JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. This order shall dispose of Crl. Misc.No.40404-M of 2007 and Crl. Misc. No.31029-M of 2006 as common questions of law and facts are involved in both these petitions. 2. The petitioners of both these petitions, seek quashing of Criminal Complaint No.5/1 of 18.1.2006 titled 'Charanjit Singh Dua Vs. M/s Dua Brothers & others filed under sections 63, 65, 67 and 68 of the Copy Right Act, 1957 (for short, the Act) and under sections 420/465/466/468/471/474/120-B IPC pending in the court of Shri Ranjan Khullar, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ludhiana as well as the summoning order dated 21.4.2007 summoning the petitioners under section 420 IPC under sections 64, 65 and 68 of the Act as also subsequent proceedings arising therefrom. 3. For facility, facts are being taken from Crl.Misc. No.40404-M of 2007. 4. The petitioner who is a Non-Resident-Indian settled in India has sought the quashing of the complaint on the plea that a false complaint with mala fide intention with an object to harass the petitioner has been filed against him. 5. The petitioner is one of the sleeping partner of M/s Dua Brothers in view of the partnership deed dated 25.11.1996. Other partners of the firm are Sumeet Kaur, the real sister-in-law of the wife of the petitioner and the husband of Sumeet Kaur namely Inder Pal Singh who is the manager of firm M/s Dua Brothers. The complaint filed against the petitioner reads as under:­ “1. that the complainant is the son of late S. Moinder Singh Dua who at the time of his death was residing at 363-R, Model Town, Ludhiana. 2. That the father of the complainant was a partner from 1959 till 25.2.1986 in the firm M/s Dua Brothers-accused No.1.The dissolution deed of the said firm was executed on 26.2.1986, whereby S.Mohinder Singh Dua had retired from the firm w.e.f. 25.2.1986. 3. that the firm M/s Dua Brothers was engaged in the business of manufacturing and sale of electric irons. 4. that complainant/s father late S.Mohinder Singh Dua created an artistic work of a Label of Deson electrical iron by expending his personal skill and labour. The said artistic work was first published in 1960. As such, complainant's father S.Mohinder Singh Dua was the first owner of the said copyright. 4. that complainant/s father late S.Mohinder Singh Dua created an artistic work of a Label of Deson electrical iron by expending his personal skill and labour. The said artistic work was first published in 1960. As such, complainant's father S.Mohinder Singh Dua was the first owner of the said copyright. It comprised of the drawing and painting of the said Label of Deson electrical iron in a particular style, design and get up. The said artistic work was created by S. Mohinder Singh Dua individually without any collaboration with any other person. It was not under any contract and employment from any other firm, concern or other person, nor Mohinder Singh Dua had received any consideration to create the said work from any quarter. As such, the complainant/s father S.Mohinder Singh Dua was the exclusive owner and proprietor of the said copyright as defined u/s 14 read with section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The said facts are corroborated from the entries made in columns No.7 and 9 of the Copyright Register dated 20.12.1988, a copy of which is attached herewith. 5. That the said copy right in the shape of its aforesaid artistic work with all its rights, vested in S.Mohinder Singh Dua as his personal movable property. No one else, during his life time, could have any claim over the same, nor anybody has any right, power or authority to use the said copyright or to reproduce the same without the written licence, consent or approval of S.Mohinder Singh Dua. 6. That it is duly provided under the Law of the Copyright Act, 1957 that duration of the proprietary rights of the copyright in any artistic work exists till the life time of the author/first owner, and for the further period of 60 years from the death of the said author/first owner. After the death of the author/first owner, the rights in the said copyright devolve on the legal heirs of the said author/first owner 7. That no person gets any right to use any copyright owned by any other person, unless the same is assigned under provided under sections 18 and 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957 or the, rights in the said copyright are licenced to the said other persons in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 30 of the? Act (Supra). That no person gets any right to use any copyright owned by any other person, unless the same is assigned under provided under sections 18 and 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957 or the, rights in the said copyright are licenced to the said other persons in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 30 of the? Act (Supra). It is further provided that for any such assignment or licence, the same is to be made in writing and has to be duly signed by the author/owner/assignor. 