Judgment :- P.K. Misra, J. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The writ petitioner was working as a Mail Man in the Postal Department under the Post Master General, Central Region, Trichirappalli. Departmental proceedings were initiated against him alleging three charges. The enquiry officer found the petitioner guilty of all the charges. Subsequently, a punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed by the disciplinary authority. The petitioner filed an appeal, which was addressed to the Director of Postal Services. Such an appeal having been dismissed, the petitioner filed O.A.No.622 of 2001 and the Tribunal dismissed such original application. Hence the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions:- (i) There is no recording of satisfaction that it was thought fit to compulsorily retire the petitioner in public interest and therefore, the order of compulsory retirement is invalid; (ii) Even though the appeal was filed before the Director, such an appeal was disposed of by the Post Master General, thereby preventing the petitioner from pursuing the revisional remedy available under the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules. (iii) The disciplinary authority, the appellate authority as well as the Tribunal have not considered many vital contradictions in the evidence given by the witnesses; and (iv) The punishment ultimately imposed is disproportionate to the nature of delinquency; 4. In support of the first submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2005) 9 SCC 748 (Pritam Singh v. Union of India). In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court, in para.20, has held as follows:- "20. In the instant case, no material on record was placed before the disciplinary authority, appellate authority, revisional authority, Tribunal and before the High Court to reasonably form an opinion that compulsory retirement was in public interest. The case on hand is also not a case of doubtful integrity. The impugned action of compulsorily retiring the appellant from service can be termed as arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion that the appellant had outlived his utility as a member of the railway service and had become a dead wood which had to be chopped off." 5. We are afraid that this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is totally misconceived. We are afraid that this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is totally misconceived. The Supreme Court in the decision referred to above was dealing with a case of compulsory retirement in accordance with F.R.56 and it was not a case of imposition of punishment of compulsory retirement in a disciplinary proceeding. It is quite well known that compulsory retirement can be one of the punishments in a disciplinary proceeding and an order of compulsory retirement can also be passed in accordance with F.R. 56. In the latter case, it is not considered as punishment and such an order can be passed only if the competent authority comes to the conclusion that in the public interest, it is necessary to retire the employee. Apart from the above, an order of compulsory retirement can be passed as a punishment in a disciplinary proceeding. It is one of the major penalties contemplated in disciplinary proceedings. If the delinquency of serious nature is proved, it is for the disciplinary authority to impose any punishment including the order of compulsory retirement. In such a scenario, it is not necessary to record specifically that the order of compulsory retirement is passed in public interest. The learned counsel for the petitioner, without keeping in view such distinction between the two types of compulsory retirements, has made the submission, which is bound to be rejected. 6. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the appeal was preferred before the Director and since it was disposed of by the superior authority, the petitioner lost an opportunity of filing a revision. From the materials placed on record, it appears that the departmental authorities in their counter filed before the Tribunal had raised the question of existence of alternative remedy. At that stage, the petitioner raised a specific ground in para.5 of the rejoinder that he was deprived of such opportunity to file a revision as the order was passed by the superior authority. The stand of the departmental authorities was to the effect that in fact, the order had been passed by the Director and only by mistake, it had not been indicated in the order that it had emanated from the Director. 7. The stand of the departmental authorities was to the effect that in fact, the order had been passed by the Director and only by mistake, it had not been indicated in the order that it had emanated from the Director. 7. The question was not specifically dealt with and the Tribunal proceeded on the assumption that the appeal had been in fact disposed of by a superior authority, but it had not caused any prejudice to the applicant. 8. On a careful perusal of the materials placed before us, it is now apparent that in fact, the appeal was disposed of by the Director, who was the competent authority and not by the superior authority. Therefore, revisional remedy was not availed. However, the petitioner (in fact, the Tribunal also) was under the impression that the appeal had been decided by the superior authority. Be that as it may, since it was the stand of the department that the petitioner should have exhausted the alternative remedy and since the main question raised by the petitioner pertains to the question of re-appreciation of evidence including the question of proportionality of punishment, we feel that interest of justice would be served by vacating the order of the Tribunal and observing that it would be now open to the petitioner to file a revision before the appropriate revisional authority, viz., the Chief Post Master General. If such a revision is filed within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of the present order, the same shall be disposed of by the revisional authority on its own merit in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within four months from the date of filing of such revision. Since the matter had remained pending before the Tribunal and the High Court, obviously, the question of limitation would not be raised and such revision shall be decided on its own merits. It is also made clear that merely because we have given this liberty to the petitioner to file a revision, it should not be construed as expressing any opinion on the merits of the contentions to be raised in such revision, which has to be decided on its own merits. Along with the revision, the petitioner shall enclose a copy of the present order. In view of the above order, it is not necessary to consider the other submissions. Along with the revision, the petitioner shall enclose a copy of the present order. In view of the above order, it is not necessary to consider the other submissions. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs.