ORDER 1. This revision has been preferred against the order dated 25.8.2007 rejecting thereby an application of the revisionist under order 7 rule 11 of CPC in case No.7-A/07 by the Court of II Additional District Judge, Katni (Fast Track) Court. 2. Plaintiff-respondent No.1 instituted a suit against the defendant-respondent for declaration, recovery of Rs.2,05,400/- and permanent injunction mainly with the allegation that various pieces of land were owned by Ramnath who had two daughters. Plaintiff as well as respondent No.1 are sons of those daughters of Ramnath. Wife of Ramnath, namely, Paniya Bai inherited a property from her parents. A will dated 3.5.1985 allegedly executed by Paniya Bai was brought on floor which gave rise to the inter-se dispute. Ultimately, the matter was amicably settled by way of compromise and land comprised in survey Nos. 190/1 , 50/1 and 14/1 situated at village Devrakhurd, Vijayraghavgarh, District Katni was allotted to the plaintiff, whereas, other pieces of land were allotted to the defendant-respondent No.1. Aforesaid entire land situated at village Devrakhurd was acquired and a sum of Rs.6,47,423/- was deposited in the S.B.I. (defendant No.2) towards compensation. Case of the plaintiff is that out of aforesaid sum, compensation to the tune of Rs. two lacs payable in lieu of survey Nos.14/1 and 50/1 belongs to the plaintiff which has been illegally and unauthorizedly received by respondent No.1. Plaintiff, accordingly, has prayed for further relief that he be declared entitled to the amount of compensation in lieu of acquisition of land comprised in survey Nos.50/1 and 14/1. He also prayed that the amount be paid to him. 3. Defendant-revisionist submitted an application under Order 7 rule 11 of CPC on the ground that the suit being barred under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not maintainable and the same be dismissed accordingly. This application was opposed and the learned trial Judge vide impugned order dismissed the application, hence this revision. 4. Shri C.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the revisionist vehemently argued the matter on the ground that in view of sections 18 and 29 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the trial Court ought to have allowed the application dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent as not maintainable. Learned counsel further contended that in view of section 9 of CPC, the present suit being prohibited under law ought to have been dismissed. Learned counsel further contended that in view of section 9 of CPC, the present suit being prohibited under law ought to have been dismissed. Placing reliance on the decisions reported as AIR 1996 SC 523 (Laxmi Chand and others v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia and others), and AIR 1997 SC 2076 (S.P. Subramanya Shetly and others v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others), it is contended that by implication, suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent No.1 is barred by virtue of provisions of Land Acquisition Act and the application under Order 7 rule 11 of CPC ought to have been allowed. 5. Considered the submissions and perused the record. 6. Section 9 of CPC makes it clear that civil suits normally of all kind are entertainable unless they are prohibited or barred under law. Needless to say that such bar or prohibition may be express or implied. This being so, the revisionist is required to show that the suit in question is barred under law. 7. Faced with the aforesaid, learned counsel for the revisionist drew attention of this Court to sections 18 and 29 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which are reproduced below for convenience : "18. Reference to Court. -- (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken : Provided that every such application shall be made -- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. 29. Particulars of apportionment to be specified. 29. Particulars of apportionment to be specified. -- Where there are several persons interested, if such persons agree in the apportionment of the compensation, the particulars of such apportionment shall be specified in the award, and as between such persons the award shall be conclusive evidence of the correctness of the apportionment." 8. Learned counsel for the revisionist for the aforesaid purpose placed reliance on the apex Court decisions in the case of Laxmi Chand (supra), and S.P. Subramanya (supra). In the case of Laxmi Chand (supra), civil suit was filed for challenging the validity of the acquisition and the award on the ground that the land could not be acquired. This suit was held to be not maintainable which was upheld upto the apex Court. In the case of S.P. Subramanya (supra), civil suit was filed for mandatory injunction against the State restraining them from interfering into possession of a property which was subject of acquisition and to denotify the notification of acquisition. It was held that the notification had become final and the proceedings of acquisition having attained finality, civil suit was not maintainable. In the instant case, the plaintiff has neither challenged the notification nor the acquisition. He has not challenged the award also. His contention is that the compensation on account of acquisition was duly deposited which included compensation in lieu of survey Nos.50/l and 14/1 which belonged to him exclusively. This has been paid to the defendant-revisionist, who did not disclose that the aforesaid two survey numbers did not belong to him. Thus, the amount of compensation in respect of these two survey numbers is received by the defendant-revisionist wrongly or by misrepresentation. Plaintiff has nowhere accused the acquisition officer or the proceedings of acquisition. In civil suit he would be required to establish his title to land comprised in survey Nos.50/1 and 14/1. If he succeeds in establishing this fact and further that the defendant-revisionist has received the amount of compensation in respect of these two survey numbers, I see no reason