JUDGMENT By the Court.—Sri M.D. Singh ‘Shekhar’, learned Counsel for the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection that the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge dated 2nd June, 2008, being an order passed by Vacation Judge exercising jurisdiction of Division Bench in a case which was cognizable by Division Bench, the special appeal does not lie. He has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 1985 UPLBEC 1064, Allahabad Galla Tilhan Vyapari Sangh, 25 Muthiganj and others v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Allahabad and others. 2. Sri A.N. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the appellant, refuted the above submission and relied upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported in 2004 (4) AWC 3162 , State of U.P. and others v. Smt. Meera Sankhwar and others, for the proposition that an order passed by learned Single Judge during vacation exercising jurisdiction of Division Bench does not become order of Division Bench and the special appeal in respect thereto is maintainable. 3. We have given thought to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 4. The special appeal is defined under Chapter I Rule 3 of Rules of the Court in following words : “Special Appeal” means the appeal from the judgments of one Judge.” 5. Chapter V Rule 1 of Rules of the Court provides that the Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts as may be constituted from time to time and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions. Chapter 5, thus, provides sitting of Judges alone or in Division Courts, as provided by the order of Chief Justice. Chapter V Rule 2 provides that except as provided by these Rules or other law, the cases mentioned therein shall be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting alone. 6. Chapter V Rules 3 and 4, provide for cases, which are to be heard by more than one Judge. 7. Chapter V Rule 8 provides that save as otherwise provided by these Rules or other law or by any general or special order of the Chief Justice, every other case shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges. 8. Chapter V Rule 10, which is relevant for the present purpose is regarding vacation. 7. Chapter V Rule 8 provides that save as otherwise provided by these Rules or other law or by any general or special order of the Chief Justice, every other case shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges. 8. Chapter V Rule 10, which is relevant for the present purpose is regarding vacation. Chapter 5 Rule 10 is quoted as below : Judge on duty during vacation.—(1) Criminal work shall continue to be dealt with during the vacation by such Judges as may be appointed for the purpose by the Chief Justice. [They may also exercise original, appellate revisional, civil or writ jurisdiction vested in the Court in fresh matters which in their opinion require immediate attention.] Such jurisdiction may be exercised even in cases which are under the Rules cognizable by two or more Judges, unless the case is required by any other law to be heard by more than one Judge. [(2) Subject to any general or special order of the Chief Justice, the senior-most vacation Judge at Allahabad or Lucknow, as the case may be, shall in the absence of the Chief Justice exercise jurisdiction at Allahabad or Lucknow, as the case may be, in connection with the arrangement of Benches, listing of cases and other like matters.] 9. A perusal of Chapter V Rule 10 indicates that all criminal work shall continue to be dealt with during the vacation by such Judges as may be appointed for the purpose by the Chief Justice. Chapter V Rule 10 (1) thereafter provides that the Judges sitting in vacation may also exercise original, appellate revisional, civil or writ jurisdiction vested in the Court in fresh matters. It is further provided that such jurisdiction may be exercised even in cases, which are under the Rules cognizable by two or more Judges. 10. Thus, by virtue of Chapter V Rule 10 as well as by orders issued by the Chief Justice the Judge sitting in vacation can exercise jurisdiction in cases, which are under the Rules cognizable by two Judges. Rule thus, contemplates exercise of jurisdiction by one Judge in cases, which are cognizable by a Division Bench. 10. Thus, by virtue of Chapter V Rule 10 as well as by orders issued by the Chief Justice the Judge sitting in vacation can exercise jurisdiction in cases, which are under the Rules cognizable by two Judges. Rule thus, contemplates exercise of jurisdiction by one Judge in cases, which are cognizable by a Division Bench. The Rule does not envisage that while exercising such jurisdiction of Division Bench the Judge sitting alone will be treated as Division Bench or the order passed by such one Judge will be treated as an order passed by a Division Bench. The Rules do not create any legal fiction that order passed by one Judge during vacation will be treated of a Division Bench. Exercise of jurisdiction by one Judge in the cases, which are cognizable by Division Bench is not equivalent to saying that such exercise of jurisdiction by one Judge will be treated to be as order passed by a Division Bench. 11. Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court provides for filing of special appeal from a judgment of one Judge. Chapter VIII Rule 5 is quoted as below : "5. Special Appeal.