RUPA & CO. LTD. v. SPECIAL COMMISSIONER AND COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, EZHILAGAM, CHENNAI.
2008-04-17
M.VENUGOPAL, SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT S. J. MUKHOPADHAYA, J. - The appellant challenged the assessment order dated June 30, 2003, passed by the second respondent, Commercial Tax Officer, Central Circle - I, Tirupur, in CST No. 314614/2001-2002 on the ground that the respondent made assessment in violation of clarification given by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chennai, vide order dated January 11, 2002. Learned single judge by impugned order dated August 28, 2003, disposed of the writ petition, W.P. No. 21170 of 2003 without deciding the claim on merit, there being an alternative remedy of appeal. The main plea taken by the appellant/petitioner is that learned single judge, instead of asking the appellant to move in appeal, should have decided the writ petition on merit, the order of assessment being without jurisdiction and against law. The appellant is a manufacturer and dealer in cotton hosiery goods. According to the appellant, as per notification issued on March 5, 1997 by the respondent, hosiery goods were generally exempted under the sales tax laws of Tamil Nadu. Consequently, rate of tax under the Central sales tax was also "nil". It was in effect for the relevant period, i.e., 2001-02, but up to November 30, 2001. Further, a Notification G.O.Ms. No. 273 dated August 5, 1996, was issued under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as, "the CST Act"), whereby it was directed that the tax payable by the dealer, who does not have any branch transfer or consignment transfer during the year, shall be calculated at the reduced rate of one per cent in respect of sale effected by him of hosiery goods (other than those made of wool) in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. According to the appellant, it is engaged in inter-State trade of hosiery goods and also transfer of hosiery goods to its own branches outside the State. The appellant had raised specific query to the first respondent, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chennai, and sought a clarification on whether the appellant would be eligible for rate of tax at one per cent if it did not claim any exemption on branch transfers. The first respondent clarified by communication dated January 11, 2002, addressed to the appellant that inter-State sale of cotton hosiery goods is taxable at one per cent if there is no claim of branch transfer or consignment in the return filed.
The first respondent clarified by communication dated January 11, 2002, addressed to the appellant that inter-State sale of cotton hosiery goods is taxable at one per cent if there is no claim of branch transfer or consignment in the return filed. Accordingly, the appellant reported taxable turnover under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 without claiming any exemption for branch transfer and paid tax at one per cent on the whole. As learned senior counsel for the appellant placed much reliance on the letter of the first respondent dated January 11, 2002, we quote the relevant portion of the said letter hereunder : "Sir, Sub. : Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Exemption on local sale in hosiery goods withdrawn - Whether inter-State sale is taxable at the reduced rate as per earlier notification - Clarification requested - Regarding. Ref. : 1. From Tvl. Rupa and Co. Ltd., Tirupur, letter dated nil. 2. From Tvl. Maxwell Apparel Industries Ltd., Gobichettipalayam letter dated nil. With reference to the petition cited, the petitioners are clarified that the inter-State sale of cotton hosiery goods is taxable at one per cent if there is no claim of branch transfer or consignment in the returns filed. The tax at one per cent is collectable from such dealers whether they charge tax at one per cent or not in the invoices. Sd/- G. Chelvakumar For Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes". It appears that the second respondent issued a pre-assessment notice dated April 7, 2003, stating that the appellant ought to have claimed exemption in respect of branch transfer and cannot claim the lower rate of tax at one per cent as claimed. The appellant filed its reply pointing out that the second respondent cannot bring the goods to tax at the higher rate than what has been specified in the clarification and brought to his notice the order of clarification communicated by letter dated January 11, 2002.