that why the reliefs claimed in the suit may not be granted. They in no way are in conflict with the purpose and object of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 9. It is an undisputed position of law that while applying provisions of Order 7 rule 11 of CPC, averments contained in the plaint alone are be examined. They in no way are in conflict with the purpose and object of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 9. It is an undisputed position of law that while applying provisions of Order 7 rule 11 of CPC, averments contained in the plaint alone are be examined. In the present case the plaintiff has categorically averred that he is Bhumiswami of land comprised in survey Nos.50/l, 14/1 in respect of which amount of compensation has been paid to the defendant-revisionist. He has not blamed the Land Acquisition Officer for passing an award in favour of defendant-revisionist. On the contrary, his contention is that his grand-mother Paniya Bai had acquired the entire land from her parents. Defendant-revisionist is grand son of Paniya Bai like the plaintiff himself. There arose a dispute about inheritance in respect of property held by Paniya Bai which was resolved by way of compromise. The subject land comprised in survey Nos.50/1 and 14/1 was allotted to the plaintiff and other land was allotted to the defendant-revisionist. Accordingly, it is averred that the plaintiff was Bhumiswami of inter alia survey Nos.50/1 and 14/1 in respect of which amount of compensation was paid wrongly to the defendant-revisionist. Since the money has already been received by the defendant-revisionist, plaintiff-respondent No.1 instituted a civil suit (giving rise to the present revision application) for the relief that he be declared entitled to the amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. two lacs being Bhumiswami of survey Nos.50/1 and 14/1. It is further averred that the defendant-revisionist has unauthorizedly received the said amount which may be directed to be paid by the defendant-revisionist to him. 10. As regards objection about sections 18 and 29 of the Land Acquisition Act, it may be seen that the plaintiff-respondent has averred exclusive title to survey Nos.50/1 and 14/1. He has not asserted joint title with the plaintiff, therefore, there was no question of apportionment of compensation. This being so, section 29 also expressly or by necessary implication does not debar the plaintiff from instituting the suit of present nature. 11. In principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 10th edition, page 682, it is stated : "As a necessary corollary of this rule provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil Courts and provisions conferring jurisdiction on authorities and Tribunals other than civil Courts are strictly construed. 11. In principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 10th edition, page 682, it is stated : "As a necessary corollary of this rule provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil Courts and provisions conferring jurisdiction on authorities and Tribunals other than civil Courts are strictly construed. The existence of jurisdiction in civil Courts to decide questions of civil nature being the general rule and exclusion being an exception the burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is excluded in any particular case is on the party raising such a contention. The rule that the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Courts is not to be readily inferred is based on the theory that civil Courts are Courts of general jurisdiction and the people have a right, unless expressly or impliedly debarred, to insist for free access to the Courts of general jurisdiction of the State. Indeed, the principle is not limited to civil Courts alone, but applies to all Courts of general jurisdiction including criminal Courts." 12. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Swamy Atmananda and others v. Sri Ramkrishna Tapovanam and others [ (2005) 10 SCC 51 ], has reiterated the principles relating to the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Courts summarized by the then Chief Justice of India Hon'ble Mr. Hidayatullah in the case of Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. [1969 JLJ 1 (SC)= AIR 1969 SC 78 ], which are as follows : "(a) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (b) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with the actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (c) Challenge to the provisions of he particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (d) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (e) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegality collected a suit lies. (f) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality, are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (g) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 13. As already observed by this Court, if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing that the defendant-revisionist is in receipt of the amount of compensation payable in respect of survey Nos.50/1 and 14/1 without any authority of law, I see no legal impediment in the maintainability of the suit. Thus, neither section 18 nor section 29 of the Land Acquisition Act may be invoked by the defendant-revisionist so as to prevent the plaintiff from prosecuting his suit. Thus, neither section 18 nor section 29 of the Land Acquisition Act may be invoked by the defendant-revisionist so as to prevent the plaintiff from prosecuting his suit. There being no allegations against the land acquisition proceedings or land acquisition officer, our system of justice may not allow the defendant-revisionist to swallow the amount of compensation payable in respect of the land not belonging to him. Thus, the case in hand does not fulfill any of the conditions prescribed by the apex Court and the jurisdiction of civil Court is not excluded by sections 18 or 29 of the Land Acquisition Act. 14. In the result, revision being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.