JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—Being aggrieved by the order dated 26.2.2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bareilly, appellants preferred this appeal. 2. The plaintiffs instituted a suit in the Court below praying inter-alia as follows : (a) that by passing decree of prohibitory injunction, defendant No. 1 be restrained from causing any interference in the peaceful use and enjoyment of the pltffs. over shop No. E-19, situated at ground floor of Butler Plaza Shopping Complex at 95, Civil Lines, Bareilly in any manner, either by pressurising them to make payment of rent or their forcible dispossession or alienation of the property on the strength of impugned sale-deed dt. 8.2.07, either by himself or through his agents, servants etc. —Valued at Rs. 5700/- (being one years rental) (b) That it be adjudged and declared that the sale-deed dt. 8.2.07 executed by defendant Nos. 3 and 4, after flouting the Special POA executed by defendant No. 2 in their favour, in favour of defendant No. 1 Prashant Arora) in respect of property situated at 95, Civil Lines, Bareilly popularly known as BUTLER PLAZA SHOPPING COMPLEX, registered in the office of S.R. Bareilly in book No. 1, Vol. 1779 on pages 205-1812 at Sl. No. 877 is null and void and inoperative and copy of the order be sent to S.R. Bareilly for appropriate notings in their records. —Valued at Rs. 19,85,95,710/- Court Fee paid - Rs. 200/- (c) Costs of suit be awarded to plaintiffs against defendants. (d) Such other relief in addition or in alternative as may be deemed proper and necessary may also be granted to the plaintiffs against the defendants. 3. The grievance of the plaintiffs-appellants is that the Court below has rejected the plaint in terms of prayer (b) under Order VII, Rule 11 (a) and returned the plaint in terms of prayer (a) to be heard by the appropriate Court under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called as C.P.C.). 4. Mr. Amit Saxena, learned Counsel appearing in support of the appellants, contended that neither any application for rejection or return of the plaint is made by the defendants/respondents nor the rejection or return of the plaint can be made partial. 5. 4. Mr. Amit Saxena, learned Counsel appearing in support of the appellants, contended that neither any application for rejection or return of the plaint is made by the defendants/respondents nor the rejection or return of the plaint can be made partial. 5. It appears from the plaint that the plaintiffs/appellants have claimed to be the tenants under registered lease deed dated 11th April, 1991 in respect of a shop situated at the ground floor of Shopping Complex at Bareilly. The landlord is a Society registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860, and a public trust registered under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, having its registered office at Mumbai. The Shopping Complex belongs to Society and the Trust, as such any sale or transfer cannot be made without obtaining permission from the Charity Commissioner, Bombay under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. It has been done by the defendant/respondent Nos. 3 and 4 by misconstruing the special power of attorney dated 27th November, 2006, by executing sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1. On inquiry, the Charity Commissioner, Bombay, has informed in writing that no permission has been obtained by the defendant Nos. 3 and 4/respondents. Consequently, a charge-sheet in a case crime has been filed against them for such unlawful acts. On the strength of such void transfer dated 8.2.2007, the defendant No. 1/respondent has pressurised and still pressurising and threatening the plaintiffs-appellants for forcible dispossession, which gives cause of action to institute the suit. 6. According to us, it is necessary to quote Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 at first hereunder to understand the legal right of the plaintiffs : "Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession.—No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.” 7. According to Mr. Saxena, a tenant may not challenge title of the landlord as per Section 116 of Evidence Act, 1872, but he can challenge the right of the transferee landlord of an immovable property. 8. According to Mr. Saxena, a tenant may not challenge title of the landlord as per Section 116 of Evidence Act, 1872, but he can challenge the right of the transferee landlord of an immovable property. 8. In support of such contention, he relied upon paragraph 18 of the judgment reported in (2002) 3 SCC 98 , J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. and others v. M.R. Murali and another and said that a tenant is not stopped from denying the title of landlord, if it comes subsequent to the creation of the tenancy nor can be stopped from questioning the derivative title of a transferee of his landlord since the rule of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act is not exhaustive. He also relied upon a judgment reported in (2002) 3 SCC 375 , Sheela and others v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, to establish that after creation of the tenancy if the title of landlord is transferred or devolved upon a third person, the tenant is not estopped from denying such title. However, if the tenant having been apprised of the