JUDGMENT 1. This second appeal has been admitted by this Court by the order passed on 16th April, 2007 on the following substantial questions of law: . (i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first Appellate Court committed patent error while reversing findings of the trial Court for the reason that copy of the sale deed dated 29th May, 1969 was not duly proved by adducing necessary secondary evidence with leave of the Court? . (ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the first Appellate Court committed patent error while holding that the suit was within limitation though, the evidence regarding delivery of possession of the suit land to Smt. Manormabai was found to be inadequate by the trial Court and story of dispossession was not believed by the trial Court, particularly in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of "Shamsundar Prasad and others V/s Rajpalsing and another" (1995) 1 SC 311, inasmuch as the plaintiff relied upon sale deed (Exhibit-87) dated 15th October, 1966 and since then was out of possession? (iii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suit should have been dismissed for want of proper description of the suit land as required under Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure?" 2. The Appellant, in this second appeal, was the defendant No.1 in the suit filed by Respondent No.1 (plaintiff). Parties hereinafter are referred to their status as plaintiff and defendants in Regular Civil Suit No.177 of 1987, for convenience. The plaintiff had sought a relief of declaration that the plaintiff and defendant No.3 are the owners of the suit field and for recovery of possession from defendant Nos.1 and 2. This suit has been dismissed with costs by the trial Court. This decree was challenged by the plaintiff in Regular Civil Appeal No.176 of 1993. The Ist Adhoc Additional District Judge, Jalgaon (first Appellate Court), after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal. This judgment of the first Appellate Court is challenged in this second appeal. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 4. Hearing of civil proceedings/ civil suits is governed by the procedural law i.e. Code of Civil Procedure (the Code, for short). The pleading of the party is provided under Order VI Rule 1 of the Code. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 4. Hearing of civil proceedings/ civil suits is governed by the procedural law i.e. Code of Civil Procedure (the Code, for short). The pleading of the party is provided under Order VI Rule 1 of the Code. Plaint is pleading of the plaintiff and written statement is pleading of the defendant in view of Order VI Rule 1 of the Code. Parties are expected to plead material facts and not evidence, as has been provided under Order VI Rule 2 of the Code. Oral evidence, in the absence of pleading, is not permissible under Order VI Rule 2 of the Code. If such oral evidence is led by the party concerned, the Courts have to ignore such oral evidence in the absence of the pleadings. In short, parties are not supposed to travel beyond the pleadings while leading oral evidence. Parties are presenting their stance before the civil Court by such pleadings. Pleadings, thus, are important in civil suits. Such importance of the pleading is time and again considered by the Supreme Court. Useful reference can be made to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of State Bank of India Vs. S.N. Goyal” reported in 2007 AIR SCW 4355 : [2008 ALL SCR 2139. 5. Agricultural land survey No.13 is converted to Gat No.203, admeasuring 3 Hectare 92 Ares, situated at village Atwade, Taluka Raver, district Jalgaon (suit property), is subject matter of the case on hand. In para 2 of the plaint, a statement is made that the suit land was owned and possessed jointly by one Mr. Namdeo Vedu (who is not party to the present suit) and the defendant No.1. After the demise of Namdeo Vedu his son Shankar acquired ownership to half portion of the suit land and has disposed of said half portion of the suit land to defendant No.4. In the case on hand, we have no concern with defendant No.4. It is also mentioned in para 1 of the plaint that defendant No.1 had sold out his 1/2 share out of the suit land on 15th October, 1966to plaintiff, his brother Shashikant Dnyandeo and defendant No.3, another brother of the plaintiff. In the case on hand, we have no concern with defendant No.4. It is also mentioned in para 1 of the plaint that defendant No.1 had sold out his 1/2 share out of the suit land on 15th October, 1966to plaintiff, his brother Shashikant Dnyandeo and defendant No.3, another brother of the plaintiff. It is pleaded that, at the time of this sale deed dated 15th October, 1966, plaintiff, his brother Shashikant and defendant No.3 were minors and were represented by their real mother/ natural guardian who purchased the suit property for them (minors). It is also pleaded, at the close of para 2, that Manormabai, mother of defendant No.3 and brother Shashikant, had cultivated the land. In para 3, it has been pleaded that, after the sale transaction dated 15th October, 1966 and taking over possession of the suit land, and after about 1-1/2 year from the said transaction, Shashikant, brother of the plaintiff, died. it was some time in the year 1978-79. cultivation of the suit property by the mother, is pleaded up till 1972-73. It is further pleaded, in para 3, that some where in the month of May, 1973 defendant No.2 has misrepresented plaintiff’s mother and illegally took possession of the suit property. It is also pleaded in para 4, that plaintiff perceived the sale transaction recently. On search of the