JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.—Infringement of the oft quoted doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” by the office of the Advocate General of the State is the cause in the present writ petition. 2. Admittedly, there was shortage of class-III employees in the office of the Advocate General of the State and, therefore, to meet the exigency of work, 42 class - III employees were recruited on daily wages over and above the sanctioned strength in the year 1999 at the rate of Rs. 47.50 P per day only. However, their services were dispensed with by an order dated 23.2.2005 passed by the Advocate General on the pretext of non-availability of funds. The other reason being that the State Government has directed to engage class-III employees on contract basis up to a sanctioned strength of sixty only. 3. Of the above 42 employees whose services were so dispensed with, 23 (who are petitioners herein) challenged the order of termination by filing a writ petition No. 14876 of 2005. The rest remained silent. The writ petition was allowed vide judgment and order dated 25.5.2005 and the order impugned therein, terminating services of the petitioners was quashed. The aforesaid decision was taken up in Special Appeal No. 704 of 2005, State of U.P. and others v. Ashok Kumar, on behalf of Advocate General which is still pending. 4. In view of the sanction alleged to have been granted by the State Government to 60 posts of class-Ill employee for the office of the Advocate General to be filled up on contract basis, 17 out of the 42 daily wage employees, who had preferred to remain silent when their services were terminated were re-employed in the office of the Advocate General on contract basis on 17/18.10.2005. This time at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month as against the daily wages of Rs. 47.50 P. per day (Rs.1425/- p.m.) which was earlier admissible to them. They started receiving a gross amount of Rs. 6,358/- per month. However, the petitioners who have shown courage to question the order of learned Advocate General were left out and were not re-employed in any form. The services of two others were regularised. Subsequently, a plea was taken that as the matter is subjudice in special appeal and an interim order of status quo dated 1.6.2005 is operating these 23 could not be re-employed. The services of two others were regularised. Subsequently, a plea was taken that as the matter is subjudice in special appeal and an interim order of status quo dated 1.6.2005 is operating these 23 could not be re-employed. The order of status quo was vacated on 8.8.2006 with the liberty to the petitioner to press for equal treatment like other 17 employees. Accordingly, petitioners were also re-inducted again as daily wagers with effect from 23.11.06 at the rate of Rs. 47.50 P per day. 5. In the pending special appeal another order was passed on 21.11.2006, on the statement made by the Advocate General, to the effect that (1) the Advocate General has taken a decision that the services of the 23 employees in question as daily wagers shall continue till regular selection is made and they would be permitted to participate in the regular selection and shall not be debarred on the ground of overage or pendency of special appeal; (2) the selection process for the newly sanctioned about 100 posts in the office of the Advocate General would be done afresh; (3) the 17 other employees are not better situated than the 23 petitioners as they are also waiting selection and are only contractual employees; and (4) until the selection is over the services of none of the 23 daily wage employees would be terminated or adversely affected or dealt with. 6. It is in this background that the petitioners who are 23 in number and were amongst the 42 daily wage class-III employees recruited in the year 1999 and have been re-engaged as daily wagers are claiming the basic pay of Rs. 3050-4500 per month, which is admissible to a regular class-III employee with arrears with effect from their date of reinduction i.e. 23.11.06 till date on the ground of parity with other 17 employees who were also initially appointed alongwith them, but were subsequently re-engaged on contract basis. 7. I have heard Sri Manish Goyal learned Counsel for petitioner, Sri Zafar Naiyar, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Pankaj Rai, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents and have also perused the record. 8. 7. I have heard Sri Manish Goyal learned Counsel for petitioner, Sri Zafar Naiyar, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Pankaj Rai, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents and have also perused the record. 8. Sri Naiyar at the threshold has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition is an abuse of process of law and it is in fact a second writ petition as the relief claimed by the petitioners in this writ petition could have been claimed by them in the earlier petition itself. 