Judgment :- K. Raviraja Pandian, J. The writ appeal is filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 12.02.2002 dismissing the writ petition No.12938 of 1994 filed by the appellants herein seeking for the writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records relating to the notifications issued under section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act in G.O. Ms. No.3-D No.630, Adi dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department dated 07.09.1992 and declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in G.O. Ms. No.3D No.894 Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department dated 20.12.1993, quash the same and consequently direct the respondents not to acquire the lands and drop the acquisition proceedings in respect of survey No.218/2 in an extent of 2 acres, Vadakkalur village, Avinashi Taluk, Coimbatore District. The said land is sought to be acquired for the purpose of providing house sites to Adi dravidars. Notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has been issued in G.O. Ms. 3D No.630 dated 07.09.1992. After following the provisions contemplated under the Act, declaration under section 6 of the Act has also been made on 011. 1993. Award has been passed on 18.07.1994. The appellants filed the writ petition on 21.07.1994 contending that the declaration under section 6 of the Act made by the respondent was beyond the period, as provided under the provisions of the Act. That was the solitary ground argued before the learned single Judge. The learned Judge, after going through the records produced, has recorded a factual finding that the declaration under section 6 of the Act was made on 011. 1993 and that was well within the period of one year and therefore, there was no violation of any procedure as put forth by the petitioners. In that view of the matter the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. 2. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners reiterated the very same argument by reading out of the provision to section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and contended that the date of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act in the gazette has to be taken for calculating the period of limitation. On the reading of statutory provisions, we are not able to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants. On the reading of statutory provisions, we are not able to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants. Further, the issue is no longer res integra and it has already been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Sriniwas Ramnath Khatod v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (1) CTC 569. In that case the apex Court has held that under section 4, a notification has to be published in the manner laid down therein. As against this, under section 6 a declaration has to be first made and declaration has then to be published in the manner provided under section 6(2) of the Act. First proviso does not lay down time limit within which publication of declaration has to be made and that publication cannot take place after the period prescribed thereunder. First proviso only provides time limit for declaration and not for publication – legislation purpose omitted to use the word publication or declaration in the first proviso to section 6. Declaration must be made within one year from the last publication of notification under section 4. Publication under section 6(1) may take place at later date. Such publication is only ministerial act. Last date prescribed under section 6(ii) is only for the purpose of computing limitation under section 11A. 3. A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of S.N.Rangappa v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 1 MLJ 105 SC after referring to the earlier judgment on this issue has held that the words publish and from the date of publication of the notification occurring in proviso (ii) to section 6(1) of the Act has reference only to section 4 notification and has no reference to the publication of any notification under section 6 of the Act. Under section 6, it is only a declaration which is required to be made, the time limit being within one year from the date of publication of section 4 notification. Hence, the contention has to fail and is rejected. 4. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellants also started to argue that the objections raised by the appellants during 5A enquiry has been considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and rejected by him and it has been not forwarded to the Collector for his opinion and orders. We are not able to countenance the argument as this point was not agitated before the learned single Judge. We are not able to countenance the argument as this point was not agitated before the learned single Judge. In the absence of any factual materials, in an appeal, we cannot decide the point in issue. 5. Further, the Supreme Court, in the case of Municipal Council, ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 SC 671 has held as follows : "In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceedings there under. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C.Padma v. Dy. Secretary to Government of Tamilnadu, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 627 , this Court observed as below : The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under s.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act) in GOR No.1392 Industries, dated 110. 1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu district in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasiua by Tvl. Rechold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30.04.1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General finance Co., which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in G.O. Ms.No.816 Industries, dated 24.03.1971 in favour of another subsidiary company, Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in G.O. Ms. No.439 Industries dated 10.05.1985. In G.O. Ms. No.546 Industries dated 30.03.1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original G.O. Ms.No.1392 Industries, dated 110. 1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. No.439 Industries dated 10.05.1985. In G.O. Ms. No.546 Industries dated 30.03.1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original G.O. Ms.No.1392 Industries, dated 110. 1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed." The Division bench of this Court in the case of Ramalingam v. State of Tamilnadu, 2005 (3) CTC 1, has held as follows : It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that no writ petition should be entertained after the award under the Land Acquisition Act has been passed – vide Tej Kaur and others v. State of Punjab and others, 2003 (4) SCC 485 ; Municipal Council, Ahmed Nagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 SC 671 , Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, Uttar Pradesh v. Suresh Nand Jayal, 1997 (9) SCC 224 , State of Tamil Nadu v. L.Krishnan and others, (1996) 1 SCC 250 . Learned counsel for the appellants started to distinguish the above propositions of law by relying on the decision in the case of R.Ramalingam v. State of Tamilnadu, 2007-3- L.W. 127. 6. On going through the facts of that case, we are of the view that the judgment is not factually applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case, the Division Bench has recorded a finding that the award was passed on 210. 1994 and the writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings has been filed well prior to the passing of the award, i.e., on 19.08.1994. In the facts of the present case, as already stated, the award was passed on 18.07.1994. However, the writ petition came to be filed on 21.07.1994. In the circumstances, the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants does not, in any way, advance the case of the appellants. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.