JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Heard Sri Siddharth Singh, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri Vinod Prasad, the learned Counsel for the Committee of Management and the learned Standing Counsel for the remaining respondents. 2. Upon the retirement of the Principal of the institution, a senior most teacher was promoted to the post of Principal on adhoc basis, which resulted in a short term vacancy on the post of Assistant Teacher. The Committee of Management resolved to fill up the short-term vacancy and based on this resolution, the vacancy was advertised in the newspaper inviting applications from eligible candidates. The petitioner applied and appeared before the Selection Committee. 3. It transpires that the Selection Committee recommended his name, and thereafter, it was approved by the Committee of Management. The Committee of Management forwarded the papers for approval to the District Inspector of Schools by a letter dated 26.10.1997 and on the same date, i.e., 26.10.97 also issued an appointment letter in favour of the petitioner. Based on the said appointment letter and in anticipation of the approval, the petitioner joined on 1.11.1997, and since then, is continuously functioning, as an Assistant Teacher. Since the salary was not being paid, the petitioner approached the Writ Court by filing a writ petition, which was disposed of by an order, directing the District Inspector of Schools to decide the representation of the petitioner with regard to the financial approval. Based on the direction of the Court, the District Inspector of Schools, by an order dated 20.6.2001 rejected the financial approval of the appointment of the petitioner. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order, has filed the present writ petition praying for its quashing and also for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay the salary to the petitioner from 1.11.1997 onwards in accordance with law. 4. The financial approval of the petitioner’s appointment was rejected by the District Inspector of Schools on the ground that the vacancy came into existence in the year 1993, and therefore, the Committee of Management had no power to make an appointment in the year 1997 and that no previous permission/approval was taken by the Committee of Management before filling up the vacancy. The District Inspector of Schools further stated that the advertisement was not made in a newspaper which had a State circulation and that the term of the Committee of Management had expired, and therefore, the Committee of Management had no power to make such appointment after expiry of its term. Further, without taking prior approval from the District Inspector of Schools, the petitioner was allowed to join the institution which was also against the Rules. 5. In the counter affidavit, the respondents, it has been urged that the vacancy that was advertised in the newspaper indicated substantive vacancy, whereas a short-term vacancy ought to have been advertised, and therefore, on this ground, the petitioner was not entitled for any relief. It was also stated that the papers were forwarded to the Committee of Management on 26.10.1997 and that without waiting for the approval from the District Inspector of Schools, the appointment letter was issued in violation of the Clause 3 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981. 6. The main point which has been canvassed before the Court, is that the previous approval/permission was not taken by the Management while filling up a short-term vacancy on the post of Assistant Teacher by the Committee of Management. Further, while forwarding the papers to the District Inspector of Schools for necessary approval, the Committee of Management issued the appointment letter without waiting for the previous approval from the District Inspector of Schools, and therefore, such appointment was illegal, and therefore, financial approval of such appointment could not be granted. 7. With regard to first point mentioned in the impugned order, it is settled law that previous approval is not required to be taken by the Management to fill up a short-term vacancy under Clause 3 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981. In this regard, a Division Bench of this Court in Jagdish Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(2) ADJ 710 , has held as under : “The observation of the learned Single Judge in Ram Dhani’s case (supra) that previous approval under Regulation 101 is required to be taken before issuing advertisement for filling up vacancy does not lay down correct law. We, however, make it clear that although prior approval is required from the District Inspector of Schools after completion of process of selection but there is no prohibition in the Principal/Management to seek permission of the District Inspector of Schools for filling up vacancy by direct recruitment. The permission may or may not be granted by the District Inspector of Schools but even if such permission to start the selection process or to issue advertisement is granted that is not akin to prior approval as contemplated under Regulation 101. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that prior approval contemplated under Regulation 101 is prior approval by the District Inspector of Schools after completion of process of selection and before issuance of appointment letter to the selected candidate.” 8. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that no previous permission is required to be taken by the Committee of Management for filling up the short-term vacancy and what is required, is before issuing the appointment letter previous approval has to be obtained from the District Inspector of Schools. 9. In the present case, the papers were forwarded on 26.10.1997 and an appointment letter was also issued to the petitioner on the same date and based on that letter, the petitioner alleges to have joined on 1.11.97, i.e., within 7 days. Sub-clause (iii) of clause 3 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 provides that there would be a deemed approval from the District Inspector of Schools, if no decision is communicated by the District Inspector of Schools within 7 days from the receipt of the papers from the management. 10. In view of this provision, this Court is of the opinion that where the management appoints a person in expectation of the approval, the said appointment would not be illegal on the sole ground that previous approval was not obtained before the issuance of the appointment letter. All it means is that the appointment would get validated after the expiry of one week for the purpose of financial approval to be granted by the State Government. Consequently, on this ground the appointment of the petitioner cannot be set at naught. All it means is that the appointment would get validated after the expiry of one week for the purpose of financial approval to be granted by the State Government. Consequently, on this ground the appointment of the petitioner cannot be set at naught. As and when, approval is granted, if any, the same would become effective after the expiry of one week from the date of the receipt of the papers by the District Inspector of Schools, that is to say, the liability for payment of salary would accrue upon the State Government after the expiry of one week from the date of the receipt of papers forwarded by the Committee of Management. 11. In Smt. Sunita Jadon v. State of U.P. and others, in writ petition No. 66180 of 2005 decided on 16.8.2007, the said petitioner was appointed prior to receiving approval from the District Inspector of Schools. The District Inspector of Schools while approving the appointment directed the payment of salary from the date of approval. The Writ Court allowed the writ petition and directed the payment of salary after the expiry of one week from the date of the receipt of the papers by the Inspector from the Committee of Management. The same principle is fully applicable in the present case. 12. The learned Counsel for the respondents laid stress on the provision of Chapter II Regulation 20 of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act and contended that where the vacancy is not advertised within three months, the said post would be deemed to have been surrendered and could not be filled up after the expiry of three months, unless the post is created and sanctioned afresh by the Director. 13. In my opinion, the provision of Regulation 20 of Chapter II of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act requiring permission from the Director, is no longer available nor is the said provision is effective after the enforcement of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Boards Act, 1982 wherein appointments are required to be made under Section 18(1)(b) of the said Act. In any case, this argument has been raised by the learned Standing Counsel which is not the basis of rejecting the claim of the petitioner in the impugned order. 14. In any case, this argument has been raised by the learned Standing Counsel which is not the basis of rejecting the claim of the petitioner in the impugned order. 14. The learned Counsel further laid stress on the fact that the advertisement was not made in a newspaper which had a State circulation, as provided under Regulation 10 of Chapter II of the Regulation framed under the Intermediate Education Act. The affidavits before this Court reveals that the vacancy was advertised in Dainik Aaj and Dainik Jantantra. The District Inspector of Schools has merely said that the vacancy was not advertised in a newspaper which had a State circulation. No reasons has been given in the impugned order. 15. In my opinion, the District Inspector of Schools ought to have specified, as to whether, the newspaper, in which the advertisement was made, had a large circulation in the State or not and if the newspaper did not have a wide circulation or a large circulation, the District Inspector of Schools ought to have specified the reasons, which in the present case, was lacking. 16. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is quashed. The writ petition is allowed and the matter is remitted again to the District Inspector of Schools to pass an order afresh within six weeks from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order in the light of the observation made above. ————