ORDER 1. This Revision Petition has been preferred by the respondent in R.C.C.No.54 of 2994 on the file of the rent Controller-cum-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kakinada. 2. The R.C.C. was filed by the first respondent herein for eviction of the Revision petitioner from the schedule premises contending that he is the owner of the property. The building is more than 100 years old. The respondent therein took the same on lease on a monthly rent of Rs.600/- payable by first of every succeeding month. The respondent is irregular in payment of the rents. After retirement, the first petitioner started pursuing the matter and demanding the respondent to pay the rent. The respondent committed willful default in payment of the rent to a tune of Rs.3,600/- and failed to pay the rent since six months prior to the filing of the petition. The respondent is not maintaining the premises properly and was causing damage to the building. The respondent, who is running a printing press, was bringing heavy machinery into the premises and on account of vibrations, further damage is likely to be caused to the building. After retirement, the first petitioner was unable to maintain his family with megre pension, therefore, he wanted to carry on the business in the building after making necessary repairs to it as his only alternative is to earn something to maintain his family, therefore the first petitioner is seeking vacant possession of the schedule premises for his self occupation. Hence, the petition for eviction of the respondent. 3. The Respondent-Revision Petitioner filed a counter contending that the first petitioner let out the portion to him for both residential and nonresidential purpose in the year 1967 on a monthly rent of Rs.40/-. The rent was enhanced from time to time and the present rent is Rs.600/- per month. The respondent is regularly paying the rent. The respondent never caused any damage to the building. He is running a printing press. He never introduced any machinery into the building. The schedule premises is not needed for the personal occupation to do business by the petitioner and it is invented to evict him. The petitioner is having another building in the back side of the schedule premises and it was leased out to a third party in getting a monthly rent of Rs.2,000/-. The respondent is unable to enhance the rent as demanded by the petitioner. The petitioner is having another building in the back side of the schedule premises and it was leased out to a third party in getting a monthly rent of Rs.2,000/-. The respondent is unable to enhance the rent as demanded by the petitioner. The petitioner is interfering with the amenities and harassing the respondent. The petitioner did not allow the respondent and his family members to take water from the tap. The petitioner was causing obstruction for free flow of water and dumping the waste material. The petitioner removed the roof of the bathroom and did not attend necessary repairs to latrines etc. He gave a complaint to the police, but the police did not take any action. The petitioner filed the Petition with a mala fide intention to evict the respondent. Therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. Before the lower Court, both parties adduced evidence. On behalf of the petitioner, PWs.1 to 3 were examined and no documentary evidence was adduced. On behalf of the respondent, RWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-13 and Ex.C-1 were marked. After conclusion of the enquiry, the court ordered eviction of the suit premises within two months from the date of the order on the sole ground of bona fide requirement. Being aggrieved by the same, the respondent preferred R.C.A.No.14 of 2001 and the Appellate Court dismissed the Appeal by confirming the order of the Rent Controller. Being aggrieved by the same, the respondent preferred the present Revision Petition. 5. The Revision Petitioner contended that the respondents took false plea to evict him and the lower Court passed an order for eviction on the ground that it is required for occupation for bona fide requirement. The first respondent required the premises for starting the business after his retirement. But he died during the pendency of the R.C.C. and his wife and children are brought on record as legal representatives. After the death of Sri Hanumantharao, the remaining respondents have not filed any amendment petition saying that the fourth respondent is having bona fide requirement to occupy the schedule shop for running her business. The fourth respondent gave evidence that the schedule premises is required for her business. The marriage of the fourth respondent was performed subsequent to her evidence and she is living with her husband at Delhi. The fourth respondent gave evidence that the schedule premises is required for her business. The marriage of the fourth respondent was performed subsequent to her evidence and she is living with her husband at Delhi. This fact discloses that the building is not required for personal occupation and that there was an alternative accommodation for the respondents, which was given on lease for running a laundry subsequently. As the premises is not for bona fide requirement, the Courts below erred in coming to a conclusion that the Revision Petitioner is liable to be evicted. 6. The respondents herein contended that they sought for eviction of the petitioner for their personal occupation and the petitioner committed default in payment of the rent and caused damage to the house. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that there was no earning member in the family of the respondents and they have to eke out their livelihood from out of the rent of the house; that they are residing in an adjacent house which is only 8 feet wide and as it was becoming very difficult for survival, they allowed a person to iron the clothes by putting a table in the varandah of the house on condition that he should pay Rs.10/- per day and as they were residing in the said house, there was no possibility of letting out the same. 7. In the light of the contentions, the point for consideration is: "Whether the bona fide requirement survives after the death of the first respondent and marriage of the fourth respondent?" 