Judgment : ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J. Both these petitions are tiled by the petitioner, a third party to the proceedings, praying to grant leave for him to seek review of the common judgment passed by this Court, dated 11.4.2008 respectively in W.A. Nos. 1030 and 1031 of 1998. 2. A brief history, leading to the filing of these petitions, is that the Government in 1836, has purchased lands in Mylapore village, Triphcane-Mylapore Taluk, Madras District, measuring an extent of C 6-18-1673 sq.ft. in O.S. No. 3410 (now part of R.S. No. 13) and an extent of C.4-22-226 sq.ft. in O.S. Nos. 3406 (part), 3407, 3408, 3409 and 3413 (now part of R.S. No. 13 and R.S. No. 64), Mylapore village, Madras District was acquired by the Government and placed at the disposal of the 5th respondent Agri Horticultural Society, for the specific purpose of maintaining an Agri-Horticulture garden. In the year 1912, another extent of C1-11-1823 sq.ft. in O.S. No. 3415 part was acquired by the Government and leased in favour of the above Society on annual rent, with provision for resumption. A specific lease deed was also executed. However, owing to non-fulfilment of the condition of grant by the Society, the Government by their order in G.O. Ms. No. 1362, Revenue, dated 26.3.1962 has ordered resumption of the land placed at the disposal of the Agri Horticultural Society. Challenging the said order of resumption, the Society filed W.P. No. 469 of 1962. While so, in the year 1964, a compromise was entered into between the Society, represented by its Secretary and the then Government of Madras, represented by the Secretary, Revenue Department and the same was communicated in G.O. Ms. No. 2572, dated 26.10.1964. Society has withdrawn the Writ Petition No. 469 of 1962. 3. Thereafter, the Government, by a Memorandum bearing No. 77668/Ll/71-41, dated 25.5.1977, had issued a notice to the Society, stating that there is violation of conditions of grant inasmuch as the Society has not obtained prior approval of the Government for subletting the lands in favour of the Woodlands Drive-in Restaurant/the petitioner herein. It was also stated that the sub-lease of the lands by the Society in favour of the petitioner came to an end on 31.7.1971, but the Society permitted the petitioner to continue to remain in the property, without the Government recognising the sub-lease. It was also stated that the sub-lease of the lands by the Society in favour of the petitioner came to an end on 31.7.1971, but the Society permitted the petitioner to continue to remain in the property, without the Government recognising the sub-lease. After detailed discussion with the office bearers of the Society, the Government has arrived at certain conclusions and issued G.O. Ms. No. 513, dated 4.3.1980. Pursuant to the said G.O., the Society had entered into an agreement on 28.4.1980. 4. Thereupon, the Government, by Letter No. 45135/Ll/89, dated 26.7.1989, placing reliance on clause No. (4) of the above said agreement which says that the Government reserve themselves the right to resume at any time the said lands in the event of infringement of or failure to observe any of the conditions of the grant or if the lands are required for any public purposes and the decision of the Government on the question of infringement or failure to observe any of the conditions of the grant or the requirement for any public purpose shall be final and binding on the Society….‘ had issued a notice to the 5 respondent Society, seeking to resume the lands immediately, for a public purpose, which includes (a) the development of sports facilities without affecting the environment and (b) development of horticulture and horticulture research and required the Society to state as to why the Government should not resume the lands for public purposes. The said notice was challenged by the Society as well as by its Honorary Secretary Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, by filing two separate writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 10167 and 10168 of 1989 before this Court, on the ground that the impugned action was initiated by the Government as a result of political vendetta, since he is closely associated with AIADMK General Secretary and also a former Minister of the AIADMK Government. It is also contended that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. A learned single Judge of this Court, considering the fact that it is only a notice to which the petitioner could very well submit his reply, has dismissed both the writ petitions, by the order dated 1.8.1989. 5. Thereupon, on 5.8.1989 itself, the Government has passed G.O. Ms. A learned single Judge of this Court, considering the fact that it is only a notice to which the petitioner could very well submit his reply, has dismissed both the writ petitions, by the order dated 1.8.1989. 