ORDER 1. The petitioner in the present writ petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has called in question the legality of the order dated 31.10.1995, Annexure P-16; whereby a land admeasuring, 0.75 acre bearing Najul Sheet No. 78 Plot No.2, reserved in favour of the petitioner has been cancelled. The challenge is also to an order dated 20.10.1999, Annexure P28; whereby, the petitioner-Society has been directed to vacate the said piece of land being in lli'1authorized occupation of the same. 2. The case of the petitioner is that it is a society registered under M.P. Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, and is engaged in a charitable and social work. The persons associated with the petitioner-Institute are public-spirited persons devoted to the service of the community. The society, it is urged, has rendered its services for the cause of humanitarian, in advancement whereof, a museum was established on 20.12.1992 in the presence of the Hon'ble President of India and the Chief Minister of the State. The Institute has been accredited to 30 National and Inter National Institutes and a magazine is regularly been published. The petitioner-Society for its existence depends on the donations received from various institutions and from public. The Institute, it is urged, does not carry any commercial activity. 3. The society to have a permanent abode, approached the State of M.P., vide its representation dated 8.7.1976 seeking an allotment of land in its favour. The department of Housing and Environment vide its letter dated 28.6.1978, Annexure P-7, addressed to Department of Land Measurement and settlement communicated its decision about reserving the land admeasuring 0.75 acres for allotment in favour of petitioner-Society. Thereafter, yielding to the insistence by the petitioner for depositing the premium and ground rent, a permission was granted vide letter dated 24.3.1979, Annexure P-5, however, with a clear stipulation that, the permission to deposit the premium and rent will not entitle the petitioner for an advance possession, the stipulation was in the following terms : ^^vkidks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd laLFkku ls dafMdk 3 esa crkbZ xbZ jkf’k tek djkbZ xbZ] jkf’k tek djkbZ tkosA iSlk tek djus ls laLFkku dk tehu ij fdlh çdkj dk gd ugha jgsxk vkSj u mUgsa vfxze vkf/kiR; nsus dh gh xbZ dksbZ fLFkfr gksxhA** 4. In the year 1993 by order dated 6.8.1993, Annexure P-11, an inspection of the plot in question was directed and vide report dated 10.10.1993. Annexure P-13, the petitioner was found in possession of the land in question. No orders are cited by the petitioner indicating therein that permission to occupy the said land was granted. The matter was taken up by the inter Departmental Committee on 26.8.1995, whereof, it was decided to cancel the proposal of reserving for allotment of said land in favour of the petitioner. The copy of the minutes are on record as Annexure R-13 and the decision by inter Departmental Committee is in following terms : ^^lfefr }kjk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k fd laLFkk dks Hkwfe dk vkcaVu dk çLrko vekU; fd;k tk,A dyDVj dks funsZf’kr fd;k tkos fd ç"uk/khu Hkwfe rRdky okil çkIRk dh tkdj Hkwfe dh lqj{kk lqfuf’pr dh tk,A** In sequel thereof, the State Government vide letter dated 31.10.1995 called upon the Collector, Bhopal, to take back the possession of the land from the petitioner/Society and protect the same. A show-cause notice ws sent to the petitioner on 22.11.1993, as contained in Annexure R-11. Furthermore in a proceedings initiated against the petitioner under section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, an order dated 20.10.1999 was passed by Tahsildar, Capital Project, Bhopal, whereby the petitioner was inflicted with a penalty of Rs.1,500/- and was directed to vacate the land in question being an encroacher. 5. The action taken by the respondent has been termed by the petitioner as an arbitrary exercise of power by the functionary of the State, depriving thereof the petitioner of reasonable and legitimate expectation to have the land in question allotted in its favour. 6. Assailing the impugned orders and the action of the respondents, the learned Senior Counsel contends that, the same suffers from arbitrariness. It is urged, the petitioner having been permitted to pay the premium and rent of the land in question and petitioner being in possession of the same since 1978 had harboured a reasonable expectation to have the land leased out in his favour as per the proposal of the Department for Housing and Environment. It is contended that, a distinct enforceable right having been created in favour of the petitioner. It is contended that, a distinct enforceable right having been created in favour of the petitioner. The decision by respondent-State, cancelling the proposal for allotment of land besides being arbitrary, suffers from the vices of capriciousness and as such liable to be quashed. 7. The respondents on their turn support the action of State Government. It is contended, inter alia, no right, title, interest or ownership in the land in question incurred in favour of the petitioner merely on the basis of a proposal by one department which does not tantamount to a decision and unless such proposal, it is contended, culminates into a decision and an order to said effect is passed, the petitioner, cannot be held entitled for a lease over a Government land. It is further contended that it was made clear to the petitioner way back in the year 1979, by letter dated 24.3.1979, AnnexureP-5, that no right is created for an advance possession of the land merely because a permission is granted to deposit the premium and the rent. The permission was, it is pointed out, at the insistence of the petitioner. It is accordingly contended that there being no crystallisation of right, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. 