9. The submission may be demoralising for the petitioners but is of no substance. In the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioners the challenge was to the order dated 23.2.2005 by which their services were dispensed with. The petitioners having succeeded in the said writ petition and the special appeal being filed by the State of U.P., probably on the strength of an interim order passed therein on 8.8.2006 were re-engaged as daily wagers. On such re-engagement, as they were not paid proper wages/salary, the dispute with regard to the rate of wages/salary had arisen. The said cause of action was not available to them earlier when the previous writ petition was filed or decided. The earlier writ petition was against a totally distinct cause of action, i.e. termination of their services. Thus, the cause of action in the present writ petition is entirely different to the cause in the earlier petition and was not even available when the previous petition was filed or decided. Clearly, the cause of action in the present writ petition had arisen subsequent in time to the filing and the decision of the earlier writ petition. 10. In view of above, this writ petition is neither a successive writ petition for the same cause of action nor is abusive in nature. The petitioners could not have claimed the relief sought herein in the previous one or even in the special appeal preferred by the State. Therefore, the analogy based on Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure would also not apply so as to debar the present writ petition. 11. The petitioners could not have claimed the relief sought herein in the previous one or even in the special appeal preferred by the State. Therefore, the analogy based on Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure would also not apply so as to debar the present writ petition. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners relying upon the interim orders dated 8.8.2006 and 21.11.2006 passed in pending special appeal has argued that as the petitioners are in no way situate inferior to the 17 other employees, they are entitle to the pay scale which is admissible to the regular class -III employees or as is being given to the said 17 persons. He has further submitted that in any event no distinction can be made between the petitioners on one hand and the 17 other employees and, therefore, even if the regular pay scale may not be admissible to the petitioners they cannot be discriminated in the payment of wages equal to that which is being paid to 17 other employees. 12. The respondents, on the other hand, relying upon the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi (3) and others, (2006)4 SCC 1 have submitted that the petitioners have no legal right for claiming the regular pay scale as they are not the holder of any post. Secondly, they cannot claim parity with 17 other employees, who form a different class inasmuch as they have been re-inducted on contract basis and were later given ad hoc appointment against substantive vacancies, whereas the petitioners are only daily wagers who are not working against any post or substantive vacancies. The relief claimed for cannot otherwise be granted as there are no pleadings to the effect that the nature of work discharged by them is same and equal to that of regular class-III employees. 13. In Uma Devi (3) (supra) the Constitution Bench was referred the matter of regularisation of ad hoc employees only and not with the principle of “equal pay for equal work” as there were conflicting decisions of three Judges Benches of the Supreme Court on the point. 13. In Uma Devi (3) (supra) the Constitution Bench was referred the matter of regularisation of ad hoc employees only and not with the principle of “equal pay for equal work” as there were conflicting decisions of three Judges Benches of the Supreme Court on the point. The Court therein laid down (i) that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of the Constitution of India; (ii) unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules after due competition, the same would not confer any right on the appointee; (iii) the contractual appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract; (iv) appointment on daily or casual basis would come to an end when it is discontinued; (v) temporary employee cannot claim to be made permanent, (vi) even if temporary or casual employee is continued for some time beyond the term of his appointment he would not be entitle to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent; (vii) Courts cannot prevent regular appointment at the instance of such temporary or casual employees as they do not hold any post or acquire any lien on any such post. It was further observed that the concept of equal pay for equal work is different from the concept of conformity/permanency in employment by regularisation of services to those who have been appointed on ad hoc, temporary or casual basis without undergoing the process of selection provided. 14. Thus, the reliance placed on the above Constitution Bench decision is based on complete misreading of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment. There the Apex Court while dealing with the matter of regularisation of certain employees, who were appointed on temporary/daily wages/casual basis without undergoing the process of selection laid down that they have no such right under law. However, it was not a case which dealt with the admissibility of the pay scale or the wages to such temporary/daily wages/casual workers. 15. Now in the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the submissions advanced by the Counsel for the parties, only one point arises for determination as under (i) whether the petitioners are entitle for salary in the regular pay scale of class-III employees or salary equivalent to that which is being paid to their 17 counter parts and whether payment of Rs. 47.50 per day as wages is fair and reasonable? 