Tulsidas s/o UTTUMAL SINDHI v. Tarunkumar s/o Yadunath Parashar
2008-09-09
B.P.DHARMADHIKARI
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
ORAL JUDGEMENT. 1. In this revision filed under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, 1887 challenge is to judgment dated 22.04.1999 delivered in Civil Suit No.330/1992. The present non-applicants filed that suit for ejectment, possession, for recovery of arrears of rent and for mesne profit, against the applicants after securing permission from Rent Controller under the provisions of Clause 13 of the C.P. and Berar, Premises Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as .Rent Control Order.). The suit was opposed by the present applicants on various counts and ultimately the suit came to be decreed. At that time of admission on 30.10.2000, this Court was required to pass a speaking order and at that time the possession of the present applicants was protected. 2. In this background, I have heard Advocate Shri S.V. Purohit for applicants/tenants and Advocate Shri A.M. Qazi, for respondents/ original plaintiffs. 3. Advocate Shri Purohit, states that the suit as filed was preceded by three notices issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such the suit itself was not maintainable. He contends that the first notice was issued ion 13.10.1978, after Rent Controller granted permission vide order dated 6.1.1978. However, thereafter rent was accepted and second notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued on 22.12.1978, during the pendency of the appeal under clause 21 of the Rent Control Order. Appeal came to be dismissed on 07.05.1979 and then the tenant filed review petition as per Clause 21[2]. The said review came to be rejected on 18.6.1981 and then 3rd notice came to be issued on 7.1.1982. After 3rd notice suit came to be filed on 2.3.1982 for various reliefs and arrears of rent from 1.10.1981 to 23.2.1982 were also claimed. He points out that after issuance of first notice on 13.10.1979 and acceptance of rent for period from expiry of tenancy month from which the tenancy was sought to be terminated by that notice, permission granted by the Rent Control Authority on 6.1.1978, exhausted itself and without obtaining fresh permission the suit could not have been filed. He points out that inspite of the said notice dated 13.10.1978 and termination of tenancy as mentioned therein w.e.f. 31.10.1978 rent was accepted till 22.12.1978 and by notice dated 22.12.1978 the tenancy was again terminated w.e.f. 31.1.1979.
He points out that inspite of the said notice dated 13.10.1978 and termination of tenancy as mentioned therein w.e.f. 31.10.1978 rent was accepted till 22.12.1978 and by notice dated 22.12.1978 the tenancy was again terminated w.e.f. 31.1.1979. Again rent was accepted and lastly suit came to be filed by placing reliance upon the third notice dated 7.1.1982. According to him unless and until there was fresh permission secured from the Rent Controller under clause 13, no suit could have been filed by placing reliance upon notice dated 7.1.1982. He relies upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chaturbhuj Sitaram Maheshwari .vrs. Mangnibai Hirachand and another (1958 Nagpur Law Journal 250) and judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Gendmal Bhuramal .vrs. Vijaykumar Dattatraya Khot 1984 Mh.L.J. 1071). 4. In reply Advocate Shri Qazi, states that the proceeding before the Rent Control Authorities were going on either in appeal or in revision and as such, after last adjudication by the Reviewing Authority notice dated 7.1.1982 was issued and tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 28.2.1982. He points out that the arrears of rent demanded in the suit instituted thereafter are for the period from 1.8.1981 to 28.2.1982 only. He contends that there is no question of waiver or relinquishment in such matter, because both the parties were aware that the litigation is going on. According to him in these facts reliance upon both the judgments of this Court is misconceived. 5. Thus facts before this Court are not in dispute. Immediately after the order of Rent Controller dated 6.1.1978, notice was issued on 13.10.1978. But that notice was not acted upon. Second notice dated 27.12.1978 came tobe issued during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority and it appears that the said notice was again not acted upon. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal of tenant in May, 1979 and then tenant filed Review, which came to be rejected in 1981. After the said rejection notice dated 7.1.1982 came to be issued. 6. Perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case of Gendmal Bhuramal (supra), shows that there after obtaining permission from Rent Controller, landlord issued notice on 9.4.1963 and terminated the tenancy of tenant w.e.f. 30.4.1963.