—An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgement (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of Superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction [or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or reward (a) of a tribunal Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.]" 12. A perusal of the above provision clearly indicates that the appeal is provided from a judgment of one Judge. A perusal of the above provision clearly indicates that the appeal is provided from a judgment of one Judge. No such limitation can be read in the said Chapter VIII Rule 5 that when one Judge exercises jurisdiction in the vacation with regard to cases, which are cognizable by Division Bench, the appeal shall be barred. It is relevant to note that Chapter VIII Rule 5 enumerates large number of cases where special appeal is barred. Had it was intended that special appeal be barred from the order of Single Judge exercising jurisdiction of a Division Bench in vacation, it ought to have been specifically mentioned in Chapter VIII Rule 5. A reading of above mentioned Rules of the Court indicate that Special Appeal is permitted against a Judgment of “one Judge”. The appeal is maintainable against every Judgment of one Judge irrespective of exercise of jurisdiction by him excepting the cases which are expressly excluded in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of Rules of the Court. Accepting the arguments of learned Counsel for the respondent shall mean carving another category of cases in which Special Appeal is barred whereas such bar can neither be expressly or impliedly read in the Rules of the Court. 13. The principles of law of precedent are well known. A learned Single Judge exercising jurisdiction in vacation in cases cognizable by Division Bench cannot overrule a judgment of another learned Single Judge on the strength that he is exercising jurisdiction of Division Bench nor a judgment given by one Judge in vacation exercising jurisdiction of Division Bench can be treated to be a judgment of a Division Bench. The judgment rendered by a Vacation Judge sitting singly exercising jurisdiction of Division Bench has never been accepted to be on any high pedestal then a judgment of another learned Single Judge and law of precedent does not recognise any supremacy to a judgment of one Judge while exercising jurisdiction of Division Bench. The natural corollary from above is that even if during vacation a Single Judge exercises jurisdiction of Division Bench his judgment will remain judgment of only one Judge. 14. We have also gone through the Division Bench judgment, which has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents. The natural corollary from above is that even if during vacation a Single Judge exercises jurisdiction of Division Bench his judgment will remain judgment of only one Judge. 14. We have also gone through the Division Bench judgment, which has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents. In Allahabad Galla Tilhan Vyapari Sangh, 25 Muthiganj and others (supra), the Division Bench in para-2 of the judgment has observed as follows : “2. Apart from the Rules of Court no other law e.g. Section 57 (2) of the Stamp Act which requires a reference under that Act to be heard by three Judges has been brought to our notice which required such a writ petition to be heard by more than one Judge. Under the Rules of Court, the jurisdiction which the learned Vacation Judge exercised in deciding the writ petition by the order appealed against was, however, a jurisdiction which ordinarily was exercisable only by a Division Bench. In view of the provisions contained in Chapter V, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court referred to above it will, therefore, have to be assumed that even though the order appealed against was passed by a learned Single Judge it was passed by a Division Bench, the same having been passed by him as Vacation Judge, for otherwise a writ petition cognizable by a Division Bench could not be entertained by a Single Judge. As a necessary corollary no special appeal will lie against that order before another Division Bench. In this connection reference may be made to following observations of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 Appeal Cases 109 Page 132 : “If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative State of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it..............The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.” Reference may also be usefully made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bengali Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 , wherein Paragraph 33 it was held : “When we apply a fiction all we do is to assume that the situation created by the fiction is true. Therefore, the same consequences must flow from the fiction as would have flown had the facts supposed to be true been the actual facts from the start.” 