papers, plaintiff found that defendant No.1 got recorded his name. It is pleaded, in para 4, that such entries are bogus. Plaintiff, therefore, addressed a notice to defendant Nos.1 and 2 on 14th September, 1981 by registered post A.D. and demanded possession of the suit property. However, defendant Nos.1 and 2 have not heeded to the notice, neither have handed over possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. Therefore, the suit for declaration and possession against the defendants, was filed. In para 5, explanation is given as to why defendant No.3, brother of the plaintiff, is joined as party-defendant as well as reference/pleading is made regarding joining of defendant No.4 as party defendant. In para 6, it is pleaded that on the date of sale transaction in favour of the plaintiff, he was minor, has attained majority on 8th March, 1979 and, therefore, suit filed by the plaintiff is within limitation. 6. On behalf of defendant No.1 written statement is filed at Exhibit-60. In para 6, it is pleaded that on the date of sale transaction in favour of the plaintiff, he was minor, has attained majority on 8th March, 1979 and, therefore, suit filed by the plaintiff is within limitation. 6. On behalf of defendant No.1 written statement is filed at Exhibit-60. After denial, in para 3, it has been pleaded by defendant No.1 that he had purchased agricultural land at Newari-Dewari village, Taluka Burhanpur. For said transaction he had raised loan of Rs.3,000/-. He could not repay the said amount of loan. It is further pleaded, in para 3, that suit land is situated in the vicinity of village Atwade and, therefore, defendant No.1 approached to one Mr. Jankiram Dayaram who is defendant No.2, in this suit, and Mr. Hari Bhagwan of village Atwade. He demanded rs.3,000/- by way of hand loan. Jankiram defendant No.2 and Hari Bhagwan could not lend such amount and have informed the defendant No.1 that Smt. Manormabai Patil i.e. mother of the plaintiff is dealing in money lending. Defendant No.1 has further pleaded that he requested defendant No.2 Jankiram and Hari Bhagwan that they should perform role of mediator for raising loan from mother of the plaintiff. Defendant No.1 confided the defendant No.2 and Mr. Hari Bhagwan, went to mother of the plaintiff, demanded Rs.3,000/-. Defendant No.1, that time, was informed by mother of the plaintiff that she does not have money lending licence. Amount of loan sought for by the defendant No.1 is big amount and, therefore, defendant No.1 should give suit land to her for the amount of Rs.3,000/-towards interest. She also informed the defendant No.1 that he will have to execute sale deed of Rs.6,000/-in favour of her children. The amount of Rs.3,000/-to be paid by defendant No.1 to Manoramabai towards hand loan, would be returned with interest in the year 1969 which would be in its totality Rs.5,000/- and in that case she would execute sale deed in the name of defendant No.1. Since defendant No.1 was in dire need of the loan, has executed the sale deed of Rs.6,000/-by accepting Rs.3,000/-. It is also pleaded, in this para 3, that Manoramabai had also taken one more mediator, her relation, viz. Mr. Bhika Shivram Patil. It is further pleaded that defendant No.1 could not repay the amount. He, therefore, sold out agricultural land at village Newari-Dewari. It is also pleaded, in this para 3, that Manoramabai had also taken one more mediator, her relation, viz. Mr. Bhika Shivram Patil. It is further pleaded that defendant No.1 could not repay the amount. He, therefore, sold out agricultural land at village Newari-Dewari. As agreed, he paid Rs.5,000/- with interest to mother of plaintiff on 29th May, 1969 and she had reconveyed the suit property. It is further pleaded that agricultural land of the defendant No.1 has been sold by plaintiff and, therefore, plaintiff cannot claim any right in the suit property. It is specifically pleaded further that though the mother of plaintiff has purchased the suit property, the original transaction is of money lending and, therefore, is not binding on defendant No.1. It is also pleaded that defendant No.1 had not delivered possession of the suit property to mother of the plaintiff. Suit property is in actual possession of the defendant No.1 as owner thereof. 7. Defendant No.2, after entering appearance, has also filed written statement. After denial, it has been pleaded in para 1 of the written statement Exhibit-24 by defendant No.2 that the suit property is owned by Shantabai w/o Murlidhar and Yeshwant Shivram. Defendant No.2 Jankiram Dayaram Patil and Yeshwant Shivram Choudhari are related. The defendant No.2 is not cultivating the suit property, neither possessing the suit property. He did not take over possession of the suit property, illegally. It is also pleaded that plaintiff could not seek 1/2 share out of the suit property. Allegations made against defendant No.2 are denied in para 1. In para 2, it is pleaded that suit is barred by limitation. 