Judgment :- V. Periya Karuppiah, J. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge made in W.P. No: 3064 of 1997 dated 03.01.2005 in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant herein seeking quashing of the order of the 1st respondent made in I.D. No: 107 of 1994 dated 09.08.1996. 2. The case before the 1st respondent was filed by the 2nd respondent herein, the workman who sought for reinstatement to the employment from which he was said to have been orally terminated on 22.09.1992 and the said case was taken up on file in I.D. No: 107 of 1994 by the Labour Court, Vellore, and the same was disposed of by the Labour Court Judge, Vellore, and an award was passed in favour of the 2nd respondent, who was the petitioner in that petition to be reinstated by the appellant with backwages and continuance of service. Against the said award, the writ petition was filed by the appellant herein in W.P. No: 3064 of 1997 which was dismissed by the learned single Judge of this Court confirming the award passed by the 1st respondent Labour Court, Vellore. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Dwarakanathan would submit in his argument that the learned single Judge did not consider the case of the appellant that the employee alone has to prove his case initially and thereafter only the burden will shift on the appellant management to show that the employee was working as a casual labourer without any regularization for many number of years and the employer, the appellant, was under the obligation to produce the registers for attendance and wages and thereby prove its case against the canons of law and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He would further submit in his argument that the 1st respondent being the petitioner before the Labour Court did not even seek the appellant for production of those registers and on the failure in producing those registers, the presumption of continuity of service should have been taken note of, but no such presumption made by the 2nd respondent before the Labour Court to produce such documents. He would further submit that when the facts are such that the Labour Court had wrongly come to the conclusion that the appellant herein was under the obligation to produce those registers and on failure to produce the same adverse inference could be taken against is certainly not valid in law. He would further submit that the learned single Judge was misguided through the arguments of the 2nd respondent in the writ petition – petitioner before the Labour Court – that the appellant Management was directed by the Labour Court to produce those registers and that only the appellant had invited the award passed against it. More over, he would submit that the learned single Judge had also relied upon the arguments advanced by the 2nd respondent contrary to facts and circumstances of the case and had decided on the point that the Management has not produced the attendance register and wages register as directed. 4. He would further submit in his argument that the Supreme Court has laid down the position of law in this regard through its judgments reported in (i) 2004 (III) L.L.J. 760 [Municipal Corp. Faridabad vs. Shri Niwas]; (ii) 2004 (4) L.L.N. 845 [Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan and another] and (iii) 2006 L.L.R. 175 [Surendranagar Dist. Panchayat and another vs. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai] Learned counsel would further submit that as per the judgment of the Apex Court of India, the decision of the High Court that the burden of proof that the worker had completed 240 days in a year lies on employer is purely a commission of error on the part of the High Court and it is the claimant who has to lead evidence to show that he has worked 240 days in a year in order to get the benefits. He would also submit that the 2nd respondent worker had admittedly received a sum of Rs.18/- as daily wages whenever he was called for the work and the management had entered into settlements with workers and those settlement were also produced before the Labour Court as Exs. He would also submit that the 2nd respondent worker had admittedly received a sum of Rs.18/- as daily wages whenever he was called for the work and the management had entered into settlements with workers and those settlement were also produced before the Labour Court as Exs. M.1 to M.3 and in those settlements the casual workers were made as regular employees, provided they have completed 240 days of continuous work in a year and if the 2nd respondent / worker had completed 240 days of continuous work in a year, he would have been observed as per the above settlement and admittedly the worker is receiving the daily wage of Rs.100/- till the date of the award of the Labour Court on 22.09.1992 and therefore, he did not work under the management for any continuous period of 240 days and those documents were not considered by the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge. On all these points, the learned counsel for the appellant would state that the order passed by the learned single Judge directing reinstatement of the worker with backwages may be set aside and the appeal be allowed. 5. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent Mr.P.Mani would submit in his argument that the labour Court has correctly, after appraising the evidence and the circumstances of the case, had come to the conclusion of casting the burden on the appellant to prove that the 2nd respondent worker did not work for a continuous period of 240 days when he himself admitted that he was appointed on 210. 1987 to 22.09.1992 on daily wages. It is also further argued that the employer appellant, being the custodian of the registers for attendance and wages, should have come forward to produce them before the Court in order to show that the 2nd respondent worker was not in continuous work and his failure would certainly draw adverse inference against the employer. 1987 to 22.09.1992 on daily wages. It is also further argued that the employer appellant, being the custodian of the registers for attendance and wages, should have come forward to produce them before the Court in order to show that the 2nd respondent worker was not in continuous work and his failure would certainly draw adverse inference against the employer. He would also cite an authority reported in A.I.R. 2007 S.C.W. 1712 [M/s. Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. vs. Mahak Singh & Others] which is to the effect that the proof of the continuous service for 240 days on any of the year prior to his termination of service would be on the employer when the workman had discharged his initial responsibility by producing whatever documents he had in his custody and in such a case, the re-instatement of the worker is proper. 6. He would also submit in his argument that if for any reason this Court takes a view that it cannot accept the case pleaded by the 2nd respondent, the appeal may be considered for remanding the matter to the Labour Court and direct that opportunities be given to the parties to adduce evidence suitably. He would further submit in his argument that in other respects, the award passed by the Labour court and the order passed by the learned single Judge may not be set aside and the writ appeal be dismissed. 7. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on either side. On a careful perusal of the order impugned, we could see that the 2nd respondent worker was appointed on 210. 