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2008 DIGILAW 134 (KER)

Parisons Foods (P) Ltd. v. Union of India

2008-02-15

THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

body2008
Judgment : 1. By the notifications impugned in the first two among the captioned Matters, import of different items or types of palm oil and palmolein and its fractions, hereinafter collectively called "palm oil", came to be not permitted through Kochi Port. After those Writ Petitions were entertained, such restriction was extended to all ports in Kerala. That notification is under challenge in W.P(C). 218/2008. 2. Thereafter, W.P(C).35648/2007 was filed espousing the cause of the agriculturists, particularly coconut farmers, seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government and the Director General of Foreign trade, hereinafter referred to as the "DGFT", to give effect to the recommendations of the Coconut Development Board, hereinafter referred to as the "CDB", for short, and impose ban on import of palm oil through Chennai; Mangalore, Tuticorin and Beypore ports, in addition to Kochi Port. 3. TheState of Kerala, the Director of Agriculture, the CDB, different organizations of the farmers, All Kerala Bread Manufacturing Association and Kerala Karshaka Union (Joseph) were impleaded as additional respondents in W.P(C).31397/2007. 4. The challenge to the impugned notifications is on the plea that there is no power to issue such notifications prohibiting the import of goods through any particular port and the imposition of the ban on import, initially in Kochi and later on, through all the ports in State of Kerala is without jurisdiction in terms of Ss.3 and 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the "Act" and that they are irrational and hence arbitrary and that they result in hostile discrimination owing to unintelligible differential treatment. It is argued by Advocate Sri. Jayasankar Nambiar, in support of the challenge to the impugned notifications that even assuming that they contain a policy decision, though this Court would not sit in judgment on the wisdom or soundness of the policy, as such, the impugned notifications do not withstand the test as to their legality and are arbitrary and unreasonable and hence liable to be struck down. It is further argued that the materials available with the Central Government and DGFT, while issuing the impugned notifications, do not reveal that the recommendation of the CDB was for prohibition of the import of palm oil through the southern States as a whole and the recommendation of the State Government was for reversing the earlier decision of the Central Government to reduce the import duty on palm oil and consequently to increase the rate of duty for that commodity. Figures relied on by the CDB and the State Government are referred to, to suggest that there is no material to infer that the import of palm oil was causing decrease in the price of coconut oil within the State of Kerala. 5. The comparative prices and other matters are also pointed out in support of the contentions challenging the notifications. It is also pointy argued that the import of coconut oil and other coconut produce had been a matter of great concern for the CDB in controlling the price of coconut and coconut oil and the imposition of import on palm oil without any restriction on the import of coconut oil is unreasonable and illegal. It is further argued that the impugned notifications result in hostile discrimination and irrational and arbitrary classification between manufacturers and traders in palm oil on the one hand and the manufacturers and traders in other edible oils on the other and still further, also between manufacturers and traders in palm oil within the State of Kerala and those outside it. On the basis that palm oil is not a commodity res extra commercial, it is argued that the manufacturers and traders have the fundamental right to trade or carry on business in that commodity, which right includes the right to import raw materials and the commodity itself through a port of their choice. It is argued that such right is ancillary to the enjoyment of the fundamental right to trade or to carry on business in that commodity. It is further argued that this is all the more so in a situation where the import of the commodity in question is permitted into the country under the Foreign Trade Policy. It is argued that such right is ancillary to the enjoyment of the fundamental right to trade or to carry on business in that commodity. It is further argued that this is all the more so in a situation where the import of the commodity in question is permitted into the country under the Foreign Trade Policy. The impugned notifications are, thus, criticized as those resulting in arbitrarily picking out the commodity in which the business is carried on, for discriminatory treatment in the matter of import by the imposition of the impugned ban. Arts. 301 to 304 of the Constitution are also violated, it is contended. 6. Though when the first among the captioned matters was filed there was a plea that the materials do not disclose any ground for picking Kochi Port alone to impose the ban, that question does not continue to, be relevant after the second notification was issued imposing the restriction through all ports in the State of Kerala. 