5. Thereupon, on 5.8.1989 itself, the Government has passed G.O. Ms. No. 1259, Revenue (LI) Department, dated 5.8.1989, ordering resumption of the lands for the above said public purposes together with the trees, plants and superstructures, if any, found on the lands. This order is challenged by the Society as well as by its Honorary Secretary Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, by filing two separate writ petitions in WP. Nos. 11058 and 11059 of 1989. Thereupon, on 2.8.1989, the District Registrar/Registration of Societies, Central Madras, had issued a show-cause notice in his proceedings No. l2604/Ma.P/88, dated 2.8.1989 under Section 37 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 (Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1975), regarding nine charges mentioned therein. Challenging the said show-cause notice, W.P. No. 11178 of 1989 was filed by the Society. In all these writ petitions, the main thrust of the Society and its Honorary Secretary, who are the 5th respondent in both these petitions, is that the Honorary Secretary of the Society Mr. V. Krishnamurthy. is a family friend of AIADMK General Secretary, Ms. Jayalalithaa and also the relative of Mr. K.K.S.S.R. Ramachandran, the former Minister in the earlier AIADMK Government and that there is violation of principles of natural justice and hence all the impugned proceedings are initiated by the Ruling DMK Government, only as a political vendetta. 6. The learned single Judge, while accepting the plea raised by the Society and its Secretary that the entire actions of the Government are vitiated, since being mala fide and having been initiated as a result of political vendetta, has allowed alt the writ petitions filed by the Society and its Secretary. Aggrieved, the Government has preferred W.A. Nos. 1030, 1031 and 1465 of 1998. 7. Aggrieved, the Government has preferred W.A. Nos. 1030, 1031 and 1465 of 1998. 7. This Court, upon hearing the learned counsel on either side and on thorough analysis of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, by the common judgment dated 11.4.2008, has arrived at the following conclusions: “(1) The political vendetta, pleaded by the respondents/Society is unfounded and invented only for the purpose of the case, as a result, a simple case of resumption of Government land for a public purpose and for violation of the terms and conditions of the lease has been given a political colour and tried to gain sympathy from the Court. When from the materials placed on record, this Court is able to appreciate that the AIADMK Government, with which, it is said by the respondent that he is closely associated with, itself has initiated proceedings against the respondent Society to maintain the land as a modern park like the Botanical Garden at Ooty, in order to develop the chief objectives of horticulture and further, in view of the changed political scenario that Mr. K.K.S.S.R. Rama- chandran, whose relationship/association by the Honorary Secretary of the/respondent Society Mr. V. Krishnamurthy was alleged to have prompted the ruling DMK Government to initiate the impugned proceedings against the Society, himself has joined the DMK and is a Minister in the present ruling Government, the said political vendetta pleaded on the part of the respondents/Society is no longer a good ground for them. (2) The Government is the absolute owner of the lands in question, which has been admitted by the respondents themselves by the unchallenged agreement dated 28.4.1980 and therefore, the Government has got power to resume the lands including the lands in the occupation of the Woodlands Drive-in Restaurant and also recover the rents paid to Society from the date of such unauthorised sub-lease since the sublease in their favour itself is illegal. The Government is entitled to resume the land not only for the stated public purpose but also because of violation of the conditions by the Society, such as usage of land for running the personal business of the respondent Mr. V. Krishnamurthy and for subletting the property, without permission from the Government to the Woodlands Drive-in Restaurant, etc. (3) As has already been observed supra, the Honorary Secretary of the respondent Society viz. Mr. V. Krishnamurthy and for subletting the property, without permission from the Government to the Woodlands Drive-in Restaurant, etc. (3) As has already been observed supra, the Honorary Secretary of the respondent Society viz. Mr. V. Krishnamurthy has proudly stated in his affidavit that he is running a car rental company and also an advertising agency and also made unfounded allegations against the Government that even though the Aviation Authorities have granted him the permission to run the vehicles, the Government did not permit him to do so. Thus, it is clear that he is making use of the Government lands for his personal use and enjoying the vast extent of the land situated in the heart of the city, for his personal gains, without paying any