ORDER 1. The insurer has filed this appeal against the award dated 13.5.2003 in claims case No. 74/1999 by the Nth Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Durg (CG) (henceforth the Tribunal), whereby in an injury case, compensation of Rs.2,47,009/- has been awarded jointly and severally against the appellant and ,i1e respondents No.1 & 2 Le. driver and the owner of the motor cycle bearing No. MP 24-EB/5029. 2. Despite service of notice, respondent NO.3 Leela Ram Dewangan/ claimant did not contest this appeal. 3. Admittedly, on 8.9.1998, the respondent No.3 Leela Ram Dewangan was riding on his scooter from Durg to Urla. He was carrying a bag of sugar weighing about 15 Kgs near his feet. It was also not disputed by the claimant in the Tribunal that the accident occurred on a curve. 4. The Tribunal considered the fact that the claimant was carrying a bag containing 15 Kgs of sugar near his feet on the scooter and held that to some extent, the claimant was also responsible for the accident. However, it did not apportion the compensation awarded between the respondent No.3/c1aimant on the one hand and the appellant and respondents No.1 & 2 on the other. The Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 2,47,009/- jointly and severally against the appellant and the respondents No.1 & 2 with interest @6% perannum from the date of application till realisation. The Tribunal also ordered that if the compensation was not deposited within two months, the appellant and respondents No.1 & 2 herein shall also be jointly and severally liable to pay interest @ 12% per annum on the amount awarded. 5. The respondent No.1/driver and respondent No.2/ownerofthe motor cycle No. M.P.24-EB/5029 did not prefer any appeal or cross objection against the award. 6. The appellant/insurer preferred the appeal on the following grounds: (a) that, the Tribunal acted illegally and or with material irregularity in fastening the liability upon the insurance company. (b) the respondent No. l/driver did not posses valid driving licence to drive a motorcycle on the date of accident. (c) that, in view of the finding that the respondent No.3 was also responsible for the accident to some extent, compensation ought to have been apportioned by the Tribunal. 7. (b) the respondent No. l/driver did not posses valid driving licence to drive a motorcycle on the date of accident. (c) that, in view of the finding that the respondent No.3 was also responsible for the accident to some extent, compensation ought to have been apportioned by the Tribunal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant/insurer did not dispute that permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicle Act to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim was preferred, was not sought by the insurer form the Tribunal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant/insurer argued that in view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the respondent No.3/ctaimant was also responsible to some extent in causing the accident, the liability to pay compensation ought to have been apportioned by the Tribunal. It was also urged that the Tribunal failed to notice that the permanent disability certificate (Ex.P-7) on the basis of which a finding that claimant had sustained 50% permanent disability was recorded, was obtained by the claimant from Dr. G.S. Thakur after filing the application for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was also urged that the Tribunal did :en' record any finding regarding culpable negligence of the respondent No.1 in the accident. It was further urged that due to non-examination of Dr. D.S. Thakur, the appellant/insurer did not have any opportunity to cross examine Dr. D.S. Thakur on the question of permanent disability having been suffered by respondent No1/claimant. Lastly, it was urged that the admission by respondent No.3/claimant that the accident occurred on a curve and that he was carrying a bag load of 15 Kgs sugar near his feet, the Tribunal ought to have held that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the respondent No.3/claimant. Ground No. (b) mentioned in para 6 (supra) was not pressed. 9. Shri Raja Sharma, counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.1 &.2 adopted the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that even though the respondents No.1 & 2 did not prefer any cross objection, this Court had jurisdiction under order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the Tribunal for doing complete justice between the parties 10. Having considered the rival submissions, I have perused the record. Having considered the rival submissions, I have perused the record. In National Insurance Company Ltd Chandigarh vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others, the Apex Court held as under: "17. Before proceeding further, it may be noticed that while 'The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939' was in force, Section 110-C (2A) was inserted therein in the year 1970 which corresponds to Section 170 of the 1988 Act. The said provision provides that in course of an inquiry of a claim if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is a collusion between the claimant and the insured or the insured fails to contest the claim, the Tribunal for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in subsection (2) of Section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. 18. The aforesaid provisions show two aspects. Firstly, that the insurer has only statutory defences available as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 149 ofl988 Act and, secondly, where the Tribunal is of the view that there is a collusion between the claimant and the insured, or the insured does not contest the claim, the insurer can be made a party and on such impleadment the insurer shall have all defences available to it. Then comes the provisions of Section 173 which provides for an appeal against the award given by the Tribunal. Under Section 173, any person aggrieved by an award is entitled to prefer an appeal to the High Court. Very often the question has arisen as to whether an insurer is entitled to file an appeal on the grounds available to the insured when either there is a collusion between the claimants and the insured or when the insured has not filed an appeal before the High Court questioning the quantum of compensation. The consistent view of this court had been that the insurer has no right to file an appeal to challenge the quantum of compensation or finding of the Tribunal as regards the negligence or contributory negligence of offending vehicle . 26. The consistent view of this court had been that the insurer has no right to file an appeal to challenge the quantum of compensation or finding of the Tribunal as regards the negligence or contributory negligence of offending vehicle . 26. For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. However, by virtue of Section 170 of the 1988 Act, where in course of an enquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a claim and the person against whom the claim has been made or (b) the person against whom the claim has been made has failed to contest the claim, the tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the claim also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the claim has been made. Thus, Unless an order is passed by the tribunal permitting the insurer to avail the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom a claim has been made on being satisfied of the two conditions specified in Section 170 of the Act, it is not permissible to the insurer to contest the claim on the grounds which are available to the insured or to a person against whom a claim has been made. Thus where condition precedent embodied in Section 170 is satisfied and award is adverse to the interest of the insurer, the insurer has a right to file an appeal chal1enging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal against the quantum of compensation. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one Scheme and if we give any different interpretation to Section 172 of the 1988 Act the same would go contrary to the Scheme and object of the Act. 32. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one Scheme and if we give any different interpretation to Section 172 of the 1988 Act the same would go contrary to the Scheme and object of the Act. 32. For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the question is that even if no appeal is preferred under Section 173 of 1988 Act by an insured against the award of a Tribunal, it is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as findings as regards negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle." 11. In view of the fact that admittedly the appellant did not make any application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Tribunal for permission to contest the claim on all grounds that were available to the insured, the appeal by the insurance company on the ground of quantum or negligence or contributory negligence is not tenable. The owner and driver not having preferred any appeal against the award passed by the Tribunal and the appeal by the insurer not being tenable, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents No.1 & 2 is rejected. 12. In view of the above, the appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.