7. In support of the submissions on behalf of the petitioners, the decisions of the Calcutta High Court, the Madras High Court and the Rajasthan High Court in Kalindi Woollen, Mills (P) Ltd. V. Union of India (1994 (74) ELT 827 (Cal.), P.S. Tandon v. U.O.I. & Anr. (1991 (33) ECR 419 (Mad.) and Swastika Woollen Industries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1992 (62) ELT 17 (Raj) respectively were particularly relied on. The decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation ((2001) 8 SCC 491), was cited in support of the submission that though the courts will not ordinarily Interfere with a decision, as regards a policy matter, it does not mean that the courts have to abdicate their right to scrutinize whether the policy in question is formulated keeping in mind all the relevant facts and whether the said policy can be held to be beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonableness, bearing in mind the material on record. Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission ((2007) 3 SCC 720), State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. (1988) 4 SCC 59), Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India ((1996) 9 SCC 709) and Federation of Rly. Officers Assn. Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission ((2007) 3 SCC 720), State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. (1988) 4 SCC 59), Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India ((1996) 9 SCC 709) and Federation of Rly. Officers Assn. v. Union of India ((2003) 4 SCC 289), laying down that while there is no doubt about the principle that the courts will be slow to interfere with matters affecting policy requiring technical expertise and leave them for decision of experts, manifest arbitrariness and irrationality is an exception to that principle, were referred to. Aashirwad Films v. Union of India ((2007) 6 SCC 624) and Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation (AIR 1990 SC 1031) were cited as precedents regarding the test of reasonableness as would govern judicial review and constitutional validity of legislation with reference to Art.19. 8. The learned Assistant Solicitor General Sri. P. Parameswaran Nair, making reference to the decisions of the Apex Court in M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P. ((1997) 7 SCC 592) Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Admin. ((2001) 3 SCC 635), Principal, Madhav Institute of Technology & Science v. Rajendra Singh Yadav ((2000) 6 SCC 608), Union of India v. Ashutosh Kumar Srivastava ((2002) 1 SCC 188), Union of India v. Shah Goverdhan Kabra Teachers College ((2002) 8 SCC 228) argued that the impugned notifications have been issued on proper application of mind and after adverting to and considering relevant materials and on the particular recommendation of the CDB and the State Government; the competence to frame a policy being with the State, the executive authority of the State has to frame it and unless it is absolutely capricious and arbitrary, it could not be interfered with in judicial review. It was also pointed out that the mere business interests of a person or persons cannot be the criteria for upholding plea as to classification, including unreasonable classification, particularly when there is no plea of malafides pleaded against it and that the courts cannot issue directions that would result in amendment of the existing Government policy and there is always a presumption in favour of administration that it exercises powers in good faith and for public benefit. 9. The learned Additional Advocate General Sri. 9. The learned Additional Advocate General Sri. Venganoor K. Chandrasekharan Nair relying on Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India (AIR 1984 SC 1271) argued that foreign trade policy is one where expertise in-public and political, national and international economy is necessary before one may emerge in the making or in the criticism of an import policy and that courts may not possess the expertise and therefore, may be incompetent to pass judgment on the appropriateness or the adequacy of a particular import policy. He accordingly argued that the impugned notifications have been issued by the Central Government on the basis of materials, including the recommendations, of the CDB and the State Government, which were made based on materials available with them. Deputy Assistant Iron and Steel Controller V. K.M. corporation (AIR 1972 SC 935), was referred to, to argue that none has an absolute vested right to an import licence in terms of the policy in force at the time of his application and the question of granting a particular import quota to an applicant etc. may depend upon various factors that would come for consideration. Fatehchand v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1977 SC 1825) was cited, pointing out the different aspects that may have to weigh with the courts sitting in judicial review in matters affecting trade and commerce. Relying on Union of India v. International Trading Co., ((2003) 5 SCC 437) it was argued that a claim based on legitimate expectation and a challenge to a change in policy cannot be upheld unless the changed policy is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational and perverse and not one in public interest. Om Prakash v. State of U.P. ((2004) 3 SCC 402) was also relied on, to sustain the contention that there could be