single pie to the Government. Therefore, the Government is also entitled to recover the amounts derived by the said Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, Honorary Secretary, by illegally making use of the Government lands for his personal gains that too for his commercial purposes, by way of rent etc. (4) It is also brought to our notice that after passing the impugned order, the possession of the suit schedule land was taken by the Government in 1989 itself, from that the lands were in the possession and enjoyment of the Government and because of the pendency of these proceedings, they are not able to proceed with the proposed developmental activities in the said lands. In view of our above categorical findings, now the Government is at liberty to make best use of the lands for the public purpose. (5) Adequate and sufficient opportunity was afforded to the respondents/Society by the Government, in due compliance of the principles of natural justice, even though RSO 24 did not envisage issue of any notice to the grantee to show-cause against such resumption of land already granted and under possession of the grantee for public purpose and the alleged non-perusal of the documents of the Government by the respondents, which are the matters of policy of the Government, did not cause any prejudice to their case….” 8. With such observations, this Court, by the common judgment dated 11.4.2008, has allowed W. As. No. 1030 of 1998 and 1031 of 1998 and dismissed W.A. 1465 of 1998 as not pressed and thus set aside the orders passed by the learned single Judge. With such observations, this Court, by the common judgment dated 11.4.2008, has allowed W. As. No. 1030 of 1998 and 1031 of 1998 and dismissed W.A. 1465 of 1998 as not pressed and thus set aside the orders passed by the learned single Judge. This order is sought to be reviewed by the petitioner, who is a third party to the entire proceedings and tiled these petitions, seeking to grant leave to him to file the review petitions. 9. The petitioner has submitted in his affidavit that having come to know that the Government has issued G.O. Ms. No. 1259, Revenue, dated 5.8.1989 for resumption of possession of the lands, including the 20 grounds of the land under the possession of the petitioner, they have directly addressed a letter to the respondents 1 to 3 on 7.8.1989, seeking direct lease from them and the first respondent, expressed interest in the said proposal and summoned the petitioner for further discussions, vide their letter dated 8.8.1989; that the petitioner encapsulated its proposal vide letter dated 9.8.1989 and attended the meeting, wherein the Government has stated that it was favourably disposed towards direct lease of the extent of 20 grounds with vehicular access to the petitioner on payment of mutually acceptable rent. It is also stated that further negotiations between the petitioner and the Government were interrupted since the 5 respondent approached the Court by W.P. Nos. 11058 and 11059 of 1989 and obtained interim orders therein and in view of the interim orders, direct lease arrangement was not entered into between the petitioner and the Government, but however, it was agreed informally that the petitioner would pay a monthly sum of Rs. 20,300/- directly to the Government as rent for the portion under the occupation of the petitioner. It is also stated that the total extent sought to be resumed by the respondents 1 to 4 for the public purpose are far larger and the premises under the petitioners occupation is only a meagre extent. 10. The petitioner further submitted that by exchange of correspondence in the month of July, 1990, an arrangement was entered into between the Government and the petitioner for payment of rent of Rs. 10. The petitioner further submitted that by exchange of correspondence in the month of July, 1990, an arrangement was entered into between the Government and the petitioner for payment of rent of Rs. 20,300/- per month commencing from 1.4.1990 onwards and ever since that day, till date, the petitioner is paying the rents by way of cheques directly to the 1st respondent along with a covering letter and the receipt has been acknowledged by the respondents 1 to 4. It is further stated that the Government, in their counter affidavit, filed in the writ petitions and the writ appeals, has deliberately and conveniently suppressed the material tact of the correspondence dated 7.8.1989, the follow up letter dated 9.8.1989 and the meetings held pursuant to the Government letter dated 8.8.1989 and further, in the writ appeal filed in 1998, the receipt of rents has also been suppressed and by virtue of the disputes between the respondents 1 to 4 and the 5th respondent, the petitioners independent rights are sought to be destroyed. 