8. That since there has been no written licence nor there has been any assignment by S.Mohinder Singh Dua, no person during his life time could claim any right in the said copyright. 9. That S.Mohinder Singh Dua has died intestate on 7.12.1988. Copy of the death certificate of S.Mohinder Singh Dua is attached. As such, after his death, the right of the said copyright has devolved upon his legal heirs namely the complainant, Harpal Singh as sons and Sarabjit Kaur, Suminder Kaur and Jaswinder Kaur as daughters and Smt. Mam Kaur as widow No other person other than these legal heirs of late S.Mohinder Singh Dua is having any right, title or interest in the said copyright. 10. That the accused No.2 and 3 claiming to be partners of accused No.1 firm, in criminal conspiracy and in connivance with accused No.4 claiming to be Manager of accused no.1/firm, dishonestly and illegally by fraudulent means and in a deceitful manner applied for and obtained the registration of the aforesaid copyright vide Registration No.A-49566/88 dated 20.12.1988 in the name of accused No.1 firm showing it to be constituted of the partners namely S.Mohinder Singh Dua, S.Harjit Singh and Smt.Jagir Kaur. The said act was committed and/or caused to be committed by accused No.2 and 3 by forging and fabricating false documents and using the same as genuine, in which they dishonestly and falsely showed S.Mohinder Singh Dua as a partner of accused No.1 firm as on 20.12.1988, whereas S. Mohinder Singh Dua had not only retired from the said firm w.e.f. 25.2.1986 as evidence from dissolution deed dated 26.2.86, but S.Mohinder Singh Dua had even expired on 7.12.1988 i.e. before the said registration was obtained by the accused persons. The said registration was as such dishonestly and illegally obtained on 20.12.88 in criminal conspiracy and connivance of accused No.4 with the other accused by concealing the fact that and falsifying the records so as to show that S.Mohinder Singh Dua was still a partner of accused No.1 firm on 20.12.1988. 11. That thereafter sometime in 1999, the accused No.2 and 3 again in criminal conspiracy with accused No.4 forged, fabricated and created and/or caused to be created false documents with the intention to use the same as genuine, and thereby got the registration of the aforesaid copyright transferred from the same of the accused firm comprising of partners Mohinder Singh Dua, Harjit Singh and Jagjit Kaur, to the names of accused No.2 and 3. As per the law, the accused No.1 firm was not the owner of the aforesaid copyright and nor did it have any claim, right, interest, whatsoever in any of the rights emanating from the aforesaid copyright. It is reiterated that the father of the complainant, namely Shri Mohinder Singh Dua was the owner of the aforesaid copyright under the Copyright Act and upon his death, in the absence of any assignment, licence, testamentary disposition, it was only the legal heirs i.e. the complainant and other legal heirs of the owner S.Mohinder Singh Dua deceased, who were now entitled to all the rights including the title emanating from the aforesaid copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957 for a period of 60 years commencing from 1st of January, 1989 onwards. Under no circumstance, but for having tendered before the Registrar and other concerned Govt. officials, such forged, fabricated and anti-dated documents, neither the aforesaid copyright could have been got registered in the name of accused No.1 firm nor the same could be transferred in the name of accused No.2 and 3 purporting themselves to be the now partners of the aforesaid accused No.1 firm. It is reiterated that mere induction into the partnership firm does not entail grant of any rights qua the aforesaid copyright under the Copyright Act. It is reiterated that mere induction into the partnership firm does not entail grant of any rights qua the aforesaid copyright under the Copyright Act. The mere fact that the accused No.2 and 3 were able to get the aforesaid otherwise legally impossible transfer of registration as well as the registration at the first instance, a posterior is itself an axiomatic proof of the illegal, nefarious and criminal acts of the accused to falsely procure the registration and the subsequent transfer of the aforesaid copyright from the Registrar by firstly forging and fabricating and anti-dating documents and secondly, by knowing fully well tendering and using the same in evidence before the Registrar and to her concerned officials under the Copyright Act in order to consummate their nefarious and oblique motive and hidden designs of committing fraud and causing wrongful loss and deprivation to the complainant of his valuable rights under the Act and earning wrongful gains and providing a grab of legality to their otherwise illegal use which tantamount to infringement of the aforesaid copyright. 12. That the said application for transfer was submitted in the names of Smt. Sumeet Kaur and Shri Balbir Singh Walia as partners of accused No.1 firm in 1999, whereas S.Harjit Singh had retired from the firm on 25.2.1986 and Smt. Jagjit Kaur had also expired on 19.3.1998. As such, the said transfer obtained by accused No.2 and 3 was based on forgery and fabrication and by preparation of false documents. Copy of Death Certificate of Smt. Jagjit Kaur is attached. 