Judgment ( 1. ) THE appellant, a sexagenarian, being dissatisfied with and aggrieved by order dated 12-11-08 passed by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 13698/08 has preferred this appeal under section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko) Appeal adhiniyam, 2005. ( 2. ) THE expose of facts which are imperative to be adumbrated are that the appellant being aspirant for contesting the Assembly elections scheduled to be held on 27-11-08 filed his nomination papers from constituency No. 143, Silvan in the district, Raisen. The nomination papers were submitted on 3-11-2008, as pleaded, with the requisite declaration. The Returning officer scrutinised the nomination papers and found that the appellant had submitted forms a and b in contravention of the requirements contained in the Handbook of the Returning Officer in terms of the provisions of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order 1968 (for short 1968 order ). ( 3. ) BEING grieved with the aforesaid rejection, the appellant invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India contending, inter alia, that the defect that has been taken note of by the Returning Officer is not substantial in nature as per Rule 4 of the Conduct of Election Rules as well as the postulates laid down in Section 36 (4) of the representation of Peoples Act, 1951 (for brevity the 1951 Act) and, therefore, the same warranted interference by this Court to demolish injustice at the threshold. It was also contended that the defects that were found by the Returning Officer had already been rectified prior to scrutiny and, therefore, it was absolutely erroneous on the part of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination forms submitted by the appellant. It was propounded that by such illegal and unsound rejection, the concept of fair election is affected and in a democratic body polity fair election is a must. ( 4. ) THE aforesaid stand and stance of the appellant was vehemently opposed by the election Commission stating, inter alia, that the order of rejection of nomination papers is a matter of enquiry which can only be examined in the election petition and, hence, the writ petition in invocation of the extraor-dinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. especially, in a matter of this nature, is not maintainable. especially, in a matter of this nature, is not maintainable. Needless to emphasise, various other asseverations were made to highlight that the nomination paper suffered from unacceptable and incurable deficiencies and, therefore, the action of the Returning Officer was absolutely just and proper and did not call for interference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court. ( 5. ) THE learned single Judge, as is manifest from the order impugned, referred to article 329 of the Constitution of India and various decisions rendered from time to time by the Apex Court as to how the writ power under Article 226 of the Constitution of india should not be exercised in a case of rejection of nomination papers of this nature and, therefore, as is vivid, opined that the appropriate remedy available to the petitioner is to challenge the election of the returned candidate in an election petition raising the grounds available under Section 100 of the 1951 Act. Being of this view, he expressed the opinion that the remedy by way of writ petition was not available and the grounds urged can be pressed into service in an election petition and accordingly dismissed the writ petition. ( 6. ) MR. A. G. Dhande, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the appellant submitted that the learned single Judge has fallen into grave error in his appreciation of section 36 (4) of the 1951 Act inasmuch as when the defects pointed out by the Returning officer while rejecting the nomination papers were not in the realm of facts, the same in fact, should have been adverted to and dwelled upon in the writ petition. It is urged by him that sub-section (4) of Section 36 is a sacrosanct provision and it is incumbent on the part of the Election Officer not to reject the nomination on the ground of any defect which is not of a substantial nature and when the said authority has not acted in consonance with the statutory mandate, it was open to the petitioner to challenge the same by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this court as the concept of judicial review gets attracted and the power which can be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be curtailed or curbed or fettered in this manner. The learned Senior Counsel to bolster his submission has pressed into service the decisions rendered in Rakesh Kumar v. Sunil kumar, (1999) 2 SCC 489 : ( AIR 1999 SC 935 ) and Election Commissioner of India v. Ashok Kumar, AIR 2000 SC 2979 . ( 7. ) MR. K. K. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel who has entered appearance on behalf of the Chief Election Commission, supporting the order passed by the learned single judge, contended that the order passed by him is absolutely impeccable inasmuch as the non obstante clause in Article 329 of the Constitution of India which has been interpreted by various decisions of the Apex court has been taken note of by the learned single Judge and the view expressed by him is totally faultless. It is urged by him that whether the rejection of nomination papers by the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny is substantial in nature or not; whether the defects have been rectified and at what stage; and whether that can be treated to be non substantial is in the realm of facts and cannot be gone into under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned senior counsel further submitted that once the election process had commenced the only remedy available to the petitioner is to take recourse to the provision of the 1951 act to challenge the election and not to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court as that will be an interdiction by way of writ jurisdiction which is impermissible. ( 8. ) TO appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at the bar, it is apposite to refer to Article 329 of the Constitution of India. It reads as under : "329. Bar to Interference by Courts in electoral matters.