11. The Government has filed a counter affidavit, denying all the allegations of the affidavit of the petitioner and further submitting that if the State Government has to implement the public purpose viz. of creating a Botanical Garden, Horticultural Research and Development facility etc. in the lands, it need hardly be stated that the petitioner cannot be continued to run a Drive-in-restaurant in the middle of that land and therefore, these petitions for review or for suspension of the judgment are clearly misconceived and not maintainable. It is further stated that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the review, since he has not been a party to the proceedings and that the petitioner himself has clearly admitted in his affidavit about its knowledge of the writ proceedings pending before this Court and of the fact that its rights are indirectly linked with the fate of its lessor viz. the Society; that the petitioner chose to keep away from these proceedings either at the writ proceedings stage between 1989-1998 or in the appellate stage from 1998 till date and having found that its own lessor has lost the case and finding itself under the imminent threat of dispossession by orders of this Court, the present review application has been filed, raising unsustainable, factual and legal contentions. 12. It is also stated that by G.O. Ms. 12. It is also stated that by G.O. Ms. No. 513, dated 4.3.1980, the Government has permitted the Society to execute a lease deed in favour of the petitioner only for a period of five years at a time and also required prior Government approval for any renewal thereafter, that it is on record and also found so by this Court in its order dated 11.4.2008 that the renewal in 1985 has been made by the Society to the petitioner without the concurrence of the State and the very G.O. referred to by the petitioner contemplates summary resumption of the land in the hands of the petitioner, if the above clause of Government concurrence is violated; that it is not known how the petitioner claims use and occupation of 20 grounds of land, when the lease deed dated 28.4.1980, executed by the Society in favour of the petitioner mentions only an extent of 8 grounds and 1390 sq.ft.; that the allegation that on 7.8.1989, the petitioner sought for a direct lease from the State and that at the meeting held on 9.8.1989, the Government was favourably disposed of towards direct lease of the extent of 20 grounds, with vehicular access on payment of mutually acceptable rent, is denied and there is no such record in such disposition and on the other hand, the records only reflect that the District Collector has written a letter dated 9.8.1989 to the Tahsildar informing him that the petitioner has been instructed to apply to the Government through the District Collector. 13. It is further submitted that the Revenue Government orders and the Government orders in force, governing lease of Government lands to private parties for commercial purposes, stipulate that the State should get not less than 14% return on the value of the land as annual lease rent and applying the Revenue Government orders and as per the orders in force, taking into account the present value of lands in Cathedral Road, assuming without admitting that the petitioner is to be granted any lease by the State, the minimum lease rental, that would be payable just for the 8 grounds and 1390 sq.ft. originally leased out by the Society, would work out to over Rs. 3 Crores per annum, whereas the petitioner has been paying to the Tahsildar, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk, a paltry sum of Rs. originally leased out by the Society, would work out to over Rs. 3 Crores per annum, whereas the petitioner has been paying to the Tahsildar, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk, a paltry sum of Rs. 20,300/- per month since 1989; that this lease rental itself was not fixed by the Government, but by the Society and in view of the status-quo orders prevailing during the pendency of the writ proceedings since 1989, the arrangement for making this payment has been continued even after the lands were resumed by the State and the impression sought to be given in the present petition as if the State has acknowledged the legitimacy of the petitioners lease by receiving the rent of Rs. 20,300/- per month is denied as mischievous and false. 14. It is further stated that quite contrary to the contentions of the petitioner that the Government was favourably disposed of towards directly negotiating a lease with the petitioner, the files relating to this matter show that even in 1990, the Government had taken a categorical decision not to examine any proposals from the petitioner for any lease of the lands in view of the pending writ proceedings wherein the resumption of lands were already under challenge and the files would show that from that date, the matter has been put on ‘call book‘ until the writ was decided in 1998, immediately after which the appeals were filed when status-quo orders continued till the disposal of the writ proceedings dated 11.4.2008. On such and other grounds, the Government would pray to dismiss these petitions. 