13. That the accused no.2 and 3, further claiming themselves as partners of accused No.1 firm illegally and dishonestly used the said copyright, which belonged to the complainant and other legal heirs of late S.Mohinder Singh Dua upon his death w.e.f. 7.12.1988. The said illegal use of the copyright by accused No.1 to 3, therefore, constituted infringement of the said copyright. The said infringement of the copyright has been committed by the accused knowingly and having reason to believe that it did not belong to them. The said illegal use of the copyright by accused No.1 to 3, therefore, constituted infringement of the said copyright. The said infringement of the copyright has been committed by the accused knowingly and having reason to believe that it did not belong to them. The accused have been having no written license ever granted by S.Mohinder Singh Dua or by the complainant of any other legal heir of late S.Mohinder Singh Dua in respect of the aforesaid copyright nor it was ever assigned to the said accused, nor they have any right of succession from S.Mohinder Singh Dua in respect of the said copyright. The said copyright was a personal movable property owned by S.Mohinder Singh Dua and after his death w.e.f. 7.12.1988, the complainant and the other legal heirs of Mohinder Singh Dua are the owners/proprietors thereof. 14. That the accused have thus knowing infringed/abetted the infringement of the copyright in the aforesaid artistic work belonging to the complainant along with other legal heirs of Late S.Mohinder Singh Dua. The accused have also caused to be made false entries in the register of copyrights kept under the Copyright Act, 1957, and they have also produced/tendered false documents as mentioned above as evidence in the proceedings before the Court in the original suit bearing No.1 of 23.1.1999 entitled “M/s Dua Brothers Vs. Dua Enterprises” decided by the Court of Sh.B.S.Mehandiratta, ADJ, Ludhiana vide judgment and decree dated 17.7.2000 and also in the original suit bearing No.2 of 23.10.2003, entitled “M/s Dua Brothers Vs. M/s Dua International” pending in the court of Shri B.S.Sodhi, ADJ, Ludhiana and fixed for 18.1.2006.The said false documents as evidence have been produced by the accused in the proceedings of the said suits knowing the same to be false. 15. That the accused, as stated above, with a view to deceive the competent authorities under the Copyright Act, 1957 and also for procuring the grant of registration of the aforesaid copyright in their favour, made false representations knowing them to be false. Inasmuch as that the accused represented that the firm M/s Dua Brothers comprised of Mohinder Singh Dua, Harjit Singh and Jagjit Kaur as partners on 20.12.1988, whereas the said statement was absolutely false to their own knowledge as stated above. Inasmuch as that the accused represented that the firm M/s Dua Brothers comprised of Mohinder Singh Dua, Harjit Singh and Jagjit Kaur as partners on 20.12.1988, whereas the said statement was absolutely false to their own knowledge as stated above. The accused also made misrepresentation to the effect that the said copyright was to be transferred from the aforesaid names to the name of M/s Dua Brothers having Sumeet Kaur and Balbir Singh Walia as partners. The said firm M/s Dua Brothers was never the owner or proprietor of the said copyright nor the accused ere having any right to get the same transferred in their name. 16. That the accused have by the aforesaid misrepresentations induced the competent authorities to grant them the registration of the aforesaid copyright and thus made a wrongful gain to themselves and a wrongful loss to the complainant and other legal heirs of the late S.Mohinder Singh Dua. The accused have also committed forgery and fabrication of the records including the valuable documents in the shape of copyright applications/statements for using the same for commercial purposes and thereby with the intention to cheat the complainant, other legal heirs of late S.Mohinder Singh Dua as well as the general public. The accused have falsified the records and prepared false documents in criminal conspiracy with each others. 17. That the accused have knowingly made as stated above and have in their possession the Plate with the help of which the printing of the infringing copyright has been got prepared by them, and which they have subsequently used for their illegal commercial benefits i.e. making the infringing copy of the said work belonging to late Shri Mohinder Singh Dua. The said act has been committed by all the accused in criminal conspiracy with each other. 