8. The trial Court had framed about six issues. Issue No.1 was in respect of title of the plaintiff and finding is recorded against the plaintiff. Issue No.2 was in respect of allegation of the plaintiff that defendant No.2 took over forcible possession in May, 1973 and finding is against the plaintiff. Issue No.3 was in respect of entitlement of the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit land and finding is against the plaintiff. Limitation was the issue No.4 and finding is in favour of the plaintiff. Entitlement of plaintiff for declaration was issue No.5, finding recorded is against the plaintiff. Issue No.7, additional issue framed, was pertaining to the plea raised by defendant No.1 and obviously burden of proof was placed on defendant No.1. Limitation was the issue No.4 and finding is in favour of the plaintiff. Entitlement of plaintiff for declaration was issue No.5, finding recorded is against the plaintiff. Issue No.7, additional issue framed, was pertaining to the plea raised by defendant No.1 and obviously burden of proof was placed on defendant No.1. Said additional issue was in respect of proof of defendant No.1 that he executed the sale deed of the suit field on 15th October, 1966 as a security for repayment of loan with interest from Manoramabai wd/o Dnyandeo Patil i.e. mother of the plaintiff. Finding is in the negative, i.e. against the defendant No.1. Issue No.8 was again regarding the plea of defendant No.1 that sale deed of suit land dated 15th October, 1966is not binding on him and it is bogus, sham and nominal document executed in money lending transaction and the finding is against the defendant No.1. Issue No.9 was in respect of defendant No.1’s plea that he is in possession of the suit land as owner and finding recorded is in favour of defendant No.1 i.e. in the affirmative. 9. In substance, parties are at issue regarding nature of the transaction of 1966i.e. 15th October, 1966. Plaintiff claims that it is a transaction of out and out sale, has purchased the suit property through his natural guardian mother, acquired ownership and possession of the suit property with his minor brothers. Defendant in substance contends that said transaction is of money lending transaction. Document of sale is bogus, sham, nominal and claims that he is owner and possessor of the suit property. It is very difficult to read three findings of the trial Court regarding issue No.1, 7 and 8 together. 10. On behalf of plaintiff, his evidence Exhibit-67, evidence of his mother Manoramabai Exhibit-74 is available on record. The defendant No.1 did not enter the witness box, however, has appointed defendant No.2 as a general power of attorney. Defendant No.2 thus, entered the witness box, led his evidence Exhibit-80. Two more witnesses have been examined on behalf of defendant Nos.1 and 2 viz. Mr. Bhika Shivram Choudhari (Exhibit-84) and Ashoksingh Hiralal Shrivastava (Exhibit-87). Registered sale deed dated 15th October, 1966, on behalf of the plaintiff, is produced on record and is at Exhibit-85. On behalf of defendant Nos.1 and 2 certified copy of the deed dated 29th May, 1969 is on record at Exhibit-82. Mr. Bhika Shivram Choudhari (Exhibit-84) and Ashoksingh Hiralal Shrivastava (Exhibit-87). Registered sale deed dated 15th October, 1966, on behalf of the plaintiff, is produced on record and is at Exhibit-85. On behalf of defendant Nos.1 and 2 certified copy of the deed dated 29th May, 1969 is on record at Exhibit-82. According to defendants, this document is a document of reconveyance to defendant No.1 for the consideration of Rs.5,000/-. Manoramabai, mother of the plaintiff, purchased the property from defendant No.1 for Rs.6,000/- on 15th October, 1966 and according to defendants the suit property is reconveyed by said Manoramabai on 29th May, 1969 for the consideration of Rs.5,000/-. 29th August, 2008 11. There are two registered instruments on record. The first is sale deed dated 15th October, 1966 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of plaintiff (minors). This sale deed dated 15th October, 1966 i.e. original document is on record. It is duly marked, its contents are proved and exhibited as Exhibit-85. There is another registered document dated 29th May, 1969 on record. According to defendants, this document is reconveyance deed. This document initially was marked by letter "A" with red pencil/ ink, however, has been subsequently marked Exhibit-82. The trial Court, while referring this document Exhibit-82 made some observation in para 7, which are not happily worded. I quote the observation of the trial Court which are at the end of para 7: "... ... The non production of the original sale deed by the defendants 1 and 2, to my mind, is not sufficient to hold that the certified copy Exhibit-82 as a secondary evidence has no evidentiary value." . Learned counsel for the Appellant has read the entire para 7 from the judgment of the trial Court. According to him, the learned trial Court wants to observe that though original sale deed dated 29th May, 1969 is not on record, certified copy of said sale deed, placed on record, can be considered or accepted as a secondary evidence, has an evidentiary value as secondary evidence and is marked Exhibit-82. This certified copy which is marked as Exhibit-82, could not find acceptance by the first Appellate Court. The first Appellate Court, in para 17, observed that scribe of the sale deed Exhibit-82 is not examined. Attesting witness Jankiram i.e. defendant No.2 is examined as well as another attesting witness Bhika Chaudhari is also examined. This certified copy which is marked as Exhibit-82, could not find acceptance by the first Appellate Court. The first Appellate Court, in para 17, observed that scribe of the sale deed Exhibit-82 is not examined. Attesting witness Jankiram i.e. defendant No.2 is examined as well as another attesting witness Bhika Chaudhari is also examined. The first Appellate Court has referred to the judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1984 Bom. 19 and opined that evidence of said attesting witness cannot be accepted on account of rule of hearsay evidence. First Appellate Court further observed that even if document Exhibit-82 is considered to be formally proved that does not amount to a proof of truth of the contents of the document. 