transfer, assignment or devolution of rights acknowledges the title of transferee either expressly or by paying rent to him, the rule of estoppel once again comes into operation. It is unjust to allow the tenant to approbate and reprobate and so long as the tenant enjoys everything, which his lease purports to grant, how does it concern him what the title of the lessor is? He also relied upon a judgment reported in (2002) 5 SCC 337 , A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons and others v. T. Palanisamy Gounder, to put affirmation on the settled position as aforesaid and contended that he is not only challenging the title of respondents but also the title of the predecessor in interest in transferring the same without appropriate permission. According to him, they can do so as per exception of the Section 116 of the Evidence Act. 9. He further said that all the points are to be taken in the plaint by applying Order II, Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C. Unless and until any relinquishment is sought and granted by the Court, they have to do so. Intentional omission, if any, can be fatal for him in future. 10. 9. He further said that all the points are to be taken in the plaint by applying Order II, Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C. Unless and until any relinquishment is sought and granted by the Court, they have to do so. Intentional omission, if any, can be fatal for him in future. 10. By citing the judgment reported in (2004) 3 SCC 277 , Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair and others, he contended that the principles of Order II, Rule 2 is to secure the exhaustion of the relief in respect of a cause of action and not the inclusion in one and the same action of different causes of action, even though they arise from the same cause of action. 11. We find in the judgment itself that the definition of cause of action is given in para 16 and 17, which are as follows : “16. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action neans the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for means the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in “cause of action”. 17. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been stated as follows : ‘Cause of action’ has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action." 12. ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action." 12. Lastly, he said that the action of rejection of the plaint partially and returning other part to file it before the Court is outcome of non-application of mind. In support of his contention, he has relied upon a judgment reported in JT 2007 (11) SC 472, Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and others. 13. We find from para 14 of the judgment earlier settled principle of the Supreme Court in 1982 (3) SCC 487 , Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill has been followed. Para-14 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder : “It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill, only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected.” 14. Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel, with able assistance of Udayan Nandan, learned Counsel appearing for the defendants/respondents, contended before this Court that the plaint is liable to be rejected since it is squarely hit by Order VII, Rule 11 (a) of the C.P.C. It has not disclosed any cause of action. The Court can take cognizance of such fact at any stage of the proceeding. He relied upon a judgment reported in (2003) 1 SCC 557 , Saleem Bhai and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, to establish that the trial Court can exercise the power under Order VII, Rule 11 of C.P.C. at any stage of the suit i.e. before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. He said that distinguishable feature of Sheela and others (supra) is available in paragraph 17 therein. The intention of the tenant is to be culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability. The tenant has not deposited any rent as yet under Section 30 (2) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The intention of the tenant is to be culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability. The tenant has not deposited any rent as yet under Section 30 (2) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Therefore, even if it was paying rent earlier, he cannot be said an interested person who can sue. By citing a judgment reported in (2004) 3 SCC 137 , Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and others, he said that a similar situation arose therein when jurisdiction to the Civil Court under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 was altogether barred. The Supreme Court held that the question of tenancy cannot be decided under such Act. A tenant of the trust does not fall within the category of a person having interest in the trust. As per Specific Relief Act, the declaratory decrees of status of right is discretion of the Court, which is to be granted judiciously as per Section 34 of the Act. Under such section any person entitled to any legal character may institute a suit. But in explanation given thereunder is that a trustee of the property is a “person interested to deny” a title adverse to the title of someone is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee. As per Section 31 therein any person against whom an instrument is void or voidable, and has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, can be able to sue for the same. That apart Bombay Public Trust Act cannot be held to be applicable in whole of the country. It is applicable only in the State of Maharashtra, as per Doctrine of lex situs as held in AIR 2006 SC 2075 , Nautam Prakash D.G.S.V.C. Vadtal and others v. K.K. Thakkar and others. If Sections 50, 51 and 80, are seen, the question will be clear. 