restrictions on trade for different reasons, which are discernible and sustainable under the Constitution. Union of India v. Asian Food Industries and M/s. Hindustan Granites v. Union of India were referred to, dilating on the scope of judicial review of actions taken under the Act. .10. Adv. Sri. Union of India v. Asian Food Industries and M/s. Hindustan Granites v. Union of India were referred to, dilating on the scope of judicial review of actions taken under the Act. .10. Adv. Sri. P.V. Lohithakshan, supporting the impugned notifications, referring to the decision in Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. C.T.O. ((2005) 1 SCC 625) contended that if the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate for it to take into consideration the national .priorities and adopt trade policies and unless such action falls on the touchstone of reasonableness, the policy decision comes out unscathed. It was also pointed out that reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of interests of the general public and not from the standpoint of the Interests of persons upon whom the restrictions have been imposed or upon any abstract consideration. 11. Advocate Sri. John Varghese, supporting the notifications, referred to Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of imports ((1974) 2 SCC 348), Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union India (1994 (72) ELT 805 (SC)) and S.B. International Ltd. v. Asst. Director General of FT (1996 (82) ELT 164 (SC), to argue that an applicant has no absolute right, much less a fundamental right, to the grant of an import licence on the basis of an import trade policy. Reference was made to D. Navinchandra and Co. v. Union of India ((1987) 3 SCC 66) rendered relying on Daruka & Co. v. Union of India ((1973) 2 SCC 617) to state that policies of imports or exports are fashioned with reference to internal and international trade, as also on monetary policy and other relevant facts and if the Government decides an economic policy regarding import or export, the court would proceed on the assumption that the decision was in the interest of the general public unless the contrary is shown. Subhash Photographics v. Union of India (1993 Supp. (3) SCC 323) was cited to argue that the domestic industry is also to be protected and encouraged in certain situations and such a consideration can also weigh with the formulation of the policies. Kasinka Trading v. Union of India ((1995)1 SCC 274) was cited for the proposition that once the notification is issued under a particular provision, the power was available with the authority to rescind or modify that notification. Kasinka Trading v. Union of India ((1995)1 SCC 274) was cited for the proposition that once the notification is issued under a particular provision, the power was available with the authority to rescind or modify that notification. Hindustan Granites v. Union of India (2007 (211) ETT 3 (SC)) was cited to point out that the Foreign Trade Policy under the Act along with the Hand Book of Procedure constituted a composite scheme and the Hand Book of Procedure merely implements the policy and it does not prevent the Central Government from changing the policy. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Union of India ((1996) 10 SCC 104) was relied on, to state that interplay of operational efficacy of the Act, the Rules and orders, on fundamental rights of the individuals to carry on trade or business guaranteed by Arts. 19(1), 14 and 301 of the Constitution has to be appreciated having regard to the concept of socio-economic aspects and that there could be a class legislation based on geographical features. Dhampur sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal ((2007) 8 SCC 418), was cited to point out that it is well settled that public authorities must have liberty and freedom in framing policies and that it is well established that courts are ill-equipped to deal with such matters, though the discretion on the public authorities in framing the policy is not absolute, unqualified, unfettered or unanalyzed and judiciary has control over all executive actions. He also referred to Jivajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. M.P Electricity Board (1989 Supp. (2) SCC 52) and State of U.P. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation ((1979) 3 SCC 229), on the scope of the expression "regulate" in different statutes. 12. Concluding the submissions on behalf of the State of Kerala, learned special Government Pleader Sri. He also referred to Jivajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. M.P Electricity Board (1989 Supp. (2) SCC 52) and State of U.P. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation ((1979) 3 SCC 229), on the scope of the expression "regulate" in different statutes. 