The appellant filed its reply pointing out that the second respondent cannot bring the goods to tax at the higher rate than what has been specified in the clarification and brought to his notice the order of clarification communicated by letter dated January 11, 2002. Thereafter, the impugned order of assessment was passed by second respondent on June 30, 2003, whereby he interpreted the letter of the first respondent and brought inter-State sales turnover of the appellant for the period November 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002, to tax at the rate of 10 per cent proposing penalty under section 9(2) of the CST Act read with section 12(3)(v) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as, "the TNGST Act"). Learned senior counsel for the appellant referred to the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Indra Industries reported in [2001] 122 STC 100; [2001] 248 ITR 338 and submitted that the department cannot question the circular issued by the Commissioner, which is binding on them. Reliance was also placed on this court's decision in Pizzeria Fast Foods Restaurant (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chennai reported in [2005] 140 STC 97 to suggest the circumstances in which relief cannot be refused on the ground of alternative remedy. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State while submitting that the consignment transfer made as evident from document, it was submitted that the appellant made suppression of fact before the authority. He placed reliance on the assessment order to suggest the manner in which the appellant suppressed the fact and to justify the order of assessment. According to him, section 6A of the CST Act is not applicable and he referred to unamended section 8(2)(b) of the CST Act. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, noticed the relevant provisions, judgments as referred to by one or other party and the impugned order dated August 28, 2003, passed by learned single judge. Section 6A of the CST Act of which reference made by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, deals with burden of proof, etc., in case of transfer of goods claimed otherwise than by way of sale, but the said provision is not applicable for determination of the question as raised in this case.
Section 6A of the CST Act of which reference made by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, deals with burden of proof, etc., in case of transfer of goods claimed otherwise than by way of sale, but the said provision is not applicable for determination of the question as raised in this case. Section 8(2)(b) relates to rates of tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce in case of goods other than declared goods. As per unamended section, which was applicable at that relevant year, in case of goods other than declared goods, it is to be calculated at the rate of 10 per cent or at the rate applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate State, whichever is higher. This was relied upon by learned counsel for the State to justify 10 per cent charged for transfer of goods, which has not been disclosed by the appellant. Section 12 of the TNGST Act deals with procedure to be followed by the assessing authority. Under section 28A, as relied on by learned counsel for the appellant, while the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is empowered to issue clarification under section 28A(3), the subordinates to the Commissioner are bound to follow such clarification. Relevant provision is quoted hereunder : "28A. Power to issue clarification by Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. - (1) The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes on an application by a registered dealer, may clarify any point concerning the rate of tax under the Act. Such clarification shall be applicable to the goods specified in the application : Section 28A(3) All persons working under the control of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes shall observe and follow the clarification issued under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2)." Against an order of assessment made under section 12 of the TNGST Act, appeal prescribed under section 31A of the TNGST Act. For preferring such appeal, under second proviso, such appeal should be accompanied by proof of payment of tax admitted by appellant and 25 per cent of difference of the tax assessed by the assessing authority.
For preferring such appeal, under second proviso, such appeal should be accompanied by proof of payment of tax admitted by appellant and 25 per cent of difference of the tax assessed by the assessing authority. As 25 per cent of the difference of tax assessed by the assessing authority has to be paid for preferring such appeal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that in such case, just for an illegal order, one should not be forced to pay the amount by directing the party to move in appeal. However, such argument cannot be accepted merely because a person will be liable to pay statutory interest, as generally a party moves in appeal only when it feels that the assessment order is illegal or without jurisdiction or excessive. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant relied on the Supreme Court decision in State of Kerala v. Kurian Abraham Pvt. Ltd. reported in [2008] 13 VST 1; [2008] TIOL 20. The said case was relied to suggest that the High Court can entertain writ petition against order of assessment, but from the said judgment it will be evident that no ratio has been laid down with regard to entertaining an order of assessment of tax under writ jurisdiction, where alternative remedy is available. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also relied on the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Indra Industries reported in [2001] 122 STC 100; [2001] 248 ITR 338. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that a circular by sales tax authority is not binding on the court and assessee, but binding on the taxing authority. The taxing authority cannot be heard to advance his arguments, which is contrary to the interpretation. From the impugned order dated June 30, 2003, it will be evident that the assessing authority has not specifically stated that the clarificatory order of Commissioner dated January 11, 2002, is contrary to the law or is not binding. He has given his explanation as to how the Commissioner's order to be read in-between. Whether such finding of the assessing authority is against the spirit of letter dated January 11, 2002, issued by the Commissioner is to be determined either by the appellate authority or by a court of law.