8. The issue which falls for consideration in the present case is whether the facts of present case leads to an accrual of a reasonable or legitimate expectation which ought to have been considered by the respondent before recalling the proposal for allotment ofland in favour of the petitioner. 9. In Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, AIR 1990 SC 1031 , the facts which led the Hon'ble Supreme Court to observe "in appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution", was that, the respondent-Indian Oil Corporation had continuously, uninterruptedly, consistently and repeatedly dealt with the appellant, therein, and recognized him and treated as dealer for 19 years. It was in this context Their Lordships were pleased to observe in Paragraph 12 : "It appears to us that rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one." 10. In Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601 , while expressing the ambit and reach of the doctrine of reasonable or legitimate expectation, Their Lordships were pleased to observe in Paragraph 8 : "8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant s perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent." (emphasis supplied) 11. In UP. Oil Extraction v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1997 (2) JLJ 214 = (1997) 7 SCC 592 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe : "44. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" has been judicially recognised by this Court in a number of decisions. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" operates in the domain of public law and in an appropriate case, constitutes a substantive and enforceable right. " (Emphasis supplied) 12. In Mahabir Auto Stores (supra), Their Lordships were pleased to observe in Paragraph 17 : "17. We are of the opinion that in all such cases whether public law or private law rights are involved, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The dichotomy between rights and remedies cannot be obliterated by any strait-jacket formula. It has to be examined in each particular case. Mr. We are of the opinion that in all such cases whether public law or private law rights are involved, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The dichotomy between rights and remedies cannot be obliterated by any strait-jacket formula. It has to be examined in each particular case. Mr. Salve sought to urge that there are certain cases under Article 14 of arbitrary exercise of such "power" and not cases of exercise of a "right" arising either under a contract or under a Statute. We are of the opinion that, that would depend upon the factual matrix." 13. In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (2005) 1 SCC 625 , while emphasizing that the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not give scope to claim relief straight-away from the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such is involved, Their Lordships were pleased to observe : "8. A person may have a "legitimate expectation" of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The, expectation may arise either from a representation or promise, made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review. It is, however, not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case, it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the Court to apply for judicial review. It is generally agreed that "legitimate expectation" gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the Administrative Authorities as no crystallised right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. (See Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation) ". 14. The case of Shrilekha Vidhyarthi v. State of U.P, AIR 1991 SC 537 , the reliance whereof is placed by the petitioner, was a case of mass termination of District Government Counsel in the State of UP. It was a case of termination from a post involving public element. It was a case of non-Government servant holding a public office, within the public law field. 15. In the case at hand, it is a piece of Government land where for one department of the State Government proposes to reserve the same for allotment to the petitioner, a private entity. Thus no public element is involved. Furthermore, no promise is extended and no undertaking is given to the petitioner, on the contrary, right from the year 1979 it is made clear by the State Government that the petitioner has no right over the property. Thus there is no crystallization of right as would entitle the petitioner for a fair hearing before a decision to dereserve the land. A physical possession of the property de hors the specific stipulations in letter dated 24.3.1979, cannot be termed to be a crystallisation of right to hold the land under law. An unlawful act does not create a right in the eyes of law. An illegitimate act is an antithesis to the doctrine of legitimate expectations, the petitioner cannot be held to be entitled for any re1ief. 16. Having thus considered, this Court does not find any substance in the challenge put forth. In the result petition fails and is hereby dismissed. However, no costs.