15. We have heard Mr. AR. L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 to 4 Government. 16. Elaborate and extensive arguments are advanced on either side regarding the whole aspect of the matter, not only about the leave petitions but also about the main review petitions themselves. Therefore, now we have to see whether the petitioner is entitled for any relief. 17. P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 to 4 Government. 16. Elaborate and extensive arguments are advanced on either side regarding the whole aspect of the matter, not only about the leave petitions but also about the main review petitions themselves. Therefore, now we have to see whether the petitioner is entitled for any relief. 17. From the materials placed on record, it is seen that pursuant to the letter dated 5.8.1989 addressed by the Tahsildar to the petitioner stating that the land has been taken over by the Government of Tamil Nadu and further having found that the Government has fixed barbed wire fencing, the petitioner has addressed a letter dated 7.8.1989 to the Collector of Madras requesting to consider and see that proper access is provided for them to make use of certain facilities including car parking. In reply to the said letter of the petitioner, the Collector of Madras, by his letter in Lr. No. 12/65179/89, dated 8.8.1989 has requested the petitioner to meet him on 8.8.1989 at 4.00 p.m. in his office along with all details, containing the lease agreement of the land occupied by the petitioner with the Society, further requiring them to submit an attested copy of the lease agreement to the Collector and by the communication dated 9.8.1989, the petitioner has requested the Government to recognise their services rendered to promote tourism and to grant them fifteen years lease of the area where the drive-in restaurant is functioning on a reasonable ten percent increase in the existing rental value of Rs. 20,000/-. Except these communications, on which much reliance has been placed by the petitioner, no document has been placed before us by the petitioner to show that the Government has entered into any lease agreement with them or at least that the Government has agreed to the proposal of the petitioner for a direct lease. 18. It is contended on the part of the petitioner that when the talks between the Government and the petitioner were about to reach the finality regarding the direct lease, one MLA had raised a question in the Assembly regarding such move of the Government and thereafter, the Government has not shown any interest to grant the lease. 18. It is contended on the part of the petitioner that when the talks between the Government and the petitioner were about to reach the finality regarding the direct lease, one MLA had raised a question in the Assembly regarding such move of the Government and thereafter, the Government has not shown any interest to grant the lease. Whatever may be the contention, the fact lies that at no point of time, any order has been passed by the Government leasing out the land to the review petitioner, though it was processed at the instance of the petitioner. Admittedly, there was no agreement between the petitioner and the Government, regarding the lease and it has already been pointed by us in our judgment dated 11.4.1989, after extracting the terms of the Agreement dated 28.4.1980, entered into by the Society with the Government, pursuant to G.O. Ms. No. 513, dated 4.3.1980, that without prior permission of the Government, the Society has sublet the property to the petitioner/Woodlands Drive-in Restaurant and as a matter of compromise, the Government has ratified the action of the Society and even thereafter, the Society had extended the term of the Restaurant for another five years time, for which the permission of the Government was not obtained and thus the sub-lease of the land by the Society in favour of the petitioner/Restaurant is illegal. In the absence of any agreement between the Government and the petitioner and in view of the tact that the sub-lease of the land by the Society in favour of the petitioner Restaurant itself is illegal, since being without the permission of the Government, the petitioner cannot have any authenticity to claim lease hold right over the property. 19. Coming to the aspect of rents, the petitioner was paying a sum of Rs. 20,000/- towards rent in respect of the land in their possession and a sum of Rs. 300/-towards the rent for the building portion, thus totalling to a sum of Rs. 20,300/-per month. Much has been argued on the part of the petitioner that continuously, they are paying the above said rent to the Tahsildar, which is also being received and acknowledged by the Tahsildar, which shows that the Government has accepted the petitioner as their lessor. 