BARKAT ALI ZAIDI, J. Accused respondents Virendra Kumar, Arjun Prasad and Jamuna Prasad were tried in Sessions Trial No. 424 of 1980 by VIIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad on a charge under section 307/34 IPC and the Trial Judge acquitted them by judgment and order dated 12. 3. 1982. Two of the ac cused Virendra Kumar and Jamuna Prasad have expired and only Arjun Prasad Sur vives. 2. The State comes in appeal. 3. The short facts of the case are that, a first information report was lodged by P. W. 2 Harish Chandra on 5. 10. 1979 at 10 Oclock in the night at Police Station Daraganj, District Allahabad, with regard to an incident which took place at 7. 30 p. m. in front of 18-Daraganj, within the jurisdiction of Police Station Daraganj, Allahabad. 4. The allegations were that a litiga tion was pending between father of the informant Ganga Prasad P. W. 1 and his uncle accused Jamuna Prasad. Around 7. 30 Oclock in the evening when the father of the informant was going to fetch Tan and biries from his house, accused Virendra Kumar exhorted accused Jamuna Prasad and his son Arjun Prasad to kill Ganga Prasad and at this instigation, as alleged that Jamuna Prasad wielded a Lathi blow on the father of the informant while his son accused Arjun Prasad assaulted him with the knife causing injuries in his person, Amar Nath, Bhola and the informant witnessed the incident. It is said that thereaf ter, the informant took his father Ganga Prasad to District Hospital, Allahabad, where he was examined and treated for his injuries and the informant along with the written report went to the police station for lodging the first information report. 5. The investigation of the case was assigned to P. W. 4 S. I. Panna Lal Verma, who submitted a charge- sheet against the aforesaid three accused under section 307/34 IPC. 6. The prosecution examined Ganga Prasad P. W. 1 Harish Chandra P. W. 2, Dr. K. P. Sarabhai P. W. 3 and S. I. Panna Lal Verma P. W. 4 in the prosecution evidence. The case of the accused was one of denial and no witness was examined in defence. 7. The Trial Court found them not guilty and acquitted them. 8. We have heard Sri K. N. Bajpayee, Addl. K. P. Sarabhai P. W. 3 and S. I. Panna Lal Verma P. W. 4 in the prosecution evidence. The case of the accused was one of denial and no witness was examined in defence. 7. The Trial Court found them not guilty and acquitted them. 8. We have heard Sri K. N. Bajpayee, Addl. Government Advocate for the appel lant-State and Sri Pulack Ganguli, advocate for accused-respondents. 9. The Trial Judge has mentioned in his judgment that despite the fact that there were thousands of people, present at the place of occurrence, at the time of occur rence because of Dussehra festival, yet none of the witnesses have been produced. The judge has emphasized that names of two witnesses Amar Nath and Bhola have been mentioned in the first information report, but none of them has been pro duced. 10. The Trial Judge did not consider the evidence of the injured person and son P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 sufficient for conviction. 11. In the first place, it must be men tioned that the perspective of the judge regarding the consequences of not produc tion of independent witnesses is blurred. It is common knowledge that people gener ally avoid evidence in courts, because of the trauma of cross-examination and other attendant inconveniences and, therefore, nobody wants to be a witness in a Criminal Case. 12. It is not the presence or absence of witnesses, which should be the determin ing factor. The Court has to see whether the evidence produced by the prosecution is credible and worthy of reliance. The atti tude of the Trial Court in suspecting the prosecution version, merely because, the independent witnesses were not produced, is unwarranted and unjustified. The Court should examine the evidence which has been produced and draw appropriate conclusions. 13. In this case, there is the evidence of a brother against his own brother. This is no ordinary evidence and cannot be treated, as such. 14. The evidence of blood relations against each other, stands on a different plane, than, the evidence of other wit nesses. The evaluation of such evidence has to be made differently and unless there are plausible reasons for a blood relation to accuse the other, the evidence should not be easily discarded. 15. 14. The evidence of blood relations against each other, stands on a different plane, than, the evidence of other wit nesses. The evaluation of such evidence has to be made differently and unless there are plausible reasons for a blood relation to accuse the other, the evidence should not be easily discarded. 