18. That by the aforesaid acts, the accused have committed offences punishable under sections 63, 65, 67 and 68 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and sections 420, 465, 468, 471 and 474 read with section 120-B of IPC. 19. That the aforesaid offences have been committed by the accused within the territorial jurisdiction of P.S. Division No.6, Ludhiana. As such this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit.” Under the facts and circumstances stated above, it is, therefore, prayed that the accused may kindly be summoned, tried and punished in accordance with law. 6. That the aforesaid offences have been committed by the accused within the territorial jurisdiction of P.S. Division No.6, Ludhiana. As such this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit.” Under the facts and circumstances stated above, it is, therefore, prayed that the accused may kindly be summoned, tried and punished in accordance with law. 6. On the basis of preliminary evidence led the petitioner has been ordered to be summoned under sections 63, 65 and 68 of the Act and under Section 420 IPC. 7. M/s Dua Brothers through its working partner Smt.Sumeet Kaur filed a civil suit against M/s Dua Enterprises and against Amar Pal Singh proprietor of M/s Dua Enterprises. The said suit was filed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the trademarks of the plaintiff and passing of a decree for rendition of accounts. Said suit was decreed by the court of Shri B.S.Mehndiratta, the then Additional District Judge, Ludhiana vide judgment and decree dated 17.7.2000. The suit only qua trade name of Dua Enterprises (India) was dismissed and counter claim filed by the defendants in the said suit was also dismissed. Defendants in the said suit filed RFA No.1874 of 2000 in which the petitioner filed cross objections No.82-C-1 of 2000. However, stay was not granted to the defendants of the suit. 8. This Court has stayed the execution of the decree of rendition of accounts subject to the judgment debtors’ depositing a sum of Rs.3 lacs in the State Bank of Patiala, High Court Branch through Registrar of this Court. It was directed to be converted to the fixed deposit earning maximum rate of interest. The said amount was to remain deposited and was to be paid to successful party in the appeal. However, Judgment Debtors did not comply with the said conditional order and thus, there is no stay in the appeal filed by the defendants in the said suit. 9. It is the case of the petitioner that an FIR also stands registered against Amar Pal vide FIR No.87 dated 3.4.1999 in Police Station Division No.6, Ludhiana under sections 467 and 471 IPC as also under sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. Challan also stands presented. 10. 9. It is the case of the petitioner that an FIR also stands registered against Amar Pal vide FIR No.87 dated 3.4.1999 in Police Station Division No.6, Ludhiana under sections 467 and 471 IPC as also under sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. Challan also stands presented. 10. Amar Pal Singh is the brother-in-law of petitioner and with the intervention of the parties a compromise was arrived at on 15.6.2005 whereby it was agreed that all litigations will come to an end in terms of the said written compromise dated 15.6.2005. It is the case of the petitioner that the present complaint has been filed by the complainant at the instance of Amar Pal Singh who could not have filed the same in his own right because of the compromise entered into between the parties. 11. The stand of the petitioner is that the present case is absolutely false and that respondent No.2 i.e. the complainant has no concern with the copy right which is the basis for filing the complaint. This plea is based on the facts that in order to elucidate that the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 is absolutely false and that respondent No.2 has no right or concern with the copyright in question, it was specifically mentioned in clause-10 of the said partnership deed that in case of dissolution of the firm or in case of retirement of Mohinder Singh, party of the third part from the firm, he shall only be entitled to the amount standing credit to his account in the account books of the firm in cash only and all other assets including rights and goodwill of the firm shall being to and remain with parties of first and second part. Mohinder Singh had retired from term and it was specifically settled that all the assets and liabilities including the name and style had been taken over by the continuing partner and it was also mentioned in the said dissolution deed that Mohinder Singh has been paid the amount which stands credited to his account and he acknowledged the receipt of the said amount in full and final settlement and from then onwards, he has got no claim of any nature against the continuing partner or against the firm M/s Dua Brothers, Ludhiana. It was also stated that to make it more clear that the restraint orders passed by the court of Shri S.P.Bangarh, the then Additional District Judge, Ludhiana in Civil Suit No.12 of 4.3.2006 on 1.5.2006 had a binding effect against all the defendants including the respondent No.2 who was defendant No.1 in the suit. Complaint under section 182 IPC filed by the prosecution against respondent No.2 Charanjit Singh in the court of Shri K.K. Bansal, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana would make it clear that Charanjit Singh respondent No.2 filed false and frivolous