After the said rejection notice dated 7.1.1982 came to be issued. 6. Perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case of Gendmal Bhuramal (supra), shows that there after obtaining permission from Rent Controller, landlord issued notice on 9.4.1963 and terminated the tenancy of tenant w.e.f. 30.4.1963. Appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed on 1.6.1965 and thereafter, landlord filed application on 22.11.1966 before the Rent Controller for enhancement of fair rent, which had been fixed earlier. That application for determination of fair rent was dismissed on 9.5.1967 as not pressed. Before that on 7.4.1967 landlord gave notice terminating the tenancy w.e.f. 30.4.1967. He had accepted rent after giving first notice. It in this background his conduct has been evaluated by this court and by placing reliance upon the judgment of Chaturbhuj Maheshwari (supra), this court has concluded that the first notice was waived and permission of rent controller on the basis of which that notice was issued stood exhausted, and was not available to the landlord. This Court therefore, found that before issuing another notice dt. 7.4.1967 landlord ought to have applied to the Rent Controller for grant of permission under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. It is tobe noted here that, the relinquishment or waiver by landlord is demonstrated by the fact that after dismissal of the appeal on 1.6.1965 by the Appellate Authority, landlord on 22.11.1966 moved Rent Control Authorities for fixation or review of fair rent. Thus, the inference drawn is on the basis of the conduct of landlord and in facts of present matter, the judgment therefore cannot save the situation for present applicants. 7. In the case of Chaturbhuj Maheshwari (supra), the Division Bench of this Court was required to consider some what similar situation. There after obtaining permission from the Rent Controller on 21.07.1950 landlord served a notice of ejectment and tenant was called upon to vacate and deliver vacant possession by 22.08.1950. After service of that notice, defendant/tenant by postal money order forwarded to the plaintiff rent for the period from 22.7.1950 to 22.10.1950 and said rent was accepted by the plaintiff/ landlord. The plaintiff thereafter served another notice on defendant on or about 24.02.1951 asking him to vacate the premises by 22.3.1951 and said notice was not preceded by any separate permission in writing by the Rent Controller.
The plaintiff thereafter served another notice on defendant on or about 24.02.1951 asking him to vacate the premises by 22.3.1951 and said notice was not preceded by any separate permission in writing by the Rent Controller. It is in this background that the controversy is considered and in paragraph no.4 the Division Bench found that the waiver has to be inferred from the intention of landlord or for his conduct. The provisions of Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act are looked into and it has been held that in absence of any other circumstances, acceptance of rent which has become due in respect of the premises since the expiration of notice period, amounts to waiver of notice. Again it is apparent that the inference of waiver has been drawn after considering the facts and in absence of any other circumstances. 8. In facts before me, it is clear that though first notice was issued, rent for the period from 1.11.1978 onwards was accepted, still the parties continued their litigation before the Rent Controller. Not only this, during the pendency of the appeal, second notice was given on 22.12.1978 and though after expiry of the period mentioned therein, rent was accepted, parties still continued to fight in appeal before the Appellate Authority. After adjudication by the Appellate Authority, tenant filed application for review which was ultimately rejected in 1981 and then on 7.1.1982 notice dated 7.1.1982 came tobe issued. Thus though the present applicants are pleading relinquishment or waiver, their own conduct shows that there was no such relinquishment or waiver and parties were only waiting for final adjudication of the matter. Under clause 21 of the Rent Control Order, the Appellate Authority is the final authority. The landlord has chosen to issue notice on 7.1.1982 after such final adjudication. Tenant no where, either before the Appellate or the Reviewing Authority pleaded that permission given by the Rent Controller on 6.1.1978 stood exhausted and as such, there was no question of landlord continuing to oppose appeal or review. Thus both the parties were aware of the permission obtained by the landlord, its consequence and effect of pending litigation on said permission.
Thus both the parties were aware of the permission obtained by the landlord, its consequence and effect of pending litigation on said permission. In these facts, it is difficult to accept that the landlord by his conduct at any time waived the benefit of permission dated 6.1.1978 granted in his favour by the Rent Control Authorities or tenant consented to such waiver. I do not find any merit in the arguments of the applicant. Revision is without any substance, the same is accordingly dismissed, however, in the acts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost. 9. At this stage, Advocate Shri Purohit, states that the applicants who are having their business in the suit premises, intend to challenge the order further and therefore, their possession may be protected at least for a period of 8 weeks. The request is being strongly opposed by Advocate Shri Qazi, who points out that the litigation is going on since last more than 30 years. However, in the interest of justice, time till 15.10.2008 is given to the applicant to obtain appropriate orders in the matter, till then the interim order protecting their possession already passed by this Court to continue. The said order shall cease to operate automatically thereafter.