JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 1st February, 2008 passed in writ petition No. 6626 of 2004 (Peer Baksha v. Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Kanpur and others) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘U.P.S.R.T.C.’) 3. The facts giving rise to the present special appeal are as follows : The writ petitioner namely, Peer Baksha, who was employed as Driver in the U.P.S.R.T.C. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 29th November, 2003, whereby the services of the said writ petitioner were retrenched on the ground that he had failed to achieve the requisite physical standard prescribed for driving the vehicle. The writ petition was entertained by this Hon’ble Court on 19th February, 2004 and an interim order was passed requiring the employers to provide employment to the petitioner till he attains the age of superannuation. It is admitted on record that in compliance of the interim order of this Hon’ble Court, the writ petitioner was re-engaged and was permitted to continue till the age of superannuation i.e. 31st January, 2007. 4. The writ petition came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge on 1st February, 2008, when the writ petitioner had already attained the age of superannuation. The learned Single Judge after noticing the aforesaid fact, has been pleased to dispose of the writ petition with a direction that the writ petitioner shall be treated to be in continuous service till the date of superannuation i.e. 31st January, 2007 and shall be paid all monitory benefits as a consequence of the aforesaid direction and ignoring the order of compulsory retirement dated 29th November, 2003, referred above. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge, the present special appeal has been filed by the employers namely, U.P.S.R.T.C. 5. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge, the present special appeal has been filed by the employers namely, U.P.S.R.T.C. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the right of the petitioner to continue was dependent upon the legality or otherwise of the order dated 29th November, 2003, which were specifically challenged in the writ petition and merely because the writ petitioner has been permitted to continue under an interim order of the High Court and it will not mean that the order whereby his services were retrenched came to an end and without deciding the writ petition, the learned Single Judge could not have directed that the employee would be treated to be in continuous service till the age of superannuation and the order terminating his employment is to be ignored. He submits that the consequential benefits and the consequential action which is to be taken in terms of the order dated 19th November, 2003 had to be examined by the learned Single Judge on merits and it is only if the Hon’ble Court was satisfied that the order dated 29th November, 2003 was not legally sustainable, the direction could have been passed for treating the petitioner in employment till he attains the age of superannuation and payment of consequential benefits upto the said date would have arisen. Since the aforesaid exercise has not been undertaken by the learned Single Judge, the order impugned in the present special appeal cannot be legally sustained. 6. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant is opposed by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner on the ground that under the interim order of this Court, he was reinstated by the U.P.S.R.T.C. itself and has actually worked upto 31st January, 2007. He, therefore, submits that the Division Bench may not interfere with the order so passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the present special appeal. He, therefore, submits that the Division Bench may not interfere with the order so passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the present special appeal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association Madras, AIR 1992 SC 1439 , has specifically held that interim order, which are passed in writ petition, merge in the final decision which has to be taken in writ proceedings which logically means that under interim order it is always dependent upon the final outcome of the writ petition even if it is presumed that the petitioner has continued in the employment till the date of superannuation i.e. upto 31st January, 2007 because of the interim order of this Court and thus, salary received by him for the period he has actually worked, cannot be recovered and issue arises as to what should be the consequential benefits payable to the petitioner subsequent to his age of retirement and such benefits be paid. Having regard to the order dated 29th November, 2003 or having regard to his continuance under an interim order, in our opinion, until and unless the legality of the order dated 29th November, 2003 is examined and conclusive finding is recorded as to whether the same is legally sustainable in the eyes of law mere continuance of the petitioner under the interim order, will not entitle him to claim consequential benefits only because of his continuance and the writ petition being disposed of without examining the merits of the order dated 29th February, 2003, direction issued by learned Single Judge are not sustainable. 8. We, therefore, record that the learned Single Judge was not justified in providing that the petitioner shall be treated to have retired on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 31st January, 2007 and that he would be paid all consequential benefits accordingly. We, therefore, hold that the judgment and order dated 1st February, 2008 is legally not sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. The writ petition is restored to its original number and since the petitioner has already retired, his post retiral benefits/other benefits are withheld because of the pendency of the writ petition. We, therefore, hold that the judgment and order dated 1st February, 2008 is legally not sustainable in the eyes of law and is hereby set aside. The writ petition is restored to its original number and since the petitioner has already retired, his post retiral benefits/other benefits are withheld because of the pendency of the writ petition. We further request the learned Single Judge to consider and decide the writ petition at the earliest possible time. 9. We further clarify that any monetary benefits which the writ petitioner is entitled in terms of the order dated 29th November, 2003, including those which may be payable treating the order to be legal and valid, may be examined by the employers and appropriate payment be made as per the law applicable. Such payment shall not prejudice the right of any parties in the pending writ petition. The aforesaid exercise may be completed by the competent authority within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal stands allowed. ————