JUDGEMENT:- 1. By this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. the appellant / original accused challenges the judgment and order passed by the Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Osmanabad on 30.11.2006 in Sessions Case No.13 of 2006. The appellant was accused no.1 in the case. In fact, the appellant, his mother and his younger brother were charged for offence punishable under Section 498 -A r.w. 34 of I.P.C. The appellant alone was charged for offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 are totally acquitted and appellant is held guilty on both the counts. So far as offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C. is concerned, he is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, fine Rs.5000/-, I.D.R.I. for two years. For offence punishable under Section 498A of I.P.C., he is sentenced to suffer R.I. for two years, fine Rs.2000/-, I.D.R.I. for six months. 2. The incident in question is stated to have taken place on 4th January, 2005 at about 8.30 p.m. at the place of accused. Victim in the case namely Shital is wife of the accused. It is alleged that marriage of the couple was solemnized on 20.2.2002. Shital originally belonged to Adas, taluka Kaij, District Beed. The couple stayed with joint family for about six months and since two years prior to the alleged incident, they were staying separate, although in the same locality. On 26.12.2004, the accused sent Shital to her parents place by directing her to undergo abortion. Shital underwent currating with Dr. Patil of Ambejogai and after bed rest for few days, she had returned to the place of husband at Terkheda, taluka Wasi, District Osmanabad on 4th January, 2005. She was accompanied by her brother Kishor (P.W.4). They reached Terkheda at 4.30 p.m. when accused was working in his shop. On demand of key, he expressed annoyance towards wife for staying with parents for a long period. At about 8.30 or 8.45 p.m. while the victim was busy at home, accused reached there, he demanded her signature on a blank paper. As she refused, he dealt her two - three slaps. Shital fell down where after, the husband is said to have poured kerosene on her person and ignited her. It is claimed that husband and neighbours extinguished her where after the couple was taken to ‘Solapur Burn Care Centre’ at Solapur and both were admitted there. As she refused, he dealt her two - three slaps. Shital fell down where after, the husband is said to have poured kerosene on her person and ignited her. It is claimed that husband and neighbours extinguished her where after the couple was taken to ‘Solapur Burn Care Centre’ at Solapur and both were admitted there. It appears that the A.P.I. Shri Prabhakar Bhagwat (P.W.10) recorded statement of Shital at the said Burn Care Centre between 3.30 a.m. to 4 a.m. on 5.1.2005. Same was treated as first information report. Initially offence punishable under Section 307, 323 r.w. 34 I.P.C. was registered which was changed to sections 302, 498A etc. of I.P.C. after death of Shital at the said Burn Care Centre on 15th January, 2005. After completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed. Upon committal, Sessions Court conducted the trial and concluded the same with conviction of appellant as described herein above. 3. Prosecution has examined eleven witnesses. PW 1 Shidling Todkar (Exh.17) and PW 4 Kishor Todkar (Exh.26) are father and brother of deceased Shital, respectively. PW 5 Ramdas Chavan (Exh.27) is neighbour and friend of PW 1 Shidling. All three witnesses are examined on the same point. They have narrated that after initial six months of happy married life, accused had started ill-treating the deceased. He was demanding cash of Rs.50,000/-for the purpose of purchasing a motorcycle and he was also subjecting her to beating for the purpose of pressing that demand. All three claim to have reached to Solapur Burn Care Centre on PW 1 Shidling getting message from son of one Sallauddin that Shital and her husband were admitted in the hospital at Solapur due to burn injuries. They reached the hospital at hours just past midnight of 4th and 5th January, 2005. All of them claim to have heard oral dying declaration of Shital inculpating the accused. There is evidence of three doctors on record. PW 9 Dr. Dayanand (Exh.39) was the Medical Officer attached to Solapur Burn Care Centre at Solapur. He has certified the fitness of the patient when two dying declarations of Shital were recorded. The first one was recorded by A.P.I. Bhagwat between 0330 to 0400 hours on 5.1.2005. The second was recorded in quick. succession by Shri S.V. Mangule (PW 3) Special Judicial Magistrate between 0415 to 0445 hours. Dr. He has certified the fitness of the patient when two dying declarations of Shital were recorded. The first one was recorded by A.P.I. Bhagwat between 0330 to 0400 hours on 5.1.2005. The second was recorded in quick. succession by Shri S.V. Mangule (PW 3) Special Judicial Magistrate between 0415 to 0445 hours. Dr. Dayanand claims to have examined the patient Shital soon before and on completion of both the dying declarations, while certifying her fitness to make a statement. PW 8 Dr. Sudhir Telkar (Exh.35) was Medical Officer attached to Civil Hospital, Solapur and on 15th January, 2005 at about 6 p.m. he had performed post-mortem of the dead body of Shital. He has opined the death to be result of shock and septicemia due to 72% burns. Deceased having suffered death due to burn injuries is not a much disputed fact and, therefore, the evidence of Dr. Sudhir is insignificant to some extent. PW 7 Dr. Anant Rajmane had clinically examined the accused on 15th January, 2005 at about 5 p.m. He was then attached to Civil Hospital, Osmanabad. Dr. Rajmane has certified accused Shivkumar to have suffered 26% burn injuries and naturally, the age of the injuries on the date of examination is said to be 10 to 11 days. His evidence confirms the contention of the defence that accused also had suffered burn injuries while attempting to extinguish Shital. PW 3 Shri S.V. Mangule (Exh.23) was Special Judicial Magistrate and he has also recorded dying declaration of the victim. PW 2 Rajendra Kadam was P.S.I. attached to Yermala Police station in January, 2005 and upon receipt of papers from Police Station, Jail Road, Solapur he had registered F.I.R. with his Police Station. Investigation is carried out by PW 11 Kishor Kamble, then attached to Yermala Police Station as A.P.I. As already referred earlier, PW 10 Prabhakar Bhagwat was A.P.I. attached to Jail Road Police Station, Solapur and he had recorded first dying declaration of Shital. The remaining witness PW 6 Balaji is a panch witness to the panchanama of spot of offence. Although, he showed signs of hostility initially, during cross-examination by A.P.P. he has supported the prosecution. 4. Accused has examined one Siddheshwar Umardand as his defence witness at Exh.58. Accused has not disputed that Shital had suffered burn injuries, but he has denied the allegation that he had set her on fire. Although, he showed signs of hostility initially, during cross-examination by A.P.P. he has supported the prosecution. 4. Accused has examined one Siddheshwar Umardand as his defence witness at Exh.58. Accused has not disputed that Shital had suffered burn injuries, but he has denied the allegation that he had set her on fire. The allegations regarding demand of Rs.50,000/-, ill-treatment for the purpose of pressing such demand and the manner in which the incident is alleged to have taken place in the dying declaration of Shital is denied by the accused. In fact, the accused has filed an elaborate written statement during the course of his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., 1973. According to accused, after 5 - 6 months of the marriage, Shital had shown disinclination to continue in joint family and, therefore, the couple had shifted to other house of the family in the same locality. The son Shivam gifted to the couple was two and half years old when the trial commenced. According to him, wife Shital had been to parents place on 26.12.2004 with a promise to return after four - five days. She returned on 4th January, 2005 at about 4 p.m. with brother Kishor. Kishor returned home at about 5.30 p.m. The accused was observing fast on that day and because of headache, he returned home at about 8 p.m. Shital enquired whether she should prepare Sabudana Khichadi and he relaxed by lying near son Shivam. After 10 - 15 minutes he heard shricks of Shital. She had caught fire because of excessive flames of the stove. Her sari was on fire so also mosquito net on the cot. Accused tried to extinguish fire. Some stationery material was also burnt in the incident. While trying to extinguish the fire, his clothes also caught fire and he suffered burn injuries to his chest, neck and both hands. He raised hue and cry. While he was trying to extinguish Shital by pouring water on her person, Siddheshwar and Maharudra had arrived at the location (this Siddheshwar is examined as defence witness). Thereafter, his mother and brother also arrived there and with the help of neighbours they were taken to Solapur Burn Care Centre at Solapur. Shital was critical. He raised hue and cry. While he was trying to extinguish Shital by pouring water on her person, Siddheshwar and Maharudra had arrived at the location (this Siddheshwar is examined as defence witness). Thereafter, his mother and brother also arrived there and with the help of neighbours they were taken to Solapur Burn Care Centre at Solapur. Shital was critical. According to accused, no dying declarations were ever recorded but the Investigating machinery has prepared false dying declarations at the say of relatives of Shital and according to their instructions by collusion with them. Thus according to accused, the deceased caught fire by accident and he had tried to extinguish her. 5. Having gone through the impugned judgment, learned Judge has discussed two recorded dying declarations in the light of evidence of PW 3 and PW 10. PW 3 Shri Mangule and PW 10 Shri Bhagwat as also evidence of PW 9 Dr. Dayanand. He took a note of the fact that Shital had survived nearly for ten days after the incident. The learned Judge, therefore, believed the two dying declarations to be validly recorded i.e. when the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement and without being tutored. He has taken note of oral dying declaration claimed to have been heard by father Shidling, brother Kishor and PW 5 Ramdas. After considering the submissions of the two Counsel, plethora of case law, the text of two dying declarations, the learned Judge arrived at a conclusion thus: "I am of the opinion that the oral evidence as well as documentary evidence with regard to dying declarations inspires confidence in the mind of the Court, due to which one can say that accused Shivkumar set deceased Shital on fire by pouring kerosene on her person with an intention to kill her. " Because the