JUDGMENT Per Ms. R. BANUMATHI, J. Challenging the order made in W.P. No. 6790 of 2007 directing the second respondent/District Collector, Virudhunagar to make a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, the Act), claimant in L.A.O.P. No. 5 of 2002, who were respondents 2 to 5 in W.P. No. 6790 of 2007 have preferred this appeal. 2. Facts in a nutshell, which led to the filing of this appeal, are as follows: First respondent and appellants 2 and 3 and late Murugesan are the sons of appellant Papammal. 4th respondent Saraswathi is the wife of late Murugesan and daughter-in-law of the first appellant. Property in S. Nos. 400/2, 405/2 and 406 of Villpathri Village, Aruppukottai Taluk, Virudhunagar District and other properties belonged to late Subban Chettiar, husband of the first appellant. Subban Chettiar has settled certain items of properties in favour of his wife first appellant. After the death of Subban Chettiar and by a registered Sale Deed dated 10.7.1974, the properties were divided. As per the partition Deed, 'A' Schedule property which includes the above said S. Nos. 400/2, 405/2 and 406 and other items of properties was given to the first appellant. The first appellant is to enjoy 'A' Schedule property during her life time without encumbering or alienating the properties. After her life time, all four sons would be equally entitled to 'A' Schedule property. 3. Acquiring lands in S. Nos. 400/2, 405/2 and 406 a total extent of 2.83.03 areas, Section 4(1) Notification was made for acquiring the lands for Kulu Santhai Water Reservoir Project. Under Award Nos. 18 and 19, compensation was paid to the first Appellant and she received the same under protest and has requested to refer the same under Section 18 of the Act. 4. Inspite of her request, reference under Section 18 was not made to Court. The first appellant has filed W.P. No. 15597 of 1995 and W.P. No. 15598 of 1995 for a direction to refer under Section 18. After contest, the writ petitions were allowed, ordering the District Collector to make a reference under Section 18. Section 18 reference was taken on file in L.A.O.P. No. 5 of 2002. 5. The compensation was enhanced to Rs. 700/- per cent and payable with interest @ 12% p.a. On the total compensation amount payable, 30% solatium was also awarded. After contest, the writ petitions were allowed, ordering the District Collector to make a reference under Section 18. Section 18 reference was taken on file in L.A.O.P. No. 5 of 2002. 5. The compensation was enhanced to Rs. 700/- per cent and payable with interest @ 12% p.a. On the total compensation amount payable, 30% solatium was also awarded. As such the District Collector has deposited Rs. 25,07,031/- as compensation amount. 6. One of the sons of the first appellant first respondent has filed I.A. No. 4 of 2007 under Section 30 of the Act claiming 1/3rd share in the compensation amount deposited. The petition was dismissed on 27.7.2007 by the Sub-Court, Aruppukottai. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the first respondent was aware of the proceedings in L.A.O.P. No. 5 of 2002. But he had not taken immediate steps to claim his share. The learned subordinate Judge held that there was no reference under Section 30 by the District Collector. The learned Subordinate Judge also took the view that compensation amount was enhanced in L.A.O.P. No. 5 of 2002 after full trial, and after order was passed in a reference under Section 18 of the Act, apportionment cannot be ordered especially when there is no reference under Section 30 of the Act. 7. Thereafter, the first respondent has filed W.P. No. 6790 of 2007 seeking writ of mandamus to direct the District Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act in respect of the properties which is the subject matter of L.A.O.P. No. 5 of 2002. Observing that there are rival claims to the compensation awarded by Land Acquisition Tribunal and whenever rival claims are made, Land Acquisition Act enjoins upon the District Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act, the learned single Judge directed the District Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act. 8. Challenging the impugned Order, the learned counsel for the appellant inter alia made the following submissions: The learned single Judge was not right in finding that where there are rival claims, it is enjoined upon the District Collector to refer the same under Section 30. 8. Challenging the impugned Order, the learned counsel for the appellant inter alia made the following submissions: The learned single Judge was not right in finding that where there are rival claims, it is enjoined upon the District Collector to refer the same under Section 30. In 1984, entire amount has been paid to the first appellant and the award has become final which is payable only to the first appellant; So long as the matter has been finally disposed of and when I.A. No. 4 of 2007 filed by the first respondent was dismissed on merits, the learned single Judge was not right in directing the District Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act. 9. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance upon AIR 2003 SC 942 : (2003) 3 SCC 128 1965 (2) SCJ 404;. 10. Supporting the impugned Order, the learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that the award passed in L.A.O.P. No. 5 of 2002 is conclusive only between the Collector and the persons interest and not amongst the persons interested. It was further submitted that only by making a reference under Section 30 of the Act, the inter se dispute between the parties could be decided and the Tribunal could take a decision on apportionment. The learned counsel would further submit that when there are rival claims, it is enjoined upon the District Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act and the learned single Judge has rightly directed the District Collector to make reference under Section 30 of the Act and the impugned Order is to be confirmed. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance upon Sharada Devi v. State of Bihar (supra). 11. The sole question which arises for our decision is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned single Judge was not right in directing the Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act. In other words, the core question is whether after the conclusion of the proceedings under Section 18, the first respondent is prevented from seeking a reference under Section 30 of the Act. 12. In other words, the core question is whether after the conclusion of the proceedings under Section 18, the first respondent is prevented from seeking a reference under Section 30 of the Act. 12. In order to appreciate the contentions, we may briefly refer to the scheme of Land Acquisition Act with particular reference to Section 18 and Section 30 of the Act and the interpretation given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Part II of the Act deals with reference to the Court and the procedures thereupon. Disputes as to apportionment of compensation are dealt with in Part IV. 13. The reference to the Civil Court by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer under Section 18 of the Act arises on application by an interested party made to the Collector, regarding the matter relating to measurement of the land acquired, compensation and apportionment of the same. If the Collector is satisfied about the requirements as provided in sub-sections (1) and (2), he must make reference to the Civil Court. 14. Under Part IV, Section 29 contemplates the compensation being apportioned between several persons interested in accordance with the agreement arrived at between them. The particulars of apportionment as specified in the award shall be conclusive as between the persons who have expressed their agreement in the apportionment of the compensation. In case of dispute, Section 30 provides as under: "Section 30: When the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arise as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof, if payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. 15. There are two classes of references under the Act one under Section 18 and the other under Section 30. The scope and objects of two sections are quite distinct. Reference under Section 18 relates to enhancement of compensation amount whereas under Section 30, reference is regarding apportionment. A person who has not accepted the award has absolute right of reference to the Court under Section 18 provided conditions laid down in Section 18 are satisfied. Under Section 30 of the Act, reference is confined to the question of title and apportionment. Moreover, under Section 30 of the Act, Collector has discretion to refer the question, while under Section 18, Collector is bound to do so. Under Section 30 of the Act, reference is confined to the question of title and apportionment. Moreover, under Section 30 of the Act, Collector has discretion to refer the question, while under Section 18, Collector is bound to do so. However, both Sections 18 and 30 are governed by the same principles as laid down under the Act. 16. Considering the scope of Section 18(1) vis-a-vis Section 30, in Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar (supra), the Supreme Court has held as under: "There are two provisions, Section 18(1) and 30 which invest the Collector with power to refer to the Court a dispute as to apportionment of compensation or as to the persons to whom it is payable. By sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act Collector is enjoined to refer a dispute as to apportionment, or as to title to receive compensation, on the application within the time prescribed by sub-section (2) of the that section of a person interested who has not accepted the award. Section 30 authorises the Collector to refer to the Court after compensation is settled under Section 11, any dispute arising as to apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. A person shown in that part of the award which relates to apportionment of compensation, who is present either personally or through a representative, or on whom a notice is served under sub-section (2) of Section 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to refer the matter to the Court. But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable, and apply to the Court for reference under Section 30, for determination of his right to compensation, which may have existed before the award or which may have devolved upon him since the award. Whereas under Section 18 an application made to the Collector must be made within the period prescribed by sub-section (2) Clause (b), there is no such period prescribed under Section 30. Whereas under Section 18 an application made to the Collector must be made within the period prescribed by sub-section (2) Clause (b), there is no such period prescribed under Section 30. Again under Section 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested. The Collector is under Section 30 not enjoined to make a reference; he may relegate the person raising a dispute as to apportionment, or as to the person to whom compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declared by his award." 17. The provisions of Section 30 are enabling provisions and states that where there is a dispute to the apportionment of the amount of compensation, the Collector may refer the dispute to the Civil Court. It would be part of the duty of the Court to proceed to decide the dispute regarding apportionment and the same could not be denied. 