12. Concluding the submissions on behalf of the State of Kerala, learned special Government Pleader Sri. P.K. Babu referred to the judgments of the Apex Court in Ekta Shakti Foundation v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi ((2006) 10 SCC 336) and in Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh (J) v. State of A.P. ((2006)4 SCC 162) to the effect that the correctness of the reasons which prompted the Government, in decision-making, taking one course of action instead of another, is not a matter of concern in judicial review and the policy decision must be left to the Government and that it is not open to the courts to strike down a policy decision until and unless it is perverse and not merely on any ground referable to any factual disputes in the matter. Accordingly, it was argued that the impugned notifications cannot be found fault with. .13. Relying on the recommendations of the CDB and the request of the State of Kerala, Advocate Sri. George Mecheril argued that ban similar to that contained in Ext. P1 notification needs to be extended to other South Indian ports as well. He states that the materials on record contain an overwhelming thrust in favour of a finding that there is an immediate requirement to impose such ban and that the Central Government and the DGFT are liable to be directed to issue notifications .banning import of palm oil through the other South Indian ports. 14. On the basis of the materials on record and the arguments advanced, the issues that arise for decision are as to whether the impugned notifications resulting in the ban of import of palm oil through the ports in Kerala are sustainable and whether the Central Government and the DGFT are liable to be directed to impose similar restriction in the ports of Chennai, Mangalore, Tuticorin and Beypore. 15. By the notification dated 16-10-2007, import was riot, permitted through the Kochi Port. In view of the issuance of the notification dated 24-12-2007, whereby import of palm oil is not permitted through any port in Kerala, the challenge in W.P. (C). 15. By the notification dated 16-10-2007, import was riot, permitted through the Kochi Port. In view of the issuance of the notification dated 24-12-2007, whereby import of palm oil is not permitted through any port in Kerala, the challenge in W.P. (C). 31397/2007 that the import is permissible even through Beypore in Kerala and therefore, the restriction for import through the Kochi Port alone, in Kerala, is baseless, no more survives for consideration. 16. Sub-s.1 of S. 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government may, by order published in the official Gazette, make provision for the development and regulation of foreign trade by facilitating imports and increasing exports. Sub-s.2 provides that the Central Government may also, by order published in the official Gazette, make provision for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise regulating, in all cases or in specified classes of cases and subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be made by or under the Order, the import or export of goods. By virtue of sub-s.3, the issuance of an order under sub-s. 2 would result in such goods falling within the net of the prohibition under 5.11 of the Customs Act, 1962. Under S.5 of the Act, the Central Government may, from time to time, formulate and announce, by notification in the official Gazette, the export and import policy and may also, in the like manner, amend that policy. 17. Para. 2.1 in Chapter 2 of the Foreign Trade Policy 2004-2009, hereinafter referred to as the "F.T. Policy", provides that exports and imports shall be free, except in cases where they are regulated by the provisions of that Policy or any other law for the time being in force. The item, wise export and import policy shall be as specified in the ITC (HS) published and notified by the DGFT, as amended from time to time. The Impugned notifications are issued by the DGFT and Ex-officio Additional Secretary to the Government of India notifying the amendment to Schedule I (Imports) of the ITC (HS) Classifications of Export and Import Items, 2004-09. The powers conferred by S.5 and S.3 of the Act along with paragraph 2.1 of the F.T. Policy are read in the impugned notifications to disclose the power being exercised. 18. The powers conferred by S.5 and S.3 of the Act along with paragraph 2.1 of the F.T. Policy are read in the impugned notifications to disclose the power being exercised. 18. The Act, going by its Preamble, is one to provide for the development and regulation of foreign trade by facilitating imports into, and augmenting exports from, India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The preamble of the F.T. Policy discloses the context, objectives and strategy for the policy. Para. 1.3 reiterates the availability; with the Central Government, the right to make any amendments to the Policy, in public interest, in exercise of powers conferred by S.5 of the Act. The thrust of the Act, as is discernible from S.3, as also its preamble, is the facilitation of import and increasing exports. While the aim is to increase exports, the Act, as a whole, does not disclose any intention to increase and enhance import. The predominant economic policy underlying the F.T. Policy is to ensure that trade is a means to economic growth and national development by stimulation of greater economic activity. The F.T. Policy is rooted on such an objective and is built around two major objectives as discernible from the Policy Document. .19. The power to regulate import cannot but be conceded. The power to issue a notification or order includes the power to rescind or modify it. -See Kasinka Trading (supra). Even without the support of any precedent in that regard, the statutory provisions in hand specifically provide the power to amend the policy and the power to prohibit, restrict or otherwise regulate, among other things, the import of goods. The provision in Paragraph 2.1 of the F.T. Policy also specifically provides the .power to amend, from time to time. Thus, the statutory provisions and the Policy Document provide legal foundation for the impugned notifications. Therefore the power to issue the impugned notifications has to be upheld. 