1987 and was working on daily wages under the appellant and he was orally terminated on 22.09.1992. As put forth by the worker, he has to be re-instated as permanent worker as he has worked for 240 days continuously in a year during the said period between 1987 to 1992. The Labour Court had also considered the fact that the appellant should have produced both the registers attendance and wages and if such registers were produced it would clearly show that the 2nd respondent worker was working under the appellant for a continuous period of 240 days and such non-production of those registers would compel the Court to come to a conclusion in favour of the workman. It is true that documents Exs. It is true that documents Exs. M.1 to M.3 were produced only on the side of the appellant management and no document was produced by the 2nd respondent worker. However, the Labour Court had cast the burden of proof on the appellant management to prove that the 2nd respondent worker had not worked for 240 days continuously in a year as it has got the registers namely the attendance and wages registers, in its custody. 8. At this juncture, we have to see the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in this regard. In the judgment reported in 2004 (III) L.L.J. 760 [Municipal Corporation, Faridabad, -vs- Shri Niwas], it was held that, “18. Further more a party in order to get benefit of the provision contained in Section 114 (f) of the Indian Evidence Act must place some evidence in support of his case. Here the respondent failed to do so. “ Similarly, in the judgment reported in 2004 (4) L.L.N. 845, cited supra, the presumption of working more than 240 days during a year of his services was considered. The relevant passage runs as follows:- “6. It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the concerned year. This claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year. There aspects were highlighted in Range Forest Officer v. S.T.Hadimani [2002 (2) L.L.N. 391]. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere non-production of the muster-roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that the workman had worked for 240 days as claimed. “ In yet another judgment reported in 2006 L.L.R. 175, cited supra, it has been discussed about the proceedings of a case as if the burden of proof lies on the employer to prove the continuance of service of 240 days in a year. “ In yet another judgment reported in 2006 L.L.R. 175, cited supra, it has been discussed about the proceedings of a case as if the burden of proof lies on the employer to prove the continuance of service of 240 days in a year. Paragraph 8 of the said judgment reads thus, “8. On the face of the aforesaid authorities, the Labour Court and the High Court committed an error in placing the burden on the employer to prove that the workman had not worked for 240 days with the employer. The burden of proof having been on the workman, he had to adduce an evidence in support of his contention that he has complied with the requirement of Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, apart from examining himself in support of his contention the workman did not produce any material to prove the fact that he worked for 240 days." 9. In the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent worker, reported in A.I.R. 1007 S.C.W. 1712 [M/s. Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Mahak Singh and others], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had dealt with the shifting of the burden in a case of proof of continuous service of a workman. The relevant passage relied on by the Supreme Court as extracted from 2006 (1) S.C.C. 106 [R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer] runs as follows :- “Analysing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforesaid judgments, we find that this Court, has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping up in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment of termination. There will also be no receipt of proof of payment. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping up in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-waged earners, there will be no letter of appointment of termination. There will also be no receipt of proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment of termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on the facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden place by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year." On a careful perusal of the aforesaid judgment we can see that the shifting of the burden to prove that the worker was in continuous service of 240 days in a year is initially on the worker himself and the filing of the affidavit are not sufficient to discharge the said burden and subsequently, it shifts to the employer to show that he was not in continuous service for 240 days in a year. In this case, we have already seen that the 2nd respondent worker did not enter into the box to adduce evidence on his side nor did he produce any document to show that he had worked for 240 days continuously in a given year so as to shift the burden on the employer. More over, the 2nd respondent worker did not serve any notice on the employer appellant to produce those documents namely the attendance register and wages register into the Court for the purpose of adducing evidence. In these circumstances, the conclusion of the Labour Court presuming adverse inference against the appellant employer for non production of the attendance register and wage register during the relevant period is not in accordance with the principles laid down by our Apex Court. In these circumstances, the conclusion of the Labour Court presuming adverse inference against the appellant employer for non production of the attendance register and wage register during the relevant period is not in accordance with the principles laid down by our Apex Court. More over, the observations of the learned single Judge, on the basis of the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the worker, that the appellant management did not produce those documents even after a direction was given by the Labour Court is ex-facie not sustainable when there was no evidence to show that the employer appellant was directed by the Labour Court to produce those registers and inspite of such direction, the appellant did not do so. The decision reached by the Labour Court in passing the award in favour of the 2nd respondent worker and the judgment of the learned single Judge confirming the said award are passed mainly on the non-production of the attendance and wage registers despite the alleged direction given by the Labour Court, which are factually found to be incorrect. The 2nd respondent worker had not adduced evidence to substantiate his case before the Labour Court that he was working as a worker for a continuous period of 240 days in a year so as to get the benefit of Section 2–S of the Industrial Disputes Act to be defined as a workman. However, the Labour Court had found that the worker/2nd respondent is entitled for re-instatement with backwages and continuity of service which is not in accordance with law. 10. Therefore, we are of the considered view that in the absence of any evidence on record, the labour Court and the learned single Judge have committed an error in law in directing re-instatement of the 2nd respondent workman. That being the case, the award of the Labour Court and the judgment of the learned single Judge are hereby set aside and the writ appeal is allowed. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.