16. To answer the above questions it is necessary to examine some of the provisions of the Constitution of India which are being reproduced here-in-below : “Article 14. Equality before law.—The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” “Article 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.—(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any officer under the State." ......................................... “Article 23. Prohibition of traffic in human being and forced labour.—(1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law." ......................................... “Article 39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.—The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing— (a) .................................... (b) .................................... (c) .................................... (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women; .........................................." 17. Some of the aforesaid provisions came up for consideration before the three Judges of the apex Court as long back as in 1982 in Randhir Singh v. Union of India and others, 1982(1) SLR 756 : AIR 1982 SC 879 . The controversy was with regard to pay scale of Drivers in the Delhi Police vis-a-vis the Drivers in services of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. The bench observed that though the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right but it certainly is a constitutional goal which has to be read into fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Equal pay for equal work for both men and women means for everyone and as between the sexes. It further says that the aforesaid principle read together with the equality clauses of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution must mean something to everyone and that would be possible in substance only if they get equal pay for equal work. Thus, construing Article 39(d) in conjunction with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India it was held that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions as the drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government and therefore are entitle to the same pay scale. Thus, construing Article 39(d) in conjunction with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India it was held that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions as the drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government and therefore are entitle to the same pay scale. 18. The ratio laid down above was affirmed by the Constitution Bench in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 and was followed by the apex Court in Surinder Singh and another v. The Engineer-in-Chief CPWD and others, AIR 1986 SC 584 in the following words : “The Central Government like all other organs of the State is committed to the Directive Principles of State Policy and Article 39 enshrines the principles of equal pay for equal work. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCR 298 : ( AIR 1982 SC 879 ), this Court had occasion to explain the observations in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi v. Union of India (supra) and to point out how the principles of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine and how it is a vital and vigorous doctrine accepted throughout the world, particularly by all socialist countries. For the benefit of those that do not seem to be aware of it, we may point out that the decision in Randhir Singh’s case has been followed in any number of cases by this Court and has been affirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 2 SCR 165 : ( AIR 1983 SC 130 ). The Central Government, the State Governments and likewise, all public sector undertakings are expected to function like model and enlightened employers and arguments such as those which were advanced before us that the principle of equal pay for equal work is an abstract doctrine which cannot be enforced in a Court of law should ill-come from the mouths of the State and State Undertakings. We allow both the writ petitions and direct the respondents, as in Nehru Yuvak Kendra’s case (supra) to pay to the petitioners and all other daily rated employees, the same salary and allowances with effect from the date when they were respectively employed.” 19. We allow both the writ petitions and direct the respondents, as in Nehru Yuvak Kendra’s case (supra) to pay to the petitioners and all other daily rated employees, the same salary and allowances with effect from the date when they were respectively employed.” 19. Yet another three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, 1992 (8) SLR 784 while dealing with the daily rated workers who were asking for regularisation of their services and equal wages at par with the basic pay and other allowances admissible to regularly appointed employees laid down that they are all entitle to equal pay at par with the persons appointed on regular basis to the similar post or discharging similar duties. 20. The same view was expressed by another three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Puttilal, 2002 (3) AWC 2375 and directions were issued to pay the daily wagers minimum of the pay scale as being paid to their counterparts so long as they continue as daily wagers and their services are not regularised but they shall not be entitle to increment or any other allowance. 