12. It is on this premise, substantial question of law no.I is formulated by this Court. Now I proceed to consider the said substantial question of law. 13. "evidence" is considered as, one fact is evidence of another when, it tends in any degree to render the existence of that other probable. The quality by virtue of which it has such an effect may be called its probative force, and evidence may therefore be defined as any fact which possesses such force. (Symond’s Jurisprudence 12 Edn., page 128 Mr. P.J.Fitzgerald.). It has been further authored by Mr. P.J.Fitzgerald that when probative force is great enough to form a rational basis for the inference that the fact so evidenced really exists, the evidence possessing it is said to constitute proof. In the opinion of said author, evidence is of various kinds, being, in the first place, either judicial or extrajudicial. Judicial evidence is that which is produced to the Court; it comprises of evidential facts that are actually brought to the personal knowledge and observation of the Tribunals. Extrajudicial evidence is that which does not come directly under judicial cognizance, but nevertheless constitute an intermediate link between judicial evidence and the fact requiring proof. Judicial evidence includes all testimony given by witnesses in Court, all documents produced to and read by the Court, and all things personally examined by the Court for the purposes of proof. While explaining phrase evidence" it is further observed by the said author that evidence is either primary or secondary. Other things being equal, the longer any chain of evidence the less its probative force, for which each successive inference the risk of error grows. While explaining phrase evidence" it is further observed by the said author that evidence is either primary or secondary. Other things being equal, the longer any chain of evidence the less its probative force, for which each successive inference the risk of error grows. In the interest of the truth, therefore, it is expedient to shorten the process, to cut out as many as possible of the intermediate links of extrajudicial evidence, and to make evidence assume the judicial form at the earliest practicable point. Hence, the importance of the distinction between primary and secondary evidence. Primary evidence is evidence viewed in comparison with any available and less immediate instrument of proof. Secondary evidence is that which is compared with any available and more immediate instrument of proof. Primary evidence of the contents of a written document is the production in Court of the documents itself; secondary evidence is the production of a copy or oral testimony as to the contents of the original. 14. Word "evidence" is also defined under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (the said Act for brief) which means and includes (i) all statements, which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry, such statements are called oral evidence; (ii) all document including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence. Chapter-V of the said Act is relevant for consideration of substantial question No.1. Section 61 from Chapter-V makes a provision for proof of contents of the documents. It is provided under section 61 that the contents of the documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Phrase "primary evidence" is envisaged from section 62 of the said Act. Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court. There are two explanations to this section 62, however, not relevant for the case on hand. Phrase "primary evidence" is envisaged from section 62 of the said Act. Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court. There are two explanations to this section 62, however, not relevant for the case on hand. Secondary evidence (section 63) means and includes (i) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained, (ii) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy and copy compared with such copies; (iii) copy is made from or compared with the original; (iv) counter parts of the documents as against the parties who do not execute them; (v) oral accounts of contents of documents given bysome person who has himself seen it. Proof of documents, is given under section 64 of the said Act. It says that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases herein mentioned. Section 65 is important in the case on hand since I am considering the question of leading, accepting and considering the secondary evidence. Section 65 provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of the document in the following cases: Section 65 (a) provides that in case of original is shown or appears to be in possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved or of any person out of reach, or not subject to the process of the Court or of any person legally bound to produce it; and when after the notices mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it. Section 65 (b) contemplates a case when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or be his representative in custody. In the case on hand, the learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that original reconveyance deed dated 29th May, 1969 is lost. He fairly concedes that there is no such pleading made in the written statement filed by the defendants. However, he has invited my attention to para 2 of the deposition of D.W.1 Jankiram Dayaram Patil. In the case on hand, the learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that original reconveyance deed dated 29th May, 1969 is lost. He fairly concedes that there is no such pleading made in the written statement filed by the defendants. However, he has invited my