-1. (Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution 2 [****] (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimination of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 327 or Article 328, shall not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. " ( 9. " ( 9. ) THE aforesaid provision came to be interpreted in N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64 wherein the Apex Court has expressed the view that the term election as has been used in Part XV of the Constitution is in wider sense and would include the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to the Legislature. Their lordships have expressed the view that the term election can be and has been appropriately used with reference to the entire process which consists of several stages and embraces many steps, some of which may have an important bearing on the result of the process. It is worth-noting in N. P. Ponnuswami (supra), the Apex Court referred to the observations made by Lord chancellor in Theberge v. Laudry, (1876) 2 ac 102 wherein paragraph 18 it was stated as follows : "the points which emerge from this decision may be stated as follows : (1) The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. (2) Strictly speaking, it is the sole right of the Legislature to examine and determine all matters relating to the election of its own hands and vests in a special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction, that special jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the law which creates it. " ( 10. ) IN Nanhoo Mal v. Hira Mal, AIR 1975 sc 2140 , a three-Judge Bench of the Apex court applied the term election even to other election and other statutes. ( 11. ) IN Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief election Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 1978 sc 851 the Apex Court ruled that every steps from start to finish of the total process constitutes election nor merely the conclusion or culmination. Thereafter their Lordships proceeded to state as follows : " 1 (a) Article 329 (b) is a blanket ban on litigative challenges to electoral steps taken by the Election Commission and its officers for carrying forward the process of election to its culmination in the formal declaration of the result. Thereafter their Lordships proceeded to state as follows : " 1 (a) Article 329 (b) is a blanket ban on litigative challenges to electoral steps taken by the Election Commission and its officers for carrying forward the process of election to its culmination in the formal declaration of the result. (b) Election, in this context, has a very wide connotation commencing from the presidential notification calling upon the electorate to elect and culminating in the final declaration of the returned candidate. ( 12. ) IN Inderjit Barua v. Election Commission of india, AIR 1984 SC 1911 , it has been held that Article 329 (b) of the constitution bars any challenge to the impugned election by a writ petition under Article 226. It was also opined therein that the 1951 Act contemplates election from each constituency and it is that election which is liable to be challenged by filing an election petition. It has been held therein that once the final electoral rolls are punished and elections are held on the basis of such electoral rolls, it is not open to anyone to challenge the election from any constituency or constituencies on the ground that the electoral rolls were defective. Be it. noted, though the same decision was rendered in a different context, we have referred to the same for the purpose of completeness. ( 13. ) THE Election Commission of India v. Shivaji, AIR 1988 SC 61 it has been held that a petition questioning the election on whatever grounds under Article 226 of the constitution of India is not permissible. It can only be challenged under the provisions contained in the 1951 Act and the High court has no jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the election process by issuing interim orders. ( 14. ) AT this juncture, it would not be inappropriate to refer to the decision rendered in Dharti Pakar Madan Lal Agrawal v. K. R. Narayanan, AIR 1998 SC 1462 wherein the apex Court has opined that a composite petition described as an election petition cum writ petition is not maintainable. ( 15. ( 14. ) AT this juncture, it would not be inappropriate to refer to the decision rendered in Dharti Pakar Madan Lal Agrawal v. K. R. Narayanan, AIR 1998 SC 1462 wherein the apex Court has opined that a composite petition described as an election petition cum writ petition is not maintainable. ( 15. ) IN Shyamdeo Prasad Singh v. Nawal kishore Yadav, AIR 2000 SC 3000 , it has been held that one of the principles underlying the plenary bar on judicial proceedings in election matters created by Article 329 (b) is the peremptory urgency of prompt engineering of the whole election process without intermediate interruptions by way of legal proceedings challenging the steps and stages in between the commencement and the conclusion. ( 16. ) IN Manda Jaganath v. K. S. Rathnam, air 2004 SC 3600 the question arose with regard to the rejection of nomination forms. In that context, the Apex Court held that whether the Returning Officer is justified in rejecting the nomination form is not a matter for the High Court to decide in exercise of writ jurisdiction and this issue should be agitated by an aggrieved party in the election petition only. ( 17. ) IN this context, it would be seemly to refer to the decision rendered in Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369 : AIR 2003 SC 3057 ) wherein in paragraph 22, it has been held that the right to contest an election is neither a fundamental right nor acommon law right but a right conferred by a statute. ( 18. ) MR. A. G. Dhande, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant, has drawn inspiration from the decision rendered in Election Commission of India (supra ). In the