21. Earlier, again a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in K.S.P. College Stop Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1992 SC 677 while dealing with the matter of regularisation of temporary Lecturers and discrimination in pay payment directed for payment of salary as is admissible to teachers appointed on permanent post even to temporary teachers. The Apex Court observed as under : “All appointment may be temporary or permanent but the nature of work being same and the temporary appointment may be due to exigency of service, non-availability of permanent vacancy or as stop-gap arrangement till the regular selection is completed, yet there can be no justification for paying a teacher, so appointed, a fixed salary by adopting a different method of payment than a regular teacher. Fixation of such emoluments is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Fixation of such emoluments is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The evil inherent in it is that apart from the teachers being at the beck and call of the management are in danger of being exploited as has been done by the management committees of State of Karnataka who have utilised the services of these teachers for 8 to 10 years by paying a meagre salary when probably during this period if they would have been paid according to the salary payable to a regular teacher they would have been getting much more. Payment of nearly eight months’ salary, by resorting to clause 5, and that too fixed amount, for the same job which is performed by regular teachers is unfair and unjust. A temporary or ad hoc employee may not have a claim to become permanent without facing selection or being absorbed in accordance with rules but no discrimination can be made for same job on the basis of method of recruitment. Such injustice is abhorring to the constitutional scheme.” 22. On the contrary, learned Additional Advocate General had relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Jasmer Singh and others, AIR 1997 SC 1788 wherein the Apex Court had observed as under : “The respondents, therefore, in the present appeal who are employed on daily wages cannot be treated as on par with persons in regular service of the State of Haryana holding similar posts. Daily-rated workers are not required to possess the qualifications prescribed for regular workers, nor do they have to fulfil the requirement relating to age at the time of recruitment. They are not selected in the manner in which the regular employees are selected. In other words, the requirements for selection are not as rigorous. Thereafter also other provisions relating to regular service such as the liability of a member of the service to be transferred, and his being subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authorities as prescribed, which daily-rated workmen are not subjected to. They cannot, therefore, be equated with regular workmen for the purposes for their wages. Nor can they claim the minimum of the regular pay-scale of the regularly employed.” 23. They cannot, therefore, be equated with regular workmen for the purposes for their wages. Nor can they claim the minimum of the regular pay-scale of the regularly employed.” 23. One another decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Balram Sahu, AIR 2003 SC 33 , laid down that the workers who are engaged temporarily on ad hoc or daily wages or casual basis cannot be treated at par with regularly employed permanent staff for the purposes of pay scale and thus approved the well considered decision in the case of Jasmer Singh (supra). Further, in another case of State of Haryana and others v. Tilak Raj and others, AIR 2003 SC 2658 , the Supreme Court reiterated that a scale of pay is attached to a definite post and a daily wager who does not hold any such post cannot claim equal pay and allowances as are admissible to the regular and permanent staff. 24. It may however be noted that the above decisions cited on behalf of the respondents are only Division Bench decisions and, therefore, would not prevail over some of the 3 Judges decisions of the Apex Court relied upon on behalf of the petitioners and discussed above. The only three Judges decision of the Supreme Court which is said to be in favour of the respondents is the case of State of Haryana and others v. Charanjeet Singh and others, JT 2005(12) SC 475 : AIR 2006 SC 161 . This decision while considering the applicability of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution of India and dealing with the previous decisions on the point, namely, that of Surinder Singh (supra), Jasmer Singh (supra) and similar such other decisions held that the view expressed in the case of Jasmer Singh (supra), State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj (supra), Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, JT 2003 (4) SC 104 and Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy, JT 2003 (9) SC 130 lay down the correct law i.e. that the daily rated workers cannot be equated with regular workmen and therefore, they are not entitle to minimum of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed workers. However, even in this case there is no reference or consideration of two contrary decisions; first, three Judges decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwati Prasad (supra) and the second, K.S.P. College Stop Gap Lecturers