Judgment Ajay Tewari, J. 1. This petition would dispose of C.W.P. Nos. 10819 of 2005, 11654 of 2005, 11657 of 2005 and 13926 of 2006 since common questions arise therein. The facts are being taken from C.W.P. No. 10819 of 2005. 2. It is pleaded that in the petition that the Punjab Wakf Board (for short the Board) was superseded on 11.11.1981 and thereafter no fresh Board was constituted. 20 years later C.W.P. No. 8166 of 2001 was filed for issuing directions to the respondents to constitute the Board. By Notification dated 1.8.2003 the State of Punjab established a new Punjab Wakf Board (in succession to the erstwhile Board, the jurisdiction of which extended to Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh). By another notification of the same date an Administrator was appointed for the new Board. 3. On 14.5.2004, this Court directed the State of Punjab to constitute the Board within a period of three weeks during the hearing of aforementioned C.W.P. No. 8166 of 2001. It is further pleaded that after a great deal of opposition by the Government, ultimately under the pressure of various court orders, the Board was constituted by the State of Punjab on 11.11.2004 and the petitioner and five other persons were nominated as members thereof. On 18.11.2004, the respondent No. 4 who, incidentally was impleaded on her application was elected as Chairperson of the Board. Further admitted position which has emerged from the record is that acrimonious relations developed between the chairperson and the other members. Eight meetings of the Board were held during the period 11.2.2005 to 25.5.2005 in which, due to the prevalent divisions, the respondent No. 4 did not participate. Matters came to such a pass that the respondent No. 4 addressed a representation to the Principal Secretary to Chief Minister, Punjab, requesting the Government to dissolve the Board. 4. Ultimately, on 15.6.2005, the State Government issued a notice under Section 99(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995 (for short the Act) requiring all the six members to show cause as to why the Board should not be superseded. All the members filed their replies and subsequently by Order dated 13.7.2005 the Board was superseded. 5. 4. Ultimately, on 15.6.2005, the State Government issued a notice under Section 99(1) of the Wakf Act, 1995 (for short the Act) requiring all the six members to show cause as to why the Board should not be superseded. All the members filed their replies and subsequently by Order dated 13.7.2005 the Board was superseded. 5. At this stage it would be apposite to notice a few subsequent details which have emerged from the pleadings of C.W.P. No. 13926 of 2006, During the hearing of C.W.P. No. 10819 of 2005 the learned Advocate General, Punjab, appeared before the Division Bench and took the stand that he would advise the State not to reconstitute the Board. However, thereafter by notification dated 9.11.2005 the State of Punjab reconstituted the Board changing all the other members except the respondent No. 4 who had to be renominated being the only Muslim member of the Legislative Assembly. The notification, however, stipulated mat this reconstitution shall be subject to the decision of this Court in C.W.P. No. 10819 of 2005. In fact, C.W.P. No. 13926 of 2006 was filed to challenge this notification. 6. Sh. M.L. Sarin, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has argued mat firstly, the show cause notice recorded that allegations had been leveled against the petitioner and an inquiry was also conducted but the same were not supplied so as to enable the petitioner to file a reply thereto. Developing this argument further the drew my attention to the following lines in the impugned order: The demand for supply of inquiry report cannot be accepted because it is an internal inquiry Conducted by an officer of the State Government or orders of H.E. The Governor of Punjab. He further urged that the whole matter was evidently predecided as would be clear from the show cause notice which itself recorded that the Chairperson had requested the Government to dissolve the Board forthwith. In this regard he also placed reliance on certain newspaper reports in early June, 2005 i.e. even prior to the issuance of the show cause notice whereby the Chief Minister announced that the Board had been superseded. He next submitted that a conspectus of the facts makes it very clear that the State Government was against constituting the Board right from 1981. He next submitted that a conspectus of the facts makes it very clear that the State Government was against constituting the Board right from 1981. It was only after almost 2-1/2 decades that the Board was reconstituted under the pressure of various Court orders in November, 2004 and by superseding it within six months the Government was only trying on circumvent the Court orders. Last but not the least, he drew my attention to the following lines of the impugned order-It has to be concluded that in the present circumstances, it is very difficult for the Board to function smoothly. Besides, litigation related to the members and Chairperson of the Board before High Court is increasing and chairperson of the Board before High Court is increasing day by day which is not only adversely impacting their relationship vis a vis the Board but also vitiating the overall working environment of the Board. It is his stand that internal dissensions alone can never give rise to the conclusion that any multimember body is unable to perform its duties because of such dissensions, He has relied upon the following cases: 1. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors. 2. Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. The Union of India and Ors. 3. The Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board v. State of Bihar and Ors. 4. Kerala Waif Board and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. 7. Learned Counsel for the State has defended the order of supersession by stating that the order was passed after issuance of notice to all the members and that the said order was a speaking order. In his submission the animosity between respondent No. 4 Chairperson and the other members was of such an order that the functioning of the Board was hampered to such an. extent so as to leave no option to the Government but to supersede it. 8. Mr: Ashok Aggarwal, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4 has opposed the prayer made in the writ petition. Even though his client was also equally affected by the supersession of the Board, this is hardly surprising in view of the admitted animosity between the said respondent and the petitioner. He has argued that his client had earlier filed CWP Nos. Even though his client was also equally affected by the supersession of the Board, this is hardly surprising in view of the admitted animosity between the said respondent and the petitioner. He has argued that his client had earlier filed CWP Nos. 2538 of 2005, 3263 of 2005 and 8319 of 2005 challenging, inter alia the meetings called by the petitioner and other members and mat if this Court holds that such meetings were illegal then the said actions of those members would render the Board to come within the ambit of thee phrase unable to perform or persistently made default in the performance of the duties or have exceeded and or abused, their powers. Developing this argument further he has urged that the present petitioner and the other members being nominated members were expected to be more circumspect and careful about their conduct. He next argued that the supersession of the Board under Section 99 of the Act is different from the removal of a member under Section 20(1)(b) of the Act since the former is a non-stigmatic order as in the present case while an action of removal under Section 20 would necessarily have to be stig-matic. 9. Before, adverting to the arguments of learned Counsel for the parties it would be relevant to reproduce Section 99 of the Act which reads as follow: 99. Power to supersede board - (1) If the State Government is of opinion mat the Board is unable to perform or has persistently made default in the performance of the duty imposed on it by or under this Act or has exceeded or abused its powers or has willfully and without sufficient cause failed to comply with any direction issued by the Central Government under Section 96 or the State Government under Section 97 or if the State Government is satisfied on consideration of any report submitted after annual inspection, that the Boards continuance is likely to be injurious to the interests of the Wakfs in the State, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, supersede the Board for a period not exceeding six months. Provided that before issuing a notification under this sub-section, the State Government shall give a reasonable time to the Board to show cause why it should not be superseded and shall consider the explanations and objections, if any, of the Board. Provided that before issuing a notification under this sub-section, the State Government shall give a reasonable time to the Board to show cause why it should not be superseded and shall consider the explanations and objections, if any, of the Board. (2) Upon the publication of a notification under Sub-section (1) superseding the board- (a) all the members of the Board shall as from the date of supersession, vacate their offices as such members; (b) all the powers and duties, which may, by or under the provisions of this Act, be exercised or performed by or On behalf of the Board shall, during the period of supersession, be exercised and performed by such person or persons as the state Government may direct; and (c) all property vested in the board shall, during the period of supersession vest in the State Government. (3) On the expiration of the period of supersession specified in the notification issued under Sub-section (1). the State Government way (a) extend the period of supersession for such (further period as it may consider necessary, or (b) reconstitute the Board in the manner provided in Section 14. 10. A perusal of the impugned order shows that competent authority has recorded as follows: Even if the Board has been able to enhance its revenue over the previous year, the same cannot be attributed to the members of the Board alone. In fact, the Chairperson can also claim that she contributed to the members of the Board alone. In fact, the Chairperson can also claim that she contributed to its increase. Similarly, officers and the staff of Board can as well claim in this behalf. All this does not imply that the members of the Board may not have contributed to its performance but at the same time it cannot be denied that the performance of the Board would have been much better if the Board had acted unitedly and performed its duties to further the objects for which it had been set up. The report of Secretary Home as mentioned in Para-2 also fully established existence of acrimony between the Chairperson and members of the Board. 