18. For applicability of Section 30 all that is required is to show about the amount of compensation settled under Section 11 and that there was a dispute for apportionment of the amount of compensation. Apart from that there may be dispute as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable and if these conditions are fulfilled, it was within the discretion of the Collector as to whether the dispute be referred to the Court or not. 19. Reference can be made by the Collector when there is dispute as to apportionment of payment of compensation amount payable under the Award. In the present case, the dispute is between the first appellant and the first respondent as to the payment of compensation. In view of recitals given in the Partition Deed giving life estate to the first appellant, whether first appellant would be entitled to the entire amount and whether the appellants 2 and 3 and Murugesan-husband of 4th respondent are each entitled to 1/4th share. In short, the dispute between the parties is how the compensation amount is to be apportioned amongst the life estate holder and the sharers. 20. Admittedly, in the partition Deed dated 10.7.1974, first appellant and then minors-Balasubramnaim (1st respondent), Selva Pandi and Veeraragavan (appellants 2 and 3) were shown as 'First Party' and Murugesan-husband of 4th respondent was shown as 'Second party'. 20. Admittedly, in the partition Deed dated 10.7.1974, first appellant and then minors-Balasubramnaim (1st respondent), Selva Pandi and Veeraragavan (appellants 2 and 3) were shown as 'First Party' and Murugesan-husband of 4th respondent was shown as 'Second party'. As per the recitals in the Partition Deed, first appellant is to enjoy 'A' Schedule Property during her life time without alienation or encumbering the property. After her life time, the property is to equally devolve upon the four sons as is seen from the following recitals: From the above recitals, it is amply clear that the first appellant has only life interest in the property. The first appellant is not the absolute owner of the property. Appellant is to maintain herself and perform the marriage of the daughters from out of the income of 'A' Schedule property. The first appellant has no power to alienate or encumber the 'A' Schedule Property which is inclusive of three items acquired. 21. After her life time, the property is to devolve upon appellants 2 and 3 and first respondent and Murugesan, husband of 4th respondent. Now, serious dispute has arisen amongst the life estate holder and other sharers. The life estate holder cannot take away the whole compensation amount. The dispute is between the appellant and other legatees viz. 1st respondent and appellants 2 and 3, who are equally entitled to share. Since the appellants 2 and 3 are sailing with the first appellant. Appellants 2 and 3 have not raised objection as to receiving of entire compensation amount by the first appellant. 22. Unlike under Section 18, where the collector is bound to make a reference under Section 30, Collector has the discretion to refer the question. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that under Section 30, no statutory obligation is cast upon the Collector to make a reference and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this is not a fit case where the Court could direct the Collector to make a reference under Section 30 so as to benefit the first respondent, who has not make any claim, nor made any objection for nearly two decades. In our considered view, the above contention does not merit acceptance. In our considered view, the above contention does not merit acceptance. For applicability of Section 30, all that is required is to show about the amount of compensation was settled under Section 11 and that there was dispute for apportionment of the amount of compensation. As discussed earlier, there is a serious dispute as to the entitlement and apportionment of the amount settled under Section 11 and necessarily, the matter has to be referred to the Court under Section 30. 23. Section 4(1) Notification was published on 15.10.1982 for acquiring items 3 to 5. Section 6 declaration was made on 28.9.1983 and under award 18 and 19, compensation was paid to the first appellant on 31.3.1984. The first appellant has filed writ petitions in 1995 and only as per the direction in those writ petitions, the matter was referred under Section 18 and Section 18 reference was taken on file in L.A.O.P. No. 5 of 2002. Drawing our attention to the various dates, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that over the years, the first respondent remained silent without raising any objection as to receipt of compensation amount by the fist appellant herself. The learned counsel further submitted that inspite of the fact that first respondent was aware of all the proceedings, he has not participated. Without participating in the earlier proceedings, the first respondent cannot seek for reference under Section 30 of the Act nearly after two decades. Power of reference in the above contention is unacceptable. The power of reference under Section 30 is wider than the power of reference under Section 18. While so, can it be said that merely because the first respondent did not appear before the Land Acquisition Officer, he has no right to seek for reference under Section 30? The answer to the same must be rendered having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. A person may not appear before the Collector either having not been issued any notice or otherwise and still his interest may have to be protected by the Collector and the Collector could make a reference under Section 30. 24. The answer to the same must be rendered having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. A person may not appear before the Collector either having not been issued any notice or otherwise and still his interest may have to be protected by the Collector and the Collector could make a reference under Section 30. 