JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amar Saran, J.—I have heard Sri P.N. Misra, learned Senior Counsel and Sri S.K. Gupta, learned Counsel for the applicant, Sri Gopal Swaroop Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Samit Gopal for the opposite party No. 2, Smt. Nalini Prasad widow of Brigadier Naresh Prasad and the learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the application and affidavit filed in support thereof. After hearing parties, I reserved the judgment, which I proceed to deliver by means of the present order. 2. The applicant is presently Assistant General Manager, Bank of Baroda, Zonal Inspection Centre at Pune. At the time of the alleged offence, he was posted as Chief Manager, Bank of Baroda, SSI Branch, Sector-18, Noida. 3. An F.I.R. was filed by the opposite party No. 2 on 12.5.2003 at 7.30 p.m. at P.S. Swaroop Nagar, Kanpur alleging that the opposite party No. 2’s pre-deceased husband Brigadier Naresh Prasad was the owner of the property, flat No. 505, 53-54 Govardhan, Nehru Place, New Delhi, which had been inherited by the opposite party No. 2 along with Somesh Prasad and Sundresh Prasad, the two pre-deceased sons of the opposite party No. 2. Opposite party No. 2 had let out the said flat to IFFCO. One pre-deceased son of the opposite party No. 2 Somesh Prasad was the owner of another property situate at W-48, Sector 2, Noida 201-301 where he was running an export unit under the title of Messrs Magnum Telilink. Somesh Prasad had taken a loan in 1988-89 from the U.P.F.C. and had mortgaged his property W-48, Sector 2, Noida with the U.P.F.C. for the aforesaid loan. One co-accused Sajida Hussain was an employee in Somesh Prasad’s said firm. There was another firm in the name of M/s Dast Al Exports, where Sajida Hussain and her two brothers Salimuddin Multani and Mohd. Hanifuddin Ibrahim were on the Directorial Board. The unit Dast-AI Exports had taken a loan from the Bank of Baroda SSI Branch Sector 18, Noida. As security for the loan an equitable mortgage of the aforementioned property belonging to opposite party No. 2 and her two sons situate at Nehru Place, New Delhi was executed with the creditor Bank of Baroda on 15.4.96. In the said loan, the opposite party No. 2 was shown as the guarantor, whereas her claim was that she never stood as the guarantor for the loan. In the said loan, the opposite party No. 2 was shown as the guarantor, whereas her claim was that she never stood as the guarantor for the loan. It was alleged that in order to grab the opposite party No. 2’s late son Somesh Prasad’s commercial unit Messrs Magnum Telilink, Sajida Hussain, who was an employee had started stealing the papers of the firm. For the loan that was taken from Bank of Baroda, Somesh Prasad’s property Messrs Magnum Telilink situate at W-48, Sector 2, Noida and the flat No. 505 situate at Govardhan Building, Nehru Place, New Delhi, which the opposite party No. 2 had inherited from her pre-deceased husband along with her sons, were mortgaged with the Bank in a collusive, and fraudulent manner and fraudulently opposite party No. 2 was shown as a guarantor of the deed when she claimed that she never stood as a guarantor for the same. Some illicit relations were also alleged between the applicant and Sajida Hussain and it was alleged that a conspiracy was entered into by Sajida Hussain, her two brothers and the applicant Branch Manager, who manufactured forged papers including the forged document containing the signatures of opposite party No. 2, which she denied to have executed. It was further pointed out that the property at W-48 Sector 2, Noida, which is also said to have been given as collateral security to the Bank of Baroda for a loan, had already been mortgaged as collateral security with U.P.F.C. for an earlier loan taken from the U.P.F.C. It is further claimed that after April 2002 when the tenant IFFCO stopped paying the rent of the property situate at Nehru Place to the opposite party No. 2 and had started depositing the same with the Debt Recovery Tribunal, then the opposite party No. 2 came to know of the alleged fraud committed by the aforesaid accused of Messrs Dast-AI Exports in collusion with the Branch Manager of the SSI branch of Bank of Baroda, Sector 18, Noida (the applicant) and the fact that the said property had been given as collateral security with the Bank and of raising of a loan for the said firm, by executing forged documents showing the complainant O.P. No. 2 as a guarantor. The said loans were never paid back to the Bank. The said loans were never paid back to the Bank. The Bank had filed a case before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, as the original debtor the proprietor of Messrs Dast Al Exports Altaf Hussain, his wife Sajida Hussain and two brothers of Sajida Hussain were not traceable, hence the Bank got the two properties attached and started proceedings for recovery and auction of the same before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which was at the final stages. The said proceedings before the Tribunal were against the principles of natural justice. The said fraud had been committed by the proprietors of Messrs Dast-AI Exports in collusion with the applicant in an illegal manner. The loan had been obtained by affixing forged signatures of the opposite party No. 2 manipulating documents relating to the property of late Somesh Prasad and by obtaining the loan in an unwarranted manner. 