ORDER : 1) This Appeal from Order was extensively heard at the admission stage. With the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the appeal is being disposed of finally. . The appellant - defendant challenges the order dated 11-5-2007 passed by the District Judge-3 Aurangabad under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure below Exhibit 5 in Regular Civil Suit No.1 of 2007, which reads thus: "1. The application at Exhibit 5 is allowed. 2. The defendant itself through its proprietors, partners, servants, agents or through any other persons is restrained by way of temporary injunction from infringing the plaintiff’s right in its artistic label at Annexure B by re-producing the same in material form or by printing, publishing or using the impugned trade mark label at Annexure C or by any such work, which is an imitation of plaintiff’s artistic label at Annexure B. 3. The defendant, its proprietors, partners and servants are temporary restrained by order of injunction from manufacturing, selling or from offering for sale by advertising or otherwise dealing in country liquor bearing the trade mark at Annexure C or by using any other trade mark label deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s trade mark at Annexure B so as to pass off or enable others to pass off the defendant’s country liquor as and for the country liquor of the plaintiff. 4. The defendant to bear its own costs and to pay the costs of the plaintiff." 2) The appellant contends that it is a private limited company registered under the Companies Act 1956 and carries out its business of ’Blending & Bottling" of "Country Liquor" having its factory at Plot No.E-45, MIDC Area, Chikalthana, Aurangabad. The appellant applied for registration of label of its "Country Liquor" branded as "Paru Santra" before the Commissioner of State Excise, Mumbai. Earlier, the appellant in the month of January 2006 had submitted its application for registration of its liquor brand as "Gangu Santra" which was objected by the present respondent, original plaintiff, in Civil Suit No.1 of 2007. The objection of the present respondent for the name of "Gangu Santra" was upheld and permission for (4) manufacturing of country liquor in the brand name "Gangu Santra" was refused by the Commissioner of Excise vide his letter dated 28-2-2006. The objection of the present respondent for the name of "Gangu Santra" was upheld and permission for (4) manufacturing of country liquor in the brand name "Gangu Santra" was refused by the Commissioner of Excise vide his letter dated 28-2-2006. The appellant thereafter would submit another application for registration of its brand and label as "Paru Santra". The Commissioner of Excise Mumbai vide his order dated 9-3-2006 approved the above brand and label. It is contended that the respondent further raised objection to the brand and label as "Paru Santra" but the objection raised by the respondent came to be rejected by the Commissioner of Excise against which, according to the appellant, the respondent did not prefer any proceedings by challenging the order of the State Excise. It is the contention of the appellant that due to quality of the product "Paru Santra" and strong marketing strategy sale of the above brand / production of the said liquor was increasing day by day. Considering the popularity of the said brand of the appellant company it is alleged that the respondent being in the same business and rival competitor, who could not digest the market growth of the above product. It is alleged that the respondent aims to stop and obstruct the appellant from its manufacturing activity of the country liquor of the above brand and with an obstructionistic attitude and to harass Regular Civil Suit No.1/2007 was filed before the District Court along with application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for violation the Copyrights Act 1957 and the Trade Marks Act 1999. The respondent manufactures country liquor under the brand and label as "Sakhu Santra". The learned counsel appearing for the appellant Shri. S.S. Deo submitted that there is no deceptive similarity between the brand name and labels of the appellant and the respondent’s product. Phonetically there is dissimilarity. In the submission of the counsel the label of the respondent does not show any glimpses of any artistic evidence and therefore there is no question of copying the label of the respondent. In view of the facts and merits of the case it was submitted by the learned counsel that the respondent failed to establish strong prima facie case and balance of convenience in his favour. 5) In support, the learned counsel places reliance on the following reported judgments. In view of the facts and merits of the case it was submitted by the learned counsel that the respondent failed to establish strong prima facie case and balance of convenience in his favour. 5) In support, the learned counsel places reliance on the following reported judgments. . Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals 73 Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73 . In para 18 of the judgment the Apex Court observed: "18. ... As far as this Court is concerned, the decisions in the last four decades have clearly laid down that what has to be seen in the case of a passing-off action is the similarity between the competing marks and to determine whether there is likelihood of deception or causing confusion. ...." . In R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613 the Apex Court observed that there can be no copyright in an idea, subject-matter, themes, plots or historical or legendary facts and violation of the copyright in such cases is confined to the form, manner and arrangement and expression of the idea by the author of the copyrighted work. Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, 2008 AIR SCW 5265 5265. In para 15 the Supreme Court observed that an action for passing off is common law right but the same does not determine the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme court considered a question whether the plaintiff in the said case can combine two causes of action, one under the Copyright Act and the second under the Trade Marks Act, 1958. In para 29 the Apex Court observed: "29. What then would be meant by a composite suit? A composite suit would not entitle a court to entertain a suit in respect whereof it has no jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise. Order II, Rule 3 of the Code specifically states so and, thus, there is no reason as to why the same should be ignored. A composite suit within the provisions of the 1957 Act as considered in Dhoda House (supra), therefore, would mean the suit which is founded on infringement of a copyright and wherein the incidental power of the Court is required to be invoked. A plaintiff may seek a remedy which can otherwise be granted by the court. A composite suit within the provisions of the 1957 Act as considered in Dhoda House (supra), therefore, would mean the suit which is founded on infringement of a copyright and wherein the incidental power of the Court is required to be invoked. A plaintiff may seek a remedy which can otherwise be granted by the court. It was that aspect of the matter which had not been considered in Dhoda House (supra) but it never meant that two suits having different causes of actions can be clubbed together as a composite suit." . Martin Burn Ltd.v. R.N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79 : In para 27 the Supreme Court observed: "(27) ... A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal considering this question may itself have arrived at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record. (See Buckingham & Carnatic Co., Ltd. v. The Workers of the Company, (1952) Lab. AC 490 (F)." Heinz Italia v. Dabur India Ltd., 2007 (6) Mh.L.J. 7. In para 17 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed: "17. In Cadila Health Care case (supra) it has also been held that in the case of a passing-off action the similarities rather than the dissimilarities have to be taken note of by the Court and the principle of phonetic "similarity" cannot be ignored and the test is as to whether a particular mark has obtained acceptability in the market so as to confuse a buyer as to the nature of product he was purchasing. We observe that both Glucon-D and Glucose-D are items containing glucose and to us it appears that there is remarkable phonetic similarity in these two words." . Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate, Nashik vs. Meher 344 Distilleries Pvt. Ltd., 2006 (1) Mh.L.J. 344 . We observe that both Glucon-D and Glucose-D are items containing glucose and to us it appears that there is remarkable phonetic similarity in these two words." . Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate, Nashik vs. Meher 344 Distilleries Pvt. Ltd., 2006 (1) Mh.L.J. 344 . In the facts of the said case this Court in para 13 observed: "13. Secondly, even if the plaintiffs have a copyright about L-1, there is absolutely no artistic work in preparing L-1. Regarding any other piece of art, there could not be only many different opinions as to whether a particular work is an artistic work or not. But regarding L-1 it cannot be said that there is anything which can be said is an artistic work. Choosing orange as background colour in the label or putting red border cannot be called as an artistic work, no skill or specialization is required. Same is the case with printing name and other material on the label. Same is the case with the label of the defendant No.2. There is absolutely nothing in the said label L-1 which can be said to be an artistic work." 6) Learned counsel Shri. H.W. Kane appearing for the respondent submitted that the appellant had infringed the copyright of the respondent, and in the facts of the case, the respondent was entitled to claim relief on the basis of infringement of copyright and for passing-off action. By demonstrating with the help of both the labels of the appellant and the respondent the counsel submitted that the brand name and label used by the appellant as "Paru Santra" is deceptively similar to the brand name and label used by the respondent. The respondent had proved prima facie case and balance of convenience both in favour of the respondent and considering the facts and legal position the trial Court had granted interim injunction. In the submission of the counsel the appellant has not made out any case for causing interference in the impugned order passed by trial Court. 7) I may prefer to mention some of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent for the purpose of deciding this Appeal from Order. (10) . Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah, 2001 AIR SCW 4989 4989. The Apex Court in para 13 observed: "13. In an action for passing off it is usual, rather essential, to seek an injunction temporary or ad-interim. (10) . Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah, 2001 AIR SCW 4989 4989. The Apex Court in para 13 observed: "13. In an action for passing off it is usual, rather essential, to seek an injunction temporary or ad-interim. The principles for the grant of such injunction are the same as in the case of any other action against injury complained of. The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in his favour and his suffering an irreparable injury in the absence or grant of injunction. According to Kerly (Ibid, para 16.16) passing off cases are often cases of deliberate and intentional misrepresentation, but it is well-settled that fraud is not a necessary element of the right of action, and the absence of an intention to deceive is not a defence though proof of fraudulent intention may materially assist a plaintiff in establishing probability of deception. Christopher Wadlow in Law of passing Off (1995 Edition at p.3.06) states that the plaintiff does not have to prove actual damage in order to succeed in an action for passing off. Likelihood of damage is sufficient. The same learned author states that the defendant’s state of mind is wholly irrelevant to the existence of the cause of action for passing off (ibid, pars 4.20 and 7.15). As to how the injunction granted by the Court would shape depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. ..." . M/s. Hiralal Parbhudas v. M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. 218 AIR 1984 Bombay 218. The Division Bench of this Court (Coram: Lentin & Sawant, JJ.) observed in para 5 : "5. As to how the injunction granted by the Court would shape depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. ..." . M/s. Hiralal Parbhudas v. M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. 218 AIR 1984 Bombay 218. The Division Bench of this Court (Coram: Lentin & Sawant, JJ.) observed in para 5 : "5. What emerges from these authorities is (a) what is the main idea or salient features, (b) marks are remembered by general impressions or by some significant detail rather than by a photographic recollection of the whole, (c) overall similarity is the touchstone, (d) marks must be looked at from the view and first impression of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, (e) overall structure, phonetic similarity and similarity of idea are important and both visual and phonetic tests must be applied, (f) the purchaser must not be put in a state of wonderment, (g) marks must be compared as a whole, microscopic examination being impermissible, (h) the broad and salient features must be considered for which the marks must not be placed side by side to find out differences in design and (i) overall similarity is sufficient. In addition, indisputably must also be taken into consideration the nature of the commodity, the class of purchasers, the mode of purchase and other surrounding circumstances." The Division Bench in para 4 of the judgment also quoted from Kerly’s "Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, (10th Edition, pages 456-457): "..... Moreover, variations in details might well be supposed by customers to have been made by the owners of the trade mark they are already acquainted with for reasons of their own." . Tata Tea Limited v. Suruchi Tea Company, 2003 Vol.105 (3) Bom. L.R. 241 wherein in it is observed in para 16 : "16. Guided as I am by the principles of law which have been laid down in several judgments of the Supreme Court and of this Court, the effort of the Court has to be not to compare the two marks with a view to notice the differences between them, but to consider whether the overall impact that is conveyed by the mark of the Respondent of which registration is sought is one of visual similarity with the mark of the Appellant. The two marks can obviously not be identical. The two marks can obviously not be identical. The test that is required to be considered under Section 11(a) is not whether the marks are identical, but whether they are such that the use of the mark which was sought to be registered would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. ..... " . In para 21 of the judgment in Pidilite Industries vs. Bom) S.M. Associates, 2004 (28) PTC 193 (Bom), a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court referred to para 7 of the judgment delivered by Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of C. Cunniah & Co. v. Balraj & Co., 111 AIR 1961 Madras 111. Para 21 reads thus: "21. In C. Cunniah & Co. v. Balraj & Co., AIR 1961 Madras 111 the Division Bench held: 7. "The sole question for our consideration, therefore, is whether the respondents picture is a copy or a colourable imitation of the appellants picture. In Hanfsataengl v. W.H. Smith and Sons, 1905-1 Ch.519, Kekewich J. defined the copy thus: "A copy is that which comes so near to the original as to suggest that original to the mind of every person seeing it. Applying this test, the degree of resemblance between the two pictures, which is to be judged by the eye, must be such that the person looking at the respondents picture must get the suggestion that it is the appellants picture...." . The Daily Calendar Supplying Bureau v. The United Concern, AIR 1967 Madras 381. Paragraph 11 reads thus: "(11) After the deletion of the words colourable imitation in the Act of 1957, to find out the meaning of infringement one has, therefore, necessarily to interpret the words ’reproduce the work in any material form’. Section 14(2) of the Act includes also the reproduction of a substantial part of the work, for the purposes of infringement of copyright. the word ’reproduce’ is a word of ordinary popular usage. However, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary refers to the progressive evolution of its meaning. ’The action or process of bringing again before the mind in the same form. The action or process of repeating in a copy. A copy or counterpart. the word ’reproduce’ is a word of ordinary popular usage. However, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary refers to the progressive evolution of its meaning. ’The action or process of bringing again before the mind in the same form. The action or process of repeating in a copy. A copy or counterpart. A copy of a picture or other work of art by mans of engraving or some other process and finally a representation in some from or by some means of the essential features of a thing’ It, therefore, appears quite likely that when Act XIV of 1957, repealed the earlier enactments and consolidated the law of copyright in India, it adopted the procedure followed in the English Act XIX of 1956 of using the word ’reproduction’ both of the work itself or a substantial part of it, as a sufficient indication of the scope of infringement, and dropped the term ’colourable imitation, as superfluous or redundant." . Penguin Books Ltd. England v. M/s India Book Distributors, 29 AIR 1985 Delhi 29. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in para 44 of the judgment observed: "44. As most infringements of copyrights consist of a continuous process of successive infringing acts such as importation of ’infringing copies’ as in this case the most important remedy and in many cases the only effective one is the injunction. This is always in the discretion of the Court and the Court has to weigh the possible damage to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted against the possible damage to the defendant if it is granted. Thus once the infringement and its continuance is proved the plaintiff will usually be entitled to an injunction, but the injunction would not be granted if the damage caused to the defendant by granting the injunction would be out of all proportion to the seriousness of the infringement or to the possible damage to the plaintiff." 8) Section 2, Clause (c)(i) of the Copyright Act 1957 defines "artistic work" which reads: "2.(c)(i) a painting, a sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan), an engraving or a photograph, whether or not any such work possesses artistic quality" The provisions of Section 14 of the Act refers to meaning of copyright. Circumstances resulting in infringement of copyright are mentioned in Section 51 of the Act. Circumstances resulting in infringement of copyright are mentioned in Section 51 of the Act. 9) Section 2 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 refers to the definitions and interpretations of words appearing in the Act. Clause (zb) of Section 2 defines "trade mark". The effect of registration of trademark is taken into consideration under Chapter IV. Section 27 (2) mentions that nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action against any person for passing off goods or services as the goods of another person or as services provided by another person, or the remedies in respect thereof. 10) The principle emerging broadly from the number of judgments cited supra is that marks must be compared as a whole to ascertain as to whether in totality the mark objected to is likely to cause deception or confusion in the minds of persons accustomed to the existing trademark. The Court would consider impression of a person of an average intelligence and imperfect recollection. A very close microscopic examination of two marks for ascertaining alleged deceptive similarity may not be adopted. There need not be actual deception or confusion and that only likelihood is sufficient. Keeping two trade marks side by side for comparison and for close examination would also not be a sound test. The Court will have to consider probable effect on minds of ordinary people. It is not necessary that deception shall be intended to cause such confusion. 11) In a given case two marks may not be phonetically similar but visually similar. In some cases the material would be similar visually, phonetically and artistically. It would ultimately depend on the overall appearance of the mark coupled with the most necessary essential feature of the infringement action and that is its effect, impact on the mind of ordinary persons of average intelligence. Therefore, it would be for the Court in the given fact situation of a case to analyse and appreciate the alleged deceptive similarity from the angle of the ultimate user, customer and persons of average intelligence having imperfect recollection. 12) Considering the principles derived from the judgments cited above and in view of the overall appearance of the two marks / labels I proceed to appreciate the case of the respective parties. 13) I have considered the overall design, the colour scheme, size of the label. 12) Considering the principles derived from the judgments cited above and in view of the overall appearance of the two marks / labels I proceed to appreciate the case of the respective parties. 