He has given his explanation as to how the Commissioner's order to be read in-between. Whether such finding of the assessing authority is against the spirit of letter dated January 11, 2002, issued by the Commissioner is to be determined either by the appellate authority or by a court of law. In this background, if learned single judge, for deciding the question of legality and propriety of the assessment order, has asked the appellant to move before the appellate authority under section 31A of the TNGST Act, no interference is called for. Another case relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is the case of Pizzeria Past Foods Restaurant (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chennai reported in [2005] 140 STC 97 (Mad). In the said case, this court, while observing that the clarification is not binding on authorities exercising judicial functions, held that remedies under statute, if inefficacious, writ petition is maintainable. In the present case, there is no allegation that the statutory alternative remedy is inefficacious. The main plea as taken is that the order is without jurisdiction and illegal and assessment is excessive and for that the appellant will have to unnecessarily pay 25 per cent of the difference amount, which is very excessive. But such ground cannot be accepted to entertain a writ petition rendering section 31A as ineffective. Some other judgments referred to by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant on similar point is not dealt with, as the observation and finding made by us in the preceding paragraphs will cover them. We have noticed the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1998 SC 287 , as relied on by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. Therein, the court made the following observation : "4. ... The Assistant Collector is entitled to complete the assessment as he thinks fit in exercise of his judgment and according to his understanding of the law and facts. For this purpose, he can call for and examine whatever documents he considers relevant. If the Assistant Collector fails to follow any judgment of the High Court or this court, the assessee had adequate statutory remedies by way of an appeal and revision against the assessment order. The court should not try to control the mode and manner in which an assessment should be made. ...
If the Assistant Collector fails to follow any judgment of the High Court or this court, the assessee had adequate statutory remedies by way of an appeal and revision against the assessment order. The court should not try to control the mode and manner in which an assessment should be made. ... 5. ... He has to make whatever enquiries he thinks necessary for determination of the value of excisable goods. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction cannot give guidance to Assistant Collector about the manner and mode in which the assessment should be made." Learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on recent Supreme Court decision in State of Punjab v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. reported in [2005] 139 STC 200; [2005] 1 SCC 604 wherein taking into consideration that the assessee challenged the order of Sales Tax Tribunal in appeal as well as in the writ petition simultaneously, held that the writ petition was not maintainable during the pendency of alternative remedy. In the present case, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, apart from placing reliance on the order of assessment, also placed reliance on a chart showing the manner in which assessment should have been made. It was also submitted that the appellant - dealer had not filed "C" form for the sales for the period from February 8, 2002 to March 31, 2003 as also the records relating to branch transfer only because of the clarification made by the Commissioner. But in the present case, we are not inclined to deliberate on this factual aspect as we are not inclined to determine whether the claim as was made by petitioner was rightly made or not. Under the appellate jurisdiction we are deciding the question whether the order passed by learned single judge was legal and proper. In view of our discussion and in absence of any illegality in the order passed by learned single judge and there being alternative remedy available to the appellant, as observed earlier, no interference is called for with the impugned order passed by learned single judge. However, in the facts and circumstances, we allow further one month's time to the appellant to prefer appeal with a petition for condonation of delay bringing to the notice of the appellate authority that the appellant was pursuing the matter before this court. The writ appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid observation.
However, in the facts and circumstances, we allow further one month's time to the appellant to prefer appeal with a petition for condonation of delay bringing to the notice of the appellate authority that the appellant was pursuing the matter before this court. The writ appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid observation. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs.