JUDGMENT : (Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) : The relief that has been sought in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, is the quashing of a First Information Report (FIR 327 of 2004) lodged on 13th November 2004 at the Economic Offences Wing, Police Station Sadar at Karnal, in the State of Haryana. The Third Respondent is the complainant. 2. Briefly stated, the allegation is that Sukhdev Singh, the son of the complainant and the complainant's grandsons, Alamjeet Singh and Bachitar Singh were desirous of obtaining visas for the U.S. and Canada. The aforesaid three persons are alleged to have met the Petitioner in New Delhi when the Petitioner is alleged to have represented that he would enable them to obtain visas for the aforesaid countries through his sister, Smt.Neha Dube, and brotherinlaw, represented to be based in England. The Petitioner was furnished with the details and addresses of the three persons. On 15th June 2001, it is alleged, the Petitioner came to the residence of the complainant at Karnal when an assurance was held out that the visas would be obtained against payment of money. An amount of Rs.10 lakhs each was allegedly demanded for obtaining the visas. On 16th June 2001, an amount of Rs. 1.50 lakhs is alleged to have been handed over to the Petitioner together with the passports of the three persons. Thereafter, according to the complainant, upon a telephonic enquiry, the Petitioner called upon the complainant to send the three individuals for whom the visas were required to Mumbai, ostensibly to appear for an interview at the Embassies and a further demand of Rs.3 lakhs in respect of each of the three individuals was made. The aforesaid three persons are alleged to have proceeded to Mumbai by arranging an amount each of Rs.3 lakhs, when the Petitioner took them to a hotel in the Dadar area. An amount of Rs.9 lakhs is alleged to have been paid to the Petitioner on the assurance that the visas would be obtained in about ten or twelve days. After the aforesaid period, the three persons were informed that the work could not be done and they were called upon to return to Karnal with an assurance that they would be informed once the visas were available. After the aforesaid period, the three persons were informed that the work could not be done and they were called upon to return to Karnal with an assurance that they would be informed once the visas were available. Queries were alleged to have been made with the Petitioner after two months when an assurance was alleged to have been given that the work would be done after some period. Eventually, the complainant claims to have proceeded to Mumbai in February 2004 when he is alleged to have been introduced to a real estate broker by the name of Lamba and an assurance was given that the visas would be obtained after fifteen days. After fifteen days when the visas were not forthcoming, the complainant is alleged to have met the Petitioner at his office when the Petitioner stated that he was unable to obtain the visas and that the money would be refunded together with the passports in due course. The passports were returned and a time period of one month was sought for the return of the money. The complainant went back to Karnal and it is alleged that thereafter, despite repeated telephonic requests, the monies were not paid. In May 2004, the complainant alleges that he once again went to Mumbai for demanding the money when the Petitioner is alleged to have refused payment and to have threatened him. Eventually, a Memorandum of Understanding was alleged to have been entered into between the Petitioner and the complainant for the sale of a residential flat at Andheri for an amount of Rs.11 lakhs in June 2004, of which an amount of Rs. 6.50 lakhs was to be adjusted by way of earnest money deposit and the balance was to be adjusted at the time of the registration of the documents. On 9th July 2004 when the complainant visited the office of Lamba, it is alleged that he was informed that the transaction could not be completed as the title was not clear. An amount of Rs.50,000/was repaid on 22nd July 2004. The complainant alleges that he was induced to part with an amount of Rs. 10.50 lakhs as consideration for obtaining visas which were never obtained by the Petitioner. It is accordingly alleged that the Petitioner has committed offences under Sections 420, 406, 506 and 120B of the Penal Code. 3. These proceedings were instituted in August 2005. The complainant alleges that he was induced to part with an amount of Rs. 10.50 lakhs as consideration for obtaining visas which were never obtained by the Petitioner. It is accordingly alleged that the Petitioner has committed offences under Sections 420, 406, 506 and 120B of the Penal Code. 3. These proceedings were instituted in August 2005. By an interim order dated 21st September 2005, a Division Bench of this Court (Parkar and Mohta, JJ.) granted adinterim relief in terms of prayer clause (d) of the petition which reads as follows: “(d) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the petition, interim and adinterim stay of hearing and further proceeding of registration of F.I.R. No.327 of 2004 dated 13.11.2004 in the P.S. Sadar, Karnal Police Station, Economic Wings, District Haryana be stayed.” 4. In support of the petition, it has been urged on behalf of the Petitioner that in March 2001, the Petitioner had come into contact with Sukhdev Singh, who is the son of the Third Respondent the complainant in the FIR filed in Karnal. According to the Petitioner, he and Sukhdev Singh agreed to produce a film together in pursuance whereof a letter was addressed to Adlabs Films on 11th April 2001 and the songs of the motion picture were recorded at or around that time. Some part of the shooting of the film is alleged to have taken place on 17th and 18th April 2001. The Petitioner claims to have invested between Rs.20 lakhs and Rs.25 lakhs while according to him, Sukhdev Singh invested Rs. 5.6 lakhs for the production of the film which was to be partly filmed in South Africa. Sukhdev Singh, according to the Petitioner, is alleged to have insisted that four persons who were his friends should be taken to South Africa and that they would stay back