attention to para 2 of the deposition of D.W.1 Jankiram Dayaram Patil. This witness has made a statement in para 2 of his deposition that Yeshwant Shivram (defendant No.1) then sold the filed of Newari-Dewari and Yeshwant Shivram then paid Rs.5,000/- to Manoramabai and obtained the sale deed of the suit field from him. The certified copy of that sale deed is now produced by him. (this sale deed means the reconveyance deed, which is contended by the defendant, dated 29th May, 1969). It is further mentioned in this para 2 of the deposition that said certified copy of the sale deed is marked as Article "A". He has further stated that he had put signature as attesting witness. The original sale deed is lost. The original sale deed, according to this witness, was given to Talathi to record entry but it was lost from him. The certified copy of the document is at Exhibit-82. (Reconveyance deed dated 29th May, 1969). That deed, it is further mentioned that, was executed in his presence (D.W.1 Jankiram) by Manoramabai and its contents are correct. The learned counsel, thus, with the assistance of this part of the evidence of D.W.1 Jankiram, submitted that case under section 65 (c) for leading secondary evidence has been established and the trial Court has accordingly marked the said document as Exhibit-82, held that contents are proved and read in favour of the plaintiff. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the Appellant, I have also perused the Roznama. The documents are to be filed in the trial Court. Procedure of production of documents, admission and denial is provided. Order XII of the Code is under the title "Admission". Elaborate scheme is provided thereunder. Notice to admit documents is contemplated under Order XII Rule and 2. Consequences are given under Order XII Rule 2A. Power of the Court to record admission is a subject matter or Order XII Rule 3A. Order XIII makes a provision for production, impounding and return of documents. Elaborate scheme is provided thereunder. Notice to admit documents is contemplated under Order XII Rule and 2. Consequences are given under Order XII Rule 2A. Power of the Court to record admission is a subject matter or Order XII Rule 3A. Order XIII makes a provision for production, impounding and return of documents. It is the mandate of Order XIII Rule 1 that parties or their pleader shall produce on or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence in original where the copies thereof have been filed along with the plaint or written statement. Order XIII Rule provides rejection or irrelevant or inadmissible documents and Rule 4 contemplates endorsements on documents admitted in evidence. From the view point of Order XII and XIII I have considered the record and proceeding especially Roznama (order sheet) maintained by the trial Court in the suit. Learned counsel for the Appellant fairly concedes that list of documents at Exhibit-55 has been mentioned by the trial Court. In this list, four documents have been detailed i.e. (i) 7/12 extract for the year 1989-90 (ii) Xerox copy of sale deed dated 29th May, 1969, (iii) copy of index No.2 and (iv) power of attorney, executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2. Thus, indisputably, xerox copy of the sale transaction dated 29th May, 1969 (according to defendants reconveyance deed) was filed and mentioned in the list of documents Exhibit-55, by the trial Court. Thus, indisputably, original sale deed dated 29th May, 1969 (or reconveyance deed, according to the defendants) was not filed along with list Exhibit-55 in the trial Court and it was a Xerox copy. The trial Court, while recording deposition of D.W.2 Jankiram considered his contention/ evidence in examination-in-chief that original was given to Talathi and has been lost, as noted above. This was the reason why the trial Court accepted sale deed dated 29th May, 1969 i.e. certified copy and marked it initially as "A" in read pencil/ ink and later marked as Exhibit-82. Sections 65 and 66 of the said Act, in the case on hand, in my view, are important. In view of the provision laid down under section 66 of the said Act, the trial Court ought not to have permitted the defendant No.1 to rely upon certified copy of the sale transaction dated 29th May, 1969 as a secondary evidence. Sections 65 and 66 of the said Act, in the case on hand, in my view, are important. In view of the provision laid down under section 66 of the said Act, the trial Court ought not to have permitted the defendant No.1 to rely upon certified copy of the sale transaction dated 29th May, 1969 as a secondary evidence. Here, the case alleged by the defendants that he tendered said original sale deed dated 29th May, 1969, as deposed in para 2 of the deposition of D.W.1 Jankiram, or allegedly handing over said document to village officer/Talathi. It is a matter of common knowledge that Talathi is a servant working with the revenue department of the State of Maharashtra. Summons could have been obtained securing presence of concerned Talathi and/ or production of the document i.e. original sale deed. Defendant has received the summons of the suit along with copy of the plaint. Such fact, tendering original sale deed to the Talathi, for recording name of the defendant No.1 in the record of rights, could have been pleaded. In that contingency plaintiff, who indisputably entered the witness box first, and/ or led his evidence first, would have an opportunity to make out a case. Such statement for the first time in para 2 of the deposition of the D.W.No.2, who also was empowered by defendant No.1, ought not to have been accepted by the trial Court. Such excuse for the first time, from