24. Assailing the direction of the learned single Judge, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the dispute, as a pre-existing right or interest in the property acquired, is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to Civil Court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. In the light of the inter se dispute between the parties, two aspects are to be determined: (i) determination of right of the first appellant herself as to her entitlement to receive the compensation amount; (ii) the apportionment of the compensation amount amongst the appellants 2 and 3 and respondents 1 to 4. The appellants are not right in contending that such dispute as to the apportionment cannot be determined by reference under Section 30 of the Act. 25. For making reference under Section 30, Collector has to be satisfied as to the existence of dispute for making reference. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that for exercising discretion by the Collector, terms under Section 30 are to be complied with and the matter goes to the Court only upon reference and exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court cannot issue such a direction to the Collector to make a reference under Section 30. 26. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance upon Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar and Another (supra). "33. The Collector acts as a representative of the State whilst holding proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. In fact, he conducts the proceedings on behalf of the State. The award of the Collector is not the source of the right to compensation; it is the pre-existing right which is recognized by the Collector and guided by the findings arrived at in determining the objections, if any, the Collector quantifies the amount of compensation to be placed as an officer of the appropriated Government to the owner recognized by the State. The offeree may accept or decline the offer. The offeree may accept or decline the offer. If he accepts he offer and the Government takes possession over the land, the title of the offeree is extinquished and vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. The power to make an award under Section 11 and to make a reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act is a statutory power. The sweep of jurisdiction of the Court to determine the disputes is also statutory and is controlled by the bounds created by Sections 17 or 30 whereunder the reference has been made to the Court. The power has to be exercised to the extent to which it has been conferred by the statute and on availability of pre-existing conditions on the availability of which and which alone the power can be exercised. 35. In (6) Moo I.A. No. 134 (PC) their Lordwhips of the Privy Council have held that wherever jurisdiction is given by a statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein, it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. The Privy Council decision above said was followed and the statement of law made therein approved by this Court in AIR 1965 SC 304 . This Court held that under the Land Acquisition Act the matter goes to the Court only upon a reference made by the Collector and there is no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Court arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it. The Court can adjudicate upon the matter referred to it but the Court is certainly not invested with the jurisdiction to consider a matter not directly connected with it and this is not a matter of mere technicality. A case of lack of inherent jurisdiction will not be cured by mere failure to object to the proceedings before the Court on the ground of an absence of reference on matters not referred. There can be no waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there is an absence of inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor can be cured by acquiescence." 27. There can be no waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there is an absence of inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor can be cured by acquiescence." 27. Contending that the Court will have no jurisdiction to call upon the Collector to make a reference to exercise the discretion in making a reference, the learned counsel placed reliance upon S. Palanisamy and Others v. Special Tahsildar (ADW) and Others (supra). 28. Of course, we do feel that the first respondent should have approached the Collector by bringing it to the notice of the collector as to the controversy as to the title. But in our considered view, deciding of the dispute under Section 18 does not foreclose the rights of the parties. In paragraph 30 of the Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar and Another (supra), the Supreme Court has categorically held that award made by Collector is final and conclusive as between 'the Collector and the persons interested' and not amongst 'the persons interested' and inter-se. The Supreme Court held as under: "30. The scheme of the Act reveals that the remedy of reference under Section 18 is intended to be available only to a 'person interested.' A person present either personally or through representative or on whom a notice is served under Section 12(2) is obliged, subject to his specifying the test as to locus, to apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to make a reference to the Court. The basis of title on which the reference would be sought for under Section 18 would obviously be pre-existing title by reference to the date of the award. So is Section 29, which speaks of 'person interested'. Finality to the award spoken of by Section 12(1) of the Act is between the Collector on one hand and the 'person interested' on the other hand and attaches to the issues relating to (i) the true area i.e. measurement of the land; (ii) the value of the land, i.e. the quantum of compensation, and (iii) apportionment of the compensation among the 'persons interested'. The 'persons interested' would be bound by the award without regard to the fact whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not. The 'persons interested' would be bound by the award without regard to the fact whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not. The finality to the award spoken of by Section 29 is as between the 'person interested' inter se and is confined to the issue as to the correctness of the apportionment. Section 