JUDGMENT : 1. The matter is part heard. It was required to be adjourned as nobody appeared for the respondent yesterday. Today, again when the matter was called out first, nobody had appeared and it was passed over. When it is called out again, there is no appearance for the respondent. 2. Shri Naik, learned counsel for the applicant points out that the present respondent has purchased a truck through finance made available by present Revision Applicant and as per the agreement entered into between the parties, the jurisdiction is specifically restricted only to Courts in Bombay where the present applicant has got its registered office. He states that in this background, the present respondent filed Regular Civil Suit No. 153 of 1999 claiming declaration that the defendant (present applicant) is not entitled to seize the vehicle. In support of his prayer, he pointed out some factual dispute in his plaint. The suit was opposed by present applicant and the applicant filed an application under Section 9A of Civil Procedure Code, raising preliminary objection about jurisdiction of the Court at Nagpur. The applicant contended that suit ought to have been filed before the Competent Court only at Bombay. The 5th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, vide his judgment dated 08.07.1999, upheld his objection and therefore returned the plaint to the respondent . plaintiff for its presentation to Competent Court at Mumbai. This order and judgment was then challenged by the respondent by filing Regular Civil Appeal No. 359 of 1999 and the learned 7th Additional District Judge, Nagpur, vide its judgment dated 12.10.1999 allowed that appeal holding that cause of action accrued at Nagpur and it found that as no part of cause of action arose at Mumbai, mere fact that defendant No.1 had its registered office at Mumbai, would not confer jurisdiction upon that Court. This reversing judgment of lower appellate Court is challenged in present revision. 3. Shri Naik, learned counsel contends that same clause has been considered in Appeal Against Order No. 112 of 1998 by this Court and vide its judgment dated 27.11.2002, this Court has accepted that in such circumstances, the Court at Mumbai alone will have jurisdiction. This reversing judgment of lower appellate Court is challenged in present revision. 3. Shri Naik, learned counsel contends that same clause has been considered in Appeal Against Order No. 112 of 1998 by this Court and vide its judgment dated 27.11.2002, this Court has accepted that in such circumstances, the Court at Mumbai alone will have jurisdiction. He relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hakam Singh vs. Gammon (India) Limited, reported at AIR 1971 SC 740 and also other judgment in Balaji Traders, Amravati vs. Indian Bank, Amravati, reported at 1996 (2) Mh. L.J. 561. The facts stated above are not in dispute. The present revision applicant was the respondent in Appeal against Order No. 112 of 1998 mentioned above and very same clause has been considered by this Court in that A.O. The judgments relied upon by Shri Naik, learned counsel are relied upon and also considered therein. It is, therefore, apparent that the controversy is squarely covered by the said judgment dated 27.11.2002. 4. However, the question here is whether a revision is maintainable in view of the amendment to Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 2002. Shri Naik, learned counsel has invited attention to the order of this Court dated 20.08.2002 in Civil Revision Application No. 785 of 2002 to state that there this Court has held that revision is not maintainable against such orders. However, he points out that certain judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in this respect were not brought to the notice of this Court at that time and therefore the order does not lay down correct proposition of law. According to him, those judgments are in the case of Amar Chand vs. Union of India, reported at AIR 1973 SC 313 ; Hanamanthappa vs. Chandrashekharappa, reported at AIR 1997 SC 1307 ; Prem Bakshi vs. Dharam Dev , reported at AIR 2002 SC 559 and Harshad Chiman Lal Modi vs. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. , reported at AIR 2006 SC 646 . He also relies upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Hirachand Succaram Gandhy vs. G.I.P. Railway Company, reported at AIR 1928 Bom. 421. The relevant portion is appearing at page 422. He also relies upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Hirachand Succaram Gandhy vs. G.I.P. Railway Company, reported at AIR 1928 Bom. 421. The relevant portion is appearing at page 422. However, this judgment is also relied upon by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Amar Chand vs. Union of India (supra) in paragraph 8. After considering these judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 8 has reproduced extensively from the judgment of Privy Council and then concluded that the suit instituted by presentation of plaint in pursuance of an order under Order 7, Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code, cannot be said to be continuation of suit as instituted in the Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The Hon'ble Apex Court, therefore, has observed that such suit cannot be deemed to be instituted in the proper Court on the date when plaint was presented in wrong Court so as to attract the provisions of Section 4 of Limitation Act, 1908, then in force. 5. In Hanamanthappa vs. Chandrashekharappa (supra), again the controversy has been considered in the light of principles of Order 6, Rule 17 of C.P.C. There, the plaint as presented in the Court of District Munsiff, Navalagund was returned for lack of territorial jurisdiction and after making necessary amendment, it was filed as O.S. No. 10 of 1991 in the Civil Court at Dharwad. An application under Order 7, Rule 10 of C.P.C. was filed by the defendants (petitioners before the Hon'ble Apex Court), seeking dismissal of suit on the ground that plaint was materially altered without seeking permission for amendment. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that such a suit as filed, is a fresh suit subject to limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment of Court fee and it could not have been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff made in such fresh suit such 7 averments which were not there in original plaint presented to and returned by the District Munsiff, Navalagund. 6. 6. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi vs. D.L.F. Universal Ltd., (supra), the earlier judgment reported in Amar Chand vs. Union of India (supra) is considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court and it has been held that when plaint is returned to plaintiff for presentation of it to proper Court on the ground of want of jurisdiction, it is not a case of transfer of suit but lack of jurisdiction of Court in which it was earlier filed. The observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraphs 9 & 10 therein show the appreciation of earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Amar Chand vs. Union of India (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court found that in the facts before it, suit could not have been instituted before Delhi Court as subject matter i.e. immovable property was not situated within Delhi and as such it was a case of lack of jurisdiction and provisions of Order 18, Rule 15 of CPC, therefore, could not have been pressed into service. 7. All these rulings, therefore, show that when plaint is returned for want of jurisdiction, the proceedings in the Court come to an end and a new suit is required to be registered at a place where the plaint is tendered thereafter. The order, therefore, cannot be viewed as interlocutory order. It is, therefore, apparent that Civil Revision Application against such an order has to be held maintainable. 8. The perusal of order of this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 785 of 2002 delivered on 20.8.2002 (supra) reveals that the judgments which are put before me were not placed before the Court at that time though argument was advanced. As all these judgments were not made available to this Court at that time, this Court recorded a finding that it was not possible for it to concur with the submissions of the learned counsel for the revision applicant in that matter. It is, therefore, clear that said order cannot be read as laying down any law in this respect. 9. In the circumstances, Civil Revision Application No. 758 of 2000 is allowed. The judgment dated 12.10.1999 delivered by 7th Additional District Judge, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 359 of 1999 is hereby quashed and set aside. It is, therefore, clear that said order cannot be read as laying down any law in this respect. 9. In the circumstances, Civil Revision Application No. 758 of 2000 is allowed. The judgment dated 12.10.1999 delivered by 7th Additional District Judge, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 359 of 1999 is hereby quashed and set aside. The order dated 08.07.1999 delivered by 5th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, in Regular Civil Suit No. 153 of 1999 is hereby restored. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Application allowed.