the witness box, is possible by any witness. Here again, it is a statement of D.W.No.2, power of attorney and not defendant No.1 himself. The Supreme Court has laid down a statement of law for the appreciation of the evidence of the power of attorney. The Court, however, is concerned with the mandate of section 62, 63 and 65 of the said Act. 1st September, 2008 15. From para 13 of the judgment of the first appellate Court it appears that the first Appellate Court has found lack of pleading regarding the loss of reconveyance deed dated 29th May, 1969 and lack of foundation to lead secondary evidence, as required under section 65 of the said Act. In para 14, the first Appellate Court has referred to evidence of D.W.3 Ashok, Sub Registrar of Raver. The first Appellate Court was of the opinion that the evidence of said witness is of no help to the Appellant. In para 14, the first Appellate Court has referred to evidence of D.W.3 Ashok, Sub Registrar of Raver. The first Appellate Court was of the opinion that the evidence of said witness is of no help to the Appellant. The defendants never asked concerned Talathi by filing application to return the original sale deed. The first Appellate Court opined that question of handing over original sale deed to Talathi would not arise. The first Appellate Court observed that there is also no iota of material that original sale deed was really handed over to concerned Talathi for taking mutation and accordingly mutation also was effected in the record of rights. The first Appellate Court reiterated in same para 14 that the evidence regarding handing over sale deed to Talathi in 1971, without pleading, cannot be considered. The first Appellate Court opined that it is a deliberate act of defendant Nos.1 and 2 to make a show that sale deed was executed on 29th May, 1969 by Manoramabai. Thus, considering the judgment of the trial Court, the manner and method adopted by the trial Court, marking the reconveyance deed dated 29th May, 1969 as Exhibit-82, setting aside the same by adequate and legal reasoning by the first Appellate Court and the provision laid down under sections 61 to 66 of the Evidence Act, in my view, the finding of the first Appellate Court cannot be said to be perverse or absurd. 16. Learned counsel for the Appellant relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of “Smt. Dayamathi Bai Vs. K.M. Shaffi” reported in AIR 2004 SC 4082 . In para 7 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has noted that the sale transaction, in that case, dated 14th November, 1944 was by document i.e. sale deed Exhibit-P1. Said document obviously was filed in the trial Court in the case of Dayamathi. From para 7, it reveals that the trial Court found that Exhibit-P1 was more than thirty years old document and the presumption under section 90 of the Evidence Act apply to the said document. On this footing, document was marked as Exhibit-P1, in the case of Dayamathi, by the trial Court and ultimately, the matter was before the Supreme Court. In this premise, the Supreme Court, in para 13 has observed that objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. On this footing, document was marked as Exhibit-P1, in the case of Dayamathi, by the trial Court and ultimately, the matter was before the Supreme Court. In this premise, the Supreme Court, in para 13 has observed that objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objections could be waived. They have to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record (See Order XIII, R.3 of Code of Civil Procedure). I have considered the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of Dayamathi Bai, have extensively referred to the record and proceedings and with the assistance of the learned counsel for the Appellant also considered Exhibit-55, the list filed on behalf of the present Appellants, the date thereof, the procedure adopted by the trial Court, the marking of said document initially as "A" with read pencil/ ink and thereafter exhibiting the said document as Exhibit-82. In this factual back ground, I have also considered the reasoning assigned by the first Appellate Court while turning down the judgment of the trial Court permitting secondary evidence, marking and exhibiting the said document as well as appreciating said document in evidence while deciding the first Appeal. In the case on hand, the defendants even failed to file at-least certified copy on record before list Exhibit-55. In this circumstance, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dayamathi, factually can be said to be distinguishable and would not be at the help of the Appellants/ defendants. Learned counsel for the Respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of learned Single Bench of this Court, on this point, in the matter of “Bank of India Vs. M/s. Allibhoy Mohammed & Ord.” reported in 2008(4) ALL MR 808. Here, the learned Single Bench of this Court has considered sections 61, 62, 63, 67 to 73 of the Eidence Act. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court is also considered by learned Single Bench, along with other judicial pronouncements. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Bench of this Court in matter of Bank of India (supra). At this stage, in my view, one more judgment of the Supreme Court needs to be referred to. It is the latest judgment in point of time, in the matter of “Smt. J. Yashoda Vs. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Bench of this Court in matter of Bank of India (supra). At this stage, in my view, one more judgment of the Supreme Court needs to be referred to. It is the latest judgment in point of time, in the matter of “Smt. J. Yashoda Vs. Smt. K. Shobha Rani reported in AIR 2007 SC 1721 : [2007(3) ALL MR 823(s.c.)]