accused admitted that Siddheshwar (DW 1) arrived at the spot later on, the learned Judge held that Siddheshwar could have had no knowledge about the manner in which the alleged incident occurred. The learned Judge has, therefore, discarded the evidence of Siddheshwar. According to the learned Judge, the burden was on the accused, in view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, to prove the case propounded by him and the defence evidence led by the accused was not sufficient to prove specific defence raised by him. The learned Judge has, therefore, discarded the evidence of Siddheshwar. According to the learned Judge, the burden was on the accused, in view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, to prove the case propounded by him and the defence evidence led by the accused was not sufficient to prove specific defence raised by him. He has also taken note that report of the analysis showed the pieces of burn clothes of the victim having kerosene traces. So far as charge under Section 498A of I.P.C. is concerned, for the reasons discussed in para 44 the learned Judge seems to have accepted the story that accused no.1 was demanding Rs.50,000/-for the purpose of purchasing motorcycle and he was also subjecting the deceased Shital to physical beating and ill-treatment for pressing his demand. Hence, appellant is held guilty also for offence punishable under Section 498A of I.P.C. In fact, the demand of signature on blank paper is also held to be attracting explanations (a) and (b) to Section 498A of I.P.C. 6. Heard learned Counsel. Together they have taken us through the entire evidence and impugned judgment. Their arguments can be summed up as under:- According to Advocate Shri Salunke for the appellant, Exh.25 and Exh.47 -the two dying declarations of Shital are so much inconsistent that they are unreliable. According to Shri Salunke when the two dying declarations are read independently and then compared it can be seen that the victim has described a totally different manner of the occurrence and in the process it also changes the time of occurrence and location of occurrence. According to him, the dying declarations are, therefore, unreliable. According to him, deposition of PW 2 Kishor who had accompanied the sister from parents place Adas to husband’s place Terkheda totally contradicts dying declaration (Exh.25) recorded by Special Judicial Magistrate. Shri Salunke was also critical about fairness of the investigation. He pointed out that the material that could have favoured the accused is deliberately kept away, by not taking a note of presence of stove and Khichadi at the location, by not seizing clothes of the accused and by not recording the statement of the accused. The learned A.P.P. on the contrary feels that the variances between two dying declarations (Exh.25 and Exh.47) are indications of the dying declarations being natural and variances are not so vital that dying declarations can be looked with suspicion. The learned A.P.P. on the contrary feels that the variances between two dying declarations (Exh.25 and Exh.47) are indications of the dying declarations being natural and variances are not so vital that dying declarations can be looked with suspicion. The learned A.P.P. did not fail to point out that the recorded dying declarations are supported by oral dying declaration of the victim, which is claimed to have been heard by as many as three witnesses namely Shidling, Kishor and Ramdas. A.P.P. states that the theory of accident is not supported by panchanama of spot of offence which does not show existence of stove and Khichadi at the location. The A.P.P., therefore, urged that finding of guilty and conviction recorded by the trial Court calls for no interference. 7. So far as offence punishable under Section 498A of I.P.C. is concerned, we may point out that father Shidling claimed that while residing separate from the joint family, the appellant started ill-treating Shital continuously for demand of Rs.50,000/- for purchasing motorcycle and Shital had disclosed this to him whenever she visited the parents. Deposition of Kishor is not much different on this issue. Friend Ramdas went a step ahead. According to him, mother-in-law had snatched away the jewellery from the person of deceased. (Mother-in-law having been acquitted, and there being no appeal against acquittal, this improvement on the part of Ramdas becomes insignificant). It must be taken a note that both dying declarations (Exhs.25 and 47) make no reference to both these aspects i.e. mother-in-law snatching the ornaments and husband demanding cash of Rs.50,000/-. In Exh.25 after reminder by Special Judicial Magistrate whether she was being harassed by anyone else, she has narrated that mother-in-law used to harass her and husband’s brother used to quarrel with her. They are all general statements. In dying declaration (Exh.47) reference to mother-in-law and brother-in-law is for a limited purpose. They are the persons who took the couple (victim as well as accused) to the hospital after wife was extinguished by the husband and neighbours. It must, therefore, be said that if at all there were demands for Rs.50,000/-by the husband, the victim has not linked the same to the incident which ultimately caused her death. 8. They are the persons who took the couple (victim as well as accused) to the hospital after wife was extinguished by the husband and neighbours. It must, therefore, be said that if at all there were demands for Rs.50,000/-by the husband, the victim has not linked the same to the incident which ultimately caused her death. 