15. The argument from the side of the accused, that since there was dispute be tween the brothers about distribution of rent, that is why P. W. 1 falsely implicated his brother and his nephew Arjun Prasad and no one and least of all, will accuse his brother for assaulting him with knife, leaving aside a person who caused injuries. Besides the name of the accused were mentioned in the first information report Ext. Ka-3, which was lodged shortly after the occurrence. There was no reason for P. W. 1 to have allowed the person who as saulted him, to go scot free and to impli cate his brother only because, there was some dispute with regard to the distribu tion of rent. 16. It has also to be noticed that the defence does not name anyone, who have actually assaulted P. W. 1. If any other per son had assaulted P. W. 1, the accused must have known about the same and they could have disclosed his name. This is not to say, that it was incumbent or necessary for the defence to name any person but that would have given more credibility to the defence version. 17. The consequence has been that the evaluation of the evidence of P. W. 1 by the Trial Judge, was fundamentally, erroneous. 18. The Trial Court was further egregiously erroneous in trying to locate the precise spot and emphasized the circum stance, that, blood which had fallen on the place of occurrence was not available. The Trial Court further went round in circles over the place of occurrence going North and South and mentioned some divergence between the witnesses with regard to the place of occurrence. There was hardly any dispute in the case, with regard to the place of occurrence and it is not necessary to pin point the exact and precise spot where the injured fell and bled. There was hardly any dispute in the case, with regard to the place of occurrence and it is not necessary to pin point the exact and precise spot where the injured fell and bled. It makes hardly any difference if he fell few yards this way or few yards that way, but the Trial Court made a mountain out of a mole hill and ingeniously discovered a monumental flaw in this aspect. The error on the part of the Trial Court, in this regard, is further com pounded by the fact that P. W. 1 said in his statement in Court that he had brought his blood stained clothes with him which were exhibited in Court, of which the Trial Court has not taken notice, which is another flaw on the part of the Court. 19. The Trial Court has found that there was delay in lodging of the first in formation report, on the basis of which, it has drawn adverse conclusion against the prosecution and has mentioned that it cre ates possibility of false implication in the first information report. 20. The incident is said to have taken place at 7. 30 in the evening, while the first information report was lodged at 10. 00 Oclock in the night. The distance of police station was 200 yards. The Trial Court said that there was delay of two and a half hour despite the police station being 200 yards away. The Trial Court further referred to the explanation of P. W. 2 that since his fa ther was bleeding he had to be taken to the hospital, which was more important, than the immediate lodging of the first informa tion report. The Trial Court found this rea son insufficient and has mentioned in his judgment, that the information could have been sent to police station, by somebody else. 21. The perspective of the Trial Court in this regard, is wholly erroneous. It is not the requirement of law that leaving aside everything, somebody should rush to the police station to lodge the first information report. 22. It cannot, therefore, be said by any reasonable standard that there was any substantial delay in lodging the first infor mation report, which may create doubt or suspicion about the bonafidees of the same. It is not the requirement of law that leaving aside everything, somebody should rush to the police station to lodge the first information report. 22. It cannot, therefore, be said by any reasonable standard that there was any substantial delay in lodging the first infor mation report, which may create doubt or suspicion about the bonafidees of the same. The non-acceptance by the Trial Court of the circumstance given by P. W. 2 that the injured person was first taken to the hospi tal gives an inclination that the Trial Court was unduly inclined towards the version of the accused. The Trial Court has referred a Supreme Court case, Garib Singh v. State of Punjab 1972 CAR 311 (SC) in which it has been held that if the injured person was taken to the hospital, that would provide sufficient explanation for the delay of the first information report, but the trial Court, distinguished the case on the ground that the condition in that case of the injured was serious but in the present case, the condition of the injured was not so serious. The line of demarcation drawn by the trial Court is too thin and fragile to be visualized. It is usually after the doctor has examined a patient, that it can be ascertained whether the injuries are serious or not, but when there are knife injuries which are bleeding, the natural concern of the attendants would be, to im mediately shift the patient to hospital for treatment, so that, there may be no further blood loss. Further, the injuries sustained were not so simple or superficial on the basis whereof, it may be said that there was no urgent need to remove Ganga Prasad to the hospital. 