13) I have considered the overall design, the colour scheme, size of the label. The appellant’s label has a trade / brand name "Paro Santra" having two oranges as device. The half lower portion exhibits orange colour. The label has a black border. On the top it is written in red colour as "Deshi Daru". In second line below the same in black colour it is written - "Paro Santra". Two leaves are shown to be on the top of the each of the orange fruit. On the middle portion of two orange fruits it is written in green ink as "Premium". On the respondent / plaintiff’s trade mark on the top of the label it is written "Deshi Daru" and below it is written in black ink "Sakhu Santra" having one orange fruit device with two green colour leaves over the fruit and below Sakhu Santra, in the green words it is written "Tango" and below "Tango" it is written "Premium". The upper half portion of the label is in orange colour and the lower portion is in yellow colour. The label has black border. In the label of the appellant - defendant the word "Premium" is written on both the orange fruits in green colour. The manufacturer’s name and address is written in the lower bottom portion of the labels with place and name of district. 14) The trial Court considered the appearance of these two labels, their sizes, the price of the commodity and held that the prima facie case was made out by the plaintiff in his favour having balance of convenience for grant of relief of temporary injunction. 15) Prima facie, considering the principles enunciated for appreciating the case at the stage of grant of temporary injunction I find that the view adopted by the trial Court does not call for interference of this Court in this Appeal from Order. 16) I find that to some extent the contentions raised by the appellant required to be looked into as regards the issue as to whether there is phonetic similarity between (19) the marks of the appellant and the registered trade mark of the respondent / plaintiff. 16) I find that to some extent the contentions raised by the appellant required to be looked into as regards the issue as to whether there is phonetic similarity between (19) the marks of the appellant and the registered trade mark of the respondent / plaintiff. "Sakhu Santra" and "Paro Santra" would sound partly having no phonetic similarity, if we exclude the word "Santra". These two words may not sound to be phonetically similar. Another submission of the learned counsel Shri. Deo is by pointing out the difference of the marks one having two orange leaves and respondent’s having one orange fruit. In the submission of the counsel it makes a lot of difference in its visual appearance when one sees one fruit and two fruits on the label. The difference is such that it could easily be made out by any person of average intelligence. In the submission of the counsel the country liquor is consumed by a particular strata of society who are common people. The word "Tango" occurring in the mark of the respondent / plaintiff would make all the difference, according to the counsel. 17) Much was submitted regarding the label having one orange device and two oranges device. It would be useful to refer to the case reported in M/s. National Chemicals and Colour Co. v. Reckitt and Colman of India Limited, AIR 76 1991 Bom.76. A Division Bench of this Court in para 17 observed: "17. In the present case, in our view, the mark of a bird sitting on a twig is very similar to the mark which is proposed to be registered, which is of two birds sitting on a twig one of the birds being partially hidden by the other. We agree with the learned single Judge that the mark proposed to be registered is likely to cause confusion and is also deceptively similar to the registered trade mark of the 1st respondent in respect of the same description of goods." 18) Prima facie, I find that the colour combination, the ink used to write words "Deshi Daru", "Sakhu Santra", "Paro Santra", the word "Premium" and the rest of the contentions the border of the label give an impression of mark / label having similarity. The plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that the label used by the defendant is likely to create confusion in the minds of ordinary customers or people. 19) I am convinced that the objection on the ground of passing off raised by the plaintiff is justified as prima facie the plaintiff has made out a case. I need not enter into the details of the sale of the products made by the plaintiff and the defendant or any other details in this connection as placed on record by the parties. 20) Learned counsel Shri. Deo submitted that the plaintiff is supposed to establish his strong prima facie case. After considering the judgments cited supra and the principle behind grant of temporary injunction I find that in the facts of the case it was sufficient if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. 21) The view adopted by the trial Court could not be brushed aside. Prima facie I find that the view was based on the material placed before the trial Court and after considering the principles behind grant of temporary injunction, the trial Court reached appropriate reasonable conclusions. 22) For the reasons stated above, I find that this Appeal from Order is meritless and it is accordingly dismissed. (NARESH H. PATIL, J.) 23) After pronouncement of judgment, the learned counsel Shri. S.S. Deo, appearing for appellant, prayed for directions to the trial Court to expeditiously dispose of the suit as, according to counsel, this is the only suit under the Copyrights Act, 1957 which is pending before the Court. 24) The learned counsel Shri. Deshmukh, appearing for respondent, has no objection if such directions are issued by this Court. 25) The trial Court is directed to expeditiously dispose of the suit finally on its own merits.