4. After recording the statement of the informant and the witnesses under Section 161, Cr.P.C. a charge-sheet had been submitted and cognizance had been taken by the C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar on 3.12.2005 against the applicants and others under Sections 406, 420, 468, 471, IPC, P.S. Sector 20, case No. 10337 of 2005. 5. It was argued by learned Counsel for the applicant that the applicant who was the Chief Manager of the Sector 18, Noida, SSI Branch of the Bank of Baroda at the material time and a senior bank officer, had been implicated in a mala fide manner by means of an FIR on concocted allegations only because recovery/ auction proceedings had been initiated by the Bank before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereafter DRT) for realisation of the loan amount from the borrowers as a counter blast and defence to the said claim. It has been falsely stated by the complainant that she was not in the know of the proceedings before the DRT till the rent from the flat in Nehru Place which was let out to IFFCO was attached on the basis that a legal award had been passed on 3.6.99 by the DRT upholding the claim of the applicant’s bank. There is no credible legal evidence for summoning the applicant for this offence. There is no credible legal evidence for summoning the applicant for this offence. The investigating officer has not even cared to take the admitted signatures of the complainant and to get the same compared with the signatures on the disputed document by a hand writing expert to reach a prima facie conclusion of forgery of the complainant’s signatures on the said document and has chosen to accept the ipse dixit of the complainant in an unwarranted manner. It has further been contended that the statements of the witnesses contained in the charge-sheet, which have been compositely annexed as Annexure 18, and include the statements of the subsequent manager Sri Rajiv Sharma, Smt. Kumbh Gautam, Chief Manager, UPFC, Sector 6, Noida and statement of Smt. Rashmi Prasad the wife of late Somesh Prasad do not disclose any incriminatory circumstance against the applicant. 6. On the other hand it was urged by Sri G.S. Chaturvedi learned Senior Counsel for the O.P. No. 2, that the scope for challenging an FIR and charge-sheet if commission of a cognizable offence is disclosed falls in a very narrow compass and there can be no evaluation of the evidence at this stage. It was not very material if the hand writing on the impugned document was not got analysed by an expert and little reason exists for disbelieving the claim of the complainant that her signatures had been forged in the guarantee document. Further it was submitted that it would not be proper for this Court to record a finding that the criminal proceedings were initiated in a mala fide manner. 7. We think that Sri Chaturvedi has suggested too narrow and pedantic a view of the plenary powers contained in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said inherent powers vest in the High Court to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. can be exercised : (a) to give effect to an order under the Code; (b) to prevent abuse of the process of Court and (c) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. can be exercised : (a) to give effect to an order under the Code; (b) to prevent abuse of the process of Court and (c) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Of course the Apex Court and this Court has suggested that the wide powers under this provision be exercised very sparingly and with extreme caution, but that is not to say that the said powers should never be exercised at all. 8. It has been aptly held in AIR 1998 SC 128, Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate in paragraph 28 that summoning an accused is a serious matter and the criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course, the Magistrate’s summoning order should reflect application of mind and the Magistrate is required to carefully scrutinize the evidence before passing the order : "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused." 9. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused." 9. The criteria for quashing criminal proceedings, (although not exhaustive as there could always be some exceptions and the criteria are only illustrative) have been appositely enumerated in the land mark decisions in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 , R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 866 and in several other decisions where the same criteria have been reiterated. 10. It would be useful to extract paragraph 108 of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 which reads as follows : “108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 11. It would be useful to examine the facts of this case on the touchstone of the aforesaid criteria and the principles for appreciation of an application for exercise of inherent powers for quashing criminal proceedings by this Court. 