8. As the term "relevant" is defined by Section 3 of Indian Evidence Act, one fact is said to be relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of Evidence Act relating to relevancy of the fact i.e. under any of the provisions as contained in sections 6 to 55 of the said Act. By virtue of section 5, evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts. Section 32 of the Evidence Act is the provision that makes statement of a person not available for deposition by entering into witness box relevant and therefore, admissible. The relevant portion reads thus:- "32. Case in which statement of relevant fact by a person who is dead or cannot be found, etc. is relevant.- Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: (1) When it relates to cause of death.- When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of the person’s death comes into question." In the matter at hands cause of death of Shital is fact in issue. Relatives claim Shital to have made a statement that husband demanded Rs.50,000/-. Relatives claim Shital to have made a statement that husband demanded Rs.50,000/-. But, it is not the case of prosecution, which mainly relies upon the two dying declarations and the oral dying declaration that soon before the incident of burning there were expressions on the part of the husband which could relate his annoyance on the spur of moment to demand Rs.50,000/-for the purpose of purchasing motorcycle and the demand of Rs.50,000/-or ill-treatment, if any, on that count to which Shital was subjected during two years preceding the death, therefore, cannot be termed as "cause of her death" or "circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death". All the claims of the relatives of this past ill-treatment, therefore, cannot be admissible pieces of evidence and the prosecution, therefore, cannot rely upon that evidence for bringing home the guilt under Section 498A of I.P.C. In fact, the term "cruelty" is defined in the explanation to Section 498A of I.P.C. in two different ways. A willful conduct of such a nature which drives a woman to commit suicide is one type, whereas harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coerce her or her relatives to meet any unlawful demand for any property by the husband or his relatives is another type of cruelty. This is not the case where prosecution claims deceased to have committed suicide by feeling death to be better option than life because of harassment by the husband or his relatives. Cruelty as defined by clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 498A of I.P.C., therefore, does not stand attracted. It is contended that husband was demanding signature on a blank paper, presumably, for endorsing consent of victim for second marriage or for recording divorce deed by mutual consent. Such a demand cannot be termed as an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security and, therefore, this demand also cannot attract explanation (b) of Section 498A of I.P.C. 9. The view taken by the trial Judge that the alleged incident attracts both explanations (a) and (b) of Section 498A of I.P.C. is, therefore, incorrect and not sustainable. Oral evidence of the relatives is not linked as a circumstance leading to the death and, therefore, those depositions are inadmissible pieces of evidence and, therefore, incapable to link the accused to offence punishable under Section 498A of I.P.C. 10. Oral evidence of the relatives is not linked as a circumstance leading to the death and, therefore, those depositions are inadmissible pieces of evidence and, therefore, incapable to link the accused to offence punishable under Section 498A of I.P.C. 10. So far as offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. is concerned, the learned A.P.P. has persistently submitted that although there are variances in two dying declarations, the deceased is consistent on two aspects. Firstly, that the husband was demanding signature on a blank paper and secondly, it was the husband who poured kerosene on her person and ignited her. According to learned A.P.P. husband having admitted his presence at the material time when the victim caught fire, it was his duty to explain as to how the wife caught fire and the theory of accident propounded by him, according to the learned A.P.P., is falsified by the panchanama of the spot of offence. 11. Shri Salunke, Advocate for the appellant has placed reliance on a reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1999 SC 3255 ) and more particularly, the observations in paragraph v.v.v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1999 SC 3255 ) State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1999 SC 3255 ) 16. The appellants in the reported matter, were husband and his mother and there were two dying declarations on record, the first one at Exh.P-14. The deceased claimed that while she was lighting the stove in the kitchen and preparing coffee at 6.00 a.m., her mother-in-law and husband came frombehind, husband caught hold of her hair, mother-in-law sprinkled kerosene on her body and asked the son to set fire. Thereafter, husband lit the matchstick and threw on the clothes of the deceased. In the dying declaration (Exh.P-11) recorded before the J.M.F.C., she narrated that at a.m. while she was sweeping, her mother-in-law and husband both poured kerosene on her and lit matchstick and set her to fire. After recording that the above material divergences in the dying declarations pertaining to the occasion for launching the murderous attack on the deceased did not create any impression in the minds of the learned Judges of the High Court, the Honourable Apex Court has reproduced the observation of the High Court in paragraph 15 of the reported judgment. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed in paragraph 16 thus:- "16. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed in paragraph 16 thus:- "16. Thus the High Court has sidelined such a noticeable discrepancy looming large as between the two different statements made by the same person. When the sphere of scrutiny of dying declaration is a restricted area, the Court cannot afford to sideline such a material divergence relating to the very occasion of the crime. Either the context spoken to one was wrong or that in the other was wrong. Both could be reconciled with each other only with much strain as it relates to the opportunity for the culprit to commit the offence. Adopting such a strain to the detriment of the accused in a criminal case is not a feasible course." Needless to say that both the appellants were acquitted by the Honourable Apex Court. While placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court, Shri Salunke has urged us to compare the two dying declarations. According to him, although it is true, as submitted by the learned A.P.P., that both the dying declarations contain two common things, the allegation that husband was demanding signature on a blank paper and on refusal by the wife, he set her on fire, but, on reading the two dying declarations as a whole, it can be seen that the same person, the deceased, who is to be believed because of the philosophy that falsehood would not lie on the tongue of the person who is at the verge to enter the next world, has narrated two different stories. Both the dying declarations contain totally different manner in which the occurrence took place and there is also change of location to some extent. He has pointed out that when we read Exh.25, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim herself had been to the shop of the husband. In Exh.25 she had narrated that she reached Terkheda at about 5 p.m., husband picked up a quarrel for her delayed arrival, he dealt her slaps, on the way, while wife was approaching home. Husband ridiculed her by saying that she should have stayed with parents for another fortnight and upon reaching home he again quarrelled with her and thereafter had ignited her by pouring kerosene. She has narrated that husband was asking signature on a blank paper only after the Special Judicial Magistrate put the concluding question whether she wanted to narrate anything more. She has narrated that husband was asking signature on a blank paper only after the Special Judicial Magistrate put the concluding question whether she wanted to narrate anything more. We are in agreement with Advocate Shri Salunke in his interpretation of Exh.25 that if Exh.25 is read as a whole and without reference to Exh.47, it gives an impression that the incident started at 5 p.m. at the shop, continued on the way home, probably husband accompanied her home and concluded at the residence. The work place and the residence of the accused certainly is not proved to be a distance of three hours walk but, being within the same small village, it may be hardly a distance of 10 - 15 minutes walk and, therefore, the incident at residence would conclude by about 6 p.m. When we referred to Exh.47, nothing alarming seems to have occurred till 8.30 p.m. Shital here narrates that at 4.30 p.m. when she reached Terkheda with brother Kishor, husband was at the shop. When she demanded key, husband expressed annoyance for her long stay with the parents but, handed over the key of the house to her, she was working at home at about 8.30/8.45 p.m. when husband arrived. He started demanding signature on a blank paper, Shital refused by saying that she would not allow divorce, whereupon the husband dealt her 2 - 3 slaps. In fact, in this dying declaration, wife says that thereafter, with the intention to go to bed she closed the door of the house, where after husband again challenged her for not having signed the blank paper and then ignited her by using kerosene and matchstick. If this dying declaration is considered as a whole, nothing untoward had occurred at the shop or on the way home except husband expressing displeasure for late arrival of the wife. The entire incident has taken place at home. The two dying declarations are at slight variance on the point as to who extinguished her. Exh.25 does not give any credit to husband on that count wherein Shital narrated that brother-in-law, mother-in-law and neighbours extinguished her and brought to the hospital. But, in Exh.47, she narrates that husband poured water on her. He shouted and called the neighbours and while trying to extinguish her fire, husband has also suffered burn injuries. Exh.25 does not give any credit to husband on that count wherein Shital narrated that brother-in-law, mother-in-law and neighbours extinguished her and brought to the hospital. But, in Exh.47, she narrates that husband poured water on her. He shouted and called the neighbours and while trying to extinguish her fire, husband has also suffered burn injuries. She is specific that mother-in-law and brother-in-law have admitted herself and husband to the hospital at Solapur. In fact, this story