ORDER 1. The appellant Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (henceforth "the Board") is aggrieved by the judgment dated 02-08-2007 passed by the District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No,02-B/2006 whereby in a case of death of a labourer Shivkumar Dhruv on 15-08-2005 due to electrocution as a result of siphoning of the electricity to his field by clandestine pilferage committed by respondent No,5Samaru Lal Lasre, damages of Rs.l, 75,000/- against the appellant/Board were awarded to the respondents NO.1 to 4 being the widow and three minor children of the deceased. 2. The only point urged by Shri R.S. Patet, learned counsel for the appellant/Board in this appeal is that there is no evidence on record to show that death of Shivkumar Dhruv occurred due to any negligence on the part of the . Board in maintaining electricity supply lines. It was contended that as admitted by Smt. Teras Bai the widow of the deceased, due to a heavy rainfall and storm occurring a day prior to the incident the bamboos on which the two kilometer long illegal connection taken by Samaru Lal Lasre was supported, had fallen due to which the live wire of illegal connection had become exposed. It was thus solely due to the negligence of Samaru Lal Lasre that death of Shivkumar had occurred. Since, no negligence on the part of the appellant/Board was proved, the liability to pay compensation ought to have been fastened on respondent No.5-Samaru Lal Lasre alone and not on the Board. Reliance was placed on SDO, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd., and Others Vs. Timudu Oram. 3. On the other hand, Shri A. V. Sridhar, learned counsel for respondent No.1 argued that liability to pay damages was primarily that of the Board which was solely responsible for taking measures to prevent any such mishap due to theft of electricity committed by Samam Lal Lasre. Reliance was placed on MP. Electricity Board Vs. Sunder Bai and Other. 4. Having heard rival contentions, I have perused the record. In M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Reliance was placed on MP. Electricity Board Vs. Sunder Bai and Other. 4. Having heard rival contentions, I have perused the record. In M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumar and Others, the supplier of electricity in a locality striving to squirm out of the liability to compensate the dependants of the sole victim of a snap electrocution had pleaded that electrocution was due to the clandestine pilferage committed by a stranger unauthorisedly siphoning the electric energy from the supply line and hence the wrong, doer alone should be mulcted with the burden of damages. In a suit filed by the dependents of the victim, the trial Court agreed with the above contentions of the Board. In an appeal, High Court disagreed and directed the Board to pay the amount of damages assessed. In appeal the Supreme Court held as under: "7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into if(sic) the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy of his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the look out (sic) the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin In English Common Low when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Ryland. Vs. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin In English Common Low when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Ryland. Vs. Fletcher, Blackburn J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: "The rule of law is that the person who for his own purpose, brings on his land and collects and keeps there any1hing likely to do mischief if it escapes. must keep it at his peril, and if he does so he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." 10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case law to the doctrine of strict liability it is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this. "Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeceable (sic) act of a stranger, the rule does not apply." 11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. VI'. Eastern Counties Leather Plc.s The said principle gained approval in India, and decision or the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of India6 and a Division Bench in Gujarat State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhat had followed with approval the principle in Rylands Vs. Fletcher. By referring to the above two decisions a two Judge Bench of this Come has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 12. In M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that "where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident. such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Ryland. Vs. Fletcher". 13. such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Ryland. Vs. Fletcher". 13. In the present case the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands Vs. F1etcher) being "an act of stranger". The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant Board. In, North-western Utilities. Ltd London Guarantee and Accident Company Ltd. (1936 Appal Cases 108) the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the at recited exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintit1s was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured weld adjoin in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the constriction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage. 14. The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Railway Light Heat and Power Company Ltd. Vs. vandry and other that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high tension a violent wind its way through the low tension cable into the premises of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire laying on the road." In the light of above discussion the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal field by the M.P. Electricity Board without issuing notice to the respondents. 5. The abovementioned case or M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumar and Others (Supra) applies with full force to the present case. To make the situation worse for the Board. 5. The abovementioned case or M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumar and Others (Supra) applies with full force to the present case. To make the situation worse for the Board. Anupam Sarkar who appeared as a witness for the Board admitted that the Board has recovered the electric charges from Samaru Lal Lasre for the electricity clandestindy siphoned to him by hooking from the electric lines of the Board for a period of three months. J. Chatterji. Assistant I Engineer. N.A W.2 also stated that responsibility I, inspection of the supply lines r was of the lineman Bisahu Ram. Bisahu Ram. lineman Incharge for Village Khamtarai was not examined by the appdlant. Hoard. (iol ina Ram Kaushik.: NAW.3. Lineman admitted that Bisahu though, he had knowledge about the incident. He further admitted that the illegal connection taken by Samaru Lal Lasre is easily visible from a long distance also. The very fact that the appellant/Board has recovered charges for electricity consumed by Samaru Lal Lasre for three months would also go to show that the appellant/Board and its employees were in complete slumber regarding the inspection of the supply lines. Tribes goes to show that the appellant/Board was wholly negligent in regularly making inspection of the supply lines. In this manner, negligence of the appellant/Board in supervising the safety of and pilferage from the supply lines is clearly borne out. The case of SDO. Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd.. and Others Vs. Timudu Oram (supra) cited by learned counsel for the appellant/ Board is distinguishable since a writ petition was filed after a lapse of 10 years for which no reasons were given. It was further held that subsequent suit for writ petition would not be maintainable in view of the dismissal of the suit. Such conditions do not exist in the present suit. In this view of the matter, the trial Court rightly fastened the liability on the appellant/Board to pay damages. 6. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed aUhe stage of admission. Appeal Dismissed.