11. It may be noticed that the following parameters of Section 99 viz. The report of Secretary Home as mentioned in Para-2 also fully established existence of acrimony between the Chairperson and members of the Board. 11. It may be noticed that the following parameters of Section 99 viz. that the Board was willfully and without sufficient cause failed to comply with any directions of the Government or that any report has come after the annual inspection because of which the Government is satisfied that the Boards continuance is likely to be injurious to the interests of the Wakf in the State, have not been brought into play to justify the supersession. The question which has to be decided by this Court is whether the mutual antipathy between the respondent No. 4 and the other members could by itself have furnished grounds to the State Government to record that the Board is unable to perform its duties or that the continuance of the Board is likely to be harmful to the interests of the Wakf. In the case of S.L. Kapoor (supra) the dispute was, whether before superseding a municipal committee an opportunity of hearing had to be given. In the present case the members of the Board were given a show cause notice and thus the said ruling is not applicable. In the case of M/s Travancore Rayons Ltd. (supra) the Honble Supreme Court held that any authority exercising judicial power is obliged to record reasons in support of its decision. In the present case reasons have been recorded and, therefore, the said authority can be of no help to the petitioner. In the case of Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board (supra) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held as follows: On a plain reading of the said provision, it would be obvious that the opinion of the State Government to supersede the Board is not a subjective opinion. It has to be based on objective findings and for the reasons to be recorded in writing. The persistent default in the performance of the duty imposed on it cannot be gathered by a solitary instance of any irregularity or illegality. On correct interpretation of Section 64, it has to be held that the opinion has to be based on consideration of the explanations submitted in regard to the charges leveled against it and that must be considered by a reasoned order. On correct interpretation of Section 64, it has to be held that the opinion has to be based on consideration of the explanations submitted in regard to the charges leveled against it and that must be considered by a reasoned order. The fact of the present case presents a peculiar feature. Each and every allegation leveled against it were categorically repelled and refuted. They were of trivial nature on which no reasonable opinion could have been formed that the Board persistently defaulted in the performance of its duties imposed under the Act. On the other hand, the facts enumerated above would disclose that there was persistent effort on behalf of the respondents and its authorities to interfere with the day to day administration of the Board and it has been brought on record that in a period of 15 years the Boards were superseded 12 times. It has also been demonstrated that the same charges, more or less, were leveled for claiming supersession. The Board had no adequate and proper opportunity to put its own house in order. No sooner the present Chairman had taken over the assignment, the notice to show cause was issued within four months on the allegations which have been shown to be palpably baseless. Even now the charges have not been established by any cogent evidence. No document in support of the allegation has been brought on record on behalf of the respondents. It has also been satisfactory demonstrated that no sooner Mr. Ozair Ahmad was appointed as the Secretary to the Board just within a week thereafter a notice for supersession of the Board issued. Mr. Oazir Ahmad was suspended by the Board on the ground of misconduct and moral turpitude. Information to this effect was in full knowledge of the respondents. Even then, ignoring the suggestion of the Board he was appointed on a false pretext that he was one of the four persons recommended by the Board itself. This has been refuted by the Board in its reply. The four persons in the list were named according to seniority and a clear indication had been given therein regarding the allegations made against Shri Oazir Ahmad and, therefore, a suggestion had been given that some other person be appointed. This has been refuted by the Board in its reply. The four persons in the list were named according to seniority and a clear indication had been given therein regarding the allegations made against Shri Oazir Ahmad and, therefore, a suggestion had been given that some other person be appointed. It has, therefore, been alleged that the show cause notice to supersede the Board was influenced by political considerations and was based on extraneous considerations. It may be pointed out that such statutory authority must have a free hand in performing its day to day public duty and undue frequent interference on some false pretext or the other will not be conducive to the interest of the people or the Waqf. I find that the show cause in question contained in Annexures 18 and 19 are based on no reason. Neither any reason has been so assigned nor any evidence or material has been disclosed justifying such action. Supersession of a statutory body is a serious matter. It is governed by the statute and the provisions contained therein must be strictly followed. Section 64 of the Waqf Act does not give a blanket power to supersede the Board as and when the respondents and its authorities desired to do so and for any reason whatsoever. 12. In the case of Kerala Wakf Board and Anr. (supra) the Single Bench of the Kerala High Court has interpreted the phrase "persistent default" and the phrase "inability to perform". The relevant extract of the said judgment is as follows: The Section speaks of inability to perform or persistent default in the performance of duty. The Section seems to refer to them as failing of equal magnitude. This appears to be the significance of the two comas in the following part of the Section. ...unable to perform, or has persistently made default in the performance of, the duty.... Inability to perform is a more or less permanent state either because of physical or mental infirmity or because of any other inhibiting circumstances. Persistent default in the performance of duty may not amount to inability to perform, which is a state of incapacity but it denotes a repeated failure to perform which is the result of conscious and deliberate omission to act. Neither is of a single act or moment but of a series of acts or a duration of time. 13. Persistent default in the performance of duty may not amount to inability to perform, which is a state of incapacity but it denotes a repeated failure to perform which is the result of conscious and deliberate omission to act. Neither is of a single act or moment but of a series of acts or a duration of time. 13. The arguments of Mr. Ashok Aggarwal have been countered by Mr. Sarin. He has stated that it would not be open for anybody to import reasons which have not found mention in the impugned order. Thus, the argument that holding of meetings which may turn out to be illegal having not weighed with the Government, cannot now be pressed into play to defend the order. The contention that the impugned order is not stigmatic and, therefore, deserves to be judged by a different yardstick is also not tenable according to Mr. Sarin. Since, as per him the very fact of supersession intrinsically implies a normative judgment, and a finding that, in the ultimate analysis the members were not able to handle the high responsibility entrusted to them. 14. In my opinion this petition deserves to succeed. The impugned order itself recognizes, albeit grudgingly, that the Board has been able to enhance its revenue over the previous years. As far as the mutual animosity in the Board is concerned, that by itself cannot be aground to supersede the Board. Every multimember body, right from the grass root Gram Panchayat to the Supreme Parliament, is riven with grave dissension. Allegations and counter allegations are routinely leveled against members pf warring camps. It is not unknown that at times such differences snowball into physical altercations. Of course, if as a result, of such differences a multimember body is completely paralysed as can be the case where there is no majority and thus every action is stonewalled, it may provide good and substantial reasons to justify a finding of inability to perform. As regards the contention that the conduct of the members would have to be viewed differently in case the meetings called by them are held to be illegal is concerned, I agree with Mr. Sarin that the said actions having not been relied upon in the impugned order, the same cannot be imported now to defend it. As regards the contention that the conduct of the members would have to be viewed differently in case the meetings called by them are held to be illegal is concerned, I agree with Mr. Sarin that the said actions having not been relied upon in the impugned order, the same cannot be imported now to defend it. Of course, if those meetings are held to be illegal or if in those petition some findings deprecating the conduct of the petitioners in these cases is returned, it would be open for the competent authority to have a fresh look at the matter because it might then justifiably be said that in the six months of its chequered existence the Board could not hold even one meeting. Mr. Aggarwal had also propounded a corollary to this argument viz. that the conduct of the petitioners in these cases and the parameters to judge the same would take colour from the fact that the petitioners are nominated members. This is also untenable in my view. The Act envisages two types of members of the Board, elected and nominated. If Mr. Aggarwals argument is to be accepted it would result in there being two standards by which the conduct of nominated and elected members would have to be judged. I am afraid the statute does not lend itself to any such interpretation. To my mind the conditions envisaged by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the Bihar State Sunni Waif Boards case (supra) and of single Bench of the Kerala High Court in the Kerala Wakf Boards case (supra) are not satisfied in the present case. I thus hold the supersession of the Board by the order dated 13.7.2005 to be illegal. 15. Consequently, the impugned order dated 13.7,2005 is quashed. By necessary implication and in view of the rider placed by the State Government the fresh Board constituted on 9.11.2005 would ceases to be in existence. 16. The petition is, therefore, allowed and a declaration is issued that the petitioners shall continue to be the members of the Board.