12. It should be borne in mind that the Opposite party No. 2 has chosen not to file any counter affidavit in this case and insisted that the matter be heard and disposed of at this stage itself. To that extent the O.P. No. 2 suffers the risk of allowing the averments made in the application and affidavit filed by the applicant to go unrebutted. 13. There are some significant circumstances in this case which need to be taken note of. To that extent the O.P. No. 2 suffers the risk of allowing the averments made in the application and affidavit filed by the applicant to go unrebutted. 13. There are some significant circumstances in this case which need to be taken note of. In this case whereas the complainant opposite party No. 2 has alleged that on 15.4.1996 the applicant in collusion with Sajida Hussain got a forged equitable mortgage executed of the property jointly owned by the opposite party No. 2 and her late son Somesh Prasad, but the documents, which have been filed with the application (and which have not been rebutted by the O.P. No. 2 by means of any counter affidavit) clearly show that Somesh Prasad, who had converted to Islam and assumed the name of Aftab Hussain was the proprietor of the firm Dast-AI Exports, which had hypothecated its machinery (vide Annexure 4). 14. Annexure 6 is a declaration given by Aftab Hussain alias Somesh Prasad at the bank which was executed on the same date, 15.4.96 wherein he mentions that he along with his father Brigadier Naresh Prasad, and brother Sundresh Prasad owned flat No. 505, 53-54 Govardhan, Nehru Place, New Delhi. After the death of his father, his 50% share had been transferred to his mother, the opposite party No. 2 Nalini Prasad. Now Somesh Prasad alias Aftab Hussain and his brother Sundresh Prasad owned 25% each of the said property. As his brother was in service at Hyderabad, he had authorised Aftab Hussain @ Somesh Prasad to execute an equitable mortgage for his undivided 25% share in the property and hence he was creating an equitable mortgage of the property in favour of the bank on behalf of himself, his brother Sundresh Prasad and his mother Smt. Nalini Prasad. This declaration was also given on 15.4.1996 the same date when the guarantee deed wherein the opposite party No. 2 claimed her signature was forged were prepared. This declaration was also given on 15.4.1996 the same date when the guarantee deed wherein the opposite party No. 2 claimed her signature was forged were prepared. It is important that neither in the FIR, nor in her statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. Nalini Prasad, opposite party No. 2 has made any mention of the role of her later deceased son Aftab Hussain @ Somesh Prasad in executing this equitable mortgage in order to obtain the loan from the Bank of Baroda, for the firm Dast Al Exports and it was only made to appear that Sajida Hussain in collusion with her brothers and the applicant had on her own initiative prepared the forged documents, when her son was not even shown to be present. As the allegations in the 482 Cr.P.C application and affidavit and annexures of the applicant mentioning the circumstance of the prime role of Somesh Prasad @ Aftab Hussain in executing the equitable mortage of the Nehru Place property in favour of the Bank for obtaining a loan for Dast Al Exports have not been refuted by the O.P. No. 2 by any counter affidavit, the allegation that the documents and agreement were forged by Sajida Hussain and her brothers in connivance with the applicant Chief Manager of the Branch becomes completely absurd and inherently improbable, that no prudent person could ever reach a just conclusion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the applicant. Whilst the O.P. No. 2 has tried to project only Sajida Hussain and her brothers Salimuddin Multani and Mohd. Alimuddin Ibrahim as the proprietors of the firm Dast Al Exports, who tried to take a loan from the bank by filing forged papers of O.P. No. 2’s Nehru Place flat (to the exclusion of her pre-deceased son Somesh Prasad alias Aftab Hussain), but contrary to this in her 161 Cr.P.C. statement her daughter-in-law Rashmi Prasad (Somesh Prasad’s first wife) has stated that Somesh Prasad and herself were the real proprietors of both Magnum Telilinks and Dast Al Exports. This statement would support the documents filed by the applicant which show the instrumental role of Somesh Prasad @ Aftab Hussain in creating an equitable mortgage of the property for obtaining a loan for Dast Al Exports from the concerned branch of the Bank of Baroda. This statement would support the documents filed by the applicant which show the instrumental role of Somesh Prasad @ Aftab Hussain in creating an equitable mortgage of the property for obtaining a loan for Dast Al Exports from the concerned branch of the Bank of Baroda. If the documents have been manufactured by Somesh Prasad @ Aftab Hussain, that would be the strongest circumstance to suggest that the signature of Nalini Prasad on the guarantee document executed on the same date, 15.4.96 were also genuine, and not forged. It would also contradict the prominent role ascribed to Sajida Hussain, her brothers and the applicant in forging the said documents. 