merely it is relatable to 11th or 12th years of passing of the order of compulsory retirement. The aforesaid adverse entry which could have been taken into account while considering the case of the respondent for his compulsory retirement from service, was duly considered by the State Government and said single adverse entry in itself was sufficient to compulsorily retire the respondent from service.” 13. The aforesaid adverse entry which could have been taken into account while considering the case of the respondent for his compulsory retirement from service, was duly considered by the State Government and said single adverse entry in itself was sufficient to compulsorily retire the respondent from service.” 13. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Lalsa Ram, (2001) 3 SCC 389 , the Supreme Court held as under : “Rule 56 (c) of the U.P. Fundamental Rules read with sub-rule (2) as noted herein before provides an authority to the Board with an absolute right to retire an employee on the date on which he attains the age of 50 years. The option for the Government servant to voluntarily retire however has been attributed to the concerned employee at any time after attaining the age of 45 years or after he has completed qualifying service of 20 years. The fundamental rules thus confer a right absolute to retire an employee on the happening of certain event namely the latter attains 50 years of age the right being absolute and in the event the same is not contra to the conditions as embodied in Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, question of violation of any legal right of the respondent herein does not and cannot arise. The factum of the doctrine of natural justice being not available to an employee so retired compulsorily stands well settled and we need not dilate thereon.” The Supreme Court further held : “The nature of the delinquency and whether it is of such a degree as to require the compulsory retirement, the Courts have no authority or jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of power if arrived at bona fide on the basis of the material available on record; Usurpation of authority is not only unwarranted but contrary to all norms of service jurisprudence.” 14. Before proceeding further, it would be necessary to quote the provisions of Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules, which is as under : “(j) Notwithstanding anything contained in the rule, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice.” 15. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that the Fundamental Rules confer an absolute right to retire an employee on the happening of certain events, namely, that the employee attains the age of 50 years. Further, the Courts have no authority or jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of powers if it is arrived at bonafidely on the basis of the material available on the record. Further, premature retirement is required to be made in public interest in the case where the Government servant has outlived his utility or has become a dead wood. The conduct and the performance of the Government servant is reflected in his service record which forms the basis of consideration in public interest in the matter of premature retirement. 16. In the present case, the entire service record has been taken into consideration by the authorities, including the adverse entries. Consequently, the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the adverse entries lost its sting, and could not be taken into consideration when he was promoted after issuance of these censure entries, is patently erroneous. The Supreme Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) and in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Kumar Jain (supra) has clearly stated that the entire service is required to be taken into consideration and that the vigour or sting of an adverse entry is not wiped out on the ground of lapse of time. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the adverse entries was for a limited period which came to an end upon its expiry and could not be considered while taking action under Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules is patently erroneous. The respondents have categorically submitted in their counter affidavit that the entire service record was taken into consideration and it was found that the petitioner was not found fit for further retention in service in public interest on the basis of his poor service record. This fact has not been denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit and the only ground urged is that no prudent man could form an opinion of not finding the petitioner fit for service on the material available on the service record of the petitioner. 17. This fact has not been denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit and the only ground urged is that no prudent man could form an opinion of not finding the petitioner fit for service on the material available on the service record of the petitioner. 17. In my opinion, since the petitioner has not denied the fact that the entire service record of the petitioner was not considered and only the adverse entries was considered, consequently, the Court is not inclined to go into a roving and fishing enquiry and it would be sufficient for this Court to hold that the order was passed by the authority on forming an opinion that it was in public interest to retire the petitioner prematurely and that the said order was passed on the subjective satisfaction of the authority. 18. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order whereby the petitioner has been prematurely retired under clause (j) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules. 19. Writ petition fails and is dismissed. ————