300/-towards the rent for the building portion, thus totalling to a sum of Rs. 20,300/-per month. Much has been argued on the part of the petitioner that continuously, they are paying the above said rent to the Tahsildar, which is also being received and acknowledged by the Tahsildar, which shows that the Government has accepted the petitioner as their lessor. This contention of the petitioner cannot be appreciated for the reason that even as per the petitioner, the said rent has been fixed by the Society and not by the Government. It is seen that while admitting W.A. Nos. 1030 and 1031 of 1998, this Court, has ordered status quo, as per the order dated 20.8.1998, in C.M.P. Nos. 11435 and 11436 of 1998 and only by virtue of the status-quo orders, that were prevailing during the pendency of the writ proceedings and in the writ appeal proceedings, the Tahsildar was accepting the said rent from the petitioner. In view of the admitted tact that there is no lease agreement between the petitioner and the Government and that the rent, which was also fixed by the Society and not by the Government was being received by the Tahsildar, only pursuant to the status-quo orders passed by this Court, both in the writ proceedings and the writ appeal proceedings, the said fact of regular payment of rent to the Tahsildar by the petitioner, cannot, in any way, augment the case of the petitioner. 20. Regarding the quantum of rent, it is to be pointed out that the Government has offered a most probable calculation regarding the rents existing in the locality of Cathedral Road, based on the Revenue Government orders, that the minimum rental value of the property of 8 grounds and 1390 sq.ft. is Rs. 3 crores per annum, whereas the petitioner is paying a sum of Rs. 20,300/- per month towards rent since 1989, even though he is in occupation of 20 grounds of land. It is now a well settled position of law that regular payment of rent by an unauthonsed occupier, does not confer any right on him. Therefore, the payment of rent which is also very paltry, does not confer any right of lease on the petitioner. 21. Even in the affidavit, the petitioner has categorically admitted that no direct lease agreement was entered into between them and the Government. Therefore, the payment of rent which is also very paltry, does not confer any right of lease on the petitioner. 21. Even in the affidavit, the petitioner has categorically admitted that no direct lease agreement was entered into between them and the Government. The plea of the petitioner, as could be seen from the affidavit is that the extent, which is in their possession viz. 20 grounds of land, is a ‘meagre‘ extent within the large extent of property sought to be resumed by the Government. A vast extent of 20 grounds of land, that too in the heart of this space craving city is attempted to be branded as ‘meagre‘ by the petitioner as if resumption of that extent of land, would serve no public purpose. At this juncture, it is but proper to mention that in the lease deed dated 28.4.1980, the Society has granted lease in favour of the petitioner only for an extent of 8 grounds and 1390 sq.ft. When such is the position, it is not known how the petitioner could claim to have been in possession of 20 grounds of land and this fact has not been explained by the petitioner. 22. Another factor to be pointed out is that the land in possession of the petitioner is situated, admittedly, in the middle of the lands sought to be resumed by the Government and if the petitioner is permitted to run the hotel therein, definitely, it will be an obstacle to the entire public purpose sought to be achieved by the Government, by resuming the land. The lessor cannot convey any better right than what he had to the lessee. When the Society itself is bound to handover the lands to the Government, for any public purpose or violation of the terms and conditions of the lessee and when this Court has categorically observed that the said Society has to hand over the possession of the lands to the Government both for public purpose and for violation of the terms and conditions of the lease, the petitioner, who is a sub-lessee under the Society, that too without the permission of the Government, cannot cling on to say that his right has not been properly guarded by the Society. As has already been observed by us, the sub-lease in favour of the petitioner, except for the period ratified by the Government, is unauthorised. 23. As has already been observed by us, the sub-lease in favour of the petitioner, except for the period ratified by the Government, is unauthorised. 