said decision, their Lordships of the Apex Court held that there was no justification for interference by the High Court when the election proceeding was in progress. Be it noted, in the said case, the apex Court has referred to the decision rendered in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and carved out certain exceptions. Their lordships 1n paragraph 28 have held as under : "28. Election disputes are not just private civil disputes between two parties. Though there is an individual or a few individuals arrayed as parties before the Court but the stakes of the constituency as a whole are on trial. Their lordships 1n paragraph 28 have held as under : "28. Election disputes are not just private civil disputes between two parties. Though there is an individual or a few individuals arrayed as parties before the Court but the stakes of the constituency as a whole are on trial. Whichever way the lis terminates it affects the fate of the constituency and the citizens, generally. A conscientious approach with overriding consideration for welfare of the constituency and strengthening the democracy is called for. Neither turning a blind eye to the controversies which have arisen nor assuming a role of over-enthusiastic activist would do. The two extremes have to be avoided in dealing with election disputes. " it is worth-noting that exceptions have been carved out in subsequent paragraphs but a pregnant one, those exceptions which have been stated in the said decision are not attracted to the present case. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the case at hand. ( 19. ) THE learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the decision rendered in krishna Ballabh Prasad Singh (sic) (supra ). The said case though related to question of grant of symbol and rejection of nomination papers yet the controversy arise under section 116-A of the 1951 Act and therefore, the said decision does not render any assistance to the petitioner. ( 20. ) AT this juncture we may refer to another facet to have the complete scenario with regard to the concept of role of the High court under Article 226 of the Constitution vis-a-vis an elected candidate or electoral proceeding. In K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan, AIR 1999 SC 1723 , it was held by the Apex Court that Article 226 of Constitution of India is couched in the widest possible term and unless there is clear bar to the jurisdiction of the High Court, its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised when there is any act which is against any provision of law or violative of constitutional provisions and when recourse cannot be had to the provisions of the Act for the appropriate relief. Their Lordships observed that in the circumstances of the said case, the bar under Article 329 (b) of the Constitution would not come into play when the case falls under Articles 191 and 193 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships observed that in the circumstances of the said case, the bar under Article 329 (b) of the Constitution would not come into play when the case falls under Articles 191 and 193 of the Constitution of India. Be it noted, in the said case, their Lordships have referred in detail to the purpose of creating a bar under Article 329 (b) of the Constitution after referring to the decision of the Constitution Bench rendered in Mohinder Singh gill (supra ). In N. ,p. Ponnuswami (supra)and laid emphasis on the fact that commencement and conclusion of election have to be kept in mind as the same has to be really done in quite promptitude as per schedule and there should not be any deviation. ( 21. ) IN this regard, we may refer to the decision rendered in Bar Council of Delhi v. Surjeet Singh, AIR 1980 SC 1612 in which challenge to the whole election of the Bar council was entertained. But a significant one, proviso of Rule 3 (3) of the Rules was challenged as ultra vires. Indubitably, it would be in a different realm where constitutional validity of a particular provision is assailed. ( 22. ) ON a perusal of the aforesaid enunciation of law there can be no scintilla or iota of doubt that rejection or acceptance of nomination papers has to be taken as a part of election process because that has been so stated in N. P. Ponnuswami (supra) and mohinder Singh Gill (supra ). The said view has also been reiterated in Avtar Singh Hit v. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee, (2006) 8 SCC 487 and Harnek Singh v. Charanjit Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 383 : ( AIR 2006 SC 52 ). The non-obstante clause under Article 329 (b) has a sacrosanct purpose. If in a particular case, the High Court interferes or interdicts, that would cause delay and the statutory remedy would get frustrated. As we have already stated, the Apex court in number of cases has expressed the opinion that contesting an election is a statutory right though it is a fundamental contour of democracy, Mr. Dhande, learned senior Counsel, submitted that if the appellant is not permitted he will be compelled to file an election petition and that too after the election is over and in the ultimate eventuate, he would be without availing a remedy. Dhande, learned senior Counsel, submitted that if the appellant is not permitted he will be compelled to file an election petition and that too after the election is over and in the ultimate eventuate, he would be without availing a remedy. The maxim Ubi jus ibi remedium is not acceptable. In an election dispute, remedy has been provided under the 1951 Act. Thus, when statutory remedy, albeit, an urgent one is available, irrefragably, disputed questions of facts are involved and hence, it can be said with certitude that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be entertained. As the learned single Judge analysed the facts and law in proper perspective and the conclusions arrive at by him are impeccable, there is no scope of interference. ( 23. ) IN view of the aforesaid we do not find any merit in this writ appeal and accordingly the same stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.