. Factually, the Supreme Court has observed that facts appearing therein were pertaining to section 65 (a) of the said Act. Obviously, this judgment can be said to be the judgment considering the provision laid down under section 65 (a). However, the Supreme Court, in para 6 of this judgment, has referred to section 63 of the Evidence Act and in para 9 has considered the provision laid down under section 65 i.e. permission for leading secondary evidence, regarding existence, condition or contents of the documents under the circumstances mentioned under section 65. It is in this context, the Supreme Court has held, in para 9, that the conditions laid down in the said section (65) must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. It is further observed that secondary evidence of the contents of the document cannot be admitted without production of the original being first accounted for, in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section itself. Now turning to the case on hand, in my view, the first Appellate Court has justifiably and legally recorded a finding that the defendants did not account for while leading of secondary evidence under section 65 (C) of the Evidence Act. In this view of the matter, in my view, substantial question of law No.1, formulated by this Court, does not arise specifically under section 100 of the Code. This ground No.1 i.e. substantial question of law No.1, therefore, I am answering against the Appellants. 17. This takes me to substantial question No.2 formulated by this Court. Issue of limitation, basically is a mixed issue of law and fact. In the case on hand, the trial Court had framed issue No.4 pertaining to the limitation. Finding recorded by the trial Court, on issue No.4, is in para 12. 17. This takes me to substantial question No.2 formulated by this Court. Issue of limitation, basically is a mixed issue of law and fact. In the case on hand, the trial Court had framed issue No.4 pertaining to the limitation. Finding recorded by the trial Court, on issue No.4, is in para 12. In short, it is observed by the trial Court that the plaintiff attained the majority on 8th March, 1979 and suit is filed on 14th October, 1981 within three years of attaining majority. The trial Court opined that suit is filed within the period of three years by the plaintiff when he attained majority and answered said issue in affirmative i.e. in favour of the plaintiff. The first Appellate Court framed about eight points for determination. The poitn No.6 was framed by the first Appellate Court as to whether suit claim is within limitation. Finding recorded by the first Appellate Court is in affirmative i.e. in favour of the plaintiff. In para 19, the first Appellate Court has considered the date of reconveyance deed i.e. 29th May, 1969, date of attaining majority by the plaintiff on 8th March, 1979, filing of the suit on 14th October, 1981. The first Appellate Court was of the opinion that Article 64 is applicable and suit can be filed within twelve years. The learned Judge has also referred to sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act and held that the suit filed by the plaintiff is within limitation. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the suit filed by the plaintiff is on the basis of previous possession and not on title. According to him, plaintiff lost the title in the year 1969 i.e. 29th May, 1969. Learned counsel for the Appellant fairly concedes that in his written statement it has not been pleaded that the plaintiff’s suit is based on previous possession and not on title. He also fairly concedes that the case pleaded by the defendant Nos.1 and 2 that the transaction dated 15th October, 1966 is a loan transaction is not accepted either by the trial Court or by the first Appellate Court. In other words, the transaction dated 15th October, 1966, according to the trial Court, is a sale transaction by defendant No.1 in favour of the minors, including the plaintiff. In other words, the transaction dated 15th October, 1966, according to the trial Court, is a sale transaction by defendant No.1 in favour of the minors, including the plaintiff. The first Appellate Court has on reappreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence, recorded a finding that the transaction dated 15th October, 1966 is sale transaction between defendant No.1 and plaintiff and minors. The nature of transaction between the parties the facts, circumstances and evidence led on record, in my view, has been justifiably considered by the trial Court. Said finding is concurred with by the first Appellate Court. In my view also, the transaction between the parties cannot be said to be a transaction of loan or security by any stretch of imagination. The suit filed by the plaintiff needs to be held to be suit based on title i.e. sale deed dated 15th of October, 1966. The application of Article 64 is in fact justifiable. Learned counsel for the Appellant relies on 7/12 extract, Exhibit-5 wherein in occupancy column name of Yeshwant Choudhari is recorded. This occupancy column and entry therein, do have rebuttable presumption under section 157 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. Mutation Entry No.1665 Exhibit-6 seems to have been certified by the Circle Inspector, Raver on 11th June, 1969. The transaction is dated 29th May, 1969. Finding of the trial Court, on this transaction dated 29th May, 1969, is an out and out sale. The first Appellate Court, in para 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, has prominently considered both the