15. If there was any other circumstance other than the solitary statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. of the O.P. No. 2 that her signatures on the alleged guarantee document dated 15.4.96 were forged, there would have been at least a sliver of material to corroborate her statement. But the police collusively or carelessly neglected to obtain Nalini Prasad’s admitted signatures and to get the same compared by a hand writing expert for corroborating the allegations of O.P. No. 2. 16. No doubt Sri Chaturvedi sought to rely on the decision in State of Gujarat v. Vinaya Chandra Chota Lal Patni, AIR 1967 SC 778 for the proposition that even without a hand writing expert’s opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, a conviction could be recorded on the basis of the allegation of the complainant that he was familiar with the writing of the accused. However that was a case where the acquitted accused who was an employee of the complainant had been withdrawing money with the aid of the blank signed cheques left with him when the complainant went out of station on some business. In that case there were other documentary evidence to show the complicity of the accused, and the Court itself compared the accuseds writing on some admitted documents for concluding that the entries on the cheque were filled up by the accused who had also appended his signatures on the back of the cheque, and he also failed to make entries about such receipts in the petty cash book maintained by him. In five other cases the accused had committed the similar crime of criminal breach of trust by using the signed cheques. In five other cases the accused had committed the similar crime of criminal breach of trust by using the signed cheques. Therefore the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the present case. 17. The witnesses examined under Section 161, Cr.P.C. by the : Investigating Officer, are Sri Rajiv Sharma, who has simply stated that he was the successor manager in the concerned branch, Smt. Kumbh Gautam, Chief Manager, UPFC, Sector 6, Noida who has stated that in 1988-89 M/s Magnum Telilink, in which Somesh Prasad was the Managing Director and his wife Smt. Rashmi Prasad was the director, had taken a loan of 30.7 lakh rupees from the IFFCO, whose papers are in the office locker, and the property of Magnum Telilink is mortgaged with IFFCO. In the 161, Cr.P.C. statement of Smt. Rashmi Prasad it is mentioned that her pre-deceased husband and she were the only directors of M/s Magnum Telilink and Dast Al Exports and that Sajida Hussain was an employee there. After the death of Somesh Prasad, Sajida Hussain showing herself as the wife of Somesh Prasad forged documents and took a loan of several lakhs with the aid of her brothers, and has failed to pay back a penny of the loan and has forged her mother-in-law’s signatures, when she was Somesh Prasad’s real wife. In none of these statements has any role been ascribed to the applicant. Thus the case would clearly fall in the 3rd criteria of Bhajan Lal that the evidence collected in support of the FIR does not disclose the commission of any offence or make out any case against the applicant. The case would also be covered in the third criteria for quashing of cases set out in R.P. Kapur’s case which is to the following effect : (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.” 18. The case would also be covered in the third criteria for quashing of cases set out in R.P. Kapur’s case which is to the following effect : (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.” 18. I think that in these circumstances the allegations in the complaint that Sajida Hussain in collusion with the applicant, the Chief Manager and her brothers (to the exclusion of Somesh Prasad, the proprietor of the firm, whose execution of relevant documents for creating the equitable mortgage has not been denied by the O.P. No. 2 by filing any counter affidavit) got executed the said documents on her initiative with the help of the applicant are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person could ever reach a conclusion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the applicant. Thus this case would also fall within the ambit of criteria 5 above set out in Bhajan Lal’s case. 19. I also find force in the applicant’s contention that the prosecution of the applicant is attended with mala fide and the case would also be covered under the seventh criteria set out in Bhajan Lal. 20. It appears to me that the learned Counsel for the applicant is right in arguing that in order to stall the recovery and auction proceedings of the Nehru Place property initiated against the O.P. No. 2 and others by the applicant’s bank, (Bank of Baroda) before the DRT when her pre­deceased son Somesh Prasad @ Aftab Hussain defaulted in paying back the loan taken from the Bank, for his firm Dast Al Exports, the O.P. No. 2 has maliciously set up the false defence of conspiracy and fraud in preparing forged documents against Sajida Hussain (whom Somesh Prasad alias Aftab Hussain had married after conversion to Islam) and the applicant (the Chief Manager) and has sought to exonerate herself by adopting the plea that the guarantee document for creating the equitable mortgage of the flat at Nehru Place was not signed by her. As per the documents filed by the applicant with his application