application against the present petitioner, Sumeet Kaur, Inderpal Singh and Ajinderpal Singh to the SSP Ludhiana concealing the factum of the restraint orders of the court of Shri S.P. Bangarh, the then Additional District Judge, Ludhiana and when the police came to know of the same, an order for prosecuting Charanjit Singh respondent No.2 under section 182 IPC was passed by the police authorities and thereafter a kalandra under section 182 IPC has been filed in the court of Shri K.K. Bansal, JMIC, Ludhiana and the said court had issued a notice to respondent No.2 Charanjit Singh to face the proceedings under section 182 IPC initiated on account of the complaint filed by the police under section 182 IPC. Applying the same yardstick, Charanjit Singh absolutely had no right to prosecute the complaint after the said restraint orders or to earn a false and frivolous summoning order in the said complaint after passing of the restraint orders by the court to Shri S.P.Bangarh, the then Additional District Judge, Ludhiana as such, this act of the respondent No.2 besides being mala fide is also violative of the restraint orders passed by the court of Shri S.P.Bangarh, the then Additional District Judge, Ludhiana and thus, is punishable under the Contempt of Court Act as well. 12. The petitioner seeks quashing of the complaint on the plea that complaint has been filed on 18.1.2005 whereas alleged false occurrence alleged by the complainant is of the year 1988 and thus, the present complaint has been filed after a lapse of 17 years and six years after the finding recorded by the civil court decided in favour M/s Dua Brothers. It is also the case of the petitioner that no offence is disclosed even if the allegations levelled in the complaint are taken on their face value and therefore, continuation of the complaint and’ subsequent proceedings is nothing but misuse of the process of the court. 13. Mr. BBS Sobti, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Sections 63, 65 and 68 of the Act which read as under: “63. Offence of infringement of copyright or other rights conferred by this Act.- Any person who knowingly infringes or abets the infringement of -­ (a) the copyright in a work, or (b) any other right conferred by this Act except the right conferred by section 53-A. shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that where the infringement has not been made for gain in the course of trade or business the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or a fine of less than fifty thousand rupees. 65. Possession of plates for purpose of making infringing copies--Any person who knowingly makes, or has in his possession, any plate for the purpose of making infringing copies of any work in which copyright subsists shall be punishable ‘with imprisonment which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. 68. Penalty for making false statements for the purposes of deceiving or influencing any authority or officer-- Any person who,-- (a) with a view to deceiving any authority or officer in the execution of the provisions of this Act, or (b) with a view to procuring or influencing the doing or omission of anything in relation to this Act or any matter thereunder, makes a false statement or representation knowing the same to be false, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. 14. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner firstly is that the offence under section 63 of the Act is punishable up to 3 years and a fine of Rs.500000/- which can be extended up to two lacs, whereas the offence under section 65 of the Act is punishable up to 2 years and a fine, whereas offence under section 68 of the Act is also punishable for one year or with fine or with both. The contention of learned counsel, therefore is that in view of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. no cognizance can be taken after the expiry of 3 years and as the present complaint has been filed after a lapse of 17 years. The complaint was, thus, not maintainable and therefore, summoning order deserves to be quashed. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to section 48 of the Act which reads as under:­- “48. Register of Copyrights to be prima facie evidence of particulars entered therein.-- The Register of Copyrights shall be prima facie evidence of the particulars entered therein and documents purporting to be copies of any entries therein, or extracts therefrom certified by the registrar of Copyrights and sealed with the seal of the Copyright Office shall be admissible in evidence in all Courts without further proof or production of the original. 16. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is that a statutory recognition is given to copyright, and in view of this once the copy right has been registered in favour of the petitioner i.e. M/s Dua Brothers till the same is set aside by invoking the provisions of the Act by filing an appeal the same has to be taken to be correct and admissible in evidence and thus, no notice can be taken. In the complaint qua misuse learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even if for the sake of arguments it is taken that copyright has been obtained by misrepresentation the said misrepresentation was made at Delhi/Bombay and therefore, the court at Ludhiana would have no jurisdiction. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner made a special reference to paras No.10 and 13 of the complaint in support of this contention. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner made a special reference to paras No.10 and 13 of the complaint in support of this contention. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the complainant is claiming his right through Mohinder Singh Dua being a legal representative who admittedly was the partner of M/s Dua Brothers. The said design was used by M/s Dua Brothers during the life time of said partner and to continued to be used after he retired during his life time. 18. Thus, no right is left with the complainant to allege that there is any violation of the Act nor any offence under section 420 IPC is disclosed in view of the copyright being registered and civil suit having been decided in favour of the petitioner. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in case admitted position is that design was made by one partner in the course of partnership business and for the purpose of partnership the copyright thereof would thereafter belong to the partnership firm and not to the individual partner. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on the Meikle V. Maufe [1941] 3 All ER 144. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on a judgment of this court in the case of Piyara Singh V s. State of Haryana 2002 (3) RCR (Criminal) 290 to contend that complaint under sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act is non-cognizable and Magistrate can only mark it for investigation. It is unreasonable for the learned Magistrate to have added Section 420 IPC. 21. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that all allegations levelled even if taken on their face value no offence under section 420 IPC can be said to have been made out against the petitioner as the Act deals with the violation of the provisions of the Act and that being a special Act the provisions of Section 420 IPC could not have been invoked to defeat the bar contained in 468 IPC. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment of this court in Kheta Ram Vs. State of Haryana, 2007(3) Law Herald (Punjab & Haryana) 1836 contended that the filing of the complaint after more than 17 years is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment of this court in Kheta Ram Vs. State of Haryana, 2007(3) Law Herald (Punjab & Haryana) 1836 contended that the filing of the complaint after more than 17 years is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. This court in the case of Kheta Ram (supra) has been pleased to allow a petition filed for quashing after delay by holding: “21. Consequently, this petition is allowed; the impugned FIR No.11 dated 12.1.2007, under sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 IPC, registered at Police Station: Ellenabad, District Sirsa and the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed. The prayer made by the petitioner to grant him pre­ arrest bail, obviously, is rendered infructuous. 22. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has been forced to incur totally avoidable expenses as a result of false accusation, the respondent-complainant is also burdened with costs of Rs.256,000/- which he is directed to pay to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order failing which the SHO, PS, Ellenabad is directed to take appropriate legal action against the respondent-complainant.” 23. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Syed Kaleem Vs. M/s Mysore Lakshmi Beedi Works and another 1993 Crl.L.J.232 to contend that for the offences punishable under sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, charge under section 420 IPC cannot be made. The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Syed Kaleem’s case (supra) has been laid down as under: ”8. As regards the framing of a charge under Section 420 of IPC, it has to be stated that in view of Sections 78 and.79 of the said Act providing penalty for applying false trade descriptions etc., and selling goods to which a false Trade Mark or false trade description is applied, a charge under Section 420 of IPC becomes wholly inapt. Section 420 of IPC reads thus: “Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property,- Whether cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter of destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment or either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine”. Though there is an element of cheating in falsely applying to his goods the Trade Mark of another person or Company it cannot be said that such an act by itself would attract Section 420 IPC. When there are specific provisions in the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act which is a self contained Act to punish the persons committing offences under the said Act, it would be improper to resort to Section 420 of IPC, altogether ignoring those provisions. It is not possible to make out from the impugned order how and on what material a charge was ordered to be framed against the accused for an offence under Section 420 of IPC.” 24. To the same effect is the judgment of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Zahir Ahmed Vs. Azan Jgab 1996 Crl. Law Journal 290. 