30 is not confined in its operation only to 'persons interested'. I would, therefore, be available for being invoked by the 'persons interested' if they were neither present not represented in proceedings before the Collector, nor were served with notice under Section 12(2) of the Act or when they claim on the basis of a title coming into existed post award. The definition of 'persons interested' speaks of 'an interested in compensation to be made'. An interest coming into existence post award gives rise to a claim in compensation which has already been determined. Such a person can also have recourse to Section 30. In any case, the dispute for which Section 30 can be invoked shall remain confined only (i) as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or (ii) as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation (already determined) or any part thereof is payable. The State claiming on the basis of a pre-existing right would not be a 'person interested', as already pointed out hereinabove and on account of his right being pre-existing, the State, in such a case, would not be entitled to invoke either Section 18 or Section 30 seeking determination of its alleged pre-existing right. A right accrued or developed post award may be determined in a reference under Section 30 depending on Collector's discretion to show indulgence, without any bas as to limitation. Alternatively, such a right may be left open by the Collector to be adjudicated upon in any independent legal proceedings. This view is just, sound, and logical as a title post award could not have been canvassed up to the date of the award an should also not be left without remedy by denying access to Section 30. Viewed from this angle, Sections 18 and 30 would not overlap and would have fields to operate independent of each others." 29. This view is just, sound, and logical as a title post award could not have been canvassed up to the date of the award an should also not be left without remedy by denying access to Section 30. Viewed from this angle, Sections 18 and 30 would not overlap and would have fields to operate independent of each others." 29. The main plank of argument of the appellants is that since petition filed in I.A. No. 4 of 2007 and under Section 30 having been dismissed on merits, the first respondent ought not to have invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking for direction to the Collector under Section 30 of the Act. Laying emphasis upon the findings in I.A. No. 4 of 2007, the learned counsel for the appellants would submit that when I.A. No. 4 of 2007 was considered on merits, it has become final and while so, it is not open to the first respondent to re-open the entire issue by seeking for reference. 30. The contention that when determination of I.A. No. 4 of 2007, the issue had become final is untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court to decide the inter se dispute between the parties and apportionment of compensation amount would arise only on the basis of reference made to it by the Collector. Like under, Section 18 of the Act, there is no suo motu power or at the instance of any of the parties for taking the matter for inquiry. Section 30 contemplates a reference by the Collector. In our considered view, the learned Subordinate Judge could have dismissed I.A. No. 4 of 2007 on the simple ground that there was no reference by the Collector under Section 30 of the Act. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to have exceeded the jurisdiction in deciding I.A. No. 4 of 2007 on merits and therefore, it cannot be contended that findings render in I.A. No. 4 of 2007 had become conclusive. 31. The learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that as against the order passed in I.A. No. 4 of 2007, the first respondent has not chosen to file any appeal or revision and writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. 31. The learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that as against the order passed in I.A. No. 4 of 2007, the first respondent has not chosen to file any appeal or revision and writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, High Court not only has administrative superintendence but also power of judicial superintendence. But the power of superintendence under Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly to keep the inferior Courts within the bounds of their authority. Nomenclature under which the petition is filed is not quite relevance. Assuming for the sake of arguments, even if writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226, the Court can certainly treat the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Simply because writ petition was filed under Article 227, the High Court need not refrain from exercising its jurisdiction. Both articles 226 and 227 of he Constitution of India are devised only to advance justice and not to frustrate it. Therefore, the appellants are not right in contending that exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, the learned Single Judge ought not to have issued writ of mandamus directing the District Collector to make a reference. 32. Having regard to the facts of the case and the dispute as to the apportionment of the compensation amount settled under Section 11 of the Act, the learned Single Judge has rightly directed the District Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act. We do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. 33. In the result, the order of the learned Single Judge is confirmed and the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. M.P. (MD) Nos. 1 of 2007 and 1 of 2008 are closed. 34. In the light of our above findings, the District Collector is directed to make a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. 35. A reference if made under Section 30 of the Act, the learned Subordinate Judge, Aruppukottai, shall take the reference on file and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. Writ appeal dismissed.