9.20. This takes us to the question as to whether the decision disclosed by the impugned notifications is liable to be interfered with, in judicial review and if so, to what extent. There is no dispute that what is reflected in the notifications is a policy decision, namely, to prohibit import of palm oil through the ports in the State of Kerala. There is no dispute that what is reflected in the notifications is a policy decision, namely, to prohibit import of palm oil through the ports in the State of Kerala. The F.T. Policy empowers the regulation of exports and imports by empowering the DGFT to notify the item wise export and import policy as specified in ITC(HS), as amended from time to time. The expression "regulate" has different shades of meaning and must take its colour from the context in which it is used having regard to the purpose and object of the relevant provisions.- See Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra). The power to prohibit import of goods is explicitly stated in S.3(2) of the Act. Hence, the power to regulate could extend to the authority to prohibit. Therefore, the existence of the power with the DGFT to issue the notifications in hand is sustained. 10.21. The question that would then arise is as to how far the policy expressed by the impugned notifications could be interfered with in judicial review. 122. In Daruka and Co. (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that policies of imports or exports were fashioned not only with reference to internal or international trade, but also on monetary policy, the development of agriculture and industries and even on the political policies of the country and rival theories and views may be held on such policies. 123. The Act and the Policy in hand are part of those statutory and executive instruments, which are potent instruments in the hands of the Government for regulating the economy of the country. The different Ministries dealing with economy and the establishments allied to that keep a close watch on the economy, constantly monitoring its behaviour. While deciding on a foreign trade policy, the domestic situations like industries, agriculture etc. is matters about which the policy framers would be concerned with. It was held by the Apex Court in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India ((1989) 4 SCC 187) that the courts have to consider the nature, objects and scheme of the instrument as a whole, and on the basis of that examination, it has to consider what exactly was the area over which, and the purposes for which, power has been delegated by the governing laws. In dealing with statutes which govern trade, including foreign trade, fiscal impositions and also statutes like the Customs Act and Customs Tariff Act, it has to be borne in mind that such legislations can be properly administered only by constantly adjusting it to the needs of the situation. This, therefore, calls for a good amount of discretion being allowed "to delegate. Profitable reference could be made in this regard to the judgment in Subhash Photographics (supra). Thus, the conferment of power and the broad spectrum of such power is constitutionally and legislatively conceived and provided for. .24. The impugned notifications are shown to have been issued after the Chairman of the CDB wrote to the Department of Agriculture and Co-operation in the Ministry of Agriculture in the Government of India on 5-6-2007, furnishing details and disclosing the requirement to impose ban on import of palm oil through the southern ports and more particularly Chennai, Mangalore and Tuticorin. Facts and figures are quoted in that communication which is Ext.R1 (a) in W.P.(C).31397/2007. The Chief Minister of Kerala is shown to have addressed the Prime Minister of India on 19-4-2007 espousing the cause of farmers and also stating specific reasons why it was necessary to impose such a ban. The first among the impugned notifications was issued only on 16-10-2007; i.e., after the aforesaid two communications. Therefore, it is not as if there was no material at all before the competent authority before-it came to the decision to impose the ban on import of palm oil as has been done as per the impugned notifications. All that happened was that initially the ban was only as regards the .Kochi Port. That has been later on extended to all ports in Kerala. The CDB and its Chairperson are not criticized of any personal malice, bias or malafides. Those authorities cannot be treated to be ignorant of the most relevant facts. CDB is a statutory board constituted under the provisions of the Coconut Development Board Act, 1981. The purpose of its constitution and its duties and responsibilities under that legislation advises me to take the view that it continuously monitors the scenario of coconut farming, development of technologies, watching the impact scenario attendant to coconut cultivation, including the market trends. CDB was impleaded as an additional respondent on its application. The purpose of its constitution and its duties and responsibilities under