25. The petitions are opposed by Shri P.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2 i.e. the complainant. 26. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No.2 is that the design being used by the petitioner was, in fact, made by Mohinder Singh Dua who was partner of Dua Brothers from 1959 to 25.2.1986. Artistic design was created by Mohinder Singh Dua in the form of label to be used by M/s Dua Brothers in 1960. By making reference to Section 17 of the Act, learned counsel for respondent No.2 contended that the author of design is its first owner. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No.2, therefore, was that once Mohinder Singh Dua is held to be the owner the said transfer could only be made by way of written document of transfer or by assignment as envisaged under sections 18 and 19 of the Act. 27. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No.2, therefore, was that once Mohinder Singh Dua is held to be the owner the said transfer could only be made by way of written document of transfer or by assignment as envisaged under sections 18 and 19 of the Act. 27. The stand of the respondent is that Mohinder Singh Dua retired from the partnership firm in the year 1986 and he being the owner was entitled to retain the said design and M/s Dua Brothers had no right to use the same. Mohinder Singh Dua is said to have died on 7.12.1988. The case of the petitioner is that the application for registration was made by M/s Dua Brothers in December, 1988 and the said copyright was entered in the name of petitioner on 20.12.1988. 28. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No.2 was that in view of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act, the artistic work would remain under the ownership of the author for 20 years and shall be inherited and used by the legal heir for a period of 60 years. The contention of learned counsel for respondent No.2, therefore, was that mere registration of copyright cannot give right to the petitioner to use the said design and therefore, besides said offence under the Act the petitioner is also guilty of cheating under Section 420 IPC. 29. The stand of the learned counsel for the respondent is that no limitation is prescribed to try an offence under section 420 IPC and therefore, the provisions of Section 468 IPC would not be applicable and as the offence under the Act has to be tried along with the offence under section 420 IPC the complaint cannot be quashed by invoking the provisions of Section 468 of the Code. 30. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 also contended that in view of the provisions of Sections 179 and 182 of the Code it cannot be said that Ludhiana courts did not have the jurisdiction as is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 31. However, in order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for respondent No.2 it would be necessary to look into Section 45 of the Act which reads as under:­- “45. 31. However, in order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for respondent No.2 it would be necessary to look into Section 45 of the Act which reads as under:­- “45. Entries in register of Copyrights.--(1) The author or publisher of, or the owner of or other person interested in the copyright in, any work may make an application in the prescribed form accompanied by the prescribed fee to the Registrar of Copyrights for entering particulars of the work in the Register of Copyrights; Provided that in respect of an artistic work which is used or is capable of being used in relation to any goods, the application shall include a statement to that effect and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the Registrar of trade Marks referred to in section 4 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958), to the effect that no trade mark identical with or deceptively similar to such artistic work has been registered under that Act in the name of, or that no application has been made under the Act for such registration by, any person other than the applicant. (2) On receipt of an application in respect of any work under sub-section (1), the Registrar of Copyrights may, after holding such inquiry as he may deem fit, enter the particulars of the’ work in the Register of Copyrights.” 32. Admittedly, the complaint is filed on the plea that the design of the label as authored by Mohinder Singh Dua is being used by M/s Dua Brothers on the product which they are selling. 33. On consideration of the matter, I find force in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 34. The complainant, if aggrieved, by the registration of the copyright then the remedy with the complainant is to challenge the same before the appropriate authority and once the copyright exist in favour of the petitioner it cannot be said that the use of the copyright result in any offence which is said to have been committed. It is pertinent to mention here that in the civil suit the claim of the petitioner stands established. 35. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Suresh Vs. Mahadevappa Shivappa Danannava and another 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 783 has been pleased to hold as under:­ “10. It is pertinent to mention here that in the civil suit the claim of the petitioner stands established. 35. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Suresh Vs. Mahadevappa Shivappa Danannava and another 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 783 has been pleased to hold as under:­ “10. We have also perused Annexures P-1 to P-3 which are copies of the pleadings/documents which form part of the records of the case in the High Court against whose order leave to appeal was sought for in this appeal. We have carefully perused the order passed by the High Court. The High Court, in our opinion, has passed the order in a mechanical way without applying its mind. A perusal of the complaint would show that the entire dispute raised by the complainant is based on the alleged agreement to sell dated 25.12.1988 nearly 11 years prior to the filing of the private complaint on 17.5.1999. The existence of any such agreement or any advance taken has been specifically denied by the appellant by way of his reply dated 18.7.1996 in response to the legal notice dated 11.7.1996 sent by the complainant through his lawyer. For nearly 3 years from the date of reply, the complainant kept quiet before filing his complaint on 17.5.1999 before the Magistrate. It is stated that even as per the police report, no offence is made out against Accused 2-4. Despite this, the magistrate issued process against Accused 2-4 as well which clearly shows the non-application of mind by the magistrate. A perusal of the complaint would only reveal that the allegations as contained in the complaint are of civil nature and do not prima facie disclose commission of alleged criminal offence under Section 420 IPC. The Magistrate, in our opinion, has not considered the report filed by the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. judicially. Irrespective of the opinion of the police, the Magistrate may or may not take cognizance under Section 190 (1) Cr.P.C. In the instant case, as could be seen from the records, the police has given a clean chit to Accused 2-4. In our opinion, the Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the alleged offence against Accused 1, the appellant therein and that the complaint has been made to harass Accused 1 to come to terms by resorting to criminal process. 11. In our opinion, the Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the alleged offence against Accused 1, the appellant therein and that the complaint has been made to harass Accused 1 to come to terms by resorting to criminal process. 11. As already noticed, the complaint was filed on 17.5 .1999 after a lapse of 10½ years and, therefore, the very private complaint filed by Respondent 1 is not at all maintainable at this distance of time. It is the specific case of Accused 1 that he has not executed any agreement to sell or received any advance payment. In our view, the complaint does not disclose the ingredients of Section 415 Cr.P.C and therefore, we have no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence alleged. It is also not clearly proved that to hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time for making the promise. The order of the magistrate and of the High Court requiring Accused 1-appellant herein to face trial would not be in the interest of justice. On the other hand, in our considered opinion, this is a fit case for setting aside the order of the Magistrate as confirmed by the High Court for issuance of process and the proceedings itself.” 36. Thus, in view of the law laid down in Suresh’s case (supra) filing of complaint after 17 years that too which the design was authored by Mohinder Singh Dua as partner of M/s Dua Brothers it can safely be said that criminal complaint and subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are nothing but misuse of the process of the court. The parties if aggrieved by any action can resort to civil remedy in accordance with law but the complainant cannot be permitted to misuse the process of the court to use it as a tool of harassment to the petitioner. 37. In addition, Balbir Singh Walia, petitioner in Crl. Misc. No.31029-M of 2006 is a Non-Resident-lndian of the firm and not responsible for day to day business of the partnership firm and therefore, the proceedings under section 420 IPC cannot be initiated against him in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Vunna Visali Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2001 (3) RCR 342. 38. State of Andhra Pradesh 2001 (3) RCR 342. 38. Consequently, both the petitions are allowed. The complaint and summoning order and all subsequent proceedings qua the petitioners are ordered to be quashed. --------------------