that husband was the person who extinguished the fire gets full support of evidence of Dr. Anant Rajmane who had examined the husband only after death of Shital on 15th January, 2005. We must say that the argument of learned Counsel Shri Salunke that the two dying declarations are at variances on two crucial aspects i.e. the manner in which and the location at which the incident took place, has a considerable force. Apart from that, in the dying declaration latter in time, wife has withdrawn the credit which she had given to the husband in first dying declaration that it was the accused who extinguished fire. 12. The learned A.P.P. vehemently argued that husband has come with a story that wife caught fire by accident with excessive stove flames but, this fact does not find support in the panchanama of scene which shows gas and electric hot plate on the location. According to learned A.P.P. the stove and Khichadi theory stands falsified by the panchanama. In this context, learned Counsel for the appellant has taken us through the admission of panch Balaji and Investigating Officer Kamble. Panch Balaji has admitted that stove was found on the spot of incident. There was Sabudana Khichadi on the spot near the stove. The house is congested one having household articles in it. Even Shri Kishor Kamble (PW 11) admits in his cross-examination "it is true that on the spot of incident, a stove and fry pan consisting of Khichadi was there." 13. Although trial Court was critical about and therefore, discarded the evidence of DW Siddheshwar, Siddheshwar does not claim personal knowledge of the incident but he claims that he reached the location upon hearing hue and cry of the accused. He saw accused and his wife were in flames and on enquiry Shital disclosed him that she had caught fire due to burning stove. He saw accused and his wife were in flames and on enquiry Shital disclosed him that she had caught fire due to burning stove. It must be stated that how Shital caught fire is a fact relating to cause of her death and statement of Shital to Siddheshwar is admissible as oral dying declaration. The learned Advocate Shri Salunke criticised the investigation to be unfair and on couple of counts, we agree with him. Although accused was also admitted in the same hospital at the same time, investigating officer has not recorded any statement of Shivkumar. It was necessary that his statement also should have been recorded. He had suffered 26% burns and not minor injuries. In fact, Dr. Anant Rajmane has certified his injuries to be of grievous nature. If prosecution has not recorded his reaction soon after the incident, it gives room to the defence to blame the investigating machinery to be unfair. If prosecution has recorded his statement, but not produced before Court, the prosecution case would get greater set back. In that case, it will have to be inferred that investigation is not only unfair but, prosecution has suppressed some material from the Court which could have brought the truth to the surface. The investigation has also not attached clothes of the accused. It has remained complacent, as the analyser reports that burnt clothes have traces of kerosene. If accused was the culprit, even his clothes could have shown traces of kerosene. 14. Last but not the least, although the relatives examined narrate story of ill-treatment to the victim at the hands of husband, none of them have narrated the husband ever having prepared for obtaining either divorce or consent for divorce by forcing the wife to sign on blank paper. They have not deposed husband ever having indicated his intention to seek divorce. About abortion, the wife had accepted wish of the husband, probably because the first child was only one and half years old. therefore, there was no dispute on that count. They have not deposed husband ever having indicated his intention to seek divorce. About abortion, the wife had accepted wish of the husband, probably because the first child was only one and half years old. therefore, there was no dispute on that count. In view of this when the reason for ill-treatment as narrated by relatives is totally different from the cause immediately preceding the alleged incident as narrated in the dying declaration, we are inclined to look to that cause as mentioned in the dying declaration also with some doubts, especially when the material i.e. paper and the pen which the accused was showing to the victim for the purpose of obtaining her signature is also not attached during the spot panchanama. 15. For all the reasons recorded herein above, we do not feel the dying declarations to be inspiring confidence as felt by the trial Judge and we have recorded our reasons which were not noticed by the trial Court. In view of the observations herein above, the finding of guilty recorded by the trial Court against the appellant on both counts is required to be quashed and set aside. Consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed shall also have to be set aside. 16. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Osmanabad on 30.11.2006 in Sessions Case No.13 of 2006 thereby holding the appellant Shivkumar s/o Maruti Umardand guilty for offences punishable under Sections 302, 498A of I.P.C. is quashed and set aside. The sentence and fine imposed on both the counts are also quashed and set aside. The appellant shall be set to liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. Fine amount deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him.