it is apparent that as Somesh Prasad alias Aftab Hussain had defaulted in repaying the credit obtained from the Bank in favour of Dast-AI Exports, the Debt Recovery Tribunal passed an order on 3.6.1999 directing the Bank of Baroda to recover a total sum of Rs. 11,67,063.04 paise from the defendant Dast-AI Exports, Aftab Hussain alias Somesh Prasad, Sajida Hussain and Mrs. Nalini Prasad along with interest and again the subsequent order was passed on 11.3.2002 directing that as a letter of the applicant’s Bank dated 29.1.2002 showed that flat No. 505, 53-54, situate in Govardhan Building in Nehru Place, New Delhi was rented out to IFFCO on a monthly rent of Rs. 2997/- and the amount was being paid by IFFCO to the joint defendant No. 4 (i.e. opposite party No. 2), the said rent be attached, as the property had already been attached on 1.3.2002 whereupon the monthly rent was being deposited with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, to which Tribunal the case had been transferred from the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur. Only after initiation of the said proceedings it appears that the opposite party No. 2 has initiated this case in a mala fide manner in order to avert recovery proceedings against her and divert the liability for the same to Sajida Hussain whom Somesh Prasad alias Aftab Hussain had married after conversion to Islam and the applicant who was the then Chief Manager of the Branch concerned and is presently Assistant General Manager, Zonal Inspection Centre, Pune. 21. In Punjab National Bank and others v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 where the facts were somewhat similar (although the facts of the present case stand on a better footing so far as the accused is concerned). In Surendra Prasad Sinha’s case, where the complainant had defaulted in repaying the loan to the Bank, and the recovery suit for the debt had been barred by limitation. However the bank thereafter adjusted the loan against the Fixed Deposit Receipts deposited by a guarantor with the bank. In Surendra Prasad Sinha’s case, where the complainant had defaulted in repaying the loan to the Bank, and the recovery suit for the debt had been barred by limitation. However the bank thereafter adjusted the loan against the Fixed Deposit Receipts deposited by a guarantor with the bank. The complaint filed against the Chairman, and Managing Director of the Bank under Sections 109, 114 and 409, IPC were quashed by the Court which observed that it had been filed in a mala fide manner, and that the “judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression and needless harassment.” It would be useful here to reproduce paragraph 5 of the aforesaid law report in its entirety : "5. It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage the Court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance. Considered from any angle we find that the respondent had abused the process and laid complaint against all the appellants without any prima facie case to harass them for vendetta. In a recent decision in Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others, AIR 2008 SC 251 the Court has noted the increased tendency of perjury these days, and referring to the decisions in Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh, Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, and other cases come down heavily on frustrated litigants who give vent to their frustration cheaply by invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal Court. It would be appropriate here to refer to paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 from Inder Mohan Goswami : "29. In Chandrapal Singh and others v. Maharaj Singh and another, (1982) 1 SCC 466 , in a landlord and tenant matter where criminal proceedings had been initiated, this Court observed in para 1 at page 467 as under : “A frustrated landlord after having met his waterloo in the hierarchy of civil Courts, has further enmeshed the tenant in a frivolous criminal prosecution which prima facie appears to be an abuse of the process of law. The facts when stated are so telling that the further discussion may appear to be superfluous. 30. The Court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much on the increase. Unless the Courts come down heavily upon such persons, the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. The Court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal Court. 31. This Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, (1988) 1 SCC 692 , observed in para 7 as under : AIR 1988 SC 709 The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” 22. For all these reasons in my view permitting criminal proceedings to continue against the applicant in Case No. 10337 of 2005, State v. Pradeep Kumar Bhatnagar, under Sections 406, 420, 467 and 471, IPC pending in the Court of CJM, Gautambudh Nagar in pursuance of the F.I.R. dated 12.5.2003, the charge-sheet dated 7.1.05 in Crime No. 165 of 2004 and the summoning order dated 3.12.2005 and consequent orders, would amount to gross abuse of the process of Court and it is expedient in the interest of justice that the same be quashed. The application is accordingly allowed. The criminal proceedings against the applicant are quashed. ————