JUDGMENT Mutum B.K. Singh, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 15.01.2007 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Dimapur in MAC Case No. 05 of 2006 awarding compensation of Rs.2,67,000/- to the claimant-respondent No. 1. 2. That, necessary facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are that the claimant-respondent No. 1 filed a claim petition before the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Dimapur (hereinafter referred to 'the Tribunal') for a compensation of Rs.5,28,640/- alleging that on 03.10.2002 at about 03-30 p.m. he sustained injuries on his chest and right ribs in a vehicular accident while travelling in a bus bearing No. NL-06-B-0132, against the owner, driver of the vehicle and the appellant-Insurance Company. 3. The claimant-respondent No. 1 claimed himself to be aged about 30 years at the time of accident, businessman by profession and earning about Rs.5,000/- per month. According to the claimant, he suffered 35-40% permanent disability because of the said accident. The appellant-Insurance Company filed written statement on 10.03.2006 denying the claim of the claimant-respondent No. 1. The driver and owner of the offending vehicle also filed a joint written statement alleging that the claim of the claimant-respondent No. 1 was unreasonable and highly excessive and liable to be quashed. It was also alleged that the offending vehicle was covered by a comprehensive policy of the National Insurance Company and filed vehicle registration certificate, driving licence and the Insurance Policy Certificate etc. 4. The Tribunal examined the claimant-respondent No. 1 and the Doctor, who examined the claimant-respondent No. 1. No defence witness, on behalf of the Insurance Company as well as the driver and owner of the vehicle, was produced despite reasonable opportunities given to them. On 08.11.2006 the examination of the defence witness was closed and fixed the case on 21.11.2006 for final argument. On 08.01.2007 both the parties filed their respective written arguments. The Tribunal, thereafter, passed the impugned judgment and award on 15.01.2006 taking the income of the claimant to be Rs.2,500/- per month and holding that the claimant-respondent No. 1 suffered 50% permanent disability and directed the Insurance Company to indemnify the vehicle owner by depositing the awarded amount within 30 days. 5. Heard Ms. A. Modi, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-Insurance Company and Mr. B.N. Sharmah, learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondent No. 1. 5. Heard Ms. A. Modi, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-Insurance Company and Mr. B.N. Sharmah, learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondent No. 1. None appears on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 despite proper service of notice. 6. Ms. Modi, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the Tribunal passed the impugned judgment and award without application of mind, by mis-appreciating the evidences on record and erroneously opined that the claimant-respondent No. 1 suffered from 50% permanent disability contrary to the evidence that the claimant-respondent No. 1 was only in the hospital for one day and continuing his business. From the above submission, it is clear that the point under challenge in the appeal is the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondent No. 1, at the outset, has strenuously contended that the appeal is not maintainable as no reasoned order was passed by the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"). The learned Counsel further submits that the appellant had not made any application before the Tribunal for grant of permission to defend the proceeding on merit under Section 170 of the Act. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 contested the proceeding by filing written statement as well as written argument. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have carefully examined the judgment and the records of the learned Claims Tribunal. It is settled principle that the Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by a Tribunal may be permitted to contest the proceeding on merit if the conditions precedent contained in Section 170 of the Act are fulfilled, otherwise the defence of the Insurance Company are to be confined only to those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act. It is settled principle that the Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by a Tribunal may be permitted to contest the proceeding on merit if the conditions precedent contained in Section 170 of the Act are fulfilled, otherwise the defence of the Insurance Company are to be confined only to those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act. Section 170 of the Act provides that where in the course of an inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that-- (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. 8. A plain reading of the provisions of Section 170 of the Act it is explicit that the Insurance Company, in order to defend the case on merit, (1) has to obtain an order in writing from the Tribunal and (2) such order should be a reasoned order. It is implicit that the Insurance Company has to file an application before the learned Tribunal during the course of proceeding satisfying the conditions that there is a collusion between the claimant and the persons against whom the claim is made and the later has failed to contest the claim. Unless the above conditions are satisfied, the Insurance Company cannot have any defence touching to the merit of the claim other than what are available under Section 149(2) of the Act. On this point, the learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondent No. 1 relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shankarayya v.United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [1998] 1 SCR 937 and National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Necolletta Rohtagi (2002) 7 SCC 475. 9. On this point, the learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondent No. 1 relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shankarayya v.United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [1998] 1 SCR 937 and National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Necolletta Rohtagi (2002) 7 SCC 475. 9. In Shankarayya (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "though the claimants themselves had joined respondent No. 1 Insurance Company in the claim petition but that was done with a view to thrust the statutory liability on the Insurance Company on account of contract of the Insurance. That was not an order of the court itself permitting the Insurance Company which was impleaded to avail of a larger defence on merit unless two conditions mentioned in Section 170 of the Act are satisfied". In Necolletta Rohtagi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court also observed that where the conditions precedent embodied in Section 170 of the Act are satisfied and the Accident Claims Tribunal passed an order permitting the insurer to avail of the grounds available to the person against whom the claim is made. The insurer can contest the claim on such ground and in case of an adverse award, can file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation for the finding regarding the negligence of the offending vehicle. 10. The ratio laid down in the above decisions is that when the conditions precedent under Section170 of the Act are satisfied, the Insurance Company can challenge the merit of the proceeding in appeal. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the claim petition was filed against the owner and driver of the offending vehicle and the Insurance Company was also impleaded as a party in the proceeding. Besides the Insurance Company, the driver and the owner of the vehicle contested the claim of the claimant by filing written statement as well as the written argument. No petition was filed by the Insurance Company to avail of the grounds available to the person against whom the claim was made. It is the duty of the learned Tribunal to pass a reasoned order while granting permission under Section 170 of the Act. In the instant case, the learned Tribunal, without assigning any reason, passed a cryptic order on 08.11.2006, which runs as follows: Permission Under Section 170 of the Act passed. Such order is not in consonance with the provisions of law. In the instant case, the learned Tribunal, without assigning any reason, passed a cryptic order on 08.11.2006, which runs as follows: Permission Under Section 170 of the Act passed. Such order is not in consonance with the provisions of law. The learned Tribunal, either on the basis of an application filed by the Insurance Company or on its own motions, before passing an order under Section 170 of the Act should satisfy the existence of the above two conditions precedent and such satisfaction shall be objective satisfaction basing on the facts and circumstances of the case and the reasons for satisfaction must be recorded in writing. In the case at hand, the learned Tribunal has not given reason while passing the order under Section 170 of the Act. The learned Tribunal should not have undermined the provisions of law by passing such cryptic order and the same cannot be treated as an order passed in accordance with the provisions of Section 170 of the Act. 11. In the light of the above discussion and observations, I find force to the submission made by the learned Counsel for the claimant-respondent No. 1. The Insurance Company has no locus standi to file the present appeal challenging the quantum of award passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in MAC Case No. 05 of 2006. 12. Resultantly, this appeal is dismissed as not maintainable in law. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.