Association (supra). The aforesaid two decisions broadly lay down that stop gap, temporary, daily rated or casual employees should not normally be distinguished in the matter of payment of wages which are admissible to their counter parts working on permanent posts. However, these decisions do not lay down the absolute rule which could be applied in each and every case, particularly, in view of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court which have been affirmed by the three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Charanjeet Singh (supra). In my opinion, where there is conflict in the decisions tendered by the benches consisting of equal number of Judges, a decision which appears to comprehensively deal with the factual situation, lay down the law after discussion of almost all the previous authorities on the point and appears to be reasonable and correct ought to be followed. Moreover, it is an acknowledged proposition of law that where there is conflict between an earlier and later decision of the Apex Court of equal number of Judges, the later decision must prevail over the earlier decision. Therefore, for the above two reasons, I prefer to rely and follow the later decision of Charanjeet Singh (supra) even though it may have omitted to take into consideration the earlier two decisions as indicated above. It may also be noticed that lately in State of Karnataka and others v. KGSD Canteen Employees Welfare Association and others, AIR 2006 SC 845 , the Supreme Court after considering very large number of earlier decisions and the provisions of the Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India held that daily wagers do not hold any status or post and as such cannot claim pay scale of any regular post. 25. It is admitted on record that all the petitioners were working as daily wagers since 1999 till their services were dispensed with on 23.2.2005. On the said order being quashed by the High Court they were re-inducted again on daily wages at the previous rate of Rs. 47.50 P. per day and they are getting the same with effect from 23.11.06. On the said order being quashed by the High Court they were re-inducted again on daily wages at the previous rate of Rs. 47.50 P. per day and they are getting the same with effect from 23.11.06. These appointments of the petitioners either at the initial stage or subsequently were not against any substantive post. The petitioners were not even subjected to any regular selection procedure. The petitioner being daily wagers do not hold any post. Therefore, they have no right to claim parity in the pay structure with those who are working in the office concerned on substantive post and have earned a status. 26. In view of legal position enumerated above, the conclusion is inevitable that the petitioners who are only daily wagers and are not holding any substantive post are not entitled for the pay scale which is admissible to a class-III employees, appointed in a regular manner on substantive posts. 27. The next limb of this very part of the argument is whether the petitioners can be equated in the payment of remuneration with the 17 other employees who have been re-engaged on contract basis prior to re-induction of the petitioners. 28. Before adverting to the above aspect it would be appropriate to first deal with the question as to whether the services of the petitioners and 17 other employees are comparable. 29. Admittedly, the petitioners and the 17 other employees were initially appointed as daily wagers. Subsequently, petitioners were re­engaged as daily wagers whereas the other 17 were appointed on contract basis and are now alleged to be ad hoc employees working on substantive posts. The letter of the State Government dated 17.5.05 (Annexure CA-1) states that His Excellency The Governor has been pleased to sanction 49 temporary posts of Routine Grade Clerks for the office of the Advocate General, 35 at Allahabad and 14 at Lucknow for the period upto 28.2.06. It is against this sanction granted by the State Government that the so called 17 other employees were re-inducted on contract basis alongwith certain other fresh candidates. Lateron, the petitioners were also re-inducted but on daily wages. However, this sanction which was for limited duration expired and there is nothing on record that it was ever extended. Nonetheless, the office of the Advocate General chose to continue with the engagement of all. Lateron, the petitioners were also re-inducted but on daily wages. However, this sanction which was for limited duration expired and there is nothing on record that it was ever extended. Nonetheless, the office of the Advocate General chose to continue with the engagement of all. There is nothing on record, except for bald allegation, to establish that these 17 persons were appointed on ad hoc basis. It has not been stated that they were subjected to any selection procedure before such appointment. The precise time and manner in which they came to be appointed on ad hoc basis has not been stated. There is no creation or sanction of further substantive posts except for the alleged temporary and time bound posts. Therefore, in the absence of such creation/sanction of substantive posts and the material to show ad hoc appointment, it is difficult to accept that these 17 employees were ever given ad hoc appointment. 