and would not return. The Petitioner claims that a dispute arose between him and Sukhdev Singh as the latter was allegedly “already involved in human/body smuggling”. The film could not be completed. According to the Petitioner, he had appointed a concern by the name of Shalimar Garden Enterprises for obtaining visas for a group of forty persons for recording of two songs in South Africa in May 2001. The visas were obtained and the Petitioner alleges that he had purchased the Air tickets for the aforesaid four persons. According to the Petitioner, he had appointed a concern by the name of Shalimar Garden Enterprises for obtaining visas for a group of forty persons for recording of two songs in South Africa in May 2001. The visas were obtained and the Petitioner alleges that he had purchased the Air tickets for the aforesaid four persons. The Petitioner alleges that he learnt that Sukhdev Singh was attempting to get his four friends to UK/USA on the basis of forged documents upon which he recalled the team back to India. Sukhdev Singh and the aforesaid persons were, according to the Petitioner, not in touch with him after 14th June 2001. According to the Petitioner, the Third Respondent used to threaten and harass him, in pursuance of which a Memorandum of Understanding was entered into for the sale of a residential flat belonging to his sister, Neha Dube, at Andheri (East) through an Estate Broker, H.S. Lamba. The agreement, according to the Petitioner, was never implemented. 5. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has urged that since a part of the cause of action has taken place within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Counsel submitted that there were prior dealings between the complainant's son and the Petitioner relating to the production of a film and, therefore, the theory that an amount of Rs. 10.50 lakhs was entrusted to him to obtain visas for persons who were intending to migrate to USA or Canada is false. The contention of the Petitioner is that the disputes between the parties are of a civil nature and the entire dispute in respect of the Memorandum of Understanding arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Petitioner had moved an application for anticipatory bail which was rejected by the Sessions Judge at Karnal on 30th July 2005. In paragraph 20 of the Writ Petition, there is an averment that the Petitioner has filed an application for anticipatory bail before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 6. We have heard Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and the Learned Public Prosecutor for the State. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provides that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 6. We have heard Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and the Learned Public Prosecutor for the State. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provides that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 provides inter alia that where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, it may be enquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Section 179 enunciates that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 7. The affidavit in reply which has been filed in these proceedings by Shri Dharamvir Singh, Sub Inspector Incharge, Economic Offences Wing, Karnal, draws the attention of this Court to the fact that the investigation of the case is still in progress. Further investigation has been interdicted by an adinterim order of stay dated 21st September 2005 passed in thee proceedings. Offences are alleged to have taken place inter alia under Sections 406 and 420 of the Penal Code. At the present stage, having regard to the ingredients of those offences, it cannot possibly be urged that the lodgment of the FIR at Karnal would constitute an abuse of process. The ingredient of the offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code consists in deceiving any person and thereby dishonestly inducing him to deliver property to another. The FIR alleges that a meeting took place between the Petitioner and the complainant at Karnal when on the representation made by the Petitioner that he would procure foreign visas for the persons named in the FIR, an amount of Rs. 10.50 lakhs was alleged to have been parted with. Of the aforesaid amount, it was alleged, an amount of Rs. 1.50 lakhs was paid on 16th June 2003 at Karnal. 8. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Court, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by PartIII and for any other purpose. 1.50 lakhs was paid on 16th June 2003 at Karnal. 8. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Court, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by PartIII and for any other purpose. Clause 2 of Article 226 provides that the power conferred by clause (1) may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 9. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, the Supreme Court held that it was well settled that the expression “cause of action” means that bundle of facts which the Petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. The Supreme Court held thus: “On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court 1 (1994) 1 SCC 711 can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories.” In Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra, this exposition of the expression “cause of action” was followed in the context of the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that “so far as the question of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence is concerned, the main factor to be considered is the place where the alleged offence was committed” (paragraph 22 page 649). State of Maharashtra, this exposition of the expression “cause of action” was followed in the context of the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that “so far as the question of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence is concerned, the main factor to be considered is the place where the alleged offence was committed” (paragraph 22 page 649). In Union of India vs. Adani Exports Ltd., the Supreme Court emphasized that each and every fact pleaded in a Writ Petition does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court and it is those facts which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case which must be considered. Facts which do not have a bearing on the dispute involved do not give rise to a cause of action, so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. In Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai, the Supreme Court held that Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction while the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Under Article 226 a Writ of Certiorari would lie where the subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction; or (ii) in excess of jurisdiction; or (iii) in flagrant disregard of law or of the rules of procedure. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court once again reiterated what is meant by the expression “cause of action” thus: “Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action.” In Mosaraf Hossain Khan vs. Bhagheeratha Engg. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action.” In Mosaraf Hossain Khan vs. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd., the Supreme Court while referring to the earlier judgments on the subject observed thus: “We have referred to the scope of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution only to highlight that the High Courts should not ordinarily interfere with an order taking cognisance passed by a competent court of law except in a proper case. Furthermore only such High Court within whose jurisdiction the order of the subordinate court has been passed, would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution unless it is established that the earlier cause of action arose within the jurisdiction thereof.” Reference may also be made in this connection to a judgment delivered by one of us (Hon'ble Smt.Justice Ranjana Desai) speaking for a Division Bench of this Court in First Custodian Fund (India) Ltd. vs. Nedungadi Bank Ltd. The Division Bench held that a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution can reach a person or authority outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court provided that a part of the cause of action which gives the Petitioner a right of relief had arisen within its jurisdiction: “Having regard to the above judgments of the Supreme Court and on a bare reading of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is not possible for us to hold that a writ of certiorari issued by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot reach a person or authority outside its territorial jurisdiction if a part of the cause of action which gives the petitioner a right of relief has arisen within its jurisdiction. Registration of FIR in one State is not the sole criterion to decide that cause of action has arisen in that State. It can partly arise in another State also. In that case, the High Court of that State may also have jurisdiction to entertain a petition. But if fake cause of action is created, the High Court must refuse to entertain the petition. If it is a mala fide move on the part of the complainant, the High Court must take a strict view of the matter. In that case, the High Court of that State may also have jurisdiction to entertain a petition. But if fake cause of action is created, the High Court must refuse to entertain the petition. If it is a mala fide move on the part of the complainant, the High Court must take a strict view of the matter. The tendency to entertain a petition on the ground that certain events unconnected with the cause of action have taken place in its jurisdiction has been deprecated by the Supreme Court. It is clear from the judgments of the Supreme Court that the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that these facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. The facts pleaded must be such that they have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. The High Court's powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are very wide and that imposes greater responsibility on the High Court. While exercising this power, it has to observe a selfordained restraint.” 10. In the present case, having regard to the restraint judicially imposed on the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, we are of the view that it would be inappropriate for this Court to exercise jurisdiction. As already noted earlier, reading the complaint as it stands at the present stage it is evident that having regard to the ingredients of the offence of cheating under Sections 415 and 420 of the Penal Code, the invocation of the jurisdiction at Karnal cannot be regarded as being inappropriate or being an abuse of process. The provisions of Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, make it abundantly clear that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Even where, an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, Section 178(d) provides that it may be enquired into or tried by the Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. At this stage, the investigation is still to be completed. Even where, an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, Section 178(d) provides that it may be enquired into or tried by the Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. At this stage, the investigation is still to be completed. The case of the complainant is that he was induced to part with property – to writ, a sum of money on the basis of an act of deception which was practiced in Karnal. In these circumstances, it is only appropriate and proper that consistent with the self imposed restraint on the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court should leave it open to the Petitioner to pursue his remedies at the appropriate stage in the Court of competent jurisdiction in Haryana. The petition is accordingly dismissed leaving it open to the Petitioner to pursue those remedies in the appropriate Court at the appropriate stage. Consequent upon the dismissal of the Petition, the interim orders shall stand vacated. Learned PP is directed to communicate the order of this Court to the Investigating Officer forthwith. At this stage, counsel appearing for the Petitioner requests that stay of the investigation be continued for four weeks. Prayer is rejected.