transactions i.e. transaction of sale in favour of minors by defendant No.1 dated 15th October, 1966 and alleged reconveyance deed of the property on behalf of minors on 29th May, 1969. The first Appellate Court has discussed the oral as well as documentary evidence. Consideration of Rs.6,000/- relating to sale transaction dated 15th October, 1966, in favour of the minors. Fact that there was no permission under section 8 (2) of the Guardians & Wards Act, the conduct of the parties, and recorded a finding that the transaction is out and out sale i.e. dated 15th October, 1966. It is not a loan transaction. This finding, in my view, is borne out from the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties on record. It is not a loan transaction. This finding, in my view, is borne out from the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties on record. Considering this finding of the first Appellate Court, in my view, the substantial question No.II, forumulated by this Courtr, in this second appeal, needs to be answered against the Appellants and in favour of the plaintiff. 18. This now takes me to consider the substantial question of law No.III, formulated by this Court. This pertains to the provisions laid down under Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case on hand, I have perused the description of the property given in the plaint. The learned counsel for the Appellant relies on judgment of the learned Single Bench of Orissa High Court in the matter of “Lucy Narona Vs. Raghunath Jew Bije, Chhauri Math” reported in [1992(2) Civil LJ 694. In the matter of Lucy, the description of the property was not given in a way so as to give clear picture and identification. On the premise of the factual matrix, the learned Single Bench of Orissa High Court took the view, as stated in the matter of Lucy. Another judicial pronouncement relied upon by the Appellant is from Orissa High Court of the learned Single Bench, in the case of “Bandhu Das and anr. Vs. Uttam Charan Pattanaik” reported in AIR 2007 Orissa 24. In the matter of Bandhu Das, suit property mentioned was C.A. Plot No.104 and 105. It was alleged in that case that said property was belonging to one Pattanaik from whom plaintiff had purchased by registered sale deed dated 12th October, 1971. Defendant, therein in that matter, filed written statement and pleaded that they have no title or possession over plot No.105; but they have kept their residential house on a portion of C.S. Plot No.104 corresponding to Hal Plot No.145 measuring area of Ac. 0.05 dec. since more than 45 years. There, the trial Court, decreed the suit with declaration of title of the plaintiff over plot No.105, however, held that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in respect to plot No.104. In para 9, the learned Single Judge has observed that the defendant had pleaded in the written statement with specific objection that the suit is bad for lack of identification. In para 9, the learned Single Judge has observed that the defendant had pleaded in the written statement with specific objection that the suit is bad for lack of identification. The learned Single Bench has also noticed that the boundaries of the disputed land were not mentioned regarding both the plots. There, the disputed plot was a part of Savik Plot No.104. The learned Single Bench, after considering the evidence, especially admission in the cross examination that "he could not say the plot number, boundary and the extent of the land" took the view and affirmed the finding of the Courts below that the decree is not executable and suit is incompetent for want of proper description and sufficient identification. 19. The courts have to decide question of fact and law on the premise of pleading, oral as well as documentary evidence brought before it by the parties and provisions of law. Order VII Rule 3 of the Code has suffered amendment so far as State of Maharashtra is concerned. In fact, there are two amendments, one for Maharashtra and one for Dadar and Nagar Haveli. In the case on hand, I am not entering into this arena for the simple reason that, in my view, this ground, formulated by this Court, refers to new plea. The issues have been framed by the trial Court; they are in para 6 of the judgment of the trial Court. Initially there were about six issues and one additional issue was framed as issue No.7. Learned counsel for the Appellant fairly concedes that this was not an issue before the trial Court. I have extensively referred to the written statement, pleading of the defendants. Absence of issue by the trial Court indicates absence of pleading by defendants. There was not such point for determination by the first Appellate Court. Substantial question of law has to be within the parameters of section 100 of the Code. This Court has to examine the plea, material brought before it. The plea, which was not before the trial Court, not answered by the trial Couse, case for which there was not point for determination framed by the first Appellate Court, cannot be accepted by this Court being a new plea holding that such ground involves substantial question of law. Apart from this, in my view, suit property is sufficiently described and clearly identifiable. Apart from this, in my view, suit property is sufficiently described and clearly identifiable. Decree can legitimately be executed. In this view of the matter, in my view, this substantial question of law No.III, really does not arise in this second appeal. For the foregoing reasons, this second appeal being meritless, needs to be dismissed. 20. Second Appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. No order as to costs.