30. On the contrary, it has come on record as per the statement of the learned Advocate General, as contained in the order dated 21.11.2006 passed in Special Appeal No. 704 of 2005 that about 100 new posts of class - III employees have been sanctioned in the office of the Advocate General for which the whole exercise of recruitment has to be taken and these 17 persons are only contract employees who are awaiting selection and are not better situated than the 23 petitioners. Meaning thereby that even though if some new posts have been created/sanctioned, though there is nothing on record to this effect except for the statement of the Advocate General, no regular appointment on such posts has been made. 31. Thus, the petitioners continue to function on daily wages whereas the other 17 employees remain to be contract employees. However, there is no dispute that all of them were appointed for the same purpose and as such discharge and perform similar nature of work and duties as the regular class-III employees. It is also admitted on record as per the statement of the Advocate General in Special Appeal that these 23 employees are in no way inferior to the 17 other employees who have been given appointment on contract as they too are awaiting regular selection. 32. It is also admitted on record as per the statement of the Advocate General in Special Appeal that these 23 employees are in no way inferior to the 17 other employees who have been given appointment on contract as they too are awaiting regular selection. 32. A three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Charanjeet Singh (supra) in paragraph 22 has clearly concluded that the persons employed on contract cannot claim equal pay on the basis of principle of equal pay for equal work. Thus, eventually the contract employees cannot be given the salary in the regular pay scale which is admissible to class-III employee. 33. Now when both contract employees and those engaged on daily wages cannot be given salary in the regular pay scale and they happen to perform same work based upon identical minimum qualifications they cannot be discriminated in payment of wages. There is no justification to pay higher remuneration to contract employees and far lower to the daily wagers. The mere description or nomenclature by classifying them as contract workers and daily wagers is not a sufficient criteria to make distinction in payment of wages. Such a classification under the facts and circumstances is certainly irrational, unfair and unreasonable. 34. The above problem can also be viewed in the light of Article 23 of the Constitution of India which prohibits Begar and other similar forms of forced labour. The term Begar is not a word of common use in English but is a word of Indian origin. It means forced labour, i.e. service without payment of any remuneration. Such forced labour amounts to exploitation of the socially and economically week persons. In (1982) 3 SCC 235 , People’s Union for Democratic Rights and others v. Union of India and others, while considering the matter of exploitation of labours employed through contractor in the construction of various buildings for the 1972 Asian Games in Delhi, the Supreme Court held that non-payment or even payment of less than minimum wages prescribed to a labour for the service rendered by him either by the State or any other person is a Begar and is violative of Article 23 of the Constitution of India. Besides, the principle of justice, equity and good conscience provide so long as the authority has work in hand, the services of contingent employees engaged on daily wages or in any other form should not be terminated in any such need arises the principle of "last come first go” should be followed and in the matter of re-employment preference be given to displaced employees. In this context it has further been held to be equitable to allow such temporary or daily wage employees by necessary implication to be paid minimum wages prescribed under the statute or at the rate prevailing in the locality though they may not be entitle to the minimum of the pay scale at par with regular employees. (Refer to (1995) 5 SCC 210 , GDA v. Vikram Chowdhary and others). In a catena of other pronouncements it has been laid down that the daily wagers are entitle for minimum of the wages fixed by the State Government or the wages prevailing in the locality. In the scenario of the present case, though legally the petitioners have no vested right to claim the minimum of the regular pay scale, which is admissible to class-III employees, they cannot be paid less than the minimum wages prescribed and the wages at the rate of Rs. 47.50 P per day paid to them is certainly below the minimum prescribed wages. Thus, the action of the respondents in offering only Rs. 47.50 per day to the petitioners is an act of Begar which is in violation of Article 23 of the Constitution on India. 35. In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the payment of Rs. 47.50 per day to the petitioners is de hors the law. Therefore, they are entitle to at least minimum of the wages prescribed and in the present case at the rate equivalent to that which is being paid to the 17 other class-III employees. Accordingly, a writ in the nature of mandamus is issued to the respondents to pay salary to the petitioners at par with their 17 other counter parts from the date of their induction, i.e. 23.11.06 till such time they continue to work as such. 36. The writ petition succeeds in part and is allowed to the above extent. ————