15. At last Mr. Shashi Nandan contended that a tenant can question the landlord’s title but cannot challenge. 16. In reply thereto, Mr. Saxena contended before this Court that para-24 of such judgment, Nautam Prakash D.G.S.V.C. Vadtal and others (supra), as cited by Mr. Shashi Nandan, gives a distinguishable feature. The legislature of a State while enacting a law is required to maintain a territorial nexus. 16. In reply thereto, Mr. Saxena contended before this Court that para-24 of such judgment, Nautam Prakash D.G.S.V.C. Vadtal and others (supra), as cited by Mr. Shashi Nandan, gives a distinguishable feature. The legislature of a State while enacting a law is required to maintain a territorial nexus. Only in certain cases, extra territoriality provided in the Act is accepted. The field of legislation in respect of religious endowments and religious institutions is referable to Item 28 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Ordinarily, therefore, the Legislation enacted by a State will be applicable only within the territorial limits thereof. But in extraordinary situation, scope can be extended like the present case where the applicability of the Act is restricted in Maharashtra but acted infringing right of a person in the State of U.P. Therefore, neither there can be any embargo in instituting the suit nor such extraordinary situation will be ignored by the Civil Court. 17. Lastly, he contended that as per Section 2-B of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, nothing shall apply to any building belonging to or vested in a Public Charitable Institution. 18. We have considered the pros and cons upon hearing the appeal at the stage of admission on the informal papers as agreed upon by the parties. We are of the considered view that the plaint is not attestically painted at all. But that does not necessarily mean the Court will only go by the painting of the plaint not by the substance. Substance has to be culled out. It is an admitted position that at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendants at any time before conclusion of the trial, the Court can come to a definite finding about rejection of the plaint. But in doing so, the Court should consider the substance and come to a conclusion at what stage it is likely to be rejected. If the claim under plaint is palpably bad in law, the Court has every right to reject the same at the stage of initiation without wasting any time. But if element of mixed question of fact and law is available, adequate opportunity of hearing will have to be given to the parties after framing a preliminary issue. If the claim under plaint is palpably bad in law, the Court has every right to reject the same at the stage of initiation without wasting any time. But if element of mixed question of fact and law is available, adequate opportunity of hearing will have to be given to the parties after framing a preliminary issue. This is a suit for immovable property by a person rank outsider to the trust. Therefore, it is a suit for land. In case of suit for land, suit is to be instituted where the immovable property situates irrespective of its documentation elsewhere. Charity Commissioner under Bombay Public Trust Act cannot have jurisdiction in respect of the land situated outside the State. Therefore, the Suit is instituted in a right jurisdiction. Now the Court has to see what is the cause of action. Whether both the causes of action are conjunctive in nature or not. Admittedly the cause of action is conjunctive in nature and arose when alleged threats have been made by the defendants/respondents. The tenants wanted to challenge the right, title and interest of the newly inducted landlord and protection by way of injunction from the alleged threat of the respondents for dispossession from the premises. Both the reliefs are intermingled with each other. If the challenge of the ownership of the respondents is not entertainable by the Court at the threshold, right of the appellants cannot continue independently without the proof of alleged threat and bonafide of the tenancy right. Conversely if the Suit is entertainable a part of it cannot be rejected on a piecemeal manner. The Court has proceeded with hot haste by rejecting one part of the claim and allowing other part to go before other Court. If no cause of action is disclosed, the Court could have framed a preliminary issue and decide the same in accordance with law. Partial rejection and partial return has committed gross procedural mistake in the facts and circumstances of the case. 19. Thus, the appeal succeeds only to that extent. Therefore, without going through the merit we send the matter back to the concerned Court for its effective disposal either way and as early as possible upon formally setting aside the same. 20. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of without imposing any cost. ————