15. The Division Bench in the said judgment proceeded to assume that even though the order appealed against was as order passed by learned Single Judge it be treated to have passed by a Division Bench. The Division Bench relied upon two judgments; one of appeal cases and another of Apex Court in Bengal Immunity Co. (supra). The cases relied upon by the Division Bench were cases of legal fiction created by a statute. There cannot be any dispute to the principles laid down for interpreting a legal fiction. All the consequences which flow from a legal fiction had to be taken into consideration and fully given effect to. The judgment of the Apex Court in Bengal Immunity Co. (supra) was with regard to Article 286 of the Constitution of India and legal fiction, which was created by explanation thereto. Had there been any provision in the Rules of the Court providing legal fiction that the order passed by one Judge during vacation will be treated to be an order of Division Bench, the assumption as above could be justified, but no such provision could be pointed out creating legal fiction to above effect. 16. On the other hand, there are two Division Bench judgments; State of U.P. and others (supra) as well as judgment reported in 1994 A.W.C. 1137, State of U.P. and another v. Smt. Dayavati Khanna relied upon in the judgment of State of U.P. and others (supra). This Court in State of U.P. v. Meera Sankhwar has laid down after considering the provisions of Chapter V Rule 10 that the order passed by learned Single Judge passed in vacation cannot be treated to be an order of a Division Bench and the appeal is not barred. Para-5 of the said judgment is quoted as below : "5. This Court in State of U.P. v. Meera Sankhwar has laid down after considering the provisions of Chapter V Rule 10 that the order passed by learned Single Judge passed in vacation cannot be treated to be an order of a Division Bench and the appeal is not barred. Para-5 of the said judgment is quoted as below : "5. The provision in the said Rule that the jurisdiction of a Division Bench can be exercised by a learned Single Judge does not mean that the order of a learned Single Judge becomes an order of a Division Bench. It only means that the learned Single Judge can exercise the jurisdiction which normally a Division Bench exercises. This does not mean that the Single Judge becomes a Division Bench. Hence in our opinion the order remains an order of a learned Single Judge, and hence a special appeal will lie under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules." 17. In the case of State of U.P. and another v. Smt. Dayavati Khanna, 1994 AWC 1137, the Court was examining the maintainability of appeal against the interim order passed in a writ petition cognizable by a Division Bench. The Division Bench also held that the special appeal is maintainable. Para 9, 10 and 11 are quoted as below : "9. Faced with this situation, Mr. L.P. Naithani, Counsel for Dayavati Khanna, sought to put-forth the wholly untenable contention, that no special appeal lay against the impugned order. The argument being that a Special Appeal would be competent only from an order passed in a writ petition which is required to be heard by a Single Judge but not when an order is passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition cognizable by a Division Bench. In other words, in a writ petition cognizable by a Division Bench no special appeal lies against an order passed by a Single Judge while dealing with interim matters. Counsel could, however, point no rule or judicial precedent to support this contention which on the face of it, has no reason or principle to support it. 10. As is well known, it is in the exercise of powers vested in the Chief Justice that the Single Judges have been conferred jurisdiction to deal with matters pertaining to interim relief, in writ petitions, cognizable by a Division Bench. 10. As is well known, it is in the exercise of powers vested in the Chief Justice that the Single Judges have been conferred jurisdiction to deal with matters pertaining to interim relief, in writ petitions, cognizable by a Division Bench. While dealing with such a matter the Single Judge does not function as a delegatee of the Division Bench nor there is any warrant for deeming an interim order passed by the Single Judge in a matter cognizable by the Division Bench, as being that of the Division Bench so as to bear a special appeal against it. 11. Further, there is nothing in the language of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 to lend itself to any such interpretation, namely, barring an appeal from an order passed by the Single Judge in such matters, rather a reading of it would show that an appeal against the order of the Single Judge is in no way barred. There is thus no ground to hold that the present Special Appeal was not competent." 18. The Division Bench judgment in Allahabad Galla Tilhan Vyapari Sangh, 25 Muthiganj and others (supra) is based on assumption that an order of Single Judge in vacation exercising jurisdiction of Division Bench is to be treated an order of Division Bench. The Division Bench for coming to the said conclusion relied upon decisions, which were regarding statutory legal fiction. In Rules of the Court no such legal fiction is envisaged nor there was any basis for such assumption as had been taken by the Division Bench. The subsequent Division Bench in State of U.P. and others v. Smt Meera Sankhwar and others although had held that against a judgment of learned Single Judge given in vacation exercising jurisdiction of Division Bench special appeal is maintainable but the said Division Bench had not noticed earlier Division Bench in Allahabad Galla Tilhan Vyapari Sangh, 25 Muthiganj and others (supra). Although, as indicated above, we are of the view that the Division Bench judgment in Allahabad Galla Tilhan Vyapari Sangh, 25 Muthiganj and others (supra) is not correctly decided but we sitting in Division Bench cannot ourselves pronounce as to which view is correct view. We think it proper that the questions be referred to a Larger Bench for authoritative pronouncement. We think it proper that the questions be referred to a Larger Bench for authoritative pronouncement. We frame following two questions for consideration of the Larger Bench : (1) Whether against the order/judgment of one Judge passed in vacation exercising jurisdiction in cases which are cognizable by a Division Bench an special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court is maintainable? (2) Whether the Division Bench judgment in Allahabad Galla Tilhan Vyapari Sangh, 25 Muthiganj and others, 1985 UPLBEC 1064 (supra) or Division Bench judgment in State of U.P. and others v. Smt. Meera Sankhwar and others, 2004 (4) A WC 3162, lays down the correct law? 19. We having taken the view that the above questions require consideration by a Larger Bench, have heard the Counsel for the parties on the merits of the appeal also. 20. Sri M.D. Singh ‘Shekhar’, learned Counsel for the respondents, has raised another objection regarding maintainability of the appeal. It is submitted that impugned order being only an interim order is not a Judgment, hence no appeal is maintainable. 21. We have considered the submissions. The motion for tabling no confidence was moved against the writ petitioner on 12th May, 2008 by the applicant, which is claimed to have signed by 72 members of Kshetra Panchayat. On the said motion, the District Magistrate issued a notice dated 13th/14th May, 2008 for convening the meeting on 6th June, 2008 for consideration of no confidence. At that juncture, the respondent filed the writ petition. This Court by the order passed on 2nd June, 2008, directed that the meeting for consideration of no confidence may be held as scheduled, but if the motion is passed against the petitioner, the same shall not be given effect till the next date of listing. Interim order thus, envisages that even if the motion is passed the same shall not be given effect to. The order thus, stopped giving effect to the resolution even if it was passed in the meeting scheduled on 6th June, 2008. Interim order has thus serious effect on the rights of members of Kshetra Panchayat. Interim order thus, envisages that even if the motion is passed the same shall not be given effect to. The order thus, stopped giving effect to the resolution even if it was passed in the meeting scheduled on 6th June, 2008. Interim order has thus serious effect on the rights of members of Kshetra Panchayat. The Apex Court in AIR 1981 SC 1786 , Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D Kama has laid down that intra Court Appeal may be available against interlocutory orders which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. The above proposition has also been reiterated in 2006 (5) SCC 399, Midnapur People’s Cooperative Bank Ltd. and others v. Chunilal Nanda and others. The present is a case where interim order stops the effect of motion of no confidence even if the same is passed by majority. The interim order affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and work serious injustice to the party concerned. Thus, the preliminary objection raised by Sri M.D. Singh ‘Shekhar’ cannot be accepted. 22. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that in passing the order staying the effect of the motion no reason was recorded by the learned Single Judge. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that unless the motion was not signed by more than half of the members, no meeting could have been convened by the District Magistrate. Learned Single Judge while passing order has not recorded any reason for such grant. This Court as well as the Apex Court time and again has laid down that in granting an interim order reasons are necessary to be recorded see 2006 (10) A.D.J. 7, Union of India v. Rama Dental College. 23. One more submission, which has been raised by the learned Counsel, for the respondents is that no motion has been passed on 6th June, 2008 whereas learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the motion has been passed. In this appeal we are not concerned as to whether the motion has been passed on 6th June, 2008 or not. We require to express no opinion in that regard. It is open for the appellant to canvass above submission in the writ petition, we leave this for consideration in the writ petition by the appropriate Bench. 24. In this appeal we are not concerned as to whether the motion has been passed on 6th June, 2008 or not. We require to express no opinion in that regard. It is open for the appellant to canvass above submission in the writ petition, we leave this for consideration in the writ petition by the appropriate Bench. 24. Let the papers be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench. 25. Copy of the order may be supplied to the learned Counsel for the parties within 48 hours on payment of usual charges. ————