Judgment :- K. Chandru, J. Heard the arguments of Mr. K. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel leading Mr. M. Muthappan, counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. M. Dhandapani, learned Special Government Pleader representing the respondents 1 to 3 and have perused the records. 2. This writ petition is filed against the order passed by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal [for short, Tribunal] dated 06. 2002 in O.A. No. 1784 of 1990. 3. The petitioner Arun Prakash (who was formerly known as R.Rajendran) filed O.A. No. 1784 of 1990 challenging the order dated 25. 1990 dismissing his appeal field against the order of his removal dated 210. 1989 passed by the third respondent. 4. The petitioner joined the post of Assistant Inspector in the Local Fund Audit Department on 26. 1983. While he was working in Orathanadu office, he was transferred to Aranthangi on 06.02.1986. Thereafter, within five months, he was transferred to Tiruppur in Coimbatore. Though he joined at Tiruppur, he was not thinking of continuing in that centre allegedly there due to family circumstances. Thereafter, he started applying for leave of various kinds. He was given a charge-memo dated 010. 1988 stating that his absence was unauthorised as he had remained absent from duty for more than 6 months continuously. The petitioner sought for the enquiry to be held in Thanjavur instead of Chennai and permission to engage a legal practitioner to assist him in the enquiry. 5. His request was not considered and the third respondent proceeded the enquiry ex parte and by proceedings dated 310. 1989. It was held that the charges were proved and he was imposed with punishment of removal from service. Along with the order of removal, he was given the Enquiry Officers report. As against the same, he filed an appeal to the second respondent. The second respondent dismissed the appeal by an order dated 25. 1990. It is against the said punishment, he preferred the Original Application before the Tribunal as noted already. 6. Before the Tribunal, he attacked the enquiry as being unfair and also contended that he was denied reasonable opportunities to defend himself. The Tribunal held that the petitioner was given all opportunities and there was no violation of principles of natural justice. It also held that he never reported for duty at Tiruppur and he was also staying at Chennai. Before the Tribunal, he attacked the enquiry as being unfair and also contended that he was denied reasonable opportunities to defend himself. The Tribunal held that the petitioner was given all opportunities and there was no violation of principles of natural justice. It also held that he never reported for duty at Tiruppur and he was also staying at Chennai. His request that enquiry should be conducted at Thanjavur can never be considered as there are no rules in this regard. The Tribunal also found that the petitioner had no intention of working anywhere other than Thanjavur and, therefore, it held that the petitioner cannot have a choice of his posting. The Tribunal also held that the petitioner was not entitled for any leave because he applied for only Earned Leave and there was no leave to his credit. It also held that the leave request for six months cannot be accepted. It is against the dismissal of the O.A., the present writ petition has been filed and the same was admitted on 09. 2003. 7. On behalf of the respondents, a counter affidavit dated 23.02.2005 has been filed justifying the punishment imposed on the petitioner. In paragraph 32, the respondents have explained in the form of a tabular column as to how various leave applications sent by the petitioner were dealt with by the Department and his ineligibility to avail any leave. 8. The reasons for under which the petitioner remained ex parte are unsustainable. The petitioner cannot have an assistance of a lawyer in the absence of any rule. The place of enquiry cannot be the choice of the petitioner. The reliance placed on G.O. Ms. No. 153 P&AR Department dated 08. 2000 has no application to the case of the petitioner and it does not give any new cause of action to the petitioner. The intention of the petitioner was that he never wanted to join at Tiruppur even as per his own admission made in the Original Application. The Tribunal has correctly declined to grant any relief to the petitioner and this Court, exercising power Article 226 of the Constitution, is not inclined to interfere with the same in the order under appeal. 9. The Tribunal has correctly declined to grant any relief to the petitioner and this Court, exercising power Article 226 of the Constitution, is not inclined to interfere with the same in the order under appeal. 9. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar, (2008) 1 SCC 224 wherein the Supreme Court held that even the Labour Court under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act cannot interfere in cases of unauthorised absence and such a misconduct must be held to be a serious misconduct. The following passages found in paragraphs 8 and 9 may be usefully reproduced below: Para 8: "So far as the question whether habitual absenteeism means the gross violation of discipline, it is relevant to take note of what was stated by this Court in Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Workmen: (AIR p. 530, para 5) “5. … There should have been an application for leave but Roy thought that he could claim, as a matter of right, leave of absence though that might be without permission and though there might not be any application for the same. This was gross violation of discipline. Accordingly, if the Company had placed him under suspension that was in order. On these findings, it seems to us that the Tribunal erred in holding that it could not endorse the Company’s decision to dispense with his services altogether. In our opinion, when the Tribunal upheld the order of suspension it erred in directing that Roy must be taken back in his previous post of employment on the pay last drawn by him before the order of suspension.” Para 9: In LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani, it was held as follows: “It is not necessary to go into detail regarding the power exercisable under Section 11-A of the Act. The power under said Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, is expected to interfere with the decision of a management under Section 11-A of the Act only when it is satisfied that punishment imposed by the management is wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. To support its conclusion the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, has to give reasons in support of its decision. The power has to be exercised judiciously and mere use of the words ‘disproportionate’ or ‘grossly disproportionate’ by itself will not be sufficient. In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-meant but wholly unsustainable, tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability. (See Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan." 10. In the light of the above, we are not persuaded to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal and accordingly, the writ petition will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.