23. The petitioner, with full knowledge of the legal battle between the Society, its Honorary Secretary and the Government regarding resumption of the lands, has slept over the matter for all these years and when this Court has passed the judgment on 11.4.2008, ordering resumption of the land, the petitioner has suddenly woken up from his deep slumber and filed these petitions. The only answer offered on the part of the petitioner is that they were under the bona fide impression that the Society will safeguard their interest. We wonder as to how a violator of the terms and conditions of the lease, viz. the Society, could safeguard‘ the interest of the petitioner. When the petitioner in his individual capacity, even bypassing their lessor, has made many attempts to get a lease from the Government and failed in his attempt, what prevented them to get themselves impleaded as party respondents to the proceedings, when they were pending, was remained unanswered on behalf of the petitioner. The entire process is within the knowledge of the petitioner right from the date of issuance of notice of resumption by the Government and thereafter, filing of the writ petition by the Society and in spite of the said fact, he kept quite all these days. He cannot be said that he is an aggrieved of the judgment of this Court, since admittedly, all the legal proceedings are within the knowledge of the petitioner. The hoax theory of safeguarding their interest by the Society‘, put forth on the part of the petitioner/Hotel cannot be appreciated in view of the vain attempts already made by the petitioner to somehow get the lease in their favour. The unauthorised occupation of the premises by the petitioner based on an illegal sub-lease granted by the Society, without any ratification by the Government, the landlord, that too with the knowledge of the entire proceedings is at his own peril, wherefrom no right or sympathy would flow to the petitioner. As the petitioner is an unauthorised occupant, his position is nothing more than a trespasser. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that equity must be adjudged, has no legs to stand. As the petitioner is an unauthorised occupant, his position is nothing more than a trespasser. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that equity must be adjudged, has no legs to stand. Hence, the judgment relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner in Anamallai Club v. Government of Tamil Nadu AIR 1997 SC 3650 : (1997) 3 SCC 169 , which deals with persons in juridical possession of the lands, has no application to the facts of the case on hand, since the petitioner herein is in unauthorised possession of the lands of the Government. 24. A painful and disturbing contention was made on the part of the petitioner that only in recognition of the services‘ rendered by the Honorary Secretary of the Society to the AIADMK party, while in crisis, and further in recognition of his ‘efforts‘ in designing the ‘two leaves‘ symbol to the party, the Government, headed by Ms. Jayalalithaa as the Chief Minister, to whom the Honarary Secretary of the Society is said to have been a loyalist, has granted lease of the lands to the Society, as if the Government lands are meant only for political loyalists, to grant them on lease for an ‘on paper avowed object‘, but, virtually for their personal benefits, to make commercial use of the same, as is evident in the case on hand, when millions of people in this country are suffering for generations together without any shelter on their head. The ‘talent‘ in getting things done for a political party should not be the criterion or hallmark for grant of such leases of the Government lands to be granted to persons or institutions, which would thwart the very foundation of the democracy. The said benefit extended to the Society by the Government headed by a particular political party, has been pitted against the Government headed by another political party, as if it is a political vendetta, which, on detailed discussion, has been rejected by us, having found that the entire process of resumption of the land for public purpose has been initiated by the AIADMK Government itself with which close association has been pleaded by the Honarary Secretary of the Society. The benefit extended to the Society has been sought to be utilised as a ‘double edged weapon‘ by the Society and its Honorary Secretary, by projecting the unestablished plea of political vendetta, when, for a stated public purpose and for violation of the terms and conditions of the lease, the lands were sought to be resumed by the Government. 25. Further, we have no hesitation to hold that whatever rents paid by the petitioner as fixed by the Committee of the Society is for unauthorised enjoyment of the lands of the Government for all these years and the payment of the rent by virtue of enjoying the Government land does not give him any title or right. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contentions raised by the review petitioner and unauthorisedly continuing and enjoying the possession of the land does not confer any right when there is no valid sanction. All these years, he is in unauthorised occupation and enjoyment of the property. As we have already held, the Government who is an absolute owner of the land has got the right to resume the land for public purpose and the petitioner has failed to establish any ground to grant leave in his favour, so as to review the well considered and merited order passed by us on 11.4.2008. 