that legislation advises me to take the view that it continuously monitors the scenario of coconut farming, development of technologies, watching the impact scenario attendant to coconut cultivation, including the market trends. CDB was impleaded as an additional respondent on its application. In opposition to its application for impleadment (I.A. 15037/2007 in W.P. (C).31397/2007), those writ petitioners impugning the notifications, in their attempt to contradict certain data given by the CDB, have placed on record Ext.P5 in that case, which is an article coauthored by the Chairman, CDB who wrote Ext.R1 (a) communication to the Central Government and the Chief Coconut Development Officer, CDB, the deponent of the affidavit filed in support of CDBS application-for impleadment. That is an article shown to have been published in January 2007 in the Indian Coconut Journal. Import surge in vegetable oil economy is a subject dealt with in that article. It criticizes the indiscriminate import of vegetable oils, particularly palm oil. In that article, contrasting the market rate, it is pointed out that such import contributes to the sudden fall in the market price of coconut oil. The argument in support of the challenge to the notifications that the Government have not imposed ban on import of coconut oil, in spite of the views of the Chairperson of the CDB, is factually true but that is not sufficient to dislodge a policy decision already taken in relation to palm oil. Even if this court assumes, in its wisdom, that having banned palm oil, the materials on record disclose that it was necessary that import of coconut oil is also banned, it would not be within the domain and province of this Court to embark upon coining an economic policy in that regard and directing the executive to enforce such policy. But the fact remains that the maker of Ext.R1(a) recommendation, namely, the chairman of the CDB, going by Ext.P5 document, is clearly demonstrated to have had sufficient material within her command to make the recommendation contained in Ext. R1(a) which is one of the specific materials relied on by the DGFT and the Central Government in bringing out the impugned notifications. Therefore, the policy under consideration is shown to have been drawn on the basis of materials which, are relevant. The challenge on that ground also fails. 25. R1(a) which is one of the specific materials relied on by the DGFT and the Central Government in bringing out the impugned notifications. Therefore, the policy under consideration is shown to have been drawn on the basis of materials which, are relevant. The challenge on that ground also fails. 25. I shall now consider the decisions cited in support of the challenge to the notifications. In Kalindi Woollen Mills (P) Ltd. (supra), the question that arose for consideration was whether it was permissible to classify the port of entry or import into India, merely on the ground of administrative convenience. The plea in support of the notification that fell for consideration in that case was that there was no proper facility in the others ports, to have surveillance on the goods being imported. It was, therefore, that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the view that instead of providing the facilities for proper scrutiny, it is impermissible to make a ban on import and such ban would result in hostile discrimination because, the classification would be unreasonable, resulting in Infringement of Arts. 14 and 19(1) of the Constitution, as also Arts. 301 to 304 thereof. In P.S. Tandon (supra), an actual user of synthetic rags with a spinning unit at Tuticorin in Tamil Nadu challenged the restriction imposed by confining the import to be only through ports of Bombay and Delhi on the ground of ensuring proper mutilation before allowing clearance. The ratio in that judgment also runs similar to that of Kalindi Woollen Mills (P) Ltd. (supra). The same view was taken on similar set of facts by the Rajasthan High Court in Swastika, Woollen Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra). So much so, those decisions have no application to the facts of the cases in hand, which are entirely different. .26. Neither the Central Government nor the State Government would be bound to act on the recommendation of the CDB. The cry of the farmers, as is expressed in W.P.(C).35648/2007, is insufficient for the judiciary to compel the Central Government and the DGFT to accept the recommendations of the CDB in toto and impose a ban on import of palm oil through the ports of Chennai, Mangalore, Tuticorin and Beypore. This again is a policy matter. The cry of the farmers, as is expressed in W.P.(C).35648/2007, is insufficient for the judiciary to compel the Central Government and the DGFT to accept the recommendations of the CDB in toto and impose a ban on import of palm oil through the ports of Chennai, Mangalore, Tuticorin and Beypore. This again is a policy matter. Drawing up an economic .policy, as already noticed, may, in certain situations, also depend upon various factors, the political policies, the foreign policies, the bilateral agreements and covenants between India and her reciprocal countries, etc. It would be beyond the bounds of judiciary to step in and issue directions as are sought for in W.P.(C) 35648/2007. 27. In the result, these Writ Petitions fail. They are accordingly dismissed.