8. The learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the schedule premises is required for doing business along with his unemployed and unmarried graduate daughters for the purpose of maintenance of the family and even after the death of the first respondent, the petition is maintainable as the person includes the family unit of the first respondent and as the children expressed their intention to carry on the business in the schedule premises under self employment scheme, the Rent Controller rightly held that the Revision Petitioner is liable to evicted from the premises as the building is required for bona fide requirement of doing business. 9. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the evidence adduced by the landlord is to the effect that in addition to the premises let out to the Revision Petitioner, there is a small adjacent portion to the building in which the respondents are living. Though the Revision Petitioner contended that there is an alternative accommodation, through the evidence of the witnesses the respondents established that it is very narrow house adjacent to the leased premises and they allowed a person to put his table for the purpose of ironing clothes on a daily rent of Rs.10/- while all the family members residing in that house. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the following citations in support of his contentions: In DWARKAPRASAD v. NIRANJAN 1, the expression "for occupation by himself" is interpreted by the Supreme Court and held as follows: "This brings us to the legal question about the meaning to be given to the word "himself" used in sub-section (g) of Section 13 (1) of the Act. Normally, the rent legislations are meant for the benefit of the tenants but the rent statutes contain exceptions in favour of the landlord which give him a right to evict the tenant, the most important being to ensure that he gets payment of rent regularly and promptly and that in case the tenanted premises is required by him for his personal need, he is able to get its possession from the tenant. So the provision regarding eviction of tenant to meet the personal requirement of the landlord with respect to the premises is a provision for the benefit of the landlord. The question arises that should such a provision be construed strictly so as to confine it to the requirement of the landlord alone or can it be extended to include the requirement of members of landlords' family. In the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded right from the beginning that he constitutes a joint family with his mother and brothers and sisters. It is also in evidence that the plaintiff holds the property for the benefit of the entire family. Even when the plaintiff is sole owner of the property, it is open to him to use the property for the benefit of his larger family which includes his brothers and sisters. It is also in evidence that the plaintiff holds the property for the benefit of the entire family. Even when the plaintiff is sole owner of the property, it is open to him to use the property for the benefit of his larger family which includes his brothers and sisters. The respondent-tenant cannot dispute the fact about the plaintiff's constituting a joint family because it is specifically provided in the lease deed which is an admitted document. Moreover, the defendant had not led any evidence to contradict or dispute this plea. The way the case has been argued before the courts below also clearly suggests that the only objection raised on behalf of the tenant was a legal objection that the need of the brothers and sisters of the landlord cannot be considered under sub-section (g). The fact that the plaintiff constituted a joint family with his brothers and sisters was never disputed." In GAYA PRASAD v. PRADEEP SRIVASTAVA 2, the Supreme Court held that: "The crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-process system subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. It is pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." In RAMESH KUMAR v. KESHO RAM 3, the Supreme Court held: "Subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events." In VALLAMPATI KALAVATHI v. HAJI ISMAIL 4, the Supreme Court held that under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, there shall be no interference by the revisional authority. But on the concurrent finding of fact, interference is possible only if findings suffer from any inherent defect or are based on inadmissible or irrelevant materials or are perverse. In Y. RAMALINGAIAH SETTY v. B. SATHYA MURTHY 5, a learned single Judge of this Court held that the requirement of the premises by anyone of family members is the requirement of the landlord. The eviction petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that the landlord took different grounds in support of his plea of bona fide requirement. 13. In the case covered by the above decision, it was mentioned in the petition that the demised premises was required for the proposed business of the landlord. In a reply affidavit, the landlord stated that the premises is required for the business of his son-in-law. There is no dispute that the son- in-law admittedly residing with the landlord. The requirement of the premises by any of the family members is certainly the requirement of the landlord, therefore, the eviction petition cannot be rejected on that ground. 14. The Courts below came to a conclusion that the respondents herein required the premises for bona fide requirement of doing business under self employment scheme. The requirement of the premises by any of the family members is certainly the requirement of the landlord, therefore, the eviction petition cannot be rejected on that ground. 14. The Courts below came to a conclusion that the respondents herein required the premises for bona fide requirement of doing business under self employment scheme. In view of the case law referred above, the bona fide requirement of the daughter of the deceased landlord is also a bona fide requirement of the landlord and as there is no alternative premises, the Rent Controller came to a conclusion that the demised premises is required for conducting business of the family. The Courts below gave a concurrent finding of fact that there is a bona fide requirement of the premises for the purpose of doing family business. 15. After going through the entire material, I am of the view that the Courts below rightly came to a conclusion that the Revision Petitioner is liable to be evicted on the ground of bona fide requirement and I am convinced that there is no illegality or perversity in the orders passed by the Courts below. I do not find any merits in the Revision Petition. 16. The Revision Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.