26. In para No. 28 of our judgment dated 11.4.2008, though the petitioner is not a party to the proceedings, we have considered the case from his angle also and we have observed as follows: ”…. Though the sublettee Woodlands Drive-in Restaurant is not a party to these proceedings, but he is also bound by this judgment, since the respondent/Society, who has sublet the property to the said Restaurant, himself has no power to sublet the property, without the permission of the Government and no such permission was granted by the Government and therefore when once we hold that the resumption is valid, automatically the sublettee is also liable for vacating the premises and therefore, the Government is directed to resume the total extent including the land given on subletting, except, of course, the lands owned by the Society, having been purchased by them under valid sale deeds.” 27. Furthermore, clauses (7) and (8) of the agreement dated 28.4.1980, entered into by the Society with the Government, read as follows: “ (7) In the event of infringement of or failure to observe any of the conditions of the lease by M/s. Woodlands Hotel or any other hotelier, the Society shall by itself or at the instance of Government take action to terminate the lease and resume possession of the lands from M/s. Woodlands Hotel or any other hotelier. The decision of Government on the question of infringement or failure to observe any of the conditions of the lease shall be final and binding on all concerned. (8) In case where the Society fails to take action under clause (7) and resume the lands from M/s. Woodlands Hotel or any other hotelier for violation of any of the conditions of the lease, the Government shall be at liberty to resume the lands directly from Messrs. Woodlands Hotel or any other hotelier and the whole land shall on such resumption vest absolutely in the Government. In the event of such resumption either by the Society or by the Government, M/s. Woodlands Hotel or any other hotelier shall not be entitled to any compensation whatsoever.” 28. Since the petitioner has continued in possession of the land, that too more than the extent of land for which they have entered into a lease deed with the Society, without any ratification orders from the Government, the owner of the property, applying clause (8) of the above said agreement also, the Government is entitled to resume the lands. 29. From the above discussions, the following conclusions would emerge: 1. There is no lease agreement between the petitioner and the Government and therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any right on the Government. 2. The petitioner is in unauthorised occupation of the land, since it was without the permission of the Government. 3. When by the lease deed dated 28.4.1980, the Society has granted lease in favour of the petitioner only for an extent of 8 grounds and 1390 sq.ft., it is not known how the petitioner could claim to have been in possession of 20 grounds of land and this fact has not been explained by the petitioner. 4. The payment of a meagre rent of Rs. 4. The payment of a meagre rent of Rs. 20,300/- by the petitioner to the Tahsildar for the whole of 20 grounds of land in their possession, though the lease deed was executed by the Society in favour of the petitioner only for 8 grounds and 1390 sq.ft., which was received by the Tahsildar, pursuant to the status-quo orders prevalent in the writ proceedings and writ appeal proceedings, does not confer any right on the petitioner, when the Government has been able to establish that the extent of 8 grounds and 1390 sq.ft. land in that area would fetch a rental income of Rs.3 crores per year. 5. When admittedly, the petitioner has got complete knowledge of the pendency of the entire proceedings from the date of their inception, he cannot be permitted to rake-up the already settled issue once again, as if he has no knowledge of the same. 6. Though the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings, we have, by our judgment dated 11.4.2008, already considered the case from his angle also and therefore, the plea of the petitioner that his claim was not properly considered by this Court, cannot be appreciated. 7. In view of the detailed order passed by us supra, we hold that the review sought to be made into the order passed by us, invoking under Section 114 read with Order 47Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code is not maintainable, since the petitioner does not come within the true meaning of “aggrieved person”. Accordingly, these petitions are liable to be dismissed. For all the above discussions held and the conclusions arrived, both these petitions fail and they are dismissed accordingly.