23. It cannot, therefore, be said that in the circumstances of the case, there was any substantial delay in lodging the first information report, which may provide grounds for doubts, about the contents of the first information report. 24. Another ground, on which the prosecution version has been assailed is that the statement of P. W. 1 was recorded after 29 days of the occurrence and this has made the trial Court to doubt the veracity and genuineness of the prosecution ver sion. 24. Another ground, on which the prosecution version has been assailed is that the statement of P. W. 1 was recorded after 29 days of the occurrence and this has made the trial Court to doubt the veracity and genuineness of the prosecution ver sion. In the first place, it has to be Stated that mere delay in recording the statement of prosecution witnesses, is no ground for suspect the bonafidees of the prosecution version, unless the delay is unusual and is unexplained. 25. In this case, there was delay of only 29 days which in the current scenario, cannot be considered a long and unusual delay. The police are encumbered with so may law and order duties and there is dearth of police persons and in such cir cumstances, delay is quite likely. 26. In this case, there was delay of 29 days which by the prevailing standards cannot be said to be unusual delay. P. W. 4, the investigation officer has also explained in his statement that he was engaged in other important duties, which caused de-lay. 27. One of the reasons for rejection and downgrading of the prosecution ver sion, given by the Trial Court is that the investigation of the case has been tardy and perfunctory. There are umpteen pro nouncements of the Supreme Court that investigation lapses, cannot provide ground for rejection of the prosecution evi dence and the conclusion of the Court in a case, cannot be allowed to stand, solely, on the probity of the investigation. We will quote a few: (i) State of U. P. v. Jagdev, 2003 (1) ILD 286 (SC ). (ii) State of U. P. v. Ear Bhan Singh, 1998 SAR 208 (SC) = 1998 (37) ACC 14 (SC ). (iii) State of Karnataka v. K. Y. Reddy, 2000 SAR (Crime) 37 (SC ). (iv) State of Rajasthan v. Kishore, 1996 (33) ACC 284 (SC ). (v) Karnail Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1995 (32) ACC 742 (SC ). 28. The Trial Court in his judgment has mentioned that the site plan, prepared by the investigating officer, is not available, which according to the Trial Court is a big lacuna in the prosecution and adversely effects the credibility of the prosecution version. (v) Karnail Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1995 (32) ACC 742 (SC ). 28. The Trial Court in his judgment has mentioned that the site plan, prepared by the investigating officer, is not available, which according to the Trial Court is a big lacuna in the prosecution and adversely effects the credibility of the prosecution version. As mentioned above, any lapses or lacunas in the prosecution version during the investigation of the case, cannot be considered sufficient to discredit the prose cution version and if the eye witnesses testimony is consistent and dependable, it must suffice to sustain conviction. 29. What is important is, whether there is credible eye witness account avail able, or not and the presence and absence of site plan, is not a material feature. 30. The Trial Court has referred the case of Sri Sat Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1974 SC (Cr. R.) 126 which only says that the site plan is admis sible. It cannot be construed to imply that the absence of a site plan, is fatal to the prosecution and injures the prosecution case in any substantial measure. If the site plan is unavailable, it will not provide ground for throwing out the prosecution case, or for branding the prosecution case as weak and in-coherent. 31. In the present case, in view of its own peculiar circumstances, which depend primarily on the eye- witness testimony in the case, there is no dispute about the place of occurrence. It is indisputable that the occurrence took place, in front of the house, of the informant. 32. Coming to the eye-witness ac count, the testimony of the injured P. W. 1 and his son P. W. 2 Harish Chandra, is clear and consistent. The Trial Court has discov ered holes and dents in their evidence, which are non-existent. It has been men tioned by the Trial Court that P. W. 1 Ganga Prasad stated that he had walked 4-5 paces, when the assault took place and his son was inside the house. The Trial Court in ferred there from that P. W. 2 Harish Chandra could not see the incident. It is quite possible, that after noise had been raised consequent upon the commence ment of the incident, P. W. 2 would have come running outside and could have been able to see the incident. 33. The Trial Court in ferred there from that P. W. 2 Harish Chandra could not see the incident. It is quite possible, that after noise had been raised consequent upon the commence ment of the incident, P. W. 2 would have come running outside and could have been able to see the incident. 33. It has also been mentioned by the Trial Court that P. W. 2 has said in his statement, that he was standing at his door steps of his house, when he saw the inci dent and the Trial Court has mentioned that there is a contradiction in this regard, in the statement of the father and the son, because, P. W. 1 has stated that he (P. W. 2) was inside the house when he (P. W. 1) had left the house. It is possible that during the intervening time, P. W. 2 would have come to the door steps of the house. In any case, the sequence of small movements by the father and the son, at the time of occur rence, cannot be a criteria for determining their-credibility, because the incident hap pened in front of their house and it is, therefore, very probable that the son P. W. 2, in the, circumstances, must have seen the incident. 34. The evaluation of the evidence by the Trial Court was, therefore misguided and, coherence in evidence is not to be as sessed in this manner, resort must be made to the coherence Theory of Law as propounded by A. Peczevik in his book on law and Rea son, University of Land Sweden with a preface by J. C. Hage. 35. On evaluation of the evidence, it has to be inferred that there is no incoher ence in the evidence of father and son P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 and there is nothing in their testimony, from which, it may be inferred that they were trying to make a false case. There can be no manner of doubt that P. W. 1 was injured at that time, right in front of his house, which is documented by the re port of P. W. 3 doctor P. K. Sarabhai at Civil Hospital, Allahabad, Ext. Ka-2 and which has been proved by him in his statement. 36. There can be no manner of doubt that P. W. 1 was injured at that time, right in front of his house, which is documented by the re port of P. W. 3 doctor P. K. Sarabhai at Civil Hospital, Allahabad, Ext. Ka-2 and which has been proved by him in his statement. 36. There was no substantial delay in filing of the first information report, as noted above and the assailants have been named in the first information report. The facts and circumstances must, therefore, lead to an inevitable conclusion that P. W. 1 Ganga Prasad received injuries at the hands of accused. 37. There is, however, scope for inter ference in respect of section of Indian Penal Code 307 for which the acquittal has been recorded by the Trial Court, inasmuch as behind the injuries sustained by the injured person P. W. 1 Ganga Prasad, there was no intention on the part of the accused to kill him. The doctor has also not said that the injuries were so serious as to endanger life. The intention to kill, is one of the essential ingredient of the evidence under section 307, Indian Penal Code and the same does not seem to have been made out, the con viction should be under section 324, Indian Penal Code. 38. The acquittal is accordingly al tered and the accused-respondent Arjun Prasad shall stand convicted under section 324, IPC. 39. In normal course, this Court would have convicted the accused for 18 months rigorous imprisonment, but it is to be seen, that the occurrence took place 29 year ago. We experience a sense of shame in deciding a case which took place 29 year earlier, the whole system needs to be changed and revamped so that such delays do not occur. 40. Some delay may not be a proper cause for showing lenience in such cases, but such unusual and monumental delay, can and should be considered as an ame liorative and extenuating circumstance. 41. We, therefore, sentence the ac cused-respondent